Mahmood, J.:— This case has come up for hearing before a Full Bench by order of the learned Chief Justice and my brother Young, dated 8th May 1890, in which they express their doubts as to the accuracy of the ruling of this Court in Fatima Begavi v. Hansi and state the question which they have referred to be “whether the minor's appeal in the Court below was properly admitted.”

The question so referred, taken with the manner in which it has been argued before the Full Bench, seems to relate entirely to the question whether the lower appellate Court acted rightly in admitting the appeal to its register, only some of the defendants-appellants before that Court being minors. In order to understand the question which has arisen, it is necessary to bear in mind the following dates. The Court of first instance decided the case on the 23rd May 1887, and the decree of that Court was signed by the Subordinate Judge on [463] the 31st May 1887. On the same day the defendants applied for copies of the judgment and the decree, and on the next day, i.e, the 1st June 1887, they were informed of the estimated cost. It was not, however, till the 9th June 1887 that they fulfilled the requirements of the estimate by paying in the costs of the copies applied for, and the copies were delivered to them on the 11th June 1887.

On the 30th June 1887 the memorandum of appeal was filed in the lower appellate Court, and the office report being that the appeal was within time, it was accordingly registered, fixing the 19th August 1887, as the date of the hearing, and notices appear to have been issued accordingly.

Meanwhile on the 1st August 1887, the office of the lower appellate Court reported to the Judge that the former report was erroneous, and that the appeal was one day beyond time, as May should have been counted as a month of 31 days. In consequence of this report, and apparently without the presence of either of the parties, the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court passed the following order on the 2nd August 1887:—

“Let the appellant be informed that this appeal must be rejected, being beyond time.”

No notice, however, appears to have been given to the appellants in the lower appellate Court, nor does it appear whether the appeal was called on for hearing, and the parties or any of them attended on the 19th August 1887, which had been originally fixed for the hearing of the appeal.

On the 27th August 1887, however, the defendants-appellants in the lower appellate Court filed a petition complaining of the order of rejection, dated the 2nd August 1887, and praying that, since that order was passed in their absence, it might be reconsidered and the appeal might be heard. The application was granted by the Judge's order of the same day, i.e, 27th August 1887, which runs as follows:

“As my order of 2nd instant was to inform appellant, and he has not apparently been informed till this petition is presented, and [464] now appears to show cause for the appeal not being rejected, the appeal will remain on register and come on for hearing in due course.”

It does not appear under what rules of procedure the learned Judge acted in rejecting the appeal in the absence of the appellants on the 2nd August 1887; nor is it clear under what section of the Civil Procedure Code the order of 27th August 1887, directing that the appeal should be heard, was passed. The appeal, however, came on for hearing in usual course, and resulted in the lower appellate Court's judgment of the 14th February 1888, whereby the appeal was decreed and the decree of the first Court reversed by dismissing the plaintiff's suit in toto.

It is from this decree that this second appeal has been preferred, and although no ground in the memorandum of appeal has been taken in this behalf, Pandit Sundar Lal on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant before us, has, in addressing his argument upon the point referred to the Full Bench, contended that the lower appellate Court should have dismissed the appeal before it, as it was barred by limitation under art. 152 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), and the circumstances of the case did not furnish sufficient grounds for extending the period of limitation by applying the provisions of the second part of s. 5 of that enactment. This preliminary plea was allowed to be argued by the Division Bench which referred the case, and has also been heard by the Full Bench, not only under the power contained in s. 542 (read with s. 587 of the Civil Procedure Code), but also in view of the stringent requirements of s. 4 of the Limitation Act, which casts upon the Judges the duty of applying the rules of limitation even where they are not pleaded. There is therefore no force in the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the defendants-respondents, to the effect that we should not allow the plea taken on behalf of the appellant to be argued at this stage.

With reference to the facts and dates above-mentioned, the arguments of the learned pleaders for the parties raise four main questions for decision.

[466] Firstly.—Whether, under the rule of computation contained in the second paragraph of s. 12 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), the defendants, who were appellants in the lower appellate Court, were entitled to the exclusion of (a) the period intervening between the day on which the first Court's judgment was pronounced (i.e, the 23rd May 1887), and the date when the decree was signed (the 31st May 1887); and (b) the period intervening between the date, when the estimate of the costs of copying was intimated to them (i.e, the 1st June 1887), and the day on which they actually paid in the copying charges and fees (i.e, the 9th June 1887)’.

Secondly.—Whether the circumstance that some of the defendants-appellants in the lower appellate Court were minors brought the appeal within the period of limitation when it was filed in the lower appellate Court (i.e, the 30th June 1887).

Thirdly.—Whether, assuming that the appeal was beyond limitation, the circumstances of the case rendered the appeal a fit one for extension of limitation under the second paragraph of s. 5 of the Limitation Act.

Fourthly.—Whether, with reference to the ruling of this Court in Fatima Begam v. Hansi the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court having admitted the defendants' appeal and heard and determined it, we should at this stage interfere with his order of 27th August 1887.

