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  • Section 375 of the old Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to Order 23, Rule 3
  • provisions of Order 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Order 23, Rule 3
  • Order 23, Rule 3
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 375 of the old Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to Order 23, Rule 3
  • provisions of Order 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Order 23, Rule 3
  • Order 23, Rule 3
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges an order of the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore recognising an assignment of a razinama (compromise) decree passed in O.S. No. 80 of 1918 and permitting execution of that decree. The appellant in this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is the 1st defendant in O.S. No. 80 of 1918. The 1st respondent is the assignee-decree-holder to whom the plaintiff's next friend assigned the razinama decree; the other respondents are co-defendant sons of the appellant and the original plaintiff (the decree-holder).

O.S. No. 80 of 1918 (the suit which produced the razinama decree) was instituted by a minor plaintiff (represented by his adoptive mother) for specific performance of an agreement dated 5-12-1915 or, alternatively, for recovery of an advance of Rs. 25,586-1-10. There were related suits and an existing decree (O.S. No. 98 of 1918) against the minor's adoptive father. By the razinama the parties compromised a number of interrelated matters (including withdrawal or non-prosecution of other suits) and the defendants agreed to pay sums (notably Rs. 53,000, with a Rs. 3,000 promissory note) and to discharge the decree-holder in O.S. No. 98 of 1918 within a stipulated period.

The defendants did not comply with their obligations under the razinama. To prevent execution against the minor's properties in consequence of default under O.S. No. 98 of 1918, the minor's next friend assigned the razinama decree to the present 1st respondent for Rs. 55,000. The assignee filed E.P. No. 4 of 1923 seeking recognition of the assignment and execution of the razinama decree. The defendants opposed that application. The Subordinate Judge recognised the assignment subject to conditions designed to protect the minor and allowed execution; the present appeal challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the razinama decree passed in O.S. No. 80 of 1918 is only a preliminary decree (requiring a final decree before execution), and therefore incapable of execution as argued by the appellant.
  2. Whether the razinama decree can be executed in its entirety when some of its terms go beyond the strict subject-matter of O.S. No. 80 of 1918 — specifically, whether terms in the compromise that do not strictly relate to the suit fall outside the scope of an executable decree (relying on Order 23, Rule 3).
  3. Whether the assignment of the razinama decree to the 1st respondent was bona fide and made in the interest of the minor-decree-holder (i.e., whether recognition of the assignment and permission to execute was proper given the asserted doubts about genuineness of certain documents and the adequacy of consideration).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The razinama decree is only in the nature of a preliminary decree (the appellant relied on the concept of preliminary vs. final decree) and hence is not executable until a final decree is passed.
  • Parts of the razinama go beyond the subject-matter of O.S. No. 80 of 1918; invoking Order 23, Rule 3, the appellant contends that a decree can only be passed "so far as it relates to the suit" and, since it is impossible to separate which components relate to the suit, the whole decree is therefore incapable of execution. For those portions not strictly within the suit, separate suits must be instituted to enforce them.
  • The assignment to the 1st respondent is not bona fide and was not made in the minor plaintiff's interest; the appellant questioned the genuineness and bona fides of certain promissory notes (Exhibits F and G) and challenged aspects of consideration alleged in the assignment deed.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any opposing party's oral arguments in the same structured manner; rather, the assignee's conduct and the Subordinate Judge's order and evidence are described in the court's reasoning.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Joti Kumnreteppa v. Izari Sirusappa [1907] 30 Mad. 478 Held that in a suit for money a compromise term creating a charge upon certain properties "relates to the suit" and may be embodied in the decree; the language of the provision (old Section 375 / Order 23, Rule 3) is wide and does not confine relief strictly to what was prayed in the plaint. Relied upon to support the proposition that parties can agree lawful terms (such as charges) as part of a compromise and have them embodied in a decree even if the plaint did not specifically pray for that relief.
Sabapathy v. Man Mahalinga [1914] 38 Mad. 959 Held that terms in a razinama decree which formed consideration for the compromise must be deemed part of the decree and can be enforced in execution proceedings. Used to support the conclusion that compromise terms which served as consideration are enforceable and included within the decree for execution.
Puma Chandra Sirkar v. Nelmadhub Nandi (1915) 2 L.W. 608 Held that a decree passed on a compromise cannot be regarded as ultra vires merely because it goes beyond the subject-matter of the suit; if other conditions constituted consideration for the compromise they must be incorporated in the decree. Referred to as authority for the proposition that extra-suit conditions forming consideration may be embodied in the decree and be executable.
Subba Narayana Aiyar v. Maya Thevan (1917) M.W.N. 751 Decision suggests that if terms of a compromise decree which do not relate strictly to the suit appear as considerations for settlement, they may nevertheless be regarded as part of the decree and executable. The Court observed that this decision in fact supports the respondents' position that compromise terms used as consideration may be enforced in execution.
Ariyaputhra Goundan v. Eliya Goundan (1917) M.W.N. 751 This decision concerned whether portions of a razinama not given effect to in the decree required registration; the present question of execution did not arise in that case. Not directly applicable to the execution issue; cited to show that different cases addressed registration rather than executability.
Pranal Anni v. Lakshmi Anni (1900) 22 Mad. 508 Authority referenced regarding the Court's acceptance of a razinama and its embodiment in the decree. Used in connection with later cases to show that acceptance by the Court gives the razinama effect as part of the decree.
Hemantka Kumari Devi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. A.I.R. 1919 P.C. 79 Considered whether a razinama decree containing terms beyond the suit, and lacking registration, could be admitted in evidence to affect matters not within the scope of the suit; the Court remarked that as a decree it "may be incapable of being executed outside the bounds of the suit" but could be received in evidence of its contents. The opinion notes that this case did not raise the present question and that remarks in it were expressed hesitantly; it was not treated as decisive against executability where terms formed consideration for compromise.
Manager of Sri Meenakshi Devastanam Madura v. Abdul Kdsim Sahib (1908) 30 Mad. 421 Holds that the argument that a razinama decree contains reliefs the plaintiff could not have obtained after trial affords no ground for questioning the decree in execution; such objections should be taken by way of appeal rather than in execution proceedings. Relied upon to support the stance that execution proceedings are not the forum to challenge a compromise decree on the ground that it contains relief beyond what was obtainable at trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each of the appellant's three principal contentions in sequence and relied on statutory interpretation, the nature of the plaint, the parties' conduct, precedents, and the record of evidence and the subordinate court's order.

