1. The respondents Nathuram and Jagannath Prasad obtained a decree against the appellants Shyamshankar and Prabhashankar in the following terms:
“It is ordered and decreed that the defendants do pay to the plaintiffs Rs. 1,326 for claim and Rs. 136-4-0 for costs of suits in the following instalments: (1) Rs. 135-4-0 costs of suit within three months from to-day. (2) Rs. 1,326 with interest shall be payable in four equal annual instalments commencing from Aghun Sndi 15 Sambat 1988. In default of and two instalments of principal and interest the whole sum then due shall become due at once. The principal amount of Rs. 1,326 shall cart interest at the rate of 8 annas per cent per mensem from this date to the date of realisation. Pandit Deokrishna Dhagat is a suret for the amount of the decree and the share of two annas in mouza Piproda Chhakka of defendants shall remain charged to satisfy the decretal amount with costs.”
2. This decree was passed on 10th August 1931. The judgment debtor defaulted, and so the decree-holders applied for execution. They asked for the personal arrest of the judgment-debtor and also for attachment of their movables. The executing Court refused to allow this, and held that since the decree-holder had a charge on certain properties they must proceed against the first, and then resort to their other remedies only if the property charged was insufficient to satisfy the decree. The lower appellate Court reversed this order and held that the decree is simple money decree in spite of the direction about a charge, and so the decree-holders are entitled to all their usual remedies. In my opinion this is right.
3. A charge is created under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, whenever
“immoveable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law, made security for payment of money to another, and the translation does not amount to a mortgage.”
4. The decree in question directs the judgment-debtors' two annas share in mouza Piproda Chhakka shall be security for payment of the decretal amount. Therefore there can be in question that it creates a charge of that property within the meaning of Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act.
5. The next question to consider is ??? that charge can be enforced. O. 34, R. 15 of the CPC, provides for this is the following terms:
“All the provisions contained in this ??? which apply to a simple mortgage shall so far as may be, apply … to a charge within the meaning of Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.”
6. Order 34, Rr. 4, 5 and 6 deal with the way in which a simple mortgages may be enforced. There must first be a preliminary decree in the usual form fixing a time for payment of the decretal amount, and ordering sale of the property in default. This is followed Page: 141by a final decree. It follows then that, charge must be enforced in the same way. The present decree fixes a time or payment but does not order sale of he property in default. It is therefore nothing but a declaratory decree so or as the charge is concerned, and not me directing its enforcement. The remainder of the decree is a simple money decree and must be dealt with as such.
7. It is true a composite decree allowing he personal remedy as well as enforcement of the charge in one decree is permissible: Jeuna Baku v. Parmeshwar Varayan AIR 1918 PC 159 , 49 IC 620 , 46 IA 294 , 47 Cal 370 (PC). But the question is whether this decree is of that character; and that is the real point for determination, as is pointed out in Falakrishna Pal v. Jaganndth Marwari AIR 1932 Cal 775 , 140 IC 788 , 59 Cal 1314. The decree in suit is very similar to the one in Ramaswami Naidu v. Subbaraya Tevar AIR 1925 Mad 1101 , 88 IC 648. In that suit a portion of the claim was for money; in the present case he entire claim is for money. In that suit, as in this, the matter was compromised by the defendants accepting a personal decree against themselves, and submitting to a declaration in the decree that a portion of their immovable property should be charged for payment if the decretal amount. It was held that this was nothing but a personal decree, and although it also created a charge, it could not be regarded as a decree under O. 34 of the CPC. I am in entire and respectful agreement without view. Therefore I agree with the lower appellate Court that O. 34, R. 15 does not apply. The decision in Jagantath Sao v. Debt Prasad AIR 1924 Pat 258 , 73 IC 598 , 2 Pat 768 is not against that view. All it decides is that of the decree-holder desires to proceed against property charged under a compromise decree it is not necessary for him to attach it before bringing it to sale, as the decree does that for him. That question does not arise for decision here, for the decree-holders are not yet pursuing this remedy.