I will deal with these various questions in the order in which I have stated them, but before doing so, I consider, in view of the manner in which the Full Bench ruling of this Court in Parbati v. Bhola and my ruling in the Single Bench in Sheogobind v. Ablakhi(3) were referred to and discussed, that some explanation is clue from me. The former of these cases was an application under s. 592 of the Code of Civil Procedure for leave to appeal in forma pauperis which was barred by limitation but had been by inadvertence admitted by me, provisionally, in the Single Bench, [466] as if it was an appeal and entitled to the benefit of s. 5 of the Limitation Act. After the case had been heard and partly dealt with by a Division Bench consisting of my brother Brodhurst and myself, when no plea of limitation was taken by the respondent, it finally came on for hearing before a Full Bench consisting of the learned Chief Justice, my brother Brodhurst and myself, under circumstances which are fully stated at the outset of the judgment which the learned Chief Justice delivered in the case. He pointed out for the first time that the case was not an appeal, but an application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis for which art. 170 prescribed only a limitation of 30 clays; that the second paragraph of s. 5 of the Limitation Act could not cover such applications for purposes of extending limitation; that the application being presented beyond the prescribed period was altogether barred by limitation. In the course of the arguments Mr. Chaudhri, on behalf of the applicant, relying upon the Full Bench ruling of the Calcutta High Court in Bani Madhub Milter v. Matungini Dassi(4), contended that, under s. 12 of the Limitation Act, time during which the decree remained unsigned must also be excluded in computing the period of limitation. The learned Chief Justice dissented from that ruling, and gave expression to his views as to the meaning of the phrase “the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree” in the second paragraph of s. 12 of the Limitation Act. In delivering my judgment in that case I did not refer to the Full Bench ruling of the Calcutta Court because, according to my view of the facts and dates of the case, even if that ruling were to be adopted by excluding the period between the 29th March and the 1st April 1887, when the decree had remained unsigned, and even if the period between the 16th April 1887 and the 19th April 1887, during which the applicant, after intimation of the estimate to furnish the charges and fees for the copies, did not furnish them, were to be excluded, her omission to attend on the 23rd April 1887, which was fixed for delivery of the copies and her not obtaining them till the 25th April 1887, rendered her application beyond limitation under any computation, and it could not be admitted except [467] under s. 5 which, I held, in concurrence with the learned Chief Justice, was wholly inapplicable to the application. I referred to s. 12 of the Limitation Act only to indicate, as fortifying the conclusion at which the whole Bench had arrived as to the inapplicability of s. 5 to pauper appeals, that the distinction which the Limitation Act draws between such appeals and ordinary appeals was at least at first sight noticeable even in the penultimate paragraph of s. 12 of the Act as to the time allowed for obtaining copies of judgments as distinguished from decrees. But my silence as to the other points of the interpretation of that section must not be understood as in any sense indicating my dissent from the views which the learned Chief Justice had expressed upon them, and if, in the course of the argument in this case, I referred to the matter, it was with no object other than pointing out, what the head-note of the printed report indicates, that the ruling of the Full Bench as a whole was limited to holding that the application was barred by art. 170 of the Limitation Act, and that s. 5 of that enactment could not be applied to such applications, the judgments of my brother Brodhurst and myself being silent on the other points upon which the learned Chief Justice had expressed his views. It would be a total misapprehension, and it could not be that, in thus referring to the case, when Pandit Ajudhia Nath for the respondent discussed it, I had any intention to shake the authority of the Full Bench ruling, or to show anything less than the profound respect which is always due from the members of this Court to any exposition of the law by the learned Chief Justice. Far from this being possible, I am, as I shall presently show, going to adopt in deciding this case the views as to the interpretation of s. 12 of the Limitation Act, which the learned Chief Justice expressed in delivering his judgment in the Full Bench case, and I will also show that my ruling in the Single Bench case is not in conflict with those views as I understand them.

To begin with the first part of the first question as stated by me, namely, whether, under the second paragraph of s. 12 of the Limitation Act, the defendants, who were appellants in the lower [468] appellate Court, were entitled to the exclusion of the period during which the decree of the first Court, from which they were appealing, remained unsigned, that is, whether limitation should be computed from the 23rd May 1887, when the judgment was pronounced, or from the 31st May 1887, when the decree was signed. There is no doubt that, if this period is to be excluded, the defendants' appeal to the lower appellate Court would be within the period of thirty days allowed by art. 152 of the Limitation Act, and otherwise it would be barred by limitation, unless the second part of the first question relating to the delay in supplying the copying charges is decided in their favour. In arguing the first part of the question, Pandit Ajudhia Nath contests the views expressed by the learned Chief Justice in Parbati v. Bhola, and in doing so he relies upon the Full Bench ruling of the Calcutta High Court in Bani Madhub Mitter v. Matungini Dassi, which was expressly dissented from by the learned Chief Justice here, and which laid down the broad rule that the period during which the decree appealed against remains unsigned is to be excluded from computation, even though the decree was signed before application for copy was made. Indeed, the rule as stated in the judgment of Pethram, C.J, goes the length of laying down that even in cases where the decree remains unsigned for a period beyond that allowed for appealing from that decree, the appellant, by a subsequent application for obtaining a copy and procuring it, might prefer an appeal by excluding the whole period during which the decree had remained unsigned and during which he had made no application for a copy at all. That this rule, in the unqualified form in which it has been expressed, taken with the facts and dates of the case before the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court, has the effect of holding that the starting period of limitation for appeal is not the date of the decree, which under s. 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure must bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced,” but the day on which it is signed, cannot be doubted. The learned Chief Justice of this Court in Parbati v. Bhola declined to adopt the rule in this unqualified form, and expressed views in which [469] I entirely concur for reasons which I shall presently explain. He said:—

“In my opinion, applying s. 12 of the Limitation Act to such a case, allowance should be made for the time between the date when the decree was signed, if the delay in signing the decree delayed the applicant in obtaining a copy of the decree, and not otherwise. In such a case as that, it would clearly be, within the meaning of s. 12, time which was requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, because a copy of the decree could not be obtained until the decree was signed by the Judge. But that is not the case here. Here no application was made until the 15th April; so that in no sense was the applicant delayed in obtaining a copy of the decree by the fact that the decree was not signed by the Judge on the date the judgment was pronounced, but was signed on the 1st April. Consequently the period between the 29th March and the 1st April cannot in my opinion be allowed.”

In appreciating the full bearing of the rule so laid down, it must be borne in mind that, in this case, the application for copies was not made by the appellant till the 15th April 1887, that is, a fortnight after the decree had been signed, a state of things similar to that which existed in the case before the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court, and in both cases the disallowance of the period during which the decree remained unsigned would bar the appeal. Thus the two rulings are in conflict with each other, and I proceed to state my reasons why I adopt the views of the learned Chief Justice of this Court which I have just quoted.

Now, in the first place I entertain no doubt that it is necessary and indispensable for a litigant who intends to appeal from a decree which is the result of a judgment against him, and which decree must, under the law, bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced, to apply for a copy of the decree and, if necessary, of the judgment also, before the lapse of the period of limitation for the appeal which he intends to file, whatever that period may be. This view is amply supported by the ruling of Garth, C.J (Cun-[470] ningham, J. concurring) in Ramey v. Broughlon, which was an appeal from a decree passed on the original side of the High Court and was therefore governed by the 20 day's limitation under art. 151 of the Limitation Act. In that case the decree had remained unsigned for more than the period of limitation, and the appellant subsequently applied for and obtained a copy of the decree. It was there contended on behalf of the appellant “that where the decree was not drawn up and signed until after 20 days had expired from the delivery of the judgment, the 20 days ought to count from the time when the decree was made.” In dealing with this contention, Garth, C.J, said (at P. 659-60):—” But this is directly contrary to the express language of the law. By art. 151 of the schedule to the Limitation Act the 20 days are to be reckoned from the date of the decree; and by s. 265 of the Civil Procedure Code, the decree is to bear date the day on which the judgment is pronounced, so that the appeal must clearly be filed within 20 days from the day on which the judgment is pronounced.” This rule must be read with the observation of Garth, C.J, in the course of the argument, when he said “if the appellant had applied for a copy while the 20 days were running he would not be barred,” and this is the effect of the judgment in the case.