Point No. 1 — Preliminary vs. Executable Decree

The appellant's contention that the razinama decree was merely preliminary and not executable was rejected. The Court examined the plaint and observed that the suit was for specific performance or, alternatively, for money (a claim for Rs. 20,113 in usufructuary mortgage terms or, in the alternative, payment). The Court concluded that the suit was not a mortgage suit in the sense contemplated by Order 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, there was no basis to treat the decree as a preliminary decree subject to the special rules for mortgages, and the objection based on the preliminary/final decree dichotomy could not be sustained.

Point No. 2 — Scope of Order 23, Rule 3 and Executability of Extra-Suit Terms

The appellant argued (relying on Order 23, Rule 3) that the Court can pass a decree only "so far as it relates to the suit," and therefore terms of the razinama beyond the strict subject-matter are not executable. The Court gave a twofold answer:

  1. It found that the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 did not support the appellant's restrictive interpretation; the language is wide and permits the Court to embody lawful terms of a compromise in the decree where they relate to the matter of the claim.
  2. Even on the facts, the parties treated the various terms of the compromise as essential parts of the decree and acted upon them; specifically, O.S. No. 82 of 1918 was dismissed/withdrawn as part of the compromise and the parties considered the terms as reciprocal considerations. Therefore, terms which formed the consideration for settling O.S. No. 80 of 1918 qualified to be part of the decree and were enforceable in execution.

