V.V.S. Rao, J.:— This civil revision petition under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is filed by the Judgment Debtor (J.Dr) against the order dated 30.7.2009 in EA No. 157 of 2008 in EP No. 26 of 2007 in AA No. 66 of 1999.

2. A short but interesting question of law that falls for consideration in this revision petition is as to the jurisdiction of Additional District Judge to adjudicate the execution petition filed for enforcing the award passed by the Arbitrator under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

3. The brief fact of the matter and background throwing up such question is as follows. The respondent is a company engaged in the business of financing motor vehicles. Petitioner availed a sum of Rs. 6,15,000/- for purchase of a bus bearing Regn. No. KA 04-6737. The amount was sanctioned. It is payable in 24 instalments @ Rs. 36,000/- per month. Petitioner statedly paid a sum of Rs. 76,895/- but committed default thereafter. On 5.3.1997, the bus met with an accident at Toopran Village and was brought to Vijayawada for necessary repairs. As the petitioner expressed inability to get the bus repaired and put it on road, respondent got the bus repaired and sold the same in an auction. An amount of Rs. 4,75,000/- was realized. For the balance amount, respondent invoked arbitration clause in the hire purchase agreement, in vain. Therefore, they approached the Court of District Judge for appointment of Arbitrator. An Arbitrator was appointed. An award was passed on 20.2.2002 for an amount of Rs. 3,62,105/- with interest at 18% per annum payable by petitioner to respondent. Aggrieved by the same, petitioner filed an application under Section 34 of Arbitration Act being AA No. 2 of 2006 on the file of the Court of District Judge, Rajahmundry. The same is pending.

4. The respondent filed EP No. 43 of 2002 and brought the immovable property of petitioner - a residential house at Kakinada; for sale. As there were no bidders in the auction conducted by the Court, E.P. was closed. It was closed on 10.10.2006. Again in 2007 respondent filed EP No. 26 of 2007 for enforcing the arbitral award dated 20.2.2002 by attachment and sale of immovable property of petitioner. Petitioner moved an application under Section 47 of CPC being EA No. 157 of 2008 to drop the execution proceedings on the ground that E.P. is barred by limitation, that E.P. schedule property is situated outside the jurisdiction of Rajahmundry Court and that E.P. is not maintainable in view of pendency of application under Section 34 of Arbitration Act. Petitioner also urged that “Principal Civil Court” for the purpose of enforcing the award is the “Principal District Court” and therefore Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the E.P. By impugned order, learned I Additional District Judge rejected the contentions and dismissed EA No. 157 of 2008.

5. In this revision petition, placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Ankati Satyamaiah v. Sallangula Lalaiah, 2003 (2) ALD 818 : 2003 (3) ALT 193, Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. Icds Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 : AIR 2007 SC 168 and Vijay Gupta v. Renu Malhotra, AIR 2008 SC 83, learned Counsel for petitioner reiterates the grounds urged before the lower Court. Per contra, learned Counsel for respondent relies on Sections 36 to 39 of CPC and the decision of this Court in Globsyn Technologies Limited, Calcutta v. Eskaaycee Infosys, Viskashapatnam, 2004 (3) ALD 163 : 2004 (2) ALT 174 and submits that Additional District Judge not being inferior to District Judge is equally competent to entertain a petition for enforcing arbitral award. He points out that though the case was filed by respondent before the Court of District Judge, the same was for the sake of administrative convenience made over to the Court of I Additional District Judge, Rajahmundry, and therefore, there is no infirmity in the lower Court entertaining the E.P.

6. Section 2(2) of CPC defines, “decree” means formal expression of adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. Section 36 of CPC further clarifies that the provisions relating to execution of decrees shall be deemed to apply to the execution of orders as well. Therefore, arbitral award passed under Section 31 of Arbitration Act is certainly not a “decree”. However, when the same has to be enforced, the law contemplates that for the purpose of enforcement even the award shall be deemed to be “decree” of the Court. This is made clear by Section 36 of Arbitration Act, which lays down that, “an award shall be enforced under CPC in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court”. Thus we do not have any doubt in our minds to hold that though arbitral award as defined under Section 2(c) of Arbitration Act is not a “decree” within the meaning of Section 2(2) of CPC read with Section 36 of CPC, but for the enforcement, the award shall be treated as a decree of the Court. Such award therefore has to be executed (enforced) under CPC. The question then is what is the procedure for enforcement/execution of the decree of a Court. The provisions in Part-II (Sections 36 to 74) and Rules contained in Order XXI CPC are applicable for execution of decrees. The question whether the award passed by the Arbitrator requires to be enforced in an appropriate Court with relevant pecuniary jurisdiction does not fall for consideration in this revision petition. The question however is whether the Additional District Judge is barred from enforcing an arbitral award. It is no doubt true that Section 2(e) of Arbitration Act defines, “Court” means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district not inferior to such Principal Civil Court. Though Sections 9 and 34 of Arbitration Act employ the word “Court” as defined in Section 2(e) of Arbitration Act, the word “Court” in the sense defined in Section 2(e) of Arbitration Act is conspicuous by absence in Section 36 of Arbitration Act, which only speaks of a “decree of a Court” being enforced under CPC. Hence while interpreting Section 2(e) of Arbitration Act with reference to Section 36 of Arbitration Act, the law governing establishment and conferment of jurisdiction on such Courts, cannot be ignored.