It appears to me upon general principles that it would be defeating the object of limitation to allow the would be appellant to sleep over his right of appeal for more than the limitation period, and then by the accidental or unavoidable delay in the decree being prepared, to claim extension of the period of limitation for appealing from a decree for obtaining a copy of which he had not taken even the first step, by filing an application therefor. This construction is in my opinion supported by the words of the second paragraph of s. 12 of the Limitation Act itself. The words referring to exclusion are “the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree.” The words “requisite” and “obtaining “as they occur in the context seem to me to assume that some definite step ancillary to the obtaining, that is, acquisition, is not only [471] intended to be taken, but has already been taken. The first step for “obtaining” must be to take some step towards the obtainment, and the act of “obtaining” cannot be said to have even commenced before such step. Taking it to be a sound rule of interpretation to interpret the words of a statute in their ordinary and usual sense, unless the contrary is shown, I have consulted Webster's English Dictionary, and it explains the word “obtain” to mean “to get hold of by effort; to gain possession of; to acquire,” as the ordinary sense of the word. In this sense I interpret the word “obtaining” as it occurs in paragraph 2 of s. 12 of the Limitation Act, and hold that “the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree” cannot refer to any period antecedent to the appellant's asking for a copy by the usual mode of applying therefor, or to any period subsequent to its being ready for delivery. If at the time when the application for a copy is made, the decree is not ready, he will of course be entitled to the allowance of such portion of time during which the decree remains unsigned, along with the time which may be occupied in preparing the copy for delivery; the reason being obvious that the act of obtaining has already commenced and the delay in such a case could not be referred to any omission or neglect on his part. But when he has made no application to obtain a copy and the decree remains unsigned for a portion of, or the whole period of, limitation, he cannot claim the benefit of a matter which in no sense and to no extent frustrated or retarded any endeavour on his part to obtain a copy of the decree, the endeavour itself not having yet commenced.

As an argument against this view Pandit Ajudhia Nath has presented an extreme illustration of a case in which a Court closes on the very day on which judgment is pronounced, excluding the possibility of an application for a copy on that day, and does not re-open till after, the lapse of the period of limitation for the appeal. The learned pleader argues that, in such a case, even if the application for a copy of the decree be made on the very day when the Court re-opens and the time occupied try the office in preparation of the copy and its delivery be excluded, it would not benefit the [472] applicant or save limitation unless the appeal is filed on the very day when the copy is delivered. This result, the learned pleader contends, my view of the law necessarily involves, but which the Legislature could not have intended, for it would practically amount to a denial of the right of appeal, especially to litigants who have a distance to travel to reach the appellate Court. Upon this hypothesis the learned pleader contends that, in the case supposed, the period during, which the Court was closed, though antecedent to the application for copy, must necessary be included in “the time requisite for obtaining a copy” within the meaning of the second paragraph of s. 12 of the Limitation Act.

This argument, though plausible, is purely speculative and unsound. In the first place, in the state of things supposed, it would be the duty of the litigant to know that the exceptional circumstances of his case necessitated extra diligence on his part, and he should apply for a copy immediately the judgment is delivered, and since such application need not be made to the presiding Judge, I can scarcely conceive that the closing of the office upon the rising of the Judge would be so sudden and literally immediate as to exclude the possibility of such application being made to the office. If the application is made to the proper officer, and he, under the supposed hurry of the moment, improperly declines to take it the matter would, of course, furnish adequate ground for holding that the application must be taken to have been made before the holidays, thus entitling the litigant to exclusion of that period as “time requisite,” since the delay would not then be due to any negligence or fault on his part. But when he omits to take due steps by applying for a copy he must abide by the consequences, and cannot complain if his own want of diligence in obtaining a copy bars his appeal. After the explanation which I have given of the word “obtaining,” I cannot hold that the closing of the Court for holidays was “requisite” for or ancillary to the act of obtaining a copy. The act of obtaining which begins by an application for a copy had not yet commenced by any step taken by the litigant towards that end, and if in the case supposed, the antecedent holidays were to [473] be included in the “time requisite,” it would be giving a false-duration to the actual period occupied in the act of obtainment, and I would decline to exclude the antecedent holidays in computing limitation, for I hold that in such matters, more than in any other, the salutary maxim must not be forgotten that vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt.

There may of course be cases in which delay in applying for a copy, or in receiving it after it is ready for delivery, is due to wholly unavoidable causes beyond the control of the litigant, but this delay being antecedent to the application, and subsequent to the time when the copy is ready for delivery, cannot be called “time requisite for obtaining a copy” within the meaning of s. 12, for such time must be taken to begin when the application for copy is made and to end when the copy is ready for delivery. Any period outside these two limits falls beyond the purview of s. 12 altogether, and if there has been delay under excusable or unavoidable-circumstances, that would be a matter for consideration under s. 5, unless the appeal is in forma pauperis to which that section does not apply.

The only reason suggested against such interpretation of s. 12 in the Full Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court is “that under s. 541 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is necessary that the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied with a copy of the decree; it would be unfair to complete the period of limitation, in all cases from the date on which the judgment was delivered, because it is obvious that things may intervene so as to prevent the decree being signed until after the expiration of the whole period of 30 days allowed for preferring the appeal, and so the appeal may be rendered impossible without any fault of the parties.” With due respect for the views thus expressed, I may observe that the right of appeal is the creation of statute-law; that the right so conferred is subject to the restrictions and qualifications imposed by statute law itself; that those in whose favour the right is created are necessarily expected to know that among those restrictions is the period of limitation which the law allows for the [474] exercise of the right; that if with this knowledge they sleep over their rights, by taking no step within limitation ancillary to filing an appeal, and allow the period of limitation to elapse, they can complian of no hardship if their right of appeal is extinguished by their own laches, as was the case before Garth, C.J, in Ramey v. Broughton.

In the present case the decree had already been signed on the 31st May 1887, and the defendants applied for a copy on that very day. It cannot be said that the fact of the decree having remained unsigned up to that date in any way delayed their obtaining a copy, and therefore no allowance should be made to them for the period antecedent to their application. Any other view would, I think, require that in the third column of art. 152 of the Limitation Act, we should read the words “the date of the decree” as if they were “the date on which the decree is signed,” an interpretation which in my opinion is not justifiable by any rule.