The Court supported this reasoning by reference to several precedents (e.g., Joti Kumnreteppa; Sabapathy; Puma Chandra) which held that a compromise may include charges or other terms that, if they are lawful and constitute consideration for the settlement of the suit, may be incorporated in the decree and executed. Other cases cited (e.g., Ariyaputhra, Hemantka) were found to address registration or evidentiary questions rather than the executability issue; the Court treated any remarks suggesting non-executability as inapposite to the present facts.

Point No. 3 — Bona Fides of the Assignment and Protection of the Minor

The Court examined the assignment's consideration and the subordinate court's procedural safeguards. The assignment deed recited total consideration of Rs. 55,000 comprising (1) Rs. 43,700 to the decree-holder in O.S. No. 98 of 1918, (2) Rs. 10,475 to Sundararaja Pillai in respect of debts under Exhibits F and G, and (3) Rs. 825 for execution of the document. Evidence (Exhibits B, C, D and their sub-parts) showed that the assignee had paid Rs. 17,000 in partial discharge of the O.S. No. 98 decree after the assignment.

Although the appellant questioned the genuineness and bona fides of Exhibits F and G (promissory notes connected to Sundararaja Pillai), the Subordinate Judge did not delve into the genuineness issue; instead he imposed protective conditions in recognising the assignment. The judge's order required that the assignee-decree-holder recover amounts only through the Court, permitted drawing of amounts already proven to have been paid (with interest), and allowed drawing of further payments made in discharge of O.S. No. 98 only upon satisfying the Court with vouchers; for amounts over and above the decree amount the assignee had to furnish security acceptable to the Court.

The appellate Court found that these conditions adequately protected the minor's interests. The evidence supported that the assignment was made bona fide by the next friend to safeguard the minor's property from sale and that the subordinate court's procedure and conditions were appropriate. There was no substantial evidence from the appellant to rebut the proof of consideration payments. Accordingly, the recognition of the assignment subject to the stated safeguards and allowance of execution was appropriate.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final rulings were as follows.

Core Rulings:

  • The razinama (compromise) decree passed in O.S. No. 80 of 1918 is executable in its entirety. The Court rejected the contention that the decree was merely preliminary or that terms going beyond the strict subject-matter of the suit were necessarily non-executable where such terms constituted consideration for the compromise.
  • The order of the Subordinate Judge recognising the assignment subject to specified conditions and permitting execution by the assignee-decree-holder is upheld.
  • This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed with costs.

Implications: As a practical consequence, the assignee-decree-holder may proceed with execution in accordance with the Subordinate Judge's conditional order (including drawing amounts already proved paid and drawing further amounts only upon satisfying the Court with proof, and furnishing security for amounts beyond the decree amount). The minor-decree-holder's interests were held to be protected by the subordinate court's conditions. The opinion applies established precedents to the facts and does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond the application of prior authorities that compromise terms which form consideration may be embodied in and executed as part of a decree.

    Ramaswamy Nayudu v. K.N.S Subbaraya Thevar And Others

    1. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal arises in connection with the execution of a razinama decree passed in O.S. No. 80 of 1918 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore. The appellant is the 1st defendant in the suit. The 1st respondent is the assigneedecree-holder and the other respondents are the remaining three defendants in O.S. No. 80 of 1918 who are the sons of the 1st defendant and the plaintiff, the decree-holder. The compromise decree was assigned by the next friend of the plaintiff-decree-holder to the present 1st respondent and he presented E.P. No. 4 of 1923 praying for the recognition of the assignment and for the recovery of the amount of Rs. 58,285-15 by the sale of the properties as per terms of the decree. The defendants in the suit opposed the application. The Subordinate Judge passed an order recognising the assignment subject to certain conditions and also allowing the execution of the decree. It is this order that is now appealed against by the 1st defendant-appellant.

