(Delivered by Hon'ble Devi Prasad Singh, J.) -- Heard shri Umesh Chandra, appellant No.1 who appeared in person and argued, as well as counsel for the other appellants namely; Shri Hira Lal Srivastava and Smt. Bulbul Godial and Shri Raghvendra Kumar Singh, Shri S.P. Singh, Shri H.G. Parihar, appeared for private respondents and learned Standing Counsel for the State. Since, in these appeals common question of law and facts are involved, hence, we proceed to decide by present common judgment. 2. Substantial question of law raised by the appellants in the present appeal, is as to whether in the absence of any resolution of Committee of Management or General Body of a Society, a writ petition can be filed by its office bearer (in the present case. Secretary of the Society) to plead the cause of Society? Whether after deciding the controversy while exercising appellate power under the Rules of Court one of the member of the Division Bench deciding the appeal may decide the writ petition while sitting single? Other questions raised by the appellants relates to power of review of an order passed by the Deputy Registrar as well as applicability of Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and other co-related issues. 3. Manila Vidyalaya Society. Aminabad. Lucknow (in short hereinafter referred as the 'Society') is a registered Society under the Societies Registration Act. The Society is managed by its bye laws/constitution framed in pursuance to resolution of its General Body. A College with the name and title of Mahila Vidyalaya, Aminabad. Lucknow has been established by the Society and managed by its Managing Committee. The institution i.e. Mahila Vidyalaya Aminabad. Lucknow (in short hereinafter referred as the 'College') is a recognized institution under the relevant Act and Provisions of law. The tenure of the Committee of the Management in accordance to constitution of the Society is of three years from the date of its election. The last election of the Committee of Management was held on 16.5.1999 for the period of three years. Accordingly, the tenure of the validly elected Committee of Management has been expired on 15.5.2002: Shri Umesh Chandra, appellant No.1 was elected as President of the Society in question. Shri Y.C. Rai. who filed the writ petition, is the Secretary of the Society. When no election was held within stipulated period provided by the Rules of the Society, the Deputy Registrar vide letter dated 2.11.2002 had directed the President of the Society to provide the records of the Society and list of the members as evident from the averments contained in Para 7 of the writ petition to proceed under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act. 4. While submitting the records, the President had informed the Deputy Registrar that there are 214 life members and 170 ordinary members in the General Body of the Society. While submitting a reply in response to letter of Deputy Registrar the copy of office memorandum dated.11.4.2000 issued by the Deputy Registrar in a proceeding under Section 4 of the Societies Registration Act was also submitted. The Office Memorandum dated 11.4.2000 has been filed as Annexure CA-3 to the impleadment application filed by the appellant alongwlth C.M. Application No.866 of 2003 in the Writ Petition No.884 (MS) of 2003. A plain reading of Office Memorandum dated 11.4.2000 issued by Deputy Registrar shows that a meeting of General Body was convened on 20.2.2000 after circulating its agenda to all the members of General Body as well as by publication in newspapers on 13.2.2000, 19.2.2000 and 20.2.2000. Shri Ram Chandra Srivastava the then Manager-cum-Secretary of the Society had made a prayer for cancellation of the meeting of the General Body dated 20.2.2000. While submitting a representation dated 18.2.2000 alongwith letter dated 15.2.2000, the meeting of General Body dated 20.2.2000 was called on to consider the conduct of Shri Ram Chandra Srivastava the then Manager-cum-Secretary of the Society. 5. It was held by the then Deputy Registrar that since conduct of Shri Ram Chandra Srivastava itself was in question, the objection raised by him against the said meeting was not sustainable. The meeting of General Body was convened by the President in response to requisition sent by five members of General Body. At that time a defence was taken by Shri Ramesh Chandra Srivastava the then Secretary that there were total 157 life members in the General Body but the President Shri Umesh Chandra Srivastava had claimed that there were 214 life members in the General Body. From the finding recorded by the Deputy Registrar vide order dated 11.4.2000 it appears that notices were sent to 214 life members of the General Body for the General Body meeting of 20.2.2000. while circulating the agenda it has been also recorded by Deputy Registrar that there was no dispute relating to a rival Committee of Management in the Society in question. The resolution of the executive body of the Society dated 11.2.2000 followed by 28.2.2000 has been filed as Annexure-8 to the impleadment application in the writ petition. The list of 214 life members was approved by the executive body and sent to Deputy Registrar by letter dated 22.11.2002 vide Annexure-8. The other list is of ordinary member containing the names of 170 persons. After receipt of relevant information from the President the Deputy Registrar had notified a scheme for election on 8.3.2003. a copy of which has been filed as Aonexure-1 to the writ petition. While notifying the scheme, the Deputy Registrar has fixed 12.3.2003 for publication of provisional electoral roll and 13.1.2003 for publication of tentative electoral roll. From the perusal of averment contained in Para 8 of the impleadment application (C.M. AppJication No.8664 (MS) of 2003). it has been pleaded by the appellant of the present appeal that in the General Body meeting held on 20.2.2000 Shri Y.C. Rai private respondent was inducted as Manager-cum-Seeretarv in place of Shri Ram Chandra Srivastava. On account of death of one Shri Yogendra Nath Srivastava a member of Managing Committee Shri K.B. Sinha was opted in file place as life member. The minutes of General Body meeting has been filed as Annexure-5 to the impleadment application. In the General Body meeting of 20.2.2000 certain other persons were elected as office bearer whose names have been given in Para 9 of the impleadment application. Thus the validity of the General Body meeting dated 20.2.2000 seems to be out of question. Accordingly, it also appears that 214 life members were called on by issuing notices to participate in General Body meeting of 20.2.2000. 6. During the course of proceeding before the Deputy Registrar relating to the membership of Society in question Shri Y.C. Rai who had filed the writ petition on behalf of Society had raised a plea that the total old life member of the General Body is 157 and 22 new members were inducted besides 64 ordinary members. It was submitted by Shri Y.C. Rai that induction of 106 ordinary members and 57 life members after election of 16.5.1999 was not lawful. The Deputy Registrar by order dated 13.1.2003, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition, had recorded a finding that there are only 157 life members and 64 ordinary members and accordingly directed that only they shall be entitled to cast their vote in the Societies election. The order dated 13.1.2003 was impugned through Writ Petition No.235 (MS) of 2003 by two newly inducted life members Mrs. Preeti Dayal and Mrs. Beena Saxena. Admittedly appellants were not party to said writ petition. This Court by interim order dated 16.1.2003 had stayed the order dated 13.1.2003, a copy of which has been Annexure-3 to the writ petition. Thus before the publication of final electoral roll as provided by notification dated 8.1.2003 the tentative electoral roll or list dated 13.1.2003 of General Body was stayed by this Court. In the notification dated 8.1.2003. 22.1.2003 was fixed as a date for publication of final electoral roll. The writ petition No.235 of 2005 was withdrawn by the petitioners of the said writ petition hence the Special Appeal No.25 and 30 of 2003 were dismissed as infructuous by order dated 5.2.2003, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure 4 to the writ petition. 7. On account of dismissal of special appeal and withdrawal of writ petition the Deputy Registrar by impugned order dated 8.3.2003 had notified fresh election schedule, which has been impugned by Shri Y.C. Rai on behalf of Society in Writ Petition No.884 of 20Q3 with the prayer that the election should be held in pursuance to list finalized vide order dated 13.1.2003. While filing the writ petition it has not been pleaded by Shri Y.C. Rai as to under what capacity and authority he had preferred the said writ petition. It has also not been pleaded as to whether the Executive Body or the General Body had authorized him to file the writ petition in this Court to challenge the order dated 8.3.2003. While filing an affidavit in support of writ petition it has been indicated by Shri Y.C. Rai that he is the Secretary of the Society running the institutions or College in question but it has been not stated as to whether he has got power under by laws or constitution of the Society to file the writ petition or whether he has been authorized by the Managing Committee or General Body of the Society to file the writ petition? No where it has been pleaded that he had filed the writ petition to defend the cause of the Society or to protect the rights of the Society. It has also not been pleaded that what prejudice shall cause to the Society in case the impugned notification dated 8.3.2003 survives and implemented. 8. This Court by interim order dated 21.3.2003 passed in Writ Petition No.884 (MS) of 2003 had stayed the notification dated 8.3.2003 to the extent it relates to condition No. 1, 2 and 3 by which objections are invited for the preparation of voter list. Feeling aggrieved with the interim order dated 21.3.2003 Special Appeal No.143 (MS) of 2003 and Special Appeal No. 159 (MS) of 2003 were preferred by appellants and other persons. Special appeal was decided by the Division Bench of this Court consisting Hon'ble Mr. Justice Khem Karan and Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Rakhra by judgment and order dated 1.9.2003, a copy of which has been filed asAnnexure-A-1 to the C.M. Application No.5124 of 2004 filed in the writ petition for modification of interim order dated 21.3.2003. While deciding the special appeal the Division, Bench of this Court though not recorded any finding that as to whether the order dated 13.1.2003 was administrative or not and can be reviewed or not but remanded the matter to Hon'ble Single Judge to decide the issue on merit in accordance to law. However, entire election process notified vide order dated 8.3.2003 was stayed till disposal of writ petition. 9. Under the above facts and circumstances of the case, the controversy was heard by Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court (Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Rakhra) and writ petition was allowed by impugned judgment, which is the subject matter of appeal under these bunch of special appeals came up before this Bench in lieu of nomination done by Hon'ble Senior Judge of this Court. Hon'ble Single Judge had set aside the condition No.1. 2 and 3 of the notification dated 8.3.2003 with the finding that the decision taken by the Deputy Registrar vide order dated 13.1.2003 was not purely an executive function. However, while doing so Hon'ble Single Judge had proceeded to distinguish a Division Bench judgment of this Court relied upon by the petitioner reported in 1992 HVD (Allahabad) 235. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha. UP. v. Registrar. Firms, Societies and Chits. During the course of proceeding before the Hon'ble Single Judge, some of the appellants had moved an application under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the Shri Y.C. Rai feeling aggrieved with the averment contained in Para 10. 11. 