Mandadi Satyanarayana Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Hyderabad And Others, Andhra Pradesh High Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses an application for continuation of ad-interim relief previously granted in a matter involving disqualification of a Member of a Legislative Assembly under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India. The initial ad-interim relief suspended the implementation of the impugned order up to 6.2.2009. As the hearing could not be concluded by that date, the petitioners sought continuation of that relief.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Court can continue or grant ad-interim relief suspending the implementation of a disqualification order passed by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India.

Whether judicial review can intervene at an interlocutory stage in proceedings before the Speaker/Chairman under the Tenth Schedule.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent No. 2's Arguments

The implementation of a disqualification order by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule should not be stayed by any Court.

Relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Kihito Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651, particularly paragraphs 110 and 111, which emphasize limited judicial review and generally prohibit interlocutory interference in Speaker's decisions.

Submitted that ad-interim relief granted earlier should not be continued even if the hearing is not concluded.

Petitioners' Arguments

The Court has the power to grant ad-interim relief to protect the petitioners pending final adjudication.

Without such relief, irreparable damage could be caused to the petitioners.

Asserted that the Supreme Court's direction against interim relief applies only while proceedings are pending before the Speaker, and since the Speaker's proceedings have concluded, the Court can grant such relief.

Relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641 to support the possibility of ad-interim relief, though the Court found this judgment inapplicable to the present case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Kihito Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651	- Limited scope of judicial review against Speaker's decisions under Tenth Schedule. - No interlocutory relief against disqualification orders except in cases of grave, immediate, and irreversible harm. - Speaker's decisions have statutory finality but remain amenable to judicial review on grounds such as mala fides or violation of natural justice.	The Court relied on this precedent to hold that ordinarily no interim relief should be granted against the Speaker's disqualification orders, and that the ad-interim relief previously granted should not be extended.
Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641	Possibility of Courts granting ad-interim relief in certain circumstances.	The Court considered this precedent but found it inapplicable to the present facts and legal context.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

Kihito Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651

- Limited scope of judicial review against Speaker's decisions under Tenth Schedule.
- No interlocutory relief against disqualification orders except in cases of grave, immediate, and irreversible harm.
- Speaker's decisions have statutory finality but remain amenable to judicial review on grounds such as mala fides or violation of natural justice.

The Court relied on this precedent to hold that ordinarily no interim relief should be granted against the Speaker's disqualification orders, and that the ad-interim relief previously granted should not be extended.

Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641

Possibility of Courts granting ad-interim relief in certain circumstances.

The Court considered this precedent but found it inapplicable to the present facts and legal context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the scope of judicial review available against the Speaker's orders under the Tenth Schedule by extensively relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Kihito Hollohan v. Zachillhu. It noted that the Tenth Schedule confers adjudicatory powers on the Speaker with a statutory finality clause limiting judicial intervention. The Court emphasized that interlocutory relief against disqualification orders should generally not be granted, except in exceptional cases involving grave and irreversible consequences.

The Court found that the petitioners had not demonstrated such exceptional circumstances to warrant continuation of the ad-interim relief. It also rejected the petitioners' reliance on the Ravi S. Naik judgment, stating it was not applicable to the current situation. Consequently, the Court concluded that it was not open to extend the ad-interim relief and proceeded to dismiss the writ petitions while allowing the related WVMP applications.

Holding and Implications

The Court refused to extend the ad-interim relief previously granted suspending the implementation of the Speaker's disqualification order.

The direct effect is that the impugned order of disqualification will be implemented without further interim suspension. The decision reinforces the principle that judicial review of Speaker's decisions under the Tenth Schedule is limited and interlocutory relief is generally not available. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming binding Supreme Court authority.

Mandadi Satyanarayana Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Hyderabad And Others

1. By way of ad-interim relief, implementation of the impugned order was suspended up to 6.2.2009 i.e, up to today. As the hearing could not be concluded, it has been prayed that the ad-interim relief granted earlier be continued.