    2. In order to understand the contentions put forward on his behalf, it is necessary to state the facts relating to the compromise decree in detail. O.S. No. 80 of 1918, on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore, on which the razinama decree was passed, was instituted by the minor plaintiff Kamachia Pillai represented by his adoptive mother for specific performance of contract by the present appellant and his eons, defendants 1 to 4 in pursuance of the agreement dated 5-12-1915 or for recovery of the amount of advance together with interest thereto, i.e., for Rs. 25,586-1-10. At that time there were two suits pending on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore in which the present parties were interested and also there was a decree in existence against the late adoptive father of the minor plaintiff passed by the Triohinopoly Sub-Court. One of these suits, viz., O.S. No. 82 of 1918 was instituted by Nalesa Pillai who had obtained an assignment benami of a promissory note alleged to have been executed by the 1st defendant (the present appellant) in the name of one Chockalingam, the father o£ the adoptive mother and next friend of the minor plaintiff in O.S. No. 80 of 1918. O.S. No. 83 of 1918, the otter suit, was instituted by the minor plaintiff in O.S. No. 80 of 1918 for recovery of the amount due under the three other deeds executed for Rs. 35,000 by the defendants in O.S. No. 80 of 1918 and the deceased Varadarajulu Naidu in favour of the adoptive father of the minor plaintiff and for delivery of possession in accordance with the aforesaid other deeds and for the recovery of swamibogam. The decree against the late adoptive father of the minor plaintiff was passed by the Trichinopoly Sub-Court in O.S. No. 98 of 1918 on its file. It was passed on promissory notes which had been executed by him. Besides compromising the present suit, namely, O.S. No. 80 of 1918, it was arranged by the razinama that the minor plaintiff should cause the heirs of Natesa Pillai not to prosecute the suit O.S. No. 82 of 1918 and that he Ehould withdraw the suit O.S. No. 83 of 1918. The defendants in consideration of the compromise of these suits agreed to pay the plaintiff (a) Rs. 53,000 in quit of all claims and that out of the sum of Rs. 53,000 they agreed to execute in favour of the minor plaintiff a promissory note for Rs. 3,000 with interest and out of the balance pay Palaniappa Chetty the decree-holder in 6. Section No. 98 of 1918 mentioned above and thus discharge his claim against the adoptive father of the plaintiff within a specified period. It was stated in the compromise that "If the defendants in this suit (O.S. No. 80 of 1918) make any default in paying the said amount within the stipulated period aforesaid the plaintiff is to proceed against the suit properties and to execute the razinama decree that may be passed in the suit, and to sell the properties and recover the amount with costs of execution. The last paragraph of the compromise contains the provision that the parties in this suit and in Suit No. 83 of 1918 are to bear themselves their respective costs. On these terms O.S. No. 80 of 1918 was adjusted by the razinama and a decree was passed in accordance therewith so far as it related to the suit.

    3. The defendants in O.S. No. 80 of 1918 (the appellant and his sons respondents 2, 3 and 4) not having complied with their obligation in accordance with the razinama decree to pay up the amount due under the decree in O.S. No. 98 of 1918 it was apprehended by the adoptive mother of the plaintiff that the properties of the minor would be brought to sale in execution of that decree unless some arrangement was made for assigning the razinama decree in O.S. No. 80 of 1918, discharging the debts due to Palaniappa Chetty on O.S. No. 98 of 1918. For the purpose of safeguarding the interest of the minor an assignment of the razinama decree was therefore made in favour of the present 1st resondent for a consideration of Rs. 55,000. It is not hero necessary to go intodetails of the consideration and the obligations which the assignee decree-holder undertook under assignment. As already mentioned, E.P. No. 4 of 1918 was filed by the assignee-decree-holder for recognising the assignment and for executing the razinama decree.

    4. The learned vakil for the appellant in the course of a lengthy argument has emphasised three points for our consideration : (1) That the razmama decree taken in its entirety is only in the nature of a preliminary decree and is incapable of execution in the absence of a final decree. (2) The razinama was made into a decree of the Court only so far as it relates to O.S. No. 80 of 1918. The terms of the razinama relate to matters not covered by O.S. No. 80 of 1918 and inasmuch as these do not fall strictly within the scope of the suit and as it is not possible to determine how far it relates to the subject-matter of the suit, the whole decree is incapable of execution. As regards the terms comprised in the razinama but not covered strictly by the scope of O.S. No. 80 of 1918 no relief can be given unless the decree-holder institutes separate suits upon the agreements contained therein and obtains decrees. (3) The assignment is not bona ft le and has not been made in the interest of the minor plaintiff.