12 and 14 of the affidavit dated 9.9.2004 on the ground that those are false and based on unfounded facts. However. Hon'ble Single Judge had declined to exercise power conferred under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. Though specific plea was taken and argued by the appellant before Hon'ble Single Judge that the writ petition was not maintainable on behalf of Society as Committee of Management has not passed any resolution authorizing Shri Y.C. Rai to file the writ petition. A finding has been recorded by Hon'ble Single Judge that under the general power of management conferred by Rule 31 of the Rules of the Society. Sri Y.C. Rai was competent to file a writ petition being Secretary. Needless to say that question relating to the competence of Shri Y.C. Rai to file a writ petition on behalf of Society was an important question of law and in case the competence of Shri Y.C. Rai to file the writ petition would have been negatived by Hon'ble Single Judge the writ petition could not have been considered on merit 11. The appellant while assailing the impugned judgment proceeded to submit that Shri Y.C. Rai was not competent to file the writ petition on behalf of Society and Hon'ble Single Judge should not have decided the writ petition being member of the bench which has decided the earlier special appeal. It has been further submitted by the appellants that the publication dated 1.3.2003 was an administrative act, hence. Deputy Registrar was competent to review the earlier decision while notifying the election afresh. The other around raised by appellant is that all 214 life members and 114 ordinary members were called on to participate in the General Body meeting on 20.2.2000 and 3.11.2002 hence are entitled to cast their votes. It was because of participation of 214 life members and ordinary members inducted after the election of 1999 Shri Y.C. Rai was elected and inducted as the Secretary-cum-Manager of the Society in question. In case the validity of life members who had participated in the General Body meeting of 20.2.2000 is not upheld, then the election and induction of Shri Y.C. Rai as Secretary-cum-Manager in the Society itself shall become invalid. It has been further submitted that since neither the Committee of Management and nor General Body had not passed any resolution for the filing of the writ petition Shri Y.C. Rai was not competent to file the writ petition in this Court. It has also been submitted that the Constitution or by laws of the Society does not empower the Secretary or even the President to file a petition on their own in the absence of resolution of executive body. The other submission is that Hon'ble Single Judge should have allowed the application filed under Section 349 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Shri Umesh Chandra, appellant No.1 had further submitted that in order to deposition of fees on early date or any irregularity committed by the Society relating to the induction of new members shall be covered by the "doctrine of indoor management" and members so inducted can not be blamed for any lapses on the part of Society. It has also been submitted that Shri Y.C. Rai himself had submitted a list containing the names of new members. It has been further submitted that sub-section 2 of Section 25 of the Act does not empower the Registrar or Deputy Registrar to travel beyond the Rules of the Society. The power conferred to office bearer and members of the Society under the Rules can not be abrogated by the Deputy Registrar while deciding the controversy. After making payment of subscription fees members have discharged their duties and any subsequent irregularity shall not effect their membership. It has also been submitted that meeting for the purpose of election should be held strictly in accordance to Rules of the Society and shall not rest on the discretion of Deputy Registrar or Registrar. Before publication of final electoral roll Registrar has got power to consider the grievance and correct any error which may be apparent, at the face of record after providing opportunity of hearing to the affected parties. Being a private Society even after publication of final electoral roll in pursuance to notification electoral roll can be corrected by Deputy Registrar being discharging duty of administrative nature. While assailing impugned judgment relating to the maintainability of writ petition Shri Umesh Chandra as well as Shri Hira Lal had relied upon the Judgments reported in (2002) 3 UPLBEC 2777. Saraswati Vidya Mandir. Rewatipur. Ghazipur through its Manager Smt. Ram Rakhi Devi v. State of U. P. and others. (1976) AWC (Journal) 18. Sardar Patel Higher Secondary School. Deve Nagar. Mathura v. The Deputy Director of Education. Agra Region. Agra and others. AIR 1951 Allahabad 1. Indian Sugar Mills Association through its President Shri Hari Rai Swarup v. Secy. To Government. Uttar Pradesh Labour Department and others and Allahabad Rent Cases 1994 (1) 435. Arya Samaj Ganesh Ganj v. Man Mohan Tewari and others. On judicial proprietary and discipline appellants have relied upon the judgments reported in Supreme Court Reports (1963) 22. R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-UI-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid. AIR 1965 SC 1349. Kamalammal and others v. Venkatalakashmi Ammal and another. (1984) 2 SCC 324, Smt. Kausalya Devi Bogra and others v. Land Acquisition Officer. Aurangabad and another. Al R 1997 Supreme Court 2431. State of UP. v. C.L Agarwal. 1998 (5) SCC 637. State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Association and others. 2002 (1) SCC 649. Harjeet Singh alias Seeta v. State of Hunjab and another. While arguing on the power of Registrar or Deputy Registrar in pursuance to provision contained in sub-section 2 of Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act appellants have relied upon the case reported in HVD (All) 1992 (II) 235. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha. U.P. v. Registrar. Firms. Societies & Chits and others, 2002 (4) AWC 3050 (LB). Navyug Radiance Senior Secondary School Society and another, v. Registrar. Firms. Societies & Chits and another. 2002 (4) AWC 3083 (LB). Sandeep Agarwal and others v. Adarsh Chandha and others. On controversy relating to preparation of membership list of the Society appellants have relied upon the cases reported in (1980) 4 SCC 211. Bar Council of Delhi and others v. Surjeet Singh and others. (1998) 2 UPLBEC 1271. Committee of Management. Azamgarh v. Assistant Registrar. Firms. Societies and Chits. Azamgarh. 2003 (52) ALR 772. Dr. Virendra Bahadur Singh v. Assistant Registrar. Firms. Societies & Chits. Varanasi and others. It has been submitted by appellants that once the proposed members deposit their fees then for any lapses on the part of Society or its office bearer in not depositing the membership fees immediately or in not completion of any formalities under Rules shall not effect the validity of membership of newly inducted members on the doctrine of indoor management. To advance the argument relating to the applicability of doctrine of indoor management appellants have relied upon the judgments reported in AIR 1946 Madras 35. P.V. Damodara Reddi and another v. Indian National Agencies Ltd., AIR 1959 Punjab 106. Dewan Singh Hira Singh v. Minerva Films Ltd., Sonepat. While defending the action of President to exercise emergency power in accordance to byelaw Rules of the Society, appellants have relied upon the cases reported in 1957 the Indian Law Reports 214. Suraj Prakash v. Lucknow University. Unreported Judgment of Division Bench of this Court. Mahila Vidyalaya. Lucknow v. State of U.P. It has also been submitted by appellants that Hon'ble Single Judge should have exercised power under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relying upon the pronouncements of Apex Court reported in AIR 1961 SC 181. NarainDasv. State of U.P.. 2002(1) SCC 253. Pritish v. State of Maharashtra. 2000(5) SCC 668. Swaran Singh v. State Of Punjab.. While defending their actions relating to the pleading on the basis of counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit appellants have placed reliance on the cases reported in AIR 1962 Allahabad 439. Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh v. Additional Registrar, Firms, Societies & Chits. While relying upon the cases reported in 1974 (4) SCC 3, E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamilnadu & another: 1978 (1) SCC 248, Mrs. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India and another; 1991 (2) SCC 604, Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association v. State of Karnataka and others: 2002 (2) SCC 333, Balco Employees Union v. Union of India and others: 2003 (4) SCC 557, Canara Bank and others v. Debasis and others: HVD (All) 1992 (11)235, Arya Pratinidhi Sabha U.P. and another v. Registrar. Firms. Societies and Chits and 2002 (4) AWC 3050 (LB), Navyug Radiance Senior Secondary School Society and another v. Registrar. Firms. Societies and Chits. U.P. Smt. Bulbul Godial appeared for the appellants had proceeded to submit that the newly inducted members after 1999 election have got right of audience and to cast vote. Neither their membership can be set aside nor they can be restrained to exercise their rights by an ex parte order in utter disregard to principle of natural justice. It has been further submitted by Smt. Bulbul Godial that all the new members including the appellants have exercised their rights in two General Body meetings hence their names should be included in the voter list. It has also been submitted that before publication of final electoral roll i.e. prior to 22.1.2003 members have got right to raise their grievance and electoral roll can be corrected by reconsidering the issue. Neither the constitutional provisions nor the provisions contained in the Representation of Peoples Act are applicable in the matter of private societies like the present one. Smt. Bulbul Godial had raised two folds of arguments, firstly, duty exercised by Registrar in pursuance to sub-section 2 of Section 25 of the Act is administrative in nature and secondly, it was incumbent the Deputy Ragistrar to provide opportunity of hearing to all the members who were inducted in Society after 1999 election before deleting their names from the electoral roll. It has been brought on record by filing an affidavit by the appellant that Shri Y.C. Rai was suspended by the Society through resolution dated 14.4.2005 and the Assistant Manager of the Society has been delegated power to discharge duty of the Secretary-cum-Manager. Accordingly it has been further submitted that Shri Y.C. Rai had not placed on record the resolution dated 14.4.2005 and concealed material fact. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the election schedule notified on 4.1.2003 could not be reviewed by the Deputy Registrar while notifying the election afresh. It has been submitted that the election notified on 4.1.2003 should have been completed by the same electoral roll without any change as the writ petitions were withdrawn and special appeals were dismissed. The further submission of the respondents is that Shri Y.C. Rai was competent enough to file the writ petition being Secretary-cum-Manager of the Society in question to defend the cause of Society. It has been submitted that the order dated 13.1.2003 was not an administrative order but was a quasi-judicial order and could not have been reviewed unless set aside by the competent Court of law. It has also been submitted that since election was rescheduled in a short span of two months it should have been proceeded in pursuance to earlier notification from the same stage. Shri Raghvendra Kumar Singh appeared for respondent Shri Y.C. Rai further submitted that in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in a case reported in AIR 1970SC 1896. The Purtabpur Company Ltd, v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and others, the nature of order is to be seen coupled with how the power has been exercised and no other things. It has been further submitted that in view of Division Bench judgment reported in AIR 1969 Allahabad 248. Shanti Sarup v. Radhaswami Satsung Sabha, Dayalbagh. Agra and others, a writ petition filed by the Secretary of the Society shall be maintainable and does not suffer from any infirmity. Learned Counsel for the respondents had relied upon Para 41.42.43 and 44 of the judgment in the case of Shanty Sarup (supra). It has been further submitted that while deciding the present special appeal this Court while exercising appellate power can not be travel beyond the issues decided by the Hon'ble Single Judge relying upon the Apex Court judgments reported in 2005 (6) SCC 791. M. Purandara and others v. Mahadesha S. and others. Relying upon a Division Bench judgment and order dated 27.5.2005 passed by the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.2174 (MB) of 2005. Sushil Kumar Singh v. State of U. P. and others, learned counsel submits that the election shall be rescheduled from the same stage from which it was disrupted on account of earlier set of litigation. It has also been submitted that the observation made by Hon'ble Single Judge relating to the membership issue and validity of voter list is simply obiter dicta and is not binding. CONSTITUTION (BYE LAWS) OF THE SOCIETY 13. While considering the argument advanced by the parties' counsel it shall be appropriate that the power conferred by the bye laws (in the present case, constitution) of the Society should be considered to understand the power and duties of the members and office bearers of the Society. Rule 3. 4. 5 and 6 of the Constitution deals with the provision relating to the membership. Rule 7 provides for payment of admission fees and procedure for admission in the Society. Rule 16 provides that the fundsand property of the Society shall be vested in management. Rule 17 deals with the constitution of Managing Committee. Rule 18 provides that there shall be one President, two Vice President, senior and junior, one Manager and Secretary and one Assistant Manager, one Assistant Secretary and one Treasurer in the Society. Rule 19 provides that office bearer of the Managing Committee shall be elected for three years. Rule 27 deals with function and duties and power of General Body. Rule 28 deals with the function, duty and power of Managing Committee. Rule 29 dels with the power of President and Rule 31 deals with the power of Manager and Secretary. 14. Since question has been raised relating to the competence of Manager-cum-Secretary to file the writ petition, for convenience Rules 27.28.29 and 31 are reproduced as under: "27. General Body -- Persons mentioned in Rules 3 to 6 shall form the General Body of the institution. The General Body shall meet at lest once a year as mentioned in Rule 10. lt may also meet oftener as mentioned in Rule 11. Consideration of the matters mentioned in Rules 10 and 11. motions of non-confidence in any office bearer or Managing Committee as a whole shall be the function of the General Body. The General Body shall also have the power to amend the Rules in accordance with this Constitution. 