2. In the course of hearing, learned Senior Advocate Shri Ramakrishna Reddi appearing for respondent No. 2 has submitted that when the Hon'ble Speaker has disqualified any Member of a Legislative Assembly under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, implementation of the order of disqualification should not be stayed by any Court. In support of this submission, he has relied upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kihito Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651 and drawn our attention to Paragraphs 110 and 111 of the afore-stated judgment, which read as under:

“110. In view of the limited scope of judicial review that is available on account of the finality clause in Paragraph 6 and also having regard to the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power i.e, Speaker/Chairman, judicial review cannot be available at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker/Chairman and a quia timet action would not be permissible. Nor would interference be permissible at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings. Exception will, however, have to be made in respect of cases where disqualification or suspension is imposed during the pendency of the proceedings and such disqualification or suspension is likely to have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequence.

111. In the result, we hold on contentions (E) and (F):

That the Tenth Schedule does not, in providing for an additional grant (sic ground) for disqualification and for adjudication of disputed disqualifications, seek to create a non-justiciable constitutional area. The power to resolve such disputes vested in the Speaker or Chairman is a judicial power.

That Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeks to impart finality to the decision of the Speakers/Chairman is valid. But the concept of statutory finality embodied in Paragraph 6(1) does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution insofar as infirmities based on violations of constitutional mandates, mala fides, noncompliance with Rules of Natural Justice and perversity, are concerned.

That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule attracts an immunity analogous to that in Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of the Constitution as understood and explained in Keshav Singh's case to protect the validity of proceedings from mere irregularities of procedure. The deeming provision, having regard to the words ‘be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament’ or ‘proceedings in the legislature of a State’ confines the scope of the fiction accordingly.

The Speakers/Chairman while exercising powers and discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule Act as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review.

However, having regard to the Constitutional Schedule in the Tenth Schedule, judicial review should not cover any stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speakers/Chairmen. Having regard to the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power, no quia timet actions are permissible, the only exception for any interlocutory interference being cases of interlocutory disqualifications or suspensions which may have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequence.”

3. The learned Senior Advocate has, therefore, submitted that ad-interim relief, which had been granted earlier, should not be continued even if hearing of the matter has not been concluded.

4. On the other hand, it has been submitted by the learned advocates appearing for the petitioners viz., Shri Movva Chandrasekhar Rao and Shri Vedula Venkata Ramana that it is open to this Court to grant ad-interim relief for protecting the petitioners. It has also been submitted by them that the petitioners are hopeful of succeeding in the writ petitions and if they are not protected by way of ad-interim relief, irreparable damage would be caused to them.

5. It has been submitted by them that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has simply directed that when the proceedings are pending before the Hon'ble Speaker, no interim relief should be granted by any Court and as the proceedings before the Hon'ble Speaker have been concluded, it is open to this Court to grant ad-interim relief to the petitioners.

6. Learned advocate Shri Vedula Venkata Ramana has relied upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641, so as to substantiate his case to the effect that this Court can grant ad-interim relief, however, in our opinion, the said judgment has no application in the instant case.

7. We have heard the learned advocates on the issue of continuation of ad-interim relief, which had been granted earlier.

8. Upon hearing the learned advocates and looking to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kihito Hollohan v. Zachillhu (supra), we are of the view that while exercising the power of judicial review against an order passed by the Hon'ble Speaker, normally no interim relief should be granted. It has been clearly observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the afore-stated paragraphs that implementation of the order passed by the Hon'ble Speaker should not be stayed except when the Hon'ble Speaker has passed some interim order whereby a Member has been disqualified during the proceedings pending before him under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule.

9. In the afore-stated circumstances, in our opinion, it would not be open to this Court to extend the ad-interim relief, which had been granted earlier. We, therefore, do not extend ad-interim relief granted in favour of the petitioners, which is in operation today. Accordingly, WVMP Nos. 209 and 205 of 2009 are allowed and WPMP Nos. 37283 and 37476 of 2008 are dismissed

10. Hearing of the writ petition is adjourned to 9.2.2009

WVMP No. 209 of 2009 and Batch