    5. We will now deal with these points separately : (Point No. 1). It is argued that the decree passed in O.S. No. 80 of 1918 is only in the nature of a preliminary decree and the parties should obtain a final decree before taking out execution. We cannot uphold this argument. The decree in the present case was not passed upon a mortgage. A perusal of the plaint makes it clear that the suit is for specific performance or for damages. Paragraph 21(a) of the plaint containing the prayer portion runs-as follows : "The plaintiff prays for a decree directing the execution of a usufructuary mortgage, mortgaging the undermentioned lands for Rs. 20,113 plus interest as detailed below and subject to the previous usufructuary mortgages as undertaken in the agreement dated 5-12-1915, or, in the alternative, directing the defendants to pay the plaintiff the undermentioned amounts with subsequent interest." The utmost that can be said in favour of the appellant is that the suit is one for money in which a charge has been created by the decree. This does not convert the suit into a mortgage suit and make the provisions of Order 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable. There was clearly no mortgage suit pending before the Court and therefore there can be no question of a preliminary decree and a final decree. This argument must be overruled. (Point No. 2). The argument on this point has been pressed upon us with great force, by the learned vakil for the appellant. It is based upon the wording of Order 23, Rule 3 and in essence is this : The decree is executable, if at all, only so far as it "relates to the suit" and as it is not possible to discriminate between the component parts of the decree to find out how far it relates to the subject-matter of the suit, the entire decree is unexecutable; and as regards the matters comprised in the decree which do not strictly come within the saope of the suit, relief cannot be given to the plaintiff unless separate suits are instituted in enforcement of agreements. This argument is pressed with special force with reference to O.S. No. 83 of 1918 the withdrawal of which by the plaintiff is referred to as one of the terms of the compromise. The answer to this contention is two fold : (a) The provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 do not lend any support to the argument and (b) the parties treated the various terms of the compromise as essential parts of the decree and as considerations for the compromise and acted upon the decree in that light. Order 23, Rule 3, runs as follows : "Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith, so far as it relates to the suit." Reliance is placed on the words "so far as it relates to the suit" for emphasising the argument that the razinama decree which the Court has to pass can have reference only to the subject-matter of the suit and can have nothing to do with other ,matters which do not strictly come within the purview of it. The decisions of this Court which have been brought to our notice by the learned vakil for the respondents show that the language of the section is wide and general and that these terms of the section are not to be understood in the way contended for by the appellant. In Joti Kumnreteppa v. Izari Sirusappa [1907] 30 Mad. 478 it was held that "In a suit for money where the plaint prays for a simple money decree, an agreement by which the parties agree that the amount decreed according to the compromise should be a charge upon cartain properties, relates to the suit so as to be embodied in the decree." It was argued in that case that the claim of the plaintiff was only for money due under bonds which gave no charge on the defendant's property, and that it was therefore not competent to the Court to give a decree creating a charge even though the defendants agreed to such a charge as one of the terms of the compromise to be embodied in the decree. In dealing with that argument, the learned Judges say with reference to Section 375 of the old Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to Order 23, Rule 3 : "We see nothing in this language to preclude the Court from embodying in the decree the charge which the parties agreed to as security for the debt. The agreement was 'lawful', and it "relates to the suit," that is, to the matter of the claim in the case. In the claim as made in the plaint there was, it is true, no prayer to have the amount charged on the property, but there is nothing in principle or in the language of the section which we have quoted to restrict the relief to be granted in accordance with a compromise to what is prayed for in the plaint or less. If that were the intention of the legislature it would have found no difficulty in expressing the intention in suitable language. On the contrary, the language used is wide and general, and it is obvious that it would be highly inconvenient