28. Managing Committee -- The Managing Committee shall carry into execution all resolutions of the General Body. It shall be responsible for the entire administration and management of the institution, all residuary powers relating to the running of the institution shall remain vested in the Managing Committee. All office bearers and members of the Managing Committee shall be responsible for the due performance of their duties of the Managing Committee. Vacancies in the Managing Committee during its term of office shall be filled up by the Committee itself. The Committee shall have the power to frame bye-laws not inconsistent with these Rules. 29. President -- "The President shall preside at all meetings of the General Body as well as the Managing Committee and regulate their proceedings His decisions on points of order in any particular meeting shall be final. He shall supervise all current business of the institution. In case of emergency, (i.e. in an urgent matter, where a meeting of the Managing Committee is impracticable), the President shall exercise the power of the Managing Committee, provided that a report of the action taken in exercise of this power shall be placed before the Managing Committee as soon as practicable, and in any case before the next ordinary meeting. 31. Manager and Secreatry -- The duties and powers of the Manager and Secretary shall be as follows: (a) To frame the draft budget and the draft of the Manager's Return for the consideration of the Managing Committee. (b) To be in-charge of the movable and immovable properties of the institution. (c) To be in-charge of the general management of the institution. (d) To see that the management of the hostels is properly conducted. (e) To see that the record are regularly and correctly maintained. (f) To see that the rules of the Educational Code, and orders and directions of the educational authorities are followed. (g) To see that the resolutions of the General Body and the Managing Committee are carried out, (h) To enter into contract on behalf of the institution in terms of the express resolutions of the Managing Committee. (i) To sanction payments and expenditure on behalf of the institution, within the budget and in accordance with the directions of the Managing Committee. (j) To see that the amounts due to the institutions are regularly realized. (k) To call meeting of the. General Body and the Managing Committee, and maintain records of the proceedings. (I) To carry on correspondence on behalf of the institutions, (m) To sign cheque alongwith treasurer." A close reading of aforementioned provisions shows that the Managing Committee shall be responsible for the entire administration and management of the institution with all residuary power relating to the running of institution. All the office bearers and members of the Managing Committee shall be responsible for due performance of their duties. Rule 28 further provides that the Managing Committee shall execute the resolution of General Body. Thus, from the plane reading of Rule 28 of the Constitution of the Society, it is apparent that the Managing Committee shall be responsible for the entire administration and management of the institution with all residuary powers. 15. The Manager-cum-Secretary has been assigned duty by Rule 31, reproduced hereinabove and he or she shall be Incharge of General Management of the Institution. It shall be duty of the Manager-cum-Secretary to see that the resolution of General Body and the Committee of Management are carried out. Rule 31 does not seem to confer power on the Manager-cum-Secretary to institute a suit or file a petition. A combined reading of Chapter VI of the Constitution shows that entire administrative power has been vested with the Managing Committee and Manager-cum-Secretary have to discharge duties keeping in view the letter and spirit of resolution passed by the Committee of Management. Filing of a regular suit or a petition in the Court to defend the cause of the Society does not seem to has been delegated by the Constitution of the Society in question. Of course if any setback causes to the Society or any harm caused in any manner whatsoever on account of any act on the part of any person or authority then in view of power conferred by Rule 31 of the Constitution of the Society, the Secretary-cum-Manager should place such facts or incident before the Committee of Management for consideration. While passing the interim order dated 21.3.2003 in the writ petition the entire provision contained in the constitution was not considered by Hon'ble Single Judge. 16. It is the settled law that a thing should be done in a manner provided under the Act or statute and not otherwise vide: Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor. AIR 1936 PC 253: Deeo Chand v. State of Raiasthan. AIR 1961 SC 1527; Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi and others. AIR 1963 SC 1077; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and other. AIR 1964 SC 358; Barium Chemicals Ltd, v. Company Law Board. AIR 1967 SC 295, (Para 34); Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad and others. 1999(8) SCC 266; Delhi Administraiton v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others. 2000(7) SC 296; Dhanajay Reddv v. State of Karnataka. AIR 2001 SC 1512: Commissioner of Income Tax. Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and others. 2002(1) SCC 633; PrabhaShankarDubeyv. State of M.P.. AIR 2004 SC 486 and Ramphal Kundu v. KamalSharma. AIR 2004 SC 1657. Since. Constitution or Rule of the Society does not empower the Manager-cum-Secretary to institute a suit or file a petition, the Secretary-cum-Manager Shri Y.C. Rai was not empowered to file the writ petition in this Court. Societies Registration Act 17. Apart from provisions contained in the Constitution of the Society in question referred and discussed hereinabove the provision contained in the Societies Registration Act shall also come in the way of Shri Y.C. Rai to file the writ petition. The Societies Registration Act 1860 was promulgated with the statement and object to improve the legal condition of Societies established for promotion of literature sciences or the fine arts or for the defusion of useful knowledge or fore charitable purpose the preamble of the Act is reproduced as under: "Preamble Whereas it is expedient that provision should be made for improving the legal condition of Societies established for the promotion of literature, science, or the fine arts, or for the diffusion of useful knowledge, the diffusion of political education or for charitable purposes, it is enacted as follows: It has been settled by Calcutta High Court in a case reported in AIR 1953 Calcutta 140. Harinarayan Shaw and another v. Gobardhandas Shroff and others, that the Act is not applicable only to societies of public and charitable nature but it is also applicable to private societies established for the purpose defined in the Act. 18. A Society is constituted for a particular purpose by joining of several persons for a common object. The aims, object of a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act (in short hereinafter referred as the 'Act') should always fall within the ambit provided by the Act itself. The Black's Law Dictionary. 7th edition defines "society" as under: "Society -- 1. A community of people, as of a State. Nation, or locality with common cultures, traditions, and interests. Civil Society -- The political body of a State or nation: the body politic. 2. An association or company of persons (usu) unincorporated united by mutual consent, to deliberate, determine, and act jointly for a common purpose. 3. The general lave, affection, and companionship that family members share with on another." Section 1 of the Societies Registration Act 1860 (in short hereinafter referred as the 'Act') provides that 7 or more members may be associated for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose or for any purpose as described in section 20 of this act by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association. Thus for the formation of a Society, meeting of mind coupled with collective decision to form an association by seven or more persons is a necessary condition. This shows that while working for the purpose of the Sociaty the members and office bearers should work collectively to achieve the aims and object of the Society. The decision should be taken by the collective application of mind by the members and office bearers of the Society through their governing bodies or Committee of Management or general bodies in accordance to Rules or bye laws of the Society. Needless to say that Rules, or bye laws or Constitution of the Society reflects the wishes of a Society.- 19. Accordingly, any individual member or office bearer does not seem to have got right to fight for the cause of the Society or to work to fulfil the aims and object of the Society unless he is authenticated by the Rules or by the resolution passed by the governing body or the General Body. 20. Under Section 6 every Society registered under the Act may sue or be sued in the name of President. Chairman or Principal Secretary or trustees as shall be determined by the Rules and Regulations of the Society and in default of such determination in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body of the Society. Thus a plain reading of sub-section 6 of the Act shows that Society can institute a suit through its President. Chairman or Principal Secretary or trustees as the, case may be empowered by Rules or Regulations. In case Rules and Regulations do not empower any member or office bearer of the Society to institute a suit then obviously no person either member of the Society or office bearer will have right to institute a suit unless he has been authorized by the governing body of the Society. 21. The individual member or the office bearer does not have got right to represent or take cause of the Society unless authorized by the Rules or Regulations or by the governing body is also evident from Section 7 of the Act. In case any individual member dies or cease to exists as office bearer then suit shall not abate in view of provision contained in Section 7 of the Act. 22. Under Section 8 of the Act a judgment can not be enforced against the properties of members or office bearers but can be enforced only against the properties of the Society. Thus, it is evident that the individual office bearers or members have got no right to represent the Society unless he is being authorized by the Rules and Regulations or by the resolution of governing body or the general body as the case may be. For convenience Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act are reproduced asunder; "Section 6: Suits by and against Societies -- Every Society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the President. Chairman or Principal Secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the Rules and Regulations of the Society and, in default of such determination, in the name of such-person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion: Provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the Society, to sue the President or Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or the trustees thereof, if an application to the governing body some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant. Section 7: Suits not to abate -- No suit or proceeding in any civil Court shall abate or discontinue by reason of the person by or against whom such suit or proceedings shall have been brought or continued, dying or ceasing to fill the character in the name whereof he shall have sued or been sued, but the some suit or proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person. Section 8: Enforcement of judgment against Society -- If a judgment shall be recovered against the person or officers named on behalf of the Society: such judgment shall not be put in force against the property, movable or immovable, or against the body of such person or officer, but against the property of the Society. The application for execution shall set forth the judgment, the fact of the party against whom it shall have been recovered having sued or having been sued, as the case may be, on behalf of the Society, and shall require to have the judgment enforce against the property of the Society." 23. The individual members or office bearers of a Society have got no personal right against the properties of the Society is also evident from Section 14 of the Act Section 14 provides that after dissolution of a Society properties shall be transferred to other Society but shall not be given to individual member of the Society. For convenience Section 14 of the Act is reproduced as under: "Section 14: Upon a dissolution no member to receive profit -- If upon the dissolution of any Society registered under this Act there shall remain, after the satisfaction of all its debts and liabilities, any property whatsoever, the same shall not be paid to or distributed among the members of the said Society or any of them, but shall be given to some other Society, to be determined by the votes or not less than three-fifths of the members present personally or by proxy at the time of dissolution, or in default thereof, by such Court as aforesaid. Clause not to apply to Joint-Stock Companies -- Provided, however, that this clause shall not apply to any Society which shall have been founded or established by the contributions of shareholders in the nature of a joint-stock company." 24. Section 16 of the Act provided that there shall be governing body in the Society, which shall be responsible to manage the affairs of the Society. For convenience Section 16 of the Act is reproduced as under: "Section 16: Governing body defined -- the governing body of the Society shall be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted. 25. A combined reading of Section 6, 7, 8,14 and 16 of the Act shows that the members or the office bearer of a Society can not claim any personal interest or benefit from the properties of the societies. The right and duties of the members or office bearers of a Society shall be governed by the rules or regulations of the Society or by the resolution passed by its General Body or the Managing Committee. 