Per Pant, J.
A conjoint reading of various provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957 leaves no doubt that though each of the seven sub-clauses of clause (a) of Section 14 relating to literary, dramatic or musical work, are independent of one another, but reading these sub-clauses independently cannot be interpreted to mean that the right of producer of sound recording, who also comes under the definition of author under Section 2(d)(v) of the Copyright Act, and has a right to communicate his work to the public under Section 14(e)(iii) thereof, is lost. It is nobody's case that the respondent/defendants had stolen the lyrics or that sound recording is made without licence from the lyricist or musician. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that the permission granted to the defendant was sans the right to communicate the sound recording to the public, cannot be accepted as there appears no such term and condition between the parties depriving the defendant from communicating his work of making song to the public.
(Para 19)
A song is created by three players, namely, lyricist, musician and singer. In view of the settled principles of law, and for the reasons discussed herein, there is no error in the impugned order passed by the High Court in a suit filed in 2006. However, it is clarified that with effect from 21-6-2012, in view of the insertion of sub-section (10) to Section 19 of the Copyright Act, the assignment of the copyright in the work to make sound recording which does not form part of any cinematograph film, shall not affect the right of the author of the work to claim an equal share of royalties or/and consideration payable for utilisation of such work in any form by the respondent/plaintiff.
(Paras 20 and 22)
Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Assn., (1977) 2 SCC 820; Entertainment Network (India) Limited v. Super Cassette Industries Limited ., (2008) 13 SCC 30, relied on
Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2645; Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3113, affirmed
Per Gogoi, J. (concurring)
The three classes of works in which copyright subsists under Section 13(1) of the Copyright Act, 1957 are (a) original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, (b) cinematograph films and (c) sound recording. A reading of the provisions of the said Act shows that such copyright co-exists. The question in the suit in which the impugned order has been passed by the High Court is one of determination of the precise extent of such co-existence and the interplay between the rights in the three classes of works enumerated under Section 13.
(Para 25)
Having perused the order of the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, it is opined that the order of the Single Judge (which has been affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench), strikes a reasonable note to find a workable solution during the pendency of the suit. The order of the High Court therefore needs to be upheld.
(Para 27)
Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2645; Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3113, affirmed
B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 39 — Interim/Interlocutory order/Injunction/Stay/Interim relief — Object of interim order — Exercise of power at interim stage — Scope and limitations as to — Principles summarised (per Gogoi, J.) — Constitution of India, Art. 136
Held :
Per Gogoi, J.
The object of an interim exercise by the court is to find a reasonable solution to the matter which should govern the parties until disposal of the suit where the main controversy is required to be decided.
(Para 27)
The present appeals being against an interim order, naturally, strong and compulsive reasons exist for exercise of judicial restraint in the manner and extent of exercise of jurisdiction. Though it is too elementary, it must be said that the Court must refrain from expressing any opinion, whatsoever, touching upon the merits of the controversy, lest, the same may prejudice either of the parties in the suit. While there can be no doubt that an order, even interim, sans any reasons, would not be judicially acceptable, the precise exercise that a court would be required to undertake at the interim stage must be left to the wise discretion of the court concerned itself. It is not only difficult but also undesirable to lay down the parameters and contours of the exercise of judicial power at the interim stage by expressly laying conditions which would be binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. But it needs to be reminded that an elaborate reasoning with the “footnote” that the same are prima facie or tentative is hardly an effective remedy to prevent the imprint of such observations on the human mind that mans the court at different levels. This is what appears to have happened in the present case.
(Para 26)
Having perused the order of the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, it is opined that the order of the Single Judge (which has been affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench), strikes a reasonable note to find a workable solution during the pendency of the suit. The order of the High Court therefore needs to be upheld.
(Para 27)
However, two disturbing trends have emerged from the facts of the present cases. The suits, by now, are over 10 years old; yet, there has been no substantial progress therein. The parties to the suits seem to have lost all interest in prosecuting the same, perhaps, because the exhaustive orders at the interim stage had virtually foreclosed the issues in the suits. The pendency of the suits for a period of over 10 years with no progress and the conduct of the plaintiffs in not filing/placing their evidence before the trial Judge, though vehemently contesting the present appeals (against interim orders), are the facts which are difficult to reconcile. Equally difficult is to accept the fact that the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers, though not a party to any of the suits but have been allowed to contest the interim matter before the Supreme Court on the basis that the order of the High Court adversely affects the Societies' rights, has chosen not to implead itself as a party to the suits and pursue the same.
(Para 28)
Having said what was felt required and necessary, all the appeals are disposed of by holding all observations, findings and views expressed by the High Court in the original as well as the appellate proceedings before it to be of no legal effect, whatsoever, insofar as the merits of the suits are concerned which will now be expedited and disposed of within a year from today.
(Para 29)
Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, CS (OS) No. 1185 of 2006, order dated 24-8-2016 (Jt. Registrar, Del HC); Indian Performing Right Society v. Entertainment Network (India) Ltd., CS (OS) No. 666 of 2006, order dated 30-11-2015 (Del); Phonographic Performance Ltd. v. CRI Events (P) Ltd., CS (OS) No. 1996 of 2009, order dated 30-11-2015 (Del), referred to
C. Statute Law — Amending Act/Amendment — Applicability of amended law to suit filed prior to amendment — Civil Procedure Code, 1908, S. 9
Held :
The Copyright Act, 1957 has been amended by Act 27 of 2012 w.e.f. 21-6-2012. In the present case the suit was filed in 2006, and the law as it existed has to be applied, for the period prior to 21-6-2012.
(Para 19)
D. Intellectual Property — Copyright Act, 1957 — Ss. 18 and 30 — Distinction between assignment of copyright of a work and licence to use the work — Held, in the assignment, normally, ownership of the copyright of the work is transferred, but in the case of licence, another person is allowed to use the work by the author — Words and Phrases — “Assignment”, “licence”
(Para 18)
W-D/57542/SV
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