JUDGMENT
1. The fourth respondent landlord, filed an application for eviction of the petitioner from a building in his occupation, on the ground of bona fide need for reconstruction, under S. 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short, the Act). The petition was filed on 14-8-1969 prior to the commencement on 1-1-1970 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. According to the landlord, the petitioner-tenant bad been inducted into possession of the building on 15-7-1953 as per the rent deed Ext. AI, executed by the petitioner to the fourth respondent's mother.
2. The tenant-petitioner contended inter alia that he bad been pot in possession of the building with 22 cents of adjacent property, that he bad made improvements to the building in the first instance, and subsequently reconstructed it, and that therefore, it did not need reconstruction. When the petition came on for trial, the petitioner remained ex parte. On the basis of the evidence adduced on the side of the landlord, the petition was allowed and eviction ordered. The petitioner was directed to put the fourth respondent-landlord in possession of the building for reconstruction under S. 11(4)(iv) of the Act. The Rent Control Court however omitted to specify any time limit within which the reconstruction was to be dooe. The tenant filed appeal before the Appellate Authority. It was prima facie out of time and hence a petition for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed. This petition was dismissed on the ground that the Limitation Act was not applicable to proceedings before the Appellate Authority who had therefore no jurisdiction to condone the delay, or to entertain the appeal filed out of time. The appeal was dismissed in consequence on July 17, 1973. The matter rested there for ten years; seven months and twentyone days, after which the tenant filed a Revision Petition before the Revisional Court, namely, the District Court, Ernakulam under S. 20 of the Act. That was on March 9, 1984. The long delay according to the tenant, was not fatal in as much as S. 20 enabled the Rvisional Court to entertain a revision “at any time”, and therefore, the Revision Petition filed at this distance of time was liable to be entertained. This contention was accepted by the District Court, who entertained the Revision Petition, and dealt with the matter on merits. On consideration of the relevant dates, the District Judge held that the tenant had filed his appeal before the Appellate Authority in time, namely, on the thirtieth day of limitation (a finding with which I find myself unable to agree, having regard to the dates mentioned. However, I am not rendering any decision on this question as it Was not a matter on which the parties joined issue before me). The tenant petitioner prayed for remanding the case with opportunity to adduce evidence there being no evidence on record on bis side as be had absented himself at the trial. The District Judge did not think it fit to accede to this request in view of the long lapse of time, and the facts disclosed. However, and since the Rent Control Court had omitted to fix any period of time for the reconstruction, the Revisional Court modified the order of eviction by directing the landlord to complete the reconstruction of the building within one year from the date on which he got possession thereof. Option was given to the tenant to have the reconstructed building allotted to him with liability to pay its fair rent, as provided in the third proviso to S. 11(4)(iv) of the Act.
3. The tenant-petitioner has filed this Original Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging inter alia, the order in revision passed by the District Court, Ernakuiam and to quash it by the issue of a writ of certiorari. I may even at the outset state that this petition is not maintainable under Article 226 in as much as the Revisional Court functioning under S. 20 of the Act is a Civil Court and not a persona designata, vide Vareed v. Mary (1968 KLT. 583 (FB)). This part of the decision of the Full Bench is not affected by the decision of the Supreme Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai. (1987 (1) KLT. 53). It is now well settled by the decisions of this Court in Nulla Koya v. Administrator, Union Territory of Laccadives (1967 KLT. 395) and Nalla Koya v. Administrator, Union Territory of Laccadives (1968 KLT. 60) that a writ of certiorari will not issue to quash the order of a Civil Court. This Original Petition has, therefore, to be treated only as one falling under Article 227 of the Constitution and I shall deal with it as such. Before doing so, I shall advert to the petitioner's contentions in defence to the Rent Control Petition as also to a few more facts emanating from the counter affidavit filed by the 4th respondeot-landlord.
4. After the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal before the Appellate Authority on July 17, 1973, the petitioner filed an application O.A No. 798 of 1973 before the Land Tribunal, Palluruthy for purchase of kudikidappu rights uoder S. 80-B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. This application was dismissed by the Land Tribunal at Ernakuiam (to which it stood transferred) and this decision was affirmed by the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms), Ernakuiam on November 16, 1981. The petitioner thereafter filed a Revision Petition, C.R.P No. 934 of 1981, in this court under S. 103 of the Land Reforms Act which was heard and dismissed on November 2, 1983. Inter alia this court held that the petitioner was in possession of the building under the rent deed (Ext A1) dated 15-7-1953 and that be had never had any claim or plea of being a kudikidappukaran in the proceedings under the Rent Control Act. On the other hand, his contention was that be was a tenant of the building and of about 22 cents of land. In these circumstances, apart from others, it was held that the petitioner was not entitled to claim to be a kudikidappukaran.