26. The legislature had used the words "determine" and "determination" in Section 6 of the Act means that there must be meeting of mind by the General Body members of Society while framing rules to provide as to who shall be entitled to institute a suit in representative capacity. Section 6 authorise the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or trustee i.e. member of Society to institute a suit on behalf of Society, but this has been subjected to empowerment by rules or regulations of the Society. Meaning thereby only those office bearers or members shall be entitled to institute a suit for whom a decision has been taken collectively by General Body while framing rules and has been duly and categorically incorporated in the rules of the Society for the purpose. In a controversy where against the order passed by Hon'ble Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court, an appeal was filed by the Manager of Patiala Aviation club, a preliminary objection was raised that the Manager of the Club was not authorized by the competent authority of the Government to file the appeal hence it was not maintainable. The Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in a case reported in AIR 1974 Punjab and Haryana 256, Patiala Aviation Club. Patiala. through its Manager v. the Presiding Officer. Labour Court. Ludhiana and others, held that though the Manager was conferred with power of day to day running the Club and discharge necessary administrative duties but he was not specifically conferred by the Government to file an appeal against the judgment of Hon'ble Single Judge Hence, the manager was not competent to file an appeal in the absence of categorical delegation of power for the purpose by the Government. Therefore, the appeal filed against the Hon'ble Single Judge was not maintainable being filed by incompetent person. The Manager of the Club was authorized by the Government in accordance to rules to discharge all executive, financial and administrative power conferred on the Managing Committee for the management of the Club subject to certain limitation. The conferment of administrative and executive powers to run the Club was not found to be sufficient by the Division Bench enabling the Manager to file an appeal against the judgment of Hon'ble Single Judge of the High Court. 27. According to Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary. Sixth Edition the words 'determine’ and "determined" have been defined as under: "de-ter-mine: to discover the facts about something: to calculate something exactly, to make something happen in a particular wav or be of a particular type, to officially decide and or arrange something. De-ter-mined: showing a person's determination to do something" In the Legal Glossary by Government of India. Ministry of Law. 1992 the words "determine" and "determination" has been defined as under: "Determine: to settle or decide: to come to a decision: to lav down decisively or authoritatively: to assertain definitely: to put an end to Determination: the action of determining or deciding: a judicial or authoritative decision, ending, termination" According to Collins Cobuild dictionary the word "determine" and has been defined as under: "determine" if you determine something, you decide it or settle it. 2. If a particular factor determines the nature of a thing or event, it causes it to be of a particular kind." According to The Law Lexicon (the Encyclopaedic Legal & Commercial Dictionary) 2nd Edition the word "determine" has been defined as under: "determine" to settle or decide; to come to a decision; to lay down decisively or authoritatively; to put and end; to ascertain definitely." Thus, from the aforementioned definition given in the dictionary it is evident that there should be specific provision in the bye-laws of the Society authorizing its office bearer or member to file a suit, incorporated in pursuance to resolution of General Body. In the absence of such provision it may be assumed that the members of the Society had not expressed their views and determined as to who shall be entitled to institute a suit or a petition to plead the cause of a Society. From the dictionary meaning of the word referred hereinabove it is also evident that in the absence of any provision contained in the Rules or Regulations of a Society there should be a decision of executive body or general body authorizing a person to institute a suit or file a petition only then it may be assumed that Society had determined the issue in question. It has been provided in Section 6 to meet out the situation where the bye-laws or constitution of a Society is silent relating to empowerment of a person to institute a suit or file a petition in representative capacity. 28. While interpreting and considering difference between word "consider" and determine" their lordship of Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in 1976 SCC (L&S) 398. The Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railways and another v. T.R. Hellappan held that the word "determine" connotes that there should be active application of mind by the authority after considering the entire circumstance of a case in order to decide the nature and extent to impose a penalty on a Government officer. Active application of mind means active application of mind by the member of the Society to determine as to who shall be entitled to institute a suit on behalf of Society in representative capacity to plead the cause of the Society either at the time of framing of rules or at the time when issue crop up as to who shall institute a suit for a particular purpose. Relevant portion from the judgment of the Divisional Personnel Officer, (supra) is reproduced as under: "The word 'consider' has been used in contradistinction to the word 'determine'. The rule making authority deliberately used the word 'consider' and not 'determine' because the word 'determine' has a much wider scope. The word 'consider' merely connotes that there should be active application of the mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority." 29. In two other cases reported in AIR 1963 SC 677. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd.. Meerut v. Lakshmi Chand and others and AIR 1970 SC 311. The Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle, Ernakulam and another v. M/s Sudarsanam lyengarand Sons, while interpreting the word 'determine' or determination' Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it should be interpreted in reference to context. Relevant portion from the judgment of Jaswant Sugar Mills (supra) is reproduced as under: "The expression 'determination' in the context in which it occurs in Article 136 signifies an'effective expression of opinion which ends a controversy or a dispute by some authority to whom it is submitted under a valid law for disposal. "determination must be judicial or quasi-judicial: purely administrative: or executive direction is not contemplated to be made the subject matter of appeal to this Court." Accordingly, in case while interpreting the word "determined" or "determination" used in Section 6 of the Act may be interpreted by applying the principle of "reference to context" then the intent of legislatures shall indicate that these two words have been used purposely and specifically laying down the duty on the members of a Society to decide as to who shall be empowered to institute a suit or file a petition. There should a determination by active application of mind by the members of Society either by the General Body or by its Committee of Management to decide who shall represent a Society to institute a suit. A Division Bench of Orissa High Court in a case reported in AIR 19650rissa 76. Nabaghana v. Bhagawata, consisting R.L. Narasimham. C.J. and R.K.Das. J. while interpreting certain provisions of Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills (supra held that the word 'determination' tenures a decision taken by the competent authority on the issue involved in. reference to context relating to the issue involved with its final adjudication. The Division Bench of Orissa High Court had also relied upon the definition of word 'determination' given in Oxford Dictionary. Relevant portion from the judgment of Nabaghana (supra) is reproduced as under: "But the second part of this section says that where there is a provision in the new Act for determination or deciding a matter or dispute in respect of a religious institution, a suit can be brought only under, and in conformity with, that provision. The use of the words 'determining' and 'deciding' after the words 'matter' or 'dispute' would suggest that the Legislature was thinking of a 'matter to 'be determined' and a 'dispute to be decided' though the word 'respectively' has not been used. It is true that the word 'determine' itself involves a judicial approach. As pointed out in the Oxford Dictionary the word 'determine' means: 'ending of a controversy or suit by the decision of a judge or arbitrator: judicial or authoritative decision or settlement of the matter at issue: the settlement of a question by reasoning or argumentation." In view of above the finding recorded by Hon'ble Single Judge that Secretary cum Manager of the Society empowers to file the writ petition seems to be not sustainable. 30. Privy Council in a case reported in AIR 1940 PC 105. Secy, of State v. Mask and Co. while interpreting a controversy relating to the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Court held that unless specifically provided in the Act or statute, the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court should not be readily inferred but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Corollary to it in case the constitution or byelaws of the Society or the Societies Registration Act does not specifically provide empowering the Secretary-cum-Manager to file a suit in representative capacity, no interference (sic-enference) can be drawn merely on account of fact that certain administrative power has been vested by rules of the Society in the Secretary or any other office bearer of the Society. 31. Meaning thereby, in the absence of any Rules unless the governing body empowers a member or office bearer of the Society to institute a suit for the cause of the Society such suit shall not be maintainable. The resolution of the governing body or general body reflects the wishes of the Society. Privy council in a case reported in AIR 1938 Privy Council 73. Sunder Singh Mallah Singh Sanatan Dharam High School Trust. Indaura v. Managing Committee. Sunder Singh Mallah Singh. Rajput High School. Indaura and others, held that every Society may sue or be sued in the name of its President. Chairman. Principal Secretary or trustee as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the Society and in default of such determination in a name of such persons as shall be appointed by governing body. For convenience relevant portion from the case of Sunder Singh (supra) is reproduced as under: "The property, movable and immovable, belonging to a Society registered under this Act, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body of such Society, and in all proceedings, civil and criminal, may be described as the property of the governing body of such Society by their proper title. Every Society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the President. Chairman or Principal Secretary or Trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the Society: and in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the Society, to sue the President or Chairman, or Principal Secretary or the Trustees thereof, if an application to the governing body some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant. The governing body of this Society shall be the Governors, council, directors, committee, trustees, or other body to whom by the Rules and Regulations of the Society the management of its affairs is entrusted." 32. The aforementioned principle of law laid down by the Privy Council has been followed by Bombay High Court in a case reported in AIR 1941 Bombay 312. A.S. Krishnan v. M. Sundaram and others in the following words: "It is not open to the plaintiff, without ascertaining the wishes of the Society, to file a suit on behalf of himself and all others except the defendants. The reason for that conclusion is obvious. Even if the Court decides in favour of the plaintiff, the Society can call a meeting of its members tomorrow; confirm the acts of the defendants and confirm their position as members of the managing committee, thus rendering the decision of the Court a nullity." Hence, while filing a suit or a petition it shall always be necessary to come forward with a specific pleading that the suit or petition has been filed to fulfil the wishes of the Society or to defend the cause of Society and he or she has been authorized to do so by the rules of the Society or on account of resolution of the governing body. In the absence of such pleading the suit or petition shall not be maintainable. 