I now proceed to consider the second part of the first question as enunciated by me, namely, whether the defendants, in appealing to the lower appellate Court, were entitled to deduct from the period of limitation the time intervening between the date when estimate of the costs of copying was intimated to them, that is, the 1st June 1887, and the day on which they actually paid the copying charges and fees, that is, the 9th June 1887. This part of the case has been the subject of anxious consideration by me, as it has been contended that the learned Chief Justice in Parbati v. Bhola laid down an inflexible and stringent rule that the words “requisite for obtaining a copy” as they occur in the second paragraph of s. 12 of the Limitation Act are strictly limited to such time as is occupied in preparing the copy, and that in no case and under no circumstances can they be taken to refer to any time however short which may be required by the exigencies of the condition of the applicant for the copy. And upon this hypothesis it has been argued that my ruling in Sheogobind v. Ablakhi is in principle in conflict with the rule laid down by the learned Chief [475] Justice. Such being the contention, it amounts to maintaining that the learned Chief Justice laid down the hard and fast rule that in all cases, and no matter what the exigencies of the case may be preventing the applicant from abiding by the rule, he must pay the estimated cost of the copy the moment it is intimated then and there. It is only by this interpretation that my ruling in the Single Bench can in any sense be regarded as in conflict with the rule laid down by the learned Chief Justice. But I do not understand, and certainly could not have understood, from such recollections as I had of the case of Parbati when I delivered my judgment in the Single Bench, that the learned Chief Justice intended to lay down any such hard and fast rule. The passage to which the argument relates is very carefully worded and must be read together. The learned Chief Justice said:—

“There is another question about the computation of time, and that is, whether this lady having had notice on the 16th April of the amount of the estimate and delayed until the 19th April to pay into Court the money required for making the copies, such delay should be allowed? In my bumble judgment, delay caused by the carelessness or negligence of a party applying for a copy cannot be taken into consideration or allowed for in computing the time requisite for obtaining the copy. The time requisite there does not mean requisite by reason of the carelessness or negligence of the applicant, it means the time which is occupied by the officer who has got to provide that copy in making the copy.”

Now, as I have understood this passage, I do not take it to mean that omission in its generic sense of being excusable or inexcusable avoidable or unavoidable, was intended. The word does not occur, and the interval between the intimation, of the estimate and the payment of the copying charges is described as “the delay caused by the carelessness or negligence of a party applying for a copy” and this the learned Chief Justice held could not be deducted from the period of Limitation. The phrase occurs again towards the end of the passage, in the last sentence, which lays down that the time requisite “does not mean requisite by reason of the [476] carelessness or negligence of the applicant: it means the time which is occupied by the officer who has got to provide that copy in making the copy.” The passage lays down no rules as to cases where the delay has been caused through no carelessness or negligence of the applicant but by wholly unavoidable causes, and understanding the passage in this sense, I fully agree in it, fortified as I am by the absence of the word “only” or any other equivalent expression justifying the inference that the passage intended to lay down any rule of an exhaustive character so as to exclude even unavoidable circumstances. The passage is followed by remarks doubting the legal authority of a Circular Order of this Court (printed at pp. 204-5) of 1882, which prescribed rules for the guidance of Subordinate Courts and provided a certain number of days in every case for the party applying for the copy, as a matter of course, for compliance with the estimate furnished by the office to litigants applying for copies.

I myself regard that Circular Order as one of very doubtful legal authority, and I agree with the learned Chief Justice when he laid down the rule that the important date for purposes of computation for exclusion of time under s. 12 of the Limitation Act, is not the date when the copy of the decree is delivered, but the date when it is ready for delivery to the applicant, if he chooses to apply, where he has had notice that the copy will be ready on that date. This view is in accord with the ruling of the Calcutta Court in Gopal Chunder Ray v. Brojo Behari Milter, and, I may here observe, in passing, that in the case of Sheogobind v. Ablakhi, one of the reasons for allowing the period up to the actual delivery of the copy was, to use my own words, “because in this case no date was fixed by the officers of the Court below, either as to the date when the copy would be ready or as to the date when it would be delivered, and the copy itself was not delivered until the 10th April 1888.” In that case the estimate of costs for copies was intimated on the 29th March 1888, and the copying charges were paid on the 5th April 1888, that is, within a week, a laxness of practice somewhat [477] countenanced by the Circular Order of 1882 (vide Illustrations, especially D and E) already referred to, and I execused the delay in depositing the charges probably by a liberal or perhaps lax interpretation of “time requisite,” and possibly in view of other circumstances which, however, are not stated in my judgment. Whatever view as to the matter of detail may be taken, it cannot be said that according to the interpretation which I have undersood of the views expressed by the learned Chief Justice in the case of Parbati, my judgment in the Single Bench case is in any matter of principle in conflict with those views.

Reverting to the interpretation of the exact words of the statute in the second paragraph of s. 12 of the Limitation Act, I am of opinion that in the phrase “the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree” the word “requisite” does not refer exclusively to the exigencies of the official work of the copying department of a Court, but also to the exigencies of the applicant's situation in respect of paying in the copying charges immediately upon intimation of the estimated cost. Usually, no doubt, the law expects that the applicant for a copy is ready with the charges and fees when he makes the application, but “requiste” as it occurs in the section must not be read irrespective of the word “obtaining” which follows it in the section and which as I have already explained refers to the action of the person applying for a copy. Nor can the word “obtaining” be read as if it were “preparing,” “furnishing,” “supplying,” “granting,” “giving,” “issuing,” or other similar words referring to the duties or action of the copying department of a Court to the total exclusion of such time as may be unavoidably requisite to the person “obtaining” the copy of a decree. This being so, whilst I hold that carelessness or negligence in paying in the estimated copying charges should not be considered as part of the “time requisite,” I hold that where the delay in payment of such charges is due to causes beyond the control of the litigant, that is, unavoidable circumstances, the rule of what I may call “requisiteness” will be available to the applicant for a copy. In saying this, I contemplate cases such as the closing of a Court [478] for holidays immediately after the estimate of copying costs is intimated and cases in which for unavoidable reasons such as the court-fees stamps not being procurable, or other similar circumstances beyond the control of the litigant, the copying charges could not be immediately paid. In Nobin Chunder Roy v. Brojendro Coomar Roy Garth, C.J, and Macpherson, J., seem to have held that “the matter must be determined by the practice in force in the Court concerned, as to what is requisite time for obtaining a copy.” In Gunga Dass Dey v. Ramjoy Dey Wilson and Beverley, JJ., in expressing their views on this point said:—

“We are asked in second appeal to say that the District Judge is wrong in the interpretation he has put on the words ‘the time requisite for obtaining a copy’ in s. 12 of the Limitation Act. We think that no hard and fast rule can be laid down to meet all cases that occur under that section. Ordinarily no doubt the application for copies of the judgment and decree should be accompanied with a sufficient number of sheets of stamped paper for the copies; and parties should not be allowed to extend the period prescribed for appeal by any unnecessary delay in putting in the requisite papers. But, on the other hand, it would be grossly unfair to disallow the application if the requisite papers were not procurable, or if a mistake were made in calculating the number of sheets required. Bach case, we think, must be decided on its own merits.”