5. This court's judgment was on November 2, 1983. It was four months and seven days thereafter that the petitioner filed bis Revision Petition before the District Court under S. 20 of the Act.
6. After having lost successively in the proceedings under the Land Reforms Act, the petitioner has now set up his wife to file an application O.A No. 112 of 1987 before the Special Tahsildar, Land Reforms, Ernakuiam for purchase of kudikidappu rights, as if she were a kudikidappukari in respect of the building.
7. Petitioner's contention in this Original Petition is that having entertained the Revision Petition and held that the appeal before the Appellate Authority was in time, the District Court should have remitted the matter back to the Appellate Authority, for fresh consideration instead of passing an order itself in the matter. It is submitted that in that event the petitioner would have bad an opportunity to lead evidence regarding his alleged tenancy right over 22 cents of land, with a building thereon.
8. Counsel for the landlord, however, submits that the case of tenancy over 22 cents of land stands concluded against the petitioner by this Court's judgment in C.R.P, No. 934 of 1981, and otherwise. The terms of Ex. A1 are also clear. This court has found in C.R.P No. 934 of 1981 that the petitioner is in possession of the building as per the rent deed Ext. A.1, the execution of which has been admitted by him. Ext. A.1 describes the subject matter of the lease, only as a building, as under:—
9. This finding rendered io C.R.P No. 934 of 1981 has not been challenged by filing any appeal to the Supreme Court.
10. Further, the petitioner himself had applied for purchase of kudi-kidappu rights in respect of the building the claim being for three cents of land as a kudikidappukaran. If the petitioner were a tenant over 22 cents of land, it is incomprehensible how he would have contended himself with a claim for a mere three cents as a kudikidappukaran. Lastly his wife has now set up rights as a kudikidappukari is respect of the building. The evidence, and the consistent conduct of the petitioner (states the landlord) conclusively negate the petitioner's claim to tenancy right over 22 cents of land.
11. I may at this juncture point out that the District Court has committed a gross error in entertaining the Revision Petition filed after a long lapse of 10 years, 7 months and 21 days. It is true that S. 20 of the Act does not specify any time limit for approaching the Revisional Court. On the other hand, it enables the District Court at any lime to call for and examine the records of the Appellate Authority in relation to any order passed or proceedings taken, for the purpose, of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the said order or proceedings. That does now however mean that the District Court can exercise its jurisdiction at any future time without any limitation whatsoever. The exercise of Revisional power is entirely discretionary, and should be in the interests of justice. S. 20 does not confer any right on the petitioner but only vests a power in-the District Court. It is a privilege conferred on the petitioner, and not a right. The petitioner is therefore expected to be diligent in invoking the revisional power He most come to Court without undue delay—1 should say, at the earliest. As noted by a Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in a case arising under S. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, delay in approaching the Court is one of the factors on which the exercise of the discretion rests. The Court observed:—
“The Court will in all cases, regard its exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction as discretional and subject to considerations of the importance of the particular case, or of the principle involved in it, of delay on the part of an applicant, and of his merits with respect to the case in which the interference of the Court is sought.”
(Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath, ILR. 7 Bom. 831)
12. Krishna Iyer J., had occasion to deal with a case where the Revisional Court entertained The revision after a period of two years from the date of the Appellate Authority's order. The Judge observed:
“The revision was filed, as I said earlier, over 2 years after the appeal was disposed of, but was admitted and heard, because by a strange omission in the statute, as both sides submitted, no period, of limitation is fixed in the matter of entertaining a revision. Litigation can become a long,-acting torment if an order can be challenged years later on the pretext that there is no period of limitation fixed in the statute. Of coarse, it is for the legislature to remedy this lacuna, but it is certainly open to the revisional court to decline to exercise its discretion when a party moves for relief after a period of indiscret delay.” (Padmanabha Pillai v. Narayana Pillat, 1969 KLJ. 614).