33. In a case reported in AIR 1940 Madras 902. Kowtha Survanaravana Rao v. Putibandla Subrahmanvam and others, the Madras High Court reiterated the earlier settled principle that the dispute between the Society should be decided by the rules and not otherwise. A Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in a case reported in AIR 1963 Andhra Pradesh 20 (V50 C9). Vallabhaneni Neelakanteswara Rao and others v. Sri Edupuaanti Raahavendra Rao Memorial High School Committee and another, reiterated the aforementioned principle and proceeded to held that only an accredited representative of the Society can bring an action in its name. Otherwise suit shall not be tenable. For convenience relevant portion from the case of Neelakanteswara Rao (supra) is reproduced as under: "16. It is now well settled that the position of the members of a registered Society is similar to that of share-holders of a company and in regard to the wrong complained of, in respect of the Society redress could be sought only on behalf of the Society. This proposition is established by Krishnan v. Sundaram. ILR (1941) Bom 497: (AIR 1941 Bom 312). 17 (c). This is also the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder. AIR 1961 SC 1669. It is thus manifest that if there is an article providing for the mode in which a suit has to be brought on behalf of the company, that should be conformed to and it is not open to a member to vary procedure indicated therein unilaterly. Sri Suryanarayna sought to get over this difficulty by contending that Sections 6 and 20 envisage suits by or against strangers and they would not come into operation in regard to suits to be filed by the company against the member of the Society or the company. The answer to this is furnished by Section 10 of the Societies Registration Act itself which contemplates a suit being instituted by the Society against a member in regard to arrears of subscription which the member is bound to pay or in regard to detention of any property consequent upon which damage would accrue to the Society. This need not detain us any longer, as in our opinion, this contention does not merit serious consideration. It follows that it was not open to a member of the Society to lay this action as representing the Society. It is only on accredited representative of the Society that could bring an action in its name. If that were so the suit as framed is no a tenable one." 34. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in a case reported in AIR (38) 1951 Allahabad 1. Indian Sugar Mills Association through its President Shri Hari Rai Swarup v. Secretary to Government. Uttar Pradesh Labour Department and others, held that writ petition under Article 226 may be maintainable on behalf of Association through a person only in case it is proved that the Association had right to move a writ petition on behalf of a person who preferred the writ petition. For convenience relevant portion from the Full Bench judgment of Indian Sugar Mills Association is reproduced as under: "It has been urged by learned counsel for the applicant that, though the amount may not be payable out of the property of the Association, yet inasmuch as the payments have to be made out of the funds of the Sugar Mills, a large number of which are members of the Association, the Association has the right to move the application on their behalf. We have already said that it is the interest of the applicant which must be directly affected by the statute or the order complained against and the applicant cannot claim that its interests are directly affected." The Full Bench judgment of this Court referred hereinabove has been relied upon in a case reported in (2002) 3 UPLBEC 2777. Saraswati Vidva Mandir, Rewatipur, Ghazipur through its Manaaer Smt. Ram Rakhi Devi v. State of UP. and others, where writ petition filed on behalf of Society was dismissed by this Court on the around that petition filed by the Manager on behalf of Managing Committee or Society was not maintainable unless he was authorized to file the same. Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court had relied upon the earlier unreported judgment of this Court. Relevant portion from the judgment of Saraswati Vidya Mandir (supra) is reproduced as under: "Mahtab Rai. Manager, Har Narain Intermediate College v. Deputy Director of Education (Civil Misc. Writ petition No.5808 of 1970 decided on 7" January, 1974) a learned Single Judge of this Court, almost in similar circumstances, held that the Manager or the School has no locus standi to maintain petition against the order of the District Inspector of Schools or the Deputy Director of Education refusing to grant approval. The learned Single Judge observed that the appointment of Principal of College and termination of his services were within the power of the Managing Committee or the Society and it was the Managing Committee alone which exercises control. That being so, the Manager is not the Managing Committee or the Society and he cannot maintain a writ petition in this Court unless he is authorized to do so. Relying on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Hari Raj Swarup v. Secretary to Government of U.P.. AIR 1951 Allahabad 1. the learned Judge dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed on behalf of the Managing Committee or the Society." Reliance placed by Shri Raghvendra Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the respondents on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Shanti Sarup seems to be misconceived. In the case of Shanti Sarup as to whether the Secretary can institute a suit on behalf of Society in the absence of any specific delegation of power by the Rules of the Society or by the resolution of the governing body. Accordingly the case of Shanti Sarup does not seem to be applicable under the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the case of Sardar Patel Higher Secondary School, Deve Nagar. Mathura (supra) again Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court held that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall not be maintainable by the Manager of Institution. Only the Managing Committee or Society can maintain a writ petition. The Manager can not assume the function of Committee of Management unless he is authorized to do so. In the case of Arya Samai Ganesh Ganj (supra) a Division Bench of this Court had held that in the event of dissolution of Society, Secretary or Manager have got no right to file a suit in view of provision contained in Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act. 35. A Division Bench of this Court in a case reported in AIR 1966 Allahabad 570. -Krishna Kumar Sinha v. The Kayastha Pathshala CPrayag) Allahabad and another held that a suit may be brought in the name of Society being legal entity provided that it should be instituted by a person empowered to do so. to quote: "It is indisputable that a legal entity may choose to have itself described by a particular name for a particular purpose and it naturally follows that if a legal entity has by proper method given to itself or assumed a name for the purpose of suing and being suwed, a suit brought in that name must be regarded as a suit by that legal entity, provided of course that it has been instituted by a person empowered to do so." 36. In one another judgment reported in 2005 (10) SCC 760, Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai and others, their Lordships of Apex Court held that the purpose of registration of a trust property is that it should be administered by one body. In case the rules does not indicate as to under what manner the Management or Controller of the trust property shall be done then no person can be permitted to represent the Society or trust on their own. Relevant portion from the Church of North India (supra) is reproduced as under: "In Fact the appellants have categorically admitted that the memorandum of association of the Society itself become the deed of trust. It also stands admitted that only with a view to have one body to administer and manage the properties, was the trust so created by the Society also registered. It is not a case where the trust was created for the benefit of the Society. Furthermore, there is nothing on record to show the mode and manner of the management and control of the trust property, (see Board of Trustees, Ayurvedicand Unani Tibia College v. State of Delhi, Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, SCC para 52 and Illachi Devi v. Jain Society, Protection of Orphans India, SCC paras 21 and 22)." In the same judgment of Church of North India (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that (where the question relates to interpretation of Section 17, 21 and 22 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, unless a plaintiff establish that they could file a suit for enforcement of the right of appellant as a religious trust and such a legal right vests either in the plaintiff or in the appellant indirectly the plaintiff can not move with a petition to obtain an order of injuction. For convenience relevant portion from the judgment of Church of North India (supra) is reproduced as under: "The plaintiffs with a view to obtain an order of injunction furthermore were required to establish that they could file a suit for enforcement of right of the appellant as a religious trust and such a legal right vests either in the plaintiff or in the appellant herein indirectly. Such a prayer, related to the possession of the property, comes squarely within the purview of the BPTAct. If the question as regards recovery of possession of the property belonging to a public trust squarely falls within the purview of Section 50 of the Act, had such application been filed before the Charity Commissioner he was required to go into the question as to whether the plaintiffs are persons having interest in the trust and whether a consent should be given to them to maintain a suit. Only when, inter alia, such consent is granted, could a suit have been filed in terms of Section 51 of the Act." 37. Hence, unless the byelaws or constitution of a Society specifically empowers the office bearer of the Society to plead the cause of Society for filing of suit or a petition in a competent Court, such powers can not be exercised. The proviso of the Section 6 of the Act further amply clears that in the absence of any provisions in the rules and regulations the competence of office bearer to institute a suit shall be determined by the governing body. It is the governing body or executive body alone has got power under Section 6 to pass a resolution for the occasion, that is to authorized a person to institute a suit or file a petition in a competent Court. 38. The proviso is being added in a Section to qualify or create an exception to the original enactment. It qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception. LORD MAC MIL LAN in a case reported in AIR 1944 PC 171, Madras & Southern Maharatta Rly. Co. Ltd, v. Bezwada Municipality held that: "The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case." 39. Hon'ble Supreme Court had followed the proposition of Madras & Southern Maharatta Rly (supra) in a case reported in AIR 1959 SC 713, CIT. Mysore etc.. v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd.. in the following words: "The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment. It is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso........ It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other." The aforesaid proposition was again followed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1961 SC 1596, Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha. The proviso is not normally construed as nullifying the enactment or as taking away completely a right conferred by the Act. As held hereinabove the proviso as contained in Section 6 of the Act can not be overlooked while interpreting the original enactment as contained in the Section. 40. In view of above, not only under the provision contained in the constitution or byelaws of the Society in question but also keeping in view the various provisions contained in Societies Registration Act, writ petition filed by Shri Y.C. Rai in the name and title of Mahila Vidyalaya Society Aminabad, Lucknow was not maintainable being filed by incompetent person. In the absence of resolution by Committee of Management Shri Y.C. Rai was not competent to file a writ petition on behalf of Society in question in representative capacity not only under the constitution by laws of the Society but also under the provisions contained in Societies Registration Act referred hereinabove. In case, office bearers or members of the Society are permitted to file a suit on behalf of Society in representative capacity, in the absence of any power delegated by the bye law or rules of the Society, undoubtedly such liberty may be grossly abused by the members or office bearers for their vested interest or for extraneous reasons or consideration. The collective responsibility vested in the governing body or general body of a Society may be given go by in case without accredition a person or office bearer is permitted to institute a suit or file a petition or even contest a case. Filing of a suit or a petition by a person not accredited by a Society shall not reflect the wishes of a Society hence shall not be sustainable under law. 41. It is settled law that every word of statute should be given a meaning, by considering the statute as a whole. While interpreting a statutory provision the entire section or whole of the statute should be considered, as the case may be According to Maxwell on the Interpretation of statutes (12th edition page 36) any construction which may leave without affecting any part of the language of a statute should ordinarily be rejected. Relevant portion from to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th edition page 36) is reproduced as under; "A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected. Thus, where an Act plainly gave an appeal from one quarter sessions to another, it was observed that such a provision, though extraordinary and perhaps an oversight could not be eliminated." 