In this view of the law I concur, but subject to definite qualifications or rather explanations. Of course, no “hard and fast rule” of universal application can be laid down to meet the details of all cases, and “each case must be decided on its own merits,” as to its details. But it is possible to lay down as a general rule or principle of universal application, that “time requisite” as used in s. 12 of the Limitation Act means only the interval between the time when the copy is applied for and the time when it is ready for delivery; that during that interval due diligence on the part of the litigant is required by the law, and that no delay, unless such as was caused by circumstances over which the litigant had no control and which he [479] could not by due diligence have avoided, can form part of the time requisite for obtaining a copy, the question whether such circumstances existed is a pure question of fact and not a matter of discretion such as is implied in the phrase “sufficient cause” as it occurs in s. 5 of the Limitation Act. The very word “requisite,” as it occurs in s. 12, understood in its natural sense, means, as Webster explains it, “so needful that it cannot be dispensed with,” thus importing that no discretionary power is intended to be conveyed by the section and that its operation is therefore radically different from the discretionary power contemplated by paragraph 2 of s. 5.

In the present case the application for copy of the decree was made on the 31st May, 1887, and the estimate was intimated the very next day, namely, the 1st of June, 1887. Why the defendants did not immediately furnish the copying charges, and delayed payment till the 9th June, 1887, does not appear, nor does their application of the 27th August, 1887, contain any statement of any unavoidable cause for the delay, although the object of the application was to secure reconsideration of the Judge's order of the 2nd August, 1887, whereby he directed that the appellants (defendants) were to be informed that their appeal was beyond time. Nor is any explanation for the delay now offered by the learned Pandit Ajudhia Nath who appears on their behalf in this Court, other than the circumstance that some of the defendants are minors and that the delay of eight days was not unreasonable. But it is not shown nor affirmed how this circumstance delayed the payment of copying charges immediately upon the intimation of the estimate on the 1st June, 1887, and I hold therefore that under the circumstances of this case, so far as they are apparent to us, the delay must naturally be attributed to carelessness or neglect in complying with the estimate, and that therefore the period between the 1st and the 9th June, 1887, cannot in any sense be regarded as time requisite for obtaining a copy, and must therefore not be excluded from the period of limitation.

The effect of the views which I have expressed on both parts of the first question is to hold that the defendants' appeal to the lower [480] appellate Court was beyond limitation when it was presented on the 30th June 1887.

What effect the minority of some of the defendants has upon the case is the subject of the second question as enunciated by me. And upon this point I am of opinion that the defendants-respondents have no case. It is true that some of them are minors, but they are duly represented by guardians whose interests are the same as theirs, and the fact of minority could not prevent the guardians from showing due diligence on behalf of the minors. It is noticeable that s. 7 of the Limitation Act, in extending the period of limitation on account of minority, refers only to suits and applications and makes no mention of appeals, and its provisions are therefore unavailable to the minor defendants.

Then as to the third question, namely, whether the defendants' appeal to the lower appellate Court presented a fit case for extending limitation under s. 5 of the Limitation Act, my answer, after what I have already said, must necessarily be in the negative, for no “sufficient cause” within the meaning of that section has been shown, or even alleged. On the contrary, it appears from the facts already mentioned that the defendants obtained the copy of the decree on the 11th June, 1887, and they would be within time if they had shown ordinary diligence in filing their appeal to the lower appellate Court; but they did not do so till the 30th of June, 1887, when the period of limitation had expired, even if all allowance of time were to be made in their favour according to the Circular Order of 1882, to which reference has already been made.

But then Pandit Ajudhia Nath argues that the defendants were under a bona fide impression that they would be entitled to the exclusion of the period during which the decree had remained unsigned; that even if this impression be regarded as a mistake of law it cannot in view of the Full Bench ruling of the Calcutta High Court in Bani Madhab Mitter v. Matungini Dasi, which justifies the impression, be regarded as an unnatural, unreasonable or unexcusable mistake of law, and that it must therefore be taken into account [481] in applying the second paragraph of s. 5 of the Limitation Act to the circumstances of this case. As an authority for this argument the learned Pandit has relied upon another ruling of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Huro Chunder Roy v. Surnamoyi where Mitter and Grant, JJ., concurred in saying:—

“It appears to us that the lower appellate Court in this case has rejected the appeal as filed out of time and refused to admit it under s. 5, on the ground that a bona fide mistake made by the appellant in respect of the limit of time within which according to law he is bound to file his appeal is under no circumstances a valid ground for admitting an appeal under s. 5. We are of opinion that is not a correct view of the provisions of s. 5. It is for the Judge in each case to exercise his discretion, having regard to the particular facts established before him.” In the case before the learned Judges the filing of the appeal to the District Judge was delayed by reason of an impression that the appeal would lie to the High Court, and they held that such an impression, though erroneous in law, was a sufficient cause for extending the period of limitation under the latter part of s. 5 of the Limitation Act.

Now I may say at once that this ruling is entirely in favour of the learned Pandit's contention, but with due respect for it I am wholly unable to follow it. I had to consider a similar question in Jaglal v. Harnarain Singh where the contention for the appellant was that there had been a bona fide mistake of law as to jurisdiction, and the aid of s. 5 of the Limitation Act was invoked by asking the Court to resort to the analogy of the rule contained in s. 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with this contention I pointed out that s. 14 of the Limitation Act applied only to suits and applications and had no concern with appeals, and that to apply it to appeals would be to regard the latter part of s. 5, to that extent, as surplusage. I did not rule that the analogy of s. 14 might not in some cases be available to the appellant in claiming extension of limitation by showing that he had “sufficient cause” for delaying the appeal, but I distinctly pointed out that such suffi-[482] cient cause could not include bare mistakes of law, however easily they may have been induced. The same question was more fully considered by me in Ramjiwan Mal v. Chand Mal where, as to the question of bona fides of erroneous impressions of law, said:—“I am of opinion that, so far as this contention comeinn mistakes of law the authority of the maxim ignorantia legis neminem execusat, has been so formally settled both in England and India that it would be the shaking of established authority to maintain that ignorance of law or mistakes of law are reasons for the excuse, and as such, furnish elements for extending the period of limitation which the statute-law has provided. In my opinion s. 14 of the Limitation Act itself does not contemplate cases where questions of want of jurisdiction arise from simple ignorance of the law the facts being fully apparent and clear, but is limited to cases where from bona fide mistakes of fact the suitor has been misled into litigating in a wrong Court. The phrase “other cause of a like nature” which occurs in the section is rather vague, but it cannot be held to undo the effect of the constitutional obligation which the law imposes upon every citizen to know the law of the land in which he lives.” The law jealously guards its behests and will not tolerate their infraction. Speaking with strict accuracy, there can be no such thing as a bona fide mistake of law, for good faith, implies due care and caution. It is true that lax non cogit ad impossibilia, but knowledge of law is not an impossiblity, but a duty imposed upon every human being who lives under the protection of law. To use the words of West, J., in Sitaram Paraji v. Nimba “mure ignorance of the law cannot be recognized as a sufficient reason for delay under s. 5 of the Act, for that would be a premium on ignorance.”.