7. The Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Civil Courts Act) is an Act relating to Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Sections 3 and 10 of Civil Courts Act empower’ the Government to establish subordinate Courts in the district of Hyderabad and in other districts respectively. A reading of Sections 10 and 11 of Civil Courts Act would show that Government shall appoint a District Judge for each district and if in the opinion of the High Court it is so required, the Government may also appoint one or more Additional District Judges to the District Court and such Additional District Judges shall perform all or any functions of District Judge under Civil Courts Act. Section 11(2) of Civil Courts Act makes it clear that all Additional District Judges shall exercise same powers as the District Judge. For ready reference Sections 10 and 11 of Civil Courts Act are extracted hereunder:

Section 10. Establishment of District Courts:—

(1) The Government may, after consultation with the High Court, by notification, establish such number of District Courts as they may deem necessary and appoint a District Judge for each District Court.

(2) The Government may, from time to time, likewise abolish any District Court established under this section.

Section 11. Appointment of Additional District Judges:—(1) Where in the opinion of the High Court, the state of business pending in a District Court, so requires, the Government may, after consultation with the High Court, appoint one or more Additional District Judges to the District Court for such period as they may deem necessary.

(2) An Additional District Judge so appointed shall perform all or any of the functions of the District Judge under this Act or any other law for the time being in force which the District Judge may assign to him, and in the performance of those functions, he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge.

8. By reading Section 2(e) of Arbitration Act and Sections 10 and 11 of Civil Courts Act harmoniously, we are convinced that Additional District Judge though not strictly be considered as a Principal Civil Court, barred from entertaining applications/petitions for enforcing arbitral awards.

9. In Globsyn Technologies Ltd's case (supra), Justice Sudershan Reddy (as His Lordship then was) considered a similar issue and came to the conclusion that Additional District Judge is not a Court of grade inferior to the Court of Principal District Judge. The relevant observations are as follows:

Learned Additional Advocate General relied upon the decision reported in I.T.I. Ltd., Allahabad v. District Judge, Allahabad, AIR 1998 All. 313 : 1998 (2) Arb. LR 670 (AIL), rendered by a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in support of the submission that the Parliament intended to make only one Court - the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and any application with respect to the Arbitration Agreement will have to be filed in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district. Unless the context otherwise requires the term “Court” as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the Arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.

The short question that falls for consideration is as to whether the Court of the learned VI-Additional District Judge is a Civil Court of a grade inferior to the Principal Civil Court. The Court of the Principal District Judge and the Court of VI-Additional District Judge are of equal grade. The Court of the learned VI-Additional District Judge is not a Court of a grade inferior to the Court of the Principal District Judge. The expression “Court of a grade inferior” is required to be understood in its proper context.

The dictionary meaning of inferior is “lower in any respect, subordinate, a person who is lower in rank or station”. According to Black's Law Dictionary, inferior means “One who, in relation to another, has less power and is below him; one who is bound to obey another. The term may denote any Court subordinate to the chief appellate Tribunal in the particular judicial system (e.g. Trial Court); but it is also commonly used as the designation of a Court of special, limited, or statutory jurisdiction”,

I find it difficult to accept the submission of the learned Additional Advocate General that the Court of the learned VI-Additional District Judge at Visakhapatnam is a Court of a grade inferior to the Principal District Judge's Court. I am unable to persuade myself to accept the reasoning given and the ratio of the decision in I.T.I. Ltd., Allahabad's case (supra). The contention is accordingly rejected.

10. In the context of Arbitration Act and M.P. Civil Courts Act, 1958, a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in M.P.S.E. Board v. ANSALDO Energia, S.P.A., AIR 2008 MP 328, relying on Globsyn Technologies Ltd's case (supra), took the similar view. The relevant observations as follows:

In view of the aforesaid pronouncements of law, as far as Madhya Pradesh is concerned, the Additional District Judge is equated with the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Section 2(1)(e) does not include any civil Court of grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court or any Court of Small Causes. As is evincible from the enunciation of law, which we have referred to above, the Additional District Judge is not inferior to the District Judge. Section 42 refers to the term “Court”. The Court has to take the meaning from the definition. In this context, it is worth noting that the dictionary clause refers to two categories of Courts, namely, the High Court, which has the original civil jurisdiction, and also the Principal Civil Court. If any party to the agreement invokes the original jurisdiction of the High Court, he cannot thereafter go to the Principal Civil Court. He also cannot approach any other Court having the jurisdiction after approaching once to the said Court. This view has been rendered in Strojexport Company Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, AIR 1997 Raj 120. We are in respectful agreement with the same.

In view of the aforesaid analysis on the bedrock of 1958 Act, the irresistible conclusion is that the Additional District Judge meets the requirements as engrafted under Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act. We also respectfully agree with the view expressed in the decisions rendered in Globsyn Technologies Ltd's (supra) and B.V. Sharma's case (supra). Ergo, the objection raised under Section 34 of 1996 Act can be dwelled upon and dealt with by the learned Additional District Judge. That being the position in law, the impugned order passed by the learned Additional District Judge is neither vulnerable nor susceptible. We give the stamp of approval to the same.

11. Therefore, in view of the legal position as above, we are not able to countenance the submission of learned Counsel for petitioner. Insofar as submission that Arbitrator is not a Court within the meaning of Section 9(2) Presidency Town Insolvency Act, 1909, as held by Supreme Court in Paramjeet Singh Patheja's case (supra), we have already held supra that though an arbitral award is not a “decree” within the meaning of Section 2(2) of CPC, but for the purpose of execution/enforcement it shall be deemed to be “decree” as per the provisions of CPC. Therefore the submission is rejected. Insofar as the question of territorial jurisdiction of I Additional District Judge, Rajahmundry, is concerned, we see no merits in the contention. As rightly held by lower Court, Additional District Judge exercises jurisdiction over the entire district, and therefore, even if the property attached is situated in Kakinada, the same is not a bar to exercise the jurisdiction of Additional District Judge, Rajahmundry.

12. In the result for the above reasons, we see no merit in civil revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. We make no order as to costs.