if the parties should not be allowed to settle their disputes on such lawful terms as they might agree to, without being restricted to such relief as one of the parties had chosen to claim in the plaint." It has been decided in Sabapathy v. Man Mahalinga [1914] 38 Mad. 959 that the terms in a razinama decree which formed consideration for the compromise of the suit must be deemed to be part of the decree and can be enforced in execution proceedings. In that ease their Lordships referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Puma Chandra Sirkar v. Nelmadhub Nandi (1915) 2 L.W. 608 which held that a decree passed on a compromise cannot be regarded as ultra vires simply because it goes beyond the subject-matter of the suit and contains other conditions, and that, if those other conditions are the consideration for the compromise of the subject-matter of the suit, they must be incorporated in the decree. The question for consideration therefore is whether these terms which are stated to go beyond the strict purview of the suit were considered by the parties as consideration for the compromise of the Suit No. 80 of 1918 in which the razinama was passed. This leads us on to the second answer to this argument. There can be no doubt that the parties to O.S. No. 80 of 1918 considered these terms as consideration for the compromise and acted on it themselves subsequent to the passing of the decree. In that view it is not the appellant's case that the terms of the compromise decree so far as the plaintiff was concerned were not carried out. As a matter of fact O.S. No. 82 of 1918 was dismissed and O.S. No. 82 withdrawn by the plaintiff ; only, the appellant has not acted up to the terms of the compromise so far as he was concerned and the apprehended trouble arising from such non-compliance was the reason as already indicated for the assignment of the decree. The cases relied on by the learned vakil for the appellant do not lend any substantial support to his argument. The decision in Subba Narayana Aiyar v. Maya Thevan (1917) M.W.N. 751 referred to by him really supports the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents. That decision suggests that if the terms of the compromise decree which do not relate to the suit appear either directly or indirectly as considerations on which the settlement of the plaint claim was based, then such terms may be considered as part of the decree executable with it. In Ariyaputhra Goundan v. Eliya Goundan (1917) M.W.N. 751 the present question did not arise for consideration. The question for determination in that case was whether the razinama filed in the suit required registration in respect of the portions in the razinama which were not given effect to in the decree. The learned Judges following Pranal Anni v. Lakshmi Anni (1900) 22 Mad. 508 held that the Court by its decree accepted the whole razinama and in consequence of such acceptance passed a decree in accordance therewith so far as the suit property was concerned and that the whole of the razinama was embodied in the decree of the Court and consequently required no registration, even with respect to immovable properties not comprised in the decree. The same observation has to be made about the decision in Hemantka Kumari Devi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. A.I.R. 1919 P.C. 79 relied upon by the appellant's learned vakil. In that case also the question for consideration was the necessity for registration for being admissible in evidence of a razinama decree which contains terms which do not come strictly within the purview of the suit which was compromised. In dealing with the question whether the decree can be given in evidence to affect matters not coming within the scope of the suit for want of registration the learned Judges no doubt make the remark that it may be that as a decree it is incapable of being executed outside the bounds of the suit, but that does not prevent if being received in evidence of its contents The present question was not raised ins that case and the opinion was expressed in a very hesitating manner. In this connection we may also draw attention to the decision of this Court reported in Manager of Sri Meenakshi Devastanam Madura v. Abdul Kdsim Sahib (1908) 30 Mad. 421 which says that the argument that the razinama decree contained reliefs which the plaintiff cannot have obtained in the suit after it had been tried affords no ground for questioning the decree in execution. According to this decision this argument must be taken by way of appeal and not in execution of the decree. We therefore hold that the compromise decree' in its entirety in this case is executable' and that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to institute separate suits as argued' by the appellant's vakil. This also meets the argument specially advanced with regard to O.S. No. 83 of 1918.