It now remains for me to consider the last part of the learned Pandit's argument on the point which forms the subject of the fourth question as enunciated by me, namely, whether the fact that the lower appellate Court admitted the defendant's appeal and heard [483] and determined it, precludes us from interfering at this stage with the admission of the appeal in that Court. The learned Pandit relies upon a Single Bench ruling of Sir Louis Jackson, J., in Raj Coomar Roy v. Shaikh Mahomed Wais, where he laid down that “it was entirely in the discretion of the Judge to consider whether sufficient cause had or had not been shown for not presenting the appeal within proper time, and that this Court has no authority to interfere with the exercise of this discretion.” I respectfully think that this somewhat unqualified repudiation of the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of the exercise of discretionary powers by the lower Courts is scarcely justified by any authority or general principle of law, and in matters of limitation it is certainly inconsistent with the language and spirit of s. 4 of the Limitation Act which, as Sir Richard Garth, C.J, pointed out in Ramey v. Broughlon(5) irrespective of the pleadings of the parties, casts upon the Judge the duty of determining whether the appeal is within limitation so as to be heard by him. This being so, it seems to me to follow that it is the duty of the second appellate Court to see whether the duty thus cast upon the Judge of the lower appellate Court has been properly discharged by him, and to interfere, if by a wrong, improper and judicially unsound exercise of discretion under s. 5 of the Act, he has admitted an appeal which was barred by limitation. To hold otherwise would be to confer an amount of finality and conclusiveness upon the adjudications of District Judges in this respect which the law could never have intended, for the logical result of such a view would be to paralyze the hands of this Court, even in a case where the lower appellate Court by a grossly improper and unsound exercise of discretion under s. 5 of the Act had admitted, and beard, and determined an appeal which had for a century or more been barred by limitation. What would under such circumstances become of the laws of limitation which have justly been denominated as “statutes of repose?” I cannot but hold that the imperative requirements of s. 4 of the Limitation Act not only justify us, but require us, as a Court of second anpeal, to satisfy ourselves whether the appellate Court has properly applied [484] the provisions of s. 5 of that enactment, and, if the discretion has been wrongly exercised, to undo its effects by interference in second appeal.

In opposition to this view, however, the ruling of the learned Chief Justice and our late colleague Mr. Justice Oldfield in Fatima Begam v. Hansi has been cited and relied upon. That was a case of a somewhat peculiar character, and the appeal was presented to the District Judge long after the period of limitation, but was admitted by him in consideration of the especial circumstances of that case, by exercising discretionary power to extend limitation under s. 5 of the Limitation Act. In second appeal the matter was brought to the notice of this Court, and whilst Mr. Justice Oldfield considered the circumstances of that case as constituting sufficient cause to justify the District Judge in admitting the appeal under s. 5, the learned Chief Justice expressed himself in very guarded language, which I wish to quote here, as the ruling has been the main reason why this case has been referred to the Full Bench. The learned Chief Justice, after stating the facts and dates of the case went on to say (at p. 246):—

“I may at once say that if I had been sitting as the Judge of Allahabad, I would not have held that the defendant had shown ‘sufficient cause’ within the meaning of s. 5 of the Limitation Act. The Judge of Allahabad, to whom the application to admit the appeal was made, exercised his discretion and admitted it. In my opinion we ought not to interfere, unless when the Judge has clearly acted on insufficient grounds or has improperly exercised his discretion. We ought not to interfere with the discretion of the Judge when he has applied his mind to the subject-matter before him. However, as I have said before, under these circumstances I would not have admitted the appeal, but I do not see my way to hold that the Judge has so improperly jexercised his discretion as to say that the appeal ought not to have been admitted.”

Now in this passage it is important to notice that the learned Chief Justice did not repudiate the jurisdiction of the second appel-[485] late Court in matters of discretionary admission of appeal by the lower appellate Court; this point distinguishes the case in principle from Sir Louis' Jackson's ruling in the Calcutta case. Again, the learned Chief Justice expressed his opinion that if he were presiding in the lower appellate Court he would not have admitted the appeal, but be refrained from interference, because, although not fully agreed with Mr. Justice Oldfield's view as to the sufficiency of the cause for delay, be was not prepared to go the length of holding that the exercise of discretion by the District Judge was absolutely improper so as to require interference in appeal. This, then, is the exact scope of the rule laid down by the learned Chief Justice in that case; it does not repudiate the jurisdiction of the second appellate Court to interfere, but points out that, when discretion has been actually exercised, it must not, upon light grounds and in the absence of strong reasons, be disturbed in appeal. In the principle thus expressed I fully concur, because, in matters of this kind, as indeed in matters of conclusions on the weight of evidence, the appellate Court should always act cautiously and not disturb findings of the lower Court, unless it is absolutely satisfied that the conclusions at which the lower Court arrived were erroneous.

But whilst I thus express my concurrence in matters of principle expressed by the learned Chief Justice, in that case, I respectfully confess that if I were a member of the Bench which heard it, I should have, judging from the facts as stated in the report, dissented from Mr. Justice Oldfieid's view as to the sufficiency of the cause for delay, and, agreeing with the learned Chief Justice, in so far as he regarded the circumstances as insufficient cause, should have disagreed with him in the view that the case did not call for interference. According to my view of that case, I should have held that the District Judge had exorcised an improper discretion in admitting the appeal after limitation, and I should by my decree, have undone the effects of such wrong admission of the appeal. And for the reasons which I have stated, I would do the same here by setting aside the District Judge's order of the 27th August 1887, whereby he admitted the appeal, and by declaring [486] that he should, have dismissed it with such effect as such dismissal may have upon the rights of the parties; for I observe that the District Judge had also certain cross-objections by the plaintiff under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Codo before him.

With this answer I would return the case to the Division Bench which has referred it to the Full Bench.