42. In view of above the Court should always avoid interpretation, which would leave any part of the provision to be interpreted without effect. While doing so every clause of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the act to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Accordina to Maxwell (supra) statutory language should not be read in isolation but in tis context. While referring a decision of House of Lord reported in AG v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus. 1957 (1) All ER 49 (HL) in a famous treatise Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh the views of Lord Tucker has been discussed with approval as under (9th Edition page 34): "In an appeal before the House of Lords, where the question was of the true import of a statute, the Attorney-General wanted to call in aid the preamble in support of the meaning which he contended should be given to the enacting part, but in doing so was met by the argument on behalf of the respondent that where the enacting part of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it cannot be controlled by the preamble which cannot be read. The House of Lords rejected the objection to the reading of the preamble. Although, ultimately it come to the conclusion that the enacting part was clear and unambiguous. VISCOUNT SIMONDS (LORD TUCKER agreeing) in that connection said: "I conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every word of a statute in its context, and I use context in its widest sense as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari material, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy." 43. Thus the exposition ex visceribus actus is a long recognized rule of construction. Words in a statute often taken their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole. They are therefore not to be considered in isolation. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1992 SC 1, Mohan Kumar Singhaniay. V. Union of India, has proceeded to held as under: "However, it is suffice to say that while interpreting a statute the consideration of inconvenience and hardships should be avoided and that when the language is clear and explicit and the words used are plain and unambigous, were are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense with reference to other clauses of the Act or Rules as the case may be, so far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statute Rules/regulations relating to the subject matter. Added to this, in construing statute, the Court has to ascertain the intention of the law making authority in the backdrop of the dominant purpose and underlying intendment of the said statute and that every statute is to be interpreted about any violence to its language and applied as far as its explicit language admits consistent with the established rules of interpretation." The aforesaid settled rule of interpretation has been affirmed by the Apex Court form time to time in various cases including 1974 (1) SCC 596, M/s Gammon India Ltd and others v. Union of India and others (para 19). AIR 1978 SC 995. M/s Punjab Beverages Ltd.. Chandigarh v. Suresh Chand and another (para 5). AIR 2002 SC 829. Kailash Chandra and another v. Mukundi Lal and others (para 10) and AIR 2000 SC 66. Grasim Industries Ltd, and another v. State of M.P. 44. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in 2005 (4) SCC 741, Board of Control for the Cricket in India and another v. Netaji Cricket Club and others, held that every Association which has framed its rule is bound by it. The strict implementation of such rule shall be imperative. The office bearer of a Association must exercise power within the four corner of the Rules of the Society. For convenience relevant portion from the case of Board of Control for the Cricket in India and another (supra) (para 82) is reproduced as under: "An Association or a Club which has framed its rules is bound thereby. The strict implementation of such rules is imperative. Necessarily, the office-bearers in terms of the memorandum and Article of Association must not only act within the four corners thereof but exercise their respective powers in an honest and fair manner, keeping in view the public good as also the welfare of the sport of cricket." Hon'ble Supreme Court again in the same judgment (supra) held that there can not be two interpretation of rules relating to the entitlement of a person to represent an Association. Either a person shall be entitled or may not be entitled to represent an Association. Such right shall not vary with the nature of meeting unless otherwise provided under the statute. Relevant portion from the said judgment (supra) (para 99) is reproduced as under: "in the said legal opinion a distinction appears to have been made between a policy decision to be taken by the Maharashtra Cricket Association vis-vis representation of the Association in the meetings of the Board. No distinction might have been drawn therein as regards different types of meetings of the Board viz. extraordinary general meeting and annual general meeting or any other meeting, nor do we find any. A person may either be entitled to represent an Association or he is not. A person's right to represent an Association ordinarily would not vary with the nature of the meeting unless otherwise provide in the statute.." 45. In view of above while interpreting the provisions contained in the constitution or byelaws of the Society as well as the provisions contained in the Act, the provisions should be read as a whole and not in piecemeal. A combined reading of byelaws of the Society as well as Societies Registration Act reveals that the Secretary or Manager of a Society or any other office bearer will have no power to institute a suit or file a petition in this Court unless he is being duly and specifically authorized by the Society. In the absence of any authority under the byelaws or rules of the Society or Societies Registration Act, such power can be exercised only in pursuance to resolution of governing body of the Society. 46. There is one another aspect of the matter, which has called the attention of this Court. While deciding the controversy Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court had recorded a finding that induction of 106 ordinary members and 57 life members in the Society after 1990 election was not permissible. Hon'ble Single Judge had upheld the order dated 13.1.2003 passed by the Deputy Registrar while recording a finding on the tentative electoral roll for the publication of final electoral roll on 22.3.2003. On one hand, Hon'ble Single Judge had held that once election process was initiated it was not open for the Deputy Registrar to reschedule the entire election process but on the other hand, he had recorded a finding that order dated 13.1.2003 was a sound order and passed on sufficient material in the following words: "All these reasons given by the Deputy Registrar in the order dated 13.1.2003 are wholly sound and sufficient for the purpose of passing the order which he passed." Thus Hon'ble Single Judge had recorded specific finding on membership issue and does not seem to be obiter dicta. 47. In a case reported in (2001) 8 SCC 509, Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sah'akari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, the Apex Court held that the preparation of electoral roll is the part of election process and in case there is any illegality in preparation of such electoral roll that can be challenged after declaration of result in accordance to law. In view of above, in case the finding recorded by Hon'ble Single Judge is sustained and not set aside then being a pronouncement of this Court, the membership dispute of the person concerned shall attain finality and it shall not be open for the parties to challenge either the outcome of election through a petition in accordance to law or by filing a regular suit to install claim for membership by the aggrieved persons. While deciding the issue it was not open for the Hon'ble Single Judge to record a finding relating to the membership issue which was a disputed question of fact and could not have been adjudicated under the extraordinary remedy of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 48. It is the settled proposition of law that whenever a controversy involved disputed question of fact then ordinarily it should not be adjudicated under extraordinary remedy of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, In a recent judgment reported in JT 2006 (4) SC 373, Sanjay Sitaram Khemka v. State of Maharashtra and others. Hon'ble Supreme Court proceeded to held as under; "A writ petition, as has rightly been pointed out by the High Court, for grant of the said reliefs, was not the remedy. A matter involving a great deal of disputed questions of fact cannot be dealt with by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. As the High Court or this Court cannot, in view of the nature of the controversy as also the disputed questions of fact, go into the merit of the matter; evidently no relief can be granted to the petitioner at this stage." 49. There is one more reason why Hon'ble Single Judge should not have recorded any finding on the membership issue. The 57 life members and 104 ordinary members who were inducted in the Society after the election held on 16.5.1999 were having no opportunity to defend themselves. It has not been disputed that after 16.5.1999, two General Body meetings were convened. The General Body meeting of 20.2.2000 was recognized by the then Deputy Registrar and list of elected members of Managing Committee was approved vide order dated 11.4.2000 passed by the then Deputy Registrar. Shri Y.C. Rai was elected as Seeretary-cum-Manager in the meeting of General Body dated 20.2.2000. Thereafter, he had participated in the meeting of Managing Committee dated 11.5.2000 (as evident from Annexure-5 to the affidavit filed in support of impleadment application). Thereafter, special General Body meeting was held on 3.11.2002 in which all the members inducted after 1999 were called on and alleged to be participated. No objection was seems to be raised by Shri Y.C. Rai at that time. Accordingly, no finding can be recorded to invalidate the membership of 57 life members and the 104 ordinary members who have exercised their rights, without giving them opportunity to defend themselves. Hence, the finding recorded by the Hon'ble Single Judge which amounts to invalidate the membership of these members shall be violative of principle of natural justice and not be sustainable under law. Such controversy should have been left over for adjudication in accordance to law under the Societies Registration Act and Rules framed thereunder or byelaws of the Society or by adopting the recourse of regular suit or other recourses permissible under law. Hon'ble Single Judge as discussed hereinabove had recorded a finding upholding the order dated 13.1.2003 relating to the membership issue on one hand but on the other hand proceeded to record a finding that controversy involves disputed question of fact while considering the appellants prayer for a proceeding under Section 340 Code of Criminal Procedure, in the following words; to reproduce: "In the case, before us, there is dispute relating to the membership of the Society and also the Management Committee and office bearers thereof. There are allegations and counter allegations. There allegations and counter allegations relate to controversial question of facts, which can not straightaway be branded as true or false. They also relate to the interference drawn on the basis of activities of the parties and the circumstances relating thereof. There may be some exaggeration while drawing inference and making accusation against one another. This Court would not like to draw any inference in favour of one party or the other on the basis of such averments in their affidavits and counter affidavits." The observation made by Hon'ble Single Judge reproduced hereinabove at the face of record shows that the controversy relating to membership issue coupled with other issues are disputed question of facts. Accordingly with profound respect it was not incumbent upon His Lordship to record a finding relating to the validity of impugned order dated 13.1.2003, upholding the finding recorded by the Deputy Registrar relating to the membership issue. 