8. The next point argued is that although O. 21, R. 30 permits a decree-holder to execute his decree by attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor's property is well by his detention in the civil prison, still the discretion given to the Courts in O. 21, R. 21 should have been exercised in the judgment-debtors' favour in this case. So far as that is concerned, I respectfully agree with the observations in Hargobind Kishan Chand v. Hakim Singh & Co. AIR 1926 Lah 110 , 93 IC 54 , 6 Lah 548 and China Pemaji v. Chelabhai Narandas (1883) 7 Bom 301. The creditor has a right to all the assistance the law can give him, and although O. 21, R. 21 gives the Court discretion to refuse simultaneous execution against the person and property of the judgment-debtor, it must be exercised judicially. It is not a judicial exercise of discretion to refuse an order of committal to prison on the ground that the decree-holder should first proceed against the property. The Code gives the decree-holder the right to decide whether he should execute the decree in one way or the other or both. If the Court considers he should not exercise the right in the manner he desires, it must give reasons. It is not enough to say that there is property against which he may proceed and therefore he must proceed against that first, for that is precisely what the Code states he need not do.
9. Their Lordships of the Privy Council remarked as long ago as 1872 in General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Maharajah Coomar Ramaput Sing (1870-72) 14 MIA 605 (PC) at p. 612 that:
“the difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a decree”
and they have repeatedly commented on it ever since. In Jeuna Bahu v. Purmeshwar Narayan AIR 1918 PC 159 , 49 IC 620 , 46 IA 294 , 47 Cal 370 (PC) (at p. 376 of 47 Cal) they state that:
“Security of title and reasonable swiftness of legal decisions are essential conditions of commercial development, and both are lacking in such a case as the present, a case which, in their Lordships' experience, unfortunately does not stand alone.”
10. I agree so entirely with the remarks of Le Rossignol, J., in Hargobind Kishan Chand v. Hakim Singh AIR 1926 Lah 110 , 93 IC 54 , 6 Lah 548 (at p. 553 of 6 Lah) that I quote him at length. He says:
“The judgment-debtor in this Country as a rule is either frankly recalcitrant or averse from suffering the inconvenience of finding the decretal sum, and execution against his estate is almost invariably opposed by means of objections, generally without foundation, and more often than not, brought at his instigation in order to secure delay in the execution of the decree. The result is that the proverbial law's Page: 142delay is more frequently and strikingly exemplified is execution proceedings than even in the initial dispute. In these circumstances any tenderness towards the judgment debtor on the part of the executing Court is not only entirely misplaced but is entirely opposed to the law. Except in cases where the judgment-debtor has no property, I would go so far as to say that far from being discouraged the decree-holder should be encouraged to proceed against both the property and the person simultaneously, and the refusal of the executing Court to grant both reliefs at one time should be the exception and not the rule. The judgment-creditor except in a few cases, is inspired not by revenge but by the desire to recover his lawful due and he will not apply for execution against the person of his debtor, except in those cases when he has good reason to believe that form of execution will result in the payment of the debt.”
11. Holmwood, J. also points out in Nanda Kishore Singh v. Ram Golam Sahu (1913) 40 Cal 955 , 18 IC 207 at p. 965 that he has
“never been able to see why the interests of the decree-holder should not be just as worthy of consideration as those of the judgment-debtor”
12. Neither have I: and yet it is common experience that the decree-holder finds it far more difficult to obtain consideration at the hands of the Court than his judgment-debtor, and is often denied that prompt assistance from the Court which is his just due: a state of affairs which ought not to be.
13. In the present case the judgment-debtors have been shown every consideration. The decree holders consented to an instalment decree when they need not have done so, and the rate of interest is low. Two and a half years have elapsed since the decree was signed, and five since the decree was originally incurred on 27th June 1929; and the judgment-debtors are still in default. They have shown no reason why the normal course of the law should be arrested in their favour, except that as there is a charge upon their property they cannot raise the money for payment of the decree. The fact that they cannot pay is a reason why the decree-holders should be allowed to execute their decree by every means available to them instead of being hindered; especially when the judgment-debtors themselves agreed to the charge so that they might be dealt with leniently. They cannot now urge that as a reason for still further consideration. Moreover, the decree is an instalment one, so if the property charged is sold for the satisfaction of the instalments now due, the decree-holders may have difficulty in realising the remaining instalments. The law gives them the right to choose their remedy, and no reason has been shown why they should be deprived of it. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Pleader's fee Rs. 15.
14. Appeal dismissed.