13. It is well to remember at this stage that the Limitation Act, 1908 had not prescribed any period of limitation for a revision petition under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Nevertheless it had been the accepted rule of practice and discretion in almost all High Courts that the party aggrieved must approach the High Court for the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 within a period of 90 days, namely the period pre scribed for filing an appeal. (Vide Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure 14th Edition, Volume I, page 696, Note 37 and AIR. commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure 10th Edition Volume Two, page 388, Note 17). This was the conventional period within which any suitor was required to approach the High Court, subject of course to extension of the time on sufficient cause being shown. Any application for revision beyond this period was treated as belated. The Limitation Act of 1963 gave legislative recognition to this conventional period by its Article 131-in the Schedule to the Act. Even a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has normally to be filed within a period of 90 days. It has been so held in the decisions in Venkita-subramonia Iyer v. Catholic Bank of India Ltd. (1957 KLT. 411) Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala (1986 KLT. 817).
14. When this is the well established practice even in relation to proceedings under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no reason why the Revisionai Court should be permitted to deal with a revision petition under S. 20 of the Act, without any limit of time.
15. It must be observed here that expedition is the watchword in proceedings under the Act. When S. 24 hope fully prescribes a period of four months for passing final orders by the Rent Control Court, and S. 18 prescribes a bare period of thirty days for filing an appeal and a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution which lies against the order of the Revisionai Court has ordinarily to be filed within ninety days, it cannot be that the intermediate authority namely the Revisionai Court alones hould have an unlimited period of time within which to exercise its jurisdiction. The words “at anytime” have to be delimited to reasonable levels having regard to prevalent practice and the nature of the power to be exercised. A period of ninety days should be treated as the reasonable time within, which an aggrieved party should move under S. 20. Any delay thereafter has to be explained satisfactorily before the court can be requested to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner.
16. It is axiomatic that any authority exercising discretionary powers should act reasonably. Reasonableness is the touchstone of all judicial and quasi judicial actions. (See in this connection: Secretary of State v. Metropolitan Borough of Tamestde, 1976 (3) All England Law Reports 665). The District Court functiong under S. 20 should therefore., exercise its power in a reasonable manner. Any delay in invoking the power makes its exercise oppressive, arbitrary and unreasonable. Since ninety days has all along been accepted as a reasonable period for invoking the power of revision, the District Court should act only if approached by the aggrieved party within ninety days. That is not to say that it will not, in appropriate cases. Where the delay is properly and satisfactorily explained, interfere, or exercise its discretion, even if approached beyond this period. Sufficient cause should be established in all such cases.
17. In this case; the tenant had not furnished any reason why he took ten years, seven months and twentyone days to approach the District Court. The pendency of the proceedings under S. 80B is not a ground in extenuation of this unreasonable delay. For that matter, it has to be noted that the tenant filed even his petition in the District Court only four months and seven days after this Court disposed of his revision petition. The order of the District Court does not disclose or set forth any reason why the revision petition was entertained at such a long distance of time. The District Court has acted unreasonably in entertaining the revision after ten years without any reason. The District Court should have dismissed the Revision Petition in limine on this short ground.
18. However, I am not resting my decision on this ground. The case set up by the tenant was that he was a tenant of the building, with 22 cents of land. For the various reasons set forth earlier, this case of the tenant is quite unfounded. The complaint loudly voiced by the petitioner is that the District Court should have remitted the matter for farther evidence after having found that the appeal before the Appellate Authority was in time. A litigant who had chosen to keep away from the trial and gone in search of other untenable avenues for relief cannot claim or request as of right, to reopen a matter which had its genesis in 1969 and bad its appellate quietus in mid 1973, to open up the litigative process over again to go on for another tormenting round. The District Court did examine the matter and record its own conclusion on the merits. I do not find any illegality or error of jurisdiction so it.
19. Interference under Article 227 is not as of right but discretionary, and limited inter alia to cases where the authorities have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and where manifest injustice has resulted. No such circumstances exist in this case. If at all any interference is called for, it is to quash the entertainment of the revision petition itself by the District Court after ten long years. The petitioner is not entitled to relief under Article 227 merely to satisfy the technicality of a remand to the Appellate Authority for deciding the case on merits. The petitioner himself has slept over his rights, been negligent and set on conflicting claims. There is no reason why this court should interfere in favour of such a person.
20. A suitor is not bound to be harassed with endless proceedings as has happened in this case. After a time, be is entitled to sit back with the satisfaction of having the proceedings initiated against him terminated, or come to an end. This has found expression in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rabindra Hatha Bose v. Union of India ((1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR. 1970 SC. 470), where it was observed:
“It would be unjust to deprive the respondents” rights which have accrued to them Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years.” This principle must apply, mutatis mutandis, to the proceedings in question as well.
21. The District Court has acted rightly in refusing to remand the case, and in setting right the minor error committed by the Rent Control Court in not fixing a time for reconstruction. I do not find any merit in this Original Petition. It is accordingly dismissed.
22. Dismissed.