Sir John Edge, C.J:— I have had an opportunity of reading the judgment of my brother Mahmood in this reference, and with that judgmeut, subject to what I am about to say, I agree. The difference, if there is any, between us, I doubt if there is any, arises on the construction of s. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act. So far as I can see, the only section in the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, which enables a Court to admit an appeal or an application which is presented beyond the period of limitation prescribed by that Act is s. 5. So far as I can see, there is not any other section in the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, which enables a Court to admit a suit or an application, other than an application for a review of judgment, which is presented after the period prescribed by that Act for the institution of a suit or the presentation of an application.

Ss. 6 and 10 exclude certain cases from the period of limitation prescribed by the Act.

Ss. 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 merely enact bow the prescribed periods of limitation are to be computed and what allowances are to be made in such computations. In making such computations a Court may have to ascertain certain facts, but those sections relating to the computation of time do not appear to me to give a Court any discretion as to extension of time or the admission of a suit, appeal or application.

In order to ascertain how, under s. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, the time requisite for obtaining a docree must be computed, and what allowances, if any, can be made in computing that time, and to test the proposition that a Court in computing the time to be allowed under s. 12 for the obtaining by a party of a copy of a decree or a judgment has a discretion in the matter, I shall take [487] the case of a person entitled under the Code of Civil Procedure to appeal, who, being unable to pay the fee for the petition of appeal, presents an application for leave to appeal as a pauper. I take such a case, for as I shall presently show, if any allowance is to be made to such a person in respect of delay in obtaining a copy of a decree or a judgment, it must be made under s. 12 and cannot be made under s. 5 of the Act.

A litigant cannot appeal as a pauper unless his application for leave to appeal as a pauper be allowed under s. 592 of the Code of the Civil Procedure. Art. 170 of the second schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, provides that an application for leave to appeal as a pauper must be made within 30 days from the date of the decree appealed against. The periods of limitation for appeals are specified in the second division and those applications in the third division of the second schedule of that Act. s. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, expressly applies not only to appeals but to applications for leave to appeal as a pauper.

I consequently conclude that the legislature in framing and passing the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, did not confound appeals with applications for leave to appeal as a pauper, and did not overlook the distinction between an appeal and an application for leave to appeal as a pauper, a distinction which is kept clearly in view in the Code of Civil Procedure.

By s. 541 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so far as appeals from original decrees are concerned, by that section as made applicable by s. 587, so far as appeals from appellate decrees are concerned, and by s. 541 as made applicable by s. 590, so far as appeals from orders under the Code of Civil Procedure are concerned, appeals from original decrees from appellate decrees and from such orders under the Code of Civil Procedure as are appealable must be made in the form of a memorandum in writing presented by the appellant. That “memorandum in writing” is in pauper cases “the memorandum of appeal” referred to in s. 592 of the Code by which the application for leave to appeal as a pauper must be accompanied.

[488] As I have pointed out, the Legislature in the Code of Civil Procedure and also in s. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, and in the second schedule to that Act, observed a distinction between an appeal and an application for leave to appeal as a pauper, and did not confuse the one with the other.

The first paragraph of s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, applies to all suits, appeals, and applications for which a period of limitation is by that Act prescribed, including applications for leave to appeal as a pauper. The second paragraph of that section applies only to appeals and to applications for review of judgment, and does not apply to suits, or to applications other than applications for review of judgment; it consequently, as has been held, does not apply to application for leave to appeal as a pauper. Having regard to the principles of construction and to the distinction elsewhere observed by the Legislature between appeals and applications for leave to appeal as a pauper, it could not be held that the Legislature intended the second paragraph of s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to apply to applications for leave to appeal as a pauper, or that an application by a pauper for leave to appeal as a pauper, aud, on allowance of his application, his pauper appeal, should be treated as one and the same thing.

By s. 592 of the Code of Civil Procedure a person may be allowed to appeal as a pauper, subject to the rules contained in Chapters XXVI, XLI, XLII, and XLIII of that Code, in so far as those rules are applicable. A perusal of that section and ss. 541, 587 and 590 show that the memorandum of appeal in pauper cases must be accompanied by a copy of the decree or order appealed against and of the judgment on which it is founded. It is thus necessary that an application for leave to appeal as a pauper must not only be presented within 30 days from the date of the decree appealed against, but must be accompanied by the memorandum of appeal, a copy of the decree or order appealed against, and a copy of the judgment upon which the decree or order is founded. An order allowing a person to appeal as a pauper is an order admitting his appeal as a pauper. As there can be no appeal by a pauper as such [489] unless an order allowing him to appeal as a pauper has been made, I conclude that the second paragraph of s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, not only does not apply to applications for leave to appeal as a pauper, but is inapplicable to an appeal by a pauper as such, and that the Legislature did not intend that want of pecuniary means to present an application for leave to appeal as a pauper within the specified time should, so far as such an application or an appeal by a pauper is concerned, extend the time within which such an application should be made, or should be treated as “sufficient cause “for the non-presentation of an appeal by a pauper as such within the period of limitation prescribed. In other words the effect of ss. 4 and 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, is, in my opinion, to deprive a litigant who desires to appeal as a pauper of all right to appeal as a pauper if he has not within the prescribed period of 30 days, computed as provided by the Act, presented his application for leave to appeal as a pauper, and this, no matter what the cause may have been which prevented him from presenting his application within the 30 days so computed. The next question is how, in the case of a person desiring to appeal as a pauper, are the 30 days to be computed so far as s. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, is concerned. Under that section the day from which the period of 30 days is to be reckoned and “the time requisite for obtaining” a copy of the decree appealed against and a copy of the judgment on which it is founded, are to be excluded from the computation of the period of limitation. As I have shown, a copy of the decree appealed against and a copy of the judgment upon which it is founded must accompany an application for leave to appeal as a pauper. In ascertaining the time which was requisite for obtaining a copy of such decree and a copy of such judgment in the case of an application for leave to appeal as a pauper, can any allowance be made for delay caused by the inability, on receipt of the estimate, of the pauper, by reason of his want of money, to pay for such copies?

If such an allowance is to be made in the computation of time, in respect of what period is it to be made? Is the period of limitation within which an application for leave to appeal as a pauper may be made to be extended until he is in a position to pay for the copies [490] of the decree and the judgment? He might not be in a position to do so for five, ten, or twenty years. To make such an allowance in the computation of time would be to extend the period of limitation. Such could not have been the intention of the Legislature, although the poverty of the pauper and his consequent inability to pay the charges for the copies and to obtain them, might be owing to excusable and unavoidable circumstances in his case. The case which I have put might be a hard one upon the pauper, but it would be equally hard upon his opponent who had obtained his decree, if he were to be left in uncertainty as to his rights and liabilities until such time as the pauper might be in a position to obtain leave to appeal as a pauper.