    6. (Point No. 3) : The last argument addressed to us relates to the bona fides of the assignment and to the question whether it was made in the interest of the minor plaintiff. The consideration mentioned in the assignment deed (Exhibit A) is made up as follows : (1) the asaignee-decree-holder is directed to pay Rs. 43,700 to the decree-holder in O.S. No. 98 6t 1918 on the file of the Trichinopoly Sub-Court; (2) He is also directed to pay Rs. 10,475 to one Sundararaja Pillai in payment of debts covered by Exhibits F and G; (3) Rs. 825 were paid for the execution of the document. The consideration in all, thus amounted to Rs. 55,000 mentioned in the deed. It is proved by Exhibits B, C and D (see also BI, C1 and DI) that the assignee-decree-holder has paid Rs. 17,000 in partial discharge of the decree in O.S. No. 98 of 1918 after the assignment. As regards the amount due to Sundararaja Pillai it arose in this way. Plaintiff's adoptive father Adinarayana Pillai executed a promissory note (Exhibit G) for Rs. 5 000 to Sundararaja and in renewal of it another promissory note (Exhibit F) was executed to the same individual by the minor plaintiff's next friend Thandathammal. Exhibit F contains an endorsement of discharge from Sundararaja Pillai. The genuineness and the bona fides of Exhibits F and G have been questioned by the appellant. The decree holder does not dispute the payment. The learned Subordinate Judge did not, consider it necessary to go into the question of the bona fides and genuineness of these documents as he safeguarded the interests of the minor against all possible loss by the order which he eventually passed. The order shows that the learned Judge was not wrong in the procedure which he adopted. The order runs as follows: The assignee-decree-holder shall not recover any amount from the judgment-debtor except through Court. Out of the amount that may be deposited by the judgment-debtor into Court the assignee-decree-holder shall draw whatever amount he pays in discharge of the decree in the said O.S. No. 98 of 1918 after satisfying the Court that he has made such payments. In this connection he is at present entitled to draw the amounts covered by Exhibits B. C. and D, with further interest at 6 per cent, per annum. The balance of the decree amount he shall be entitled to draw after production of the vouchers, viz., receipt obtained from the decree-holder in the said suit and certified copy or copies of applications filed into Court certifying satisfaction. As regards the amount over and above the said decree amount the assignee-decree holder shall be entitled to draw the same upon furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Court." The provision that the assignee-decree-holder shall not recover from the judgment-debtor any amount except through Court affords a general protection to the interests of the minor. His payment of Rs. 17,000 in partial discharge is proved conclusively by Exhibits B, BI, C, CI, D and DI. No exception can be taken to the permission granted to the assignee-decree holder to draw this amount with further interest. Then he is given permission to draw from Court from the amounts deposited by the judgment-debtor whatever further amounts he pays in discharge of the decree in O.S. No. 98 of 1918 after satisfying the Court that such payments have been made. This also cannot be objected to as it keeps in view the interest of the minor. As regards the amount over and above the decree, amount, namely, those covered by Exhibits F and G the assignee-decree-holder is not entitled to draw the same from the amount deposited by the judgment debtor except upon furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Court. As he is bound to give security no harm is done to the interest of the minor, if Exhibits F and G are at any time not found to be genuine as contended for by the appellant. An analysis of the order thus shows that, in recognising the assignment, the learned Judge kept prominently before him the interest of the minor-decree-holder. It is evident that the assignment was made by the minor's next friend to safeguard his interests as otherwise owing to the non-payment of the decree-debt in O.S. No. 98 of 1918 by the appellant according to the razinama decree the minor's properties were in danger of being sold. That calamity was averted by this assignment. We have been taken through the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2. There is really no evidence on the side of the appellant challenging the payment of consideration by the assignee-decree-holder. On a consideration of the evidence in the case we think that the assignment has been made bona fide by the next friend of the minor-decree-holder and the interests of the minor are safeguarded by the conditions imposed upon the assignee-decree-holder by the Subordinate Judge. His order recognising the assignment subject to the specified conditions and allowing the assignee-decree-holder to execute the decree must be upheld and this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal must be dismissed with costs.

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    Ramaswamy Nayudu v. K.N.S Subbaraya Thevar And Others
    (Jan 8, 1925)