50. The next question raised by the parties' counsel relating to the interpretation of sub-section 2 of Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act. For convenience sub-section 2 of Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act is reproduced as under: "(2) Where by an order made under sub-section (1), an election is set aside or an office-bearer is held no longer entitled to continue in office or where the Registrar is satisfied that any election of office-bearers of a Society has not been held within the time specified in the Rules of that Society, he may call meeting of the General Body of such Society for electing such office-bearer or office-bearers, and such meeting shall be presided over and be conducted by the Registrar or by any officer authorized by him in this behalf. And the provisions in the Rules of the Society relating to meetings and elections shall apply to such meeting and election with necessary modifications." A plain reading of sub-section 2 of Section 25 of the Act shows that while exercising power under sub-section 2 of Section 25 the Registrar shall call the meeting of General Body of the Society for electing its office bearers and while doing so the provisions contained in the Rules of the Society relating to the meeting and election shall be made applicable. It means that while proceeding to hold the election the Registrar shall abide by the Rules or Regulations of the Society for the purpose of holding the meeting to elect the office bearers. In the case of Arya Pratinidhi Sabha (supra) the Division Bench of this Court had proceeded to held as under: "At any rate it is clear from bare reading of the Section 25(2) of the Act that functions of the Registrar under this sub-section are purely of executive nature. Hence, an order passed by the Registrar under Section 25(2) being an executive order can be recalled or rescinded or modified at any time." In the case of Navyug Radiance Senior Secondary School Society and another. Division Bench of this Court had reiterated the afore said principle and proceeded to held as under: "In these circumstances the order passed by the Registrar under Section 25(2) of the Act can not be termed to be an order passed by the tribunal and does not possess the trapping of the Court..... .......We further find that the order under challenge is an administrative order passed by the Registrar and thereafter the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition has the trappings of the final order." In the case of Sandeep Agarwal and others. Division Bench of this Court held that a dispute relating to the membership can not be settled without affording opportunity of hearing to those peoples whose rights are going to be adversely affected. Relevant portion from the judgment of Sandeep Agarwal (supra) is reproduced as under: "22. Having examined the materials on record and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the law laid down by the Courts, we are of the opinion, that it is the duty of Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, U.P. Vikas Bhawan, Lucknow to conduct the elections under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, smoothly of the Managing Committee of the Club and it is his job to choose grains from the chaff and then come to the conclusion as to who are duly enrolled members. The restriction imposed by the learned Single Judge will amount to deciding the matter without affording opportunity to those whose rights are going to be adversely affected. 23. We, therefore set aside the order dated 5.4.2002, so far as it impose restriction of holding election on the basis of the list which was valid on 21.3.1999, with a direction to the Registrar, Firm, Societies and Chits to prepare the final voter list of the duly enrolled members expeditiously and fix a time schedule for holding of election at the earliest. The said elections would be subject to the decision of the writ petitions." 51. In view of above the finding recorded by the Division Bench of this Court referred hereinabove it appears that the order passed by the Registrar in a proceeding under sub-section 2 of Section 25 of the Act is administrative in nature. It is also evident that while deciding a controversy relating to the membership issue to prepare electoral roll it shall always be incumbent upon the Deputy Registrar while exercising power under sub-section 2 of Section 25 of the Act to provide opportunity of hearing to all the members of the Society before declaring them non competent to cast the vote during the course of election process. Moreover, in the present case since new members had exercised their rights and appeared in two General Body meetings hence, they can not be deprived to participate in election process in violation of principle of natural justice. Reliance placed by the appellants counsel on the various judgment of Apex Court viz, E.P. Royappa (supra), Mrs. Menaka Gandhi (supra), Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association (supra), Balco Employees Union and Canara Bank and others: seems to be very well applicable under the facts and circumstances of the case where the newly inducted members have been deprived from their rights in utter disregard to principle of natural justice. In the case of Canara Bank (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court had held as under: 13. Natural justice is another name for common-sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common-sense liberal wav. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 14. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a watertight classification, it is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from -unnecessary technicality, a grammatical pedantry or logical Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence. 15. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by ail civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram pattern rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle, it must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively of the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215 the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the "Magna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to "vocate interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works the principle was thus stated (ER p.420) "[E]ven God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. 'Adam' (says God), 'where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof. I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?" Since then the principle has been chiseled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond. 16. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quashi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. 17. What is meant by the term "principles of natural justice" is not easy to determine. Lord Summer (the Hamilton. L.J.) in R. v. Local Govt. Board (KB at p. 199) described the phrase as sadly lacking in precision. In General Council of Medical Education & Registration of U.K. v. Spackman Lord Wright observed that it was not desirable to attempt "to force it into any Procrustean bed" and mentioned that one essential requirement was that the Tribunal should be impartial and have no personal interest in the controversy, and further that it should give "a full and fair opportunity" to every party of being heard. 19. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression "civil consequences" encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life." In view of above, it shall be always be incumbent upon the Deputy Registrar or the competent authority, while proceeding to finalize the electoral roll in pursuance to power conferred by sub-section 2 of Section 25 of the Act to serve notice on all the members of the Society personally or by the registered post and in case not served by publication in newspaper inviting them to submit objection if any and only thereafter the competent authority should proceed to finalize the voter list. If any party demands or claims opportunity of hearing then it shall also be incumbent upon the authorities to provide opportunity of hearing to the aggrieved parties. The electoral roll prepared by the Deputy Registrar deleting the name of certain members of a Society shall be illegal and not sustainable under law in case it is being prepared in violation of principle of natural justice. 52. Now coming to other issues in question, a perusal of order dated 13.1.2003 shows that the membership fee was given to Shri M.B. Lal, the clerk of the Society, on 8.5.2000 by its President. The fee was deposited in Bank on 8.11.2002. Whether the members who had deposited the membership fee of General Body at the time of their induction can be blamed for delayed deposition of fees by the office bearers or the staff of the Society in bank? This aspect of the matter has not been dealt with by the Deputy Registrar while passing the order dated 13.1.2003. Once new members who were inducted after 1999 election in the Society and permitted to participated in two subsequent General Body meetings without any objection from Y.C. Rai then whether their membership can be disputed? In case the induction of new member is disputed or held to be illegal then whether persons who were elected as office bearer including Shri Y.C. Rai in the General Body meeting of 20.2.2000 may be held to be validly elected office bearer and have got right to hold office? In case the membership of the life or ordinary members inducted after the General Body meeting of 1999 is held illegal then whether the persons who were elected as office bearer on account of participation of such members have got right to hold their post? Whether a person who has been benefited by the vote casted by new members like "Shri Y.C. Rai has got right to challenge the membership of such persons?" Moreover Shri Y.C. Rai himself has taken a plea relating to induction of 22 new members. What will be its effect on the present controversy is also a question requires for consideration by appropriate forum. All thses issues are the disputed question of fact and shall not be open for challenge by the aggrieved parties on account of finding recorded by Hon'ble Single Judge. These questions may call for adjudication by the competent authority provided by the Act or in regular suit in pursuance to grievance raised by a person. 53. Relying upon the three cases i.e. Bar Council of Delhi and others (supra), Committee of Management. Azamgarh Muslim Society. Azamgarh followed by Dr. Virendra Bahadur Singh (supra) the appellant submitted that in the absence of effective efficacious alternative remedy Court can interfere with the election process of a Society where validity of electoral roll is challenged. 54. The other ground raised by the appellant relates to the applicability of indoor management, relying upon the judgment of Madras High Court in a case of P.V. Darhodara Reddi (supra) and Dewan Singh Hira Singh (supra). Another argument advanced by the appellants relate to exercise of emergency power by the President of the Society relying upon the case of Suraj Prakash and unreported judgment of this Court in Mahila Vidyalaya of this Court. As discussed hereinabove, since we have arrived to the conclusion that Shri Y.C. Rai was not competent to file the writ petition hence we are not recording any finding on these arguments advanced by the appellants counsel and left it open for consideration in some other appropriate case. 55. The next question relates to proceeding under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On account of allegation and counter allegations by the parties on each other learned Hon'ble Single Judge had declined to exercise power under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure we do not intend to interfere with the finding recorded by the Hon'ble Single Judge to proceed under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure keeping in view, the facts and circumstances of the present case.- 56. It was argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that while exercising appellate jurisdiction this Court may not travel beyond the issue decided by Hon'ble Single Judge. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, from the interim order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge during the pendency of writ petition it is obvious that argument was advanced by the appellant that Shri Y.C. Rai was not competent to file the writ petition. Hence, it was our solemn duty to record a finding on the competence of Shri Y.C. Rai to file the writ petition which has been done in a manner discussed hereinabove. The case of M. Purandara (supra) does not seem to be applicable under the facts and circumstances of the present case where their Lordship of Apex Court had considered the matter relating to the adjudication of a dispute on the basis of ambit and scope of issues framed in pursuance to Code of Civil Procedure. The other ground that election process should be started from the same stage is also not a question call for adjudication in the present appeal since the finding has been recorded hereinabove that the writ petition has been filed by the incompetent person. Since writ petition itself fails and does not survive being filed by incompetent person no finding can be recorded on merit on other issues raised by the parties' counsel. 57. There is one more reason why the impugned notification dated 8.3.2003 for holding afresh election is not called for interference by this Court. It has been consistent view of Apex Court that once an election process is started then the Court should be loath to interfere with the election process and ordinarily the extraordinary jurisdiction should not be exercised vide: AIR (39) 1952 Supreme Court 64. N.P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer. Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal. Salem. Distt. and others: AIR 1978 Supreme Court 851. Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner. New Delhi and others: (2001) 8 SCC 509. Shri Sant Sadquru Janardan Swami (Moinairi Maharai) Sahakari Duadha Utpadak Sanstha and another v. State of Maharashtra and others: (2004) 7 SCC 492. Manda Jaganath v. K.S. Rathnam and others: 2004 (13) SCC 574. Taoash Maiumder v. Pranab Das Gupta: 2004 (5) SCC 795. New Friends Cooperative House Building Society Ltd, v. Raiesh Chawla and others and (2005) 11 SCC 523. Vadodara District Cooperative Sugarcane Producers' Union Ltd, v. Chandrakanbhai Thakorebhai Patel and others. In view of settled proposition of law by Apex Court the election process initiated by the impugned notification dated 8 3.2003 as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition should not have been interfered by Hon'ble Single Judge, more so when writ petition was filed by a person who was not authorized by the Society either in accordance to its constitution or byelaws or in pursuance to resolution of the Committee of Management. For any alleged illegality committed by the Deputy Registrar while notifying the election it shall always be open to the aggrieved person to proceed in pursuance to provision contained in sub-section 1 of Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act to ventilate grievance. Right to challenge the outcome of election of a Society in pursuance to provision contained in sub-section 1 of Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act has been upheld by one of us (Justice Devi Prasad Singh) while deciding the bunch of writ petitions vide judgment and order dated 5.7.2006 passed in Writ Petition No. 1498 (MS) of 2006 and other connected petitions. Apart from statutory remedy under sub-section (1) of Section 25, aggrieved person may also approach the competent civil Court by filing a regular suit. 58. Now coming to the next limb of argument argued before this Court relating to the competence of Hon'ble Single Judge to decide the writ petition. Submission of appellants is that since His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Rakhra was the member of Division Bench which had decided the Special Appeal No. 159 of 2003 vide judgment and order dated 1.9.2003, hence, it was not desirable for His Lordship to decide the writ petition after remand of matter while sitting single. 