To take another illustration, from the case of a pauper.

In computing the time requisite for obtaining copies of the decree and the judgment, could a Court make allowance for a delay by a pauper in obtaining such copies resulting from an unavoidable accident to the pauper? If it could, why should the Court not also make allowance in such computation for the delay resulting from the unavoidable circumstance of the pauper being too poor to pay for such copies? If the Court could not do so in the one case, I can see no principle upon which it could do so in the other. It appears to me that the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, so far as pecuniary means are concerned, contemplates two classes of litigants, and two classes only, namely, those who are paupers, and those who are not, and that, so far as s. 12 of that Act is concerned, we must apply the same principles of construction to that section in the case of a litigant who is not a pauper as in the case of a litigant who is a pauper.

In my opinion a Court in computing under s. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or of a judgment has no discretion, and is confined to ascertaining for the purposes of such computation the time occupied by the office in preparing the estimate, and, after payment of the amount of the estimate has been made, the time occupied by the office in preparing the copy or copies ready to be delivered to the party who [491] has applied for them. If a decree had not been drawn up and signed at the time when an application for a copy of it was made, and the making of the copy was thereby delayed, such period of delay must be allowed for in computing the time which was requisite for obtaining the copy. Copies of decrees and judgments are not made for the use of parties until the estimated charges for making them have been paid. Sometimes delay might be caused in the receipt by the office of the estimated charges owing to the stamps not being procurable, or to the office not being open to receive payment of those charges when the estimate should have been complied with. Such period of delay, and periods of delay arising from similar causes beyond the control of the applicant, and not being the result of any action or want of action on his part, should, Ithink, be allowed in making the computation. Sometimes, owing to pressure of work in the copying department, a copy of a decree or judgment cannot be made for some days after the charges for making the copy have been paid. The period of such delay would also be allowed for in computing the time which was requisite for obtaining the copy. If the party applying for a copy of a decree or judgment failed to inform himself of the time when such copy would be ready and thereby did not obtain it when it was ready to be delivered to him, it appears to me that the period of such delay could not allowed in computing the time which was requisite for obtaining the copy.

A question as to whether an appellant or an applicant for review of judgment had “sufficient cause” within the meaning of the second paragraph of s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, does not arise until the computation of time has been made.

There may be many a cause for delay in obtaining a copy of a decree or judgment, which, although it could not be considered in the making of the computation to be made under s. 12, might be a sufficient cause within the meaning of the second paragraph of s. 5 for the appellant or the applicant for a review of judgment not having presented his appeal or his application within the period prescribed. In my opinion, negligence, carelessness, or want of means at the time on the part of the applicant would not be suffi-[492] cient cause, within the meaning of s. 5. A litigant who applies for a copy without taking the precaution to have in his pocket sufficient money to pay the charges for the copy, or who delays so long in making his application for the copy, or in paying the estimated charges for it, as to leave him insufficient time to present his appeal or application for review of judgment within the period prescribed, cannot on such grounds in my opinion be held to have had sufficient cause for not presenting his appeal or application within such period.

It is for the appellant or the applicant for a review of judgment whose appeal or application has not been presented within the period prescribed, to satisfy the Judge of the Court that he had sufficient causa for not presenting the appeal or making the application within such period. In this case that has not been done.

As to the case of Fatima Began v. Hansi I need only say that I am now, and have long been satisfied, that, on the facts of that case Mr. Justice Oldfield and I ought to have given effect to the objection that the appeal, when it was admitted by the District Judge of Allahabad, was improperly admitted, no sufficient cause having been made out for the delay.

I concur in the order proposed by my brother Mahmood.

Brodhurst, J.:— The facts of this case have been most fully stated by my brother Mahmood, and to repeat them would be useless.

I concur in the exposition of the law by the learned Chief Justice, and in the order proposed by my brother Mahmood.

Young, J.:— In this case, when the arguments on each side had been fully heard before the Chief Justice and myself, the appellant's counsel raised a new point not taken in the pleas of appeal to this Court, viz., that the lower appellate Court had improperly admitted the present respondent's appeal inasmuch as the said appeal to the lower appellate Court was barred by limitation. An inspection of the file below showed that the lower appellate Court, having been apprised by the officer of the Court that the said appeal ought not [493] to have been admitted, as it was one day beyond time, at first ordered that the appellant before it be informed that his appeal was struck off as being time-barred, but subsequently decided the appeal on the merits and gave respondent a decree in his favour.

The objection now raised ought to have been stated in the memo of appeal to this Court. As the point however is one of limitation and involves some questions of much importance, it was deemed proper that it should be referred to a Full Bench, and this the more, as conflicting rulings exist in regard to some of the matters herein involved.

I do not think it necessary to recapitulate the facts of this case in detail, and it is sufficient for me here to say that I fully concur in the ruling in Parbati v. Bhola that the words “time requisite for obtaining a copy “in s. 12 of Act XV of 1877, only refer to the time occupied by the Court or its officer in furnishing the copy, and has no reference to any time required by the applicant owing to his own apathy or ignorance.

Thus the non-signature of the decree by the Judge would be no cause for indulgence to the applicant for copy, unless the latter had applied prior to signature of the decree, and had been delayed by the fact of non-signature.

So again if an applicant, after being informed of the probable cost of the copy, takes time to go and procure his money, he would not be entitled to any deduction of time on that account. So again, if, after receiving intimation that the copy is ready, or is to be ready on a certain date, the applicant delays to take it on such date, he would not be entitled to any deduction for such days, seeing that such time cannot properly be called “time requisite,” as it would not have been needed but for the applicant's own laches.

I am also of opinion that any indulgence by way of extension of the period of limitation can only be granted, not under s. 12, but under s. 5 of the Limitation Act, and subject to the provisions of that section, that is, “when the appellant or applicant satisfies [494] the Court that he had sufficient cause for not applying within the prescribed period of limitation.”

There has been no attempt so to satisfy the Court here, as far as I am aware.

For these reasons, I consider the objection valid, and I concur in the order proposed by my brother Mahmood.

On the case being brought up before the Division Bench, the following order was passed on the 14th June 1890, by Edge, C.J and Young, J.

JUDGMENT OP THE DIVISION BENCH.

“Having regard to the opinion of the Full Bench expressed in the reference in the case, we allow this appeal with costs, dismiss with costs the appeal and objection filed in the lower appellate Court, and restore the decree of the first Court.

Appeal allowed.