1. By way of ad-interim relief, implementation of the impugned order was suspended up to 6.2.2009 i.e, up to today. As the hearing could not be concluded, it has been prayed that the ad-interim relief granted earlier be continued.
2. In the course of hearing, learned Senior Advocate Shri Ramakrishna Reddi appearing for respondent No. 2 has submitted that when the Hon'ble Speaker has disqualified any Member of a Legislative Assembly under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, implementation of the order of disqualification should not be stayed by any Court. In support of this submission, he has relied upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kihito Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651 and drawn our attention to Paragraphs 110 and 111 of the afore-stated judgment, which read as under:
“110. In view of the limited scope of judicial review that is available on account of the finality clause in Paragraph 6 and also having regard to the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power i.e, Speaker/Chairman, judicial review cannot be available at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker/Chairman and a quia timet action would not be permissible. Nor would interference be permissible at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings. Exception will, however, have to be made in respect of cases where disqualification or suspension is imposed during the pendency of the proceedings and such disqualification or suspension is likely to have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequence.
111. In the result, we hold on contentions (E) and (F):
That the Tenth Schedule does not, in providing for an additional grant (sic ground) for disqualification and for adjudication of disputed disqualifications, seek to create a non-justiciable constitutional area. The power to resolve such disputes vested in the Speaker or Chairman is a judicial power.
That Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeks to impart finality to the decision of the Speakers/Chairman is valid. But the concept of statutory finality embodied in Paragraph 6(1) does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution insofar as infirmities based on violations of constitutional mandates, mala fides, noncompliance with Rules of Natural Justice and perversity, are concerned.
That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule attracts an immunity analogous to that in Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of the Constitution as understood and explained in Keshav Singh's case to protect the validity of proceedings from mere irregularities of procedure. The deeming provision, having regard to the words ‘be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament’ or ‘proceedings in the legislature of a State’ confines the scope of the fiction accordingly.
The Speakers/Chairman while exercising powers and discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule Act as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review.
However, having regard to the Constitutional Schedule in the Tenth Schedule, judicial review should not cover any stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speakers/Chairmen. Having regard to the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power, no quia timet actions are permissible, the only exception for any interlocutory interference being cases of interlocutory disqualifications or suspensions which may have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequence.”
3. The learned Senior Advocate has, therefore, submitted that ad-interim relief, which had been granted earlier, should not be continued even if hearing of the matter has not been concluded.
4. On the other hand, it has been submitted by the learned advocates appearing for the petitioners viz., Shri Movva Chandrasekhar Rao and Shri Vedula Venkata Ramana that it is open to this Court to grant ad-interim relief for protecting the petitioners. It has also been submitted by them that the petitioners are hopeful of succeeding in the writ petitions and if they are not protected by way of ad-interim relief, irreparable damage would be caused to them.
5. It has been submitted by them that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has simply directed that when the proceedings are pending before the Hon'ble Speaker, no interim relief should be granted by any Court and as the proceedings before the Hon'ble Speaker have been concluded, it is open to this Court to grant ad-interim relief to the petitioners.
6. Learned advocate Shri Vedula Venkata Ramana has relied upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641, so as to substantiate his case to the effect that this Court can grant ad-interim relief, however, in our opinion, the said judgment has no application in the instant case.
7. We have heard the learned advocates on the issue of continuation of ad-interim relief, which had been granted earlier.
8. Upon hearing the learned advocates and looking to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kihito Hollohan v. Zachillhu (supra), we are of the view that while exercising the power of judicial review against an order passed by the Hon'ble Speaker, normally no interim relief should be granted. It has been clearly observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the afore-stated paragraphs that implementation of the order passed by the Hon'ble Speaker should not be stayed except when the Hon'ble Speaker has passed some interim order whereby a Member has been disqualified during the proceedings pending before him under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule.
9. In the afore-stated circumstances, in our opinion, it would not be open to this Court to extend the ad-interim relief, which had been granted earlier. We, therefore, do not extend ad-interim relief granted in favour of the petitioners, which is in operation today. Accordingly, WVMP Nos. 209 and 205 of 2009 are allowed and WPMP Nos. 37283 and 37476 of 2008 are dismissed
10. Hearing of the writ petition is adjourned to 9.2.2009