59. Dean Pound, a famous jurist once said; to quote: "Perhaps the most significant advance in modern science of law is the change from the analytical to the functional attitude." It signifies that while considering the question relating to the function of Courts not only the analytical but practical experience of the Society coupled with the prevailing scenario of a Society should be considered to make the law effective and to maintain the peoples confidence in our system of administration of justice. 60. Benjamin N. Cardozo in his famous treatise "The nature of the Judicial Process" observed as under to quote (page 63): "The triers of the facts in determining whether that standard has been attained must consult the habits of life, the everyday beliefs and practices, of the men and women about them. Innumerable, also, are the cases where the course of dealing to be followed is defined by the customs, or, more properly speaking, the usage of a particular trade or market or profession. The constant assumption runs throughout the law that the natural and spontaneous evolutions of habit fix the limits of right and wrong. A slight extension of custom identifies it with customary morality, the prevailing standard of right conduct, the mores of the time. This is the point of contact between the method of tradition and the method of sociology. They have their roots in the same soil. Each method maintains the interaction between conduct and order, between life and law. Life casts the moulds of conduct, which will some day become fixed as law. Law preserves the moulds, which have taken form and shape from life." 61. Constitutionally and legally there is no bar to decide a writ petition by Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court after remand of a matter by Division Bench in Special Appeal or otherwise. But it is also true that while bearing an appeal as a member of Division Bench, Hon'ble Judge may form an opinion relating to the controversy decided by it while remanding the matter. When the litigants argue a controversy on merit before a Division Bench against the order passed by Hon'ble Single Judge then practically as well as psychologically the Judges of Division Bench may form an opinion relating to dispute in question, even if no finding is being recorded on merit. After remand of matter in case the member of Division Bench hear the writ petition while sitting single ordinarily it shall not be possible to provide audience to the parties with fresh mind. After remand of a case denovo hearing starts in a pending writ petition. Accordingly, in normal circumstances it shall be appropriate that Hon'ble Judges who had decided the matter as a member of Division Bench of this Court should not hear the same controversy after remand while sitting single to maintain the highest standard and propriety which is expected from the members of higher judiciary. There may be situation when on account of non-availability of Judges or under certain compelling circumstances or being specially nominated by Hon'ble the Chief Justice Hon'ble Judge may hear the controversy after remand while sitting single but it may be an exception under the particular facts and circumstance of a case. 62. We would like to quote a very old recognized and accepted principle of law propounded by Lord Hewart; to quote: ".......a long line of cases shows that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done......Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice." 63. Needless to say that while deciding the issue in Division Bench or larger Bench either of the party who appeared before the Division Bench could have noticed certain unpleasant remarks made by members of the Division Bench though not reflected from the judgment but it may create suspicion in the minds of the litigants concerned or may give a feeler that he shall loose the battle before the said Hon'ble Judge or shall not get Justice. To avoid such feelings even to remotest degree it shall always be appropriate that ordinarily after remand of matter before Hon'ble Single Judge the writ petition should be heard by other Hon'ble Judge and not by a member of Division Bench who had decided the special appeal or the writ petition as the case may be. 64. In the case of R. Viswanathan (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court held that rule of law about Judicial conduct is strict and old but the judicial proceeding should be conducted in such a manner so no litigant should leave the Court with a feeling that he has not been considered on merit. Relevant portion from the Apex Court judgment in R. Viswanathan (supra) is reproduced as under: "The rule of law about judicial conduct is as strict, as it is old. No judge can be considered to be competent to hear a case in which he is directly or indirectly interested. A proved interest in a judge not disqualifies him but render? his judgment a nullity. There is yet another rule of judicial conduct, which bears upon the hearing of case. In that, the judge is expected to be serene and even handed, even though his patience may be sorely tried and the time of the Court appear to be wasted. This is based on the maxim which is often repeated that justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done. No litigant should leave the Court feeling reasonable that his case was not heard or considered on its merit. If he does, then justice, even though done in the case, fails in the doing of it." In other cases referred by the appellants counsel like Kamalammal and others (supra). Smt. Kausalva Devi Boara (supra) State of U.P. v. C.L. Aaarwal (supra). State of Tripura (supra) and Harieet Singh alias Seeta (supra) their lordship of Apex Court had reiterated the principle referred hereinabove and observed that highest standard should be maintained by members of higher judiciary while discharging their duties. 65. Moreover, in the present case while deciding the Special Appeal No.143 of 2003 by the Division Bench consisting Hon'ble Mr. Justice Khem Karan and Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Rakhra a finding has been recorded that the membership issue should be resolved before proceeding with the election in the following words: to reproduce: "This much is not in dispute that there are some points in the writ petition that require determination by this Court. It is true that in case the impugned order holds the field and the election takes place as per schedule, the alleged members said to have been inducted after 16.5.1999 would not be able to participate in the election process, even if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed and there induction is legally upheld. On the other hand, in case the entire agenda dated 8.3.1993, is allowed to operate, pending the decision in this writ petition, the very object of the petition may be defeated. Although staying of any election process, is not healthy to democratic functioning of any institution/organization like this, but in the case in hand there appears to be no other way. In case, the matter relating to the membership is not resolved, before the proposed election, the bickering may ultimately recoil on the working of the organization." Thus, it is evident that the members of Division Bench of which Hon'ble Single Judge (Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Rakhra) had expressed their views to some extent and formed opinion on the issues in question without recording any finding while remitting the matter to Hon'ble Single Judge. In the case reported in (1998) 1 SCC 1. State of Raiasthan v. Prakash Chand and others their Lordship of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is the public confidence oriented mechanism and self discipline in the discharge of function maintain the public faith in our judicial system. Their Lordship of Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that the judicial proceeding should be held in such a manner so that our system of administration of justice may not receive any setback consciously or unconsciously. Relevant portion from the judgment of State of Rajasthan (supra) is reproduced as under: "Judicial authoritarianism is what the proceedings in the instant case smack of. It cannot be permitted under any guise. Judges must be circumspect and self-disciplined in the discharge of their judicial functions. The virtue of humility in the Judges and a constant awareness that investment of power in them is meant for use in public interest and to uphold the majesty of rule of law, would to a large extent ensure self restraint in discharge of all judicial functions and preserve the independence of judiciary. It needs no emphasis to say that all actions of a Judge must be judicious in character. Erosion of credibility of the judiciary, in the public mind. for whatever reasons, is the greatest threat to the independence of the judiciary. Eternal vigilance by the Judges to guard against any such latent internal danger is therefore, necessary, lest we "suffer from self-inflicted mortal wounds". We must remember that the constitution does not give unlimited powers to anyone including the Judge of all levels. The societal perception of judges as being detached and impartial referees is the greatest strength of the judiciary and every member of the judiciary must ensure that this perception does not receive a setback consciously or unconsciously. Authenticity of the judicial process rests on public confidence and public confidence rests on legitimacy of judicial process. Sources of legitimacy are in the impersonal application by the Judge of recognized objective principles which owe their existence to a system as distinguished from subjective moods, predilections, emotions and prejudices." 66. Accepted standards of right conduct, higher traditions, logic and history, customs, utility, confidence of peoples in the administration of Justice are the force, which individually or collectively shape the progress of law. It is the well accepted principle of law that it should be uniform and impartial not only in action but also in appearance. 67. There is one more ground which may be considered is that since the date fixed for publication of final electoral roll was 22.1.2003 and by order dated 13.1.2003 a exercise done was at the stage of tentative list, then whether before the publication of final electoral roll while exercising statutory power Deputy Registrar was not competent to review his order to decide the controversy relating to membership or electoral roll afresh? Since no final list of membership or electoral roll was published, hence, while issuing subsequent impugned notification dated 8.3.2003 whether Deputy Registrar was not empowered to reschedule the election process fixing the date for publication of final electoral roll after receipt of complaint or representation? All these grounds as well as other grounds raised by the learned counsel for the appellants and respondents in the present special appeal are not necessary to be considered to record a finding as special-appeal may be allowed on the ground that writ petition itself was not maintainable. We left it open for consideration in other case or at by appropriate forum, which parties may avail in due course. FINDING 68. In view of above, we proceed to record our finding as under: (i) The word "determine" or "determination" used in the Section 6 of the Act means that while framing the rules, byelaws or constitution of the Society, General Body of the Society must provide specifically in the rules by discussing the matter as to who shall be authorized to institute a suit representing the Society. In the absence of such specific provisions under the rules of a Society it is for the Committee of Management or governing body to determine as to who shall represent the Society in the Court of competent jurisdiction for institution of a suit. Only a person authorized by the rules or by the governing body or the executive body to institute a suit shall be entitled to file a suit or a petition in this Court or in other Courts or tribunals. (ii) Under Section 6 of the Act, it shall be incumbent upon the members of a Society while framing rules or byelaws to categorically provide as to who shall be entitled to sue on behalf of Society in representative capacity. In the absence of categorical provision in the rules or byelaws of the Society, none of the office bearer like President, Secretary or Manager or the Chairman shall be entitled to institute a suit or file an objection in representative capacity. Mere conferment of administrative or executive power on an office bearer shall not be sufficient to meet the requirement of Section 6 of the Act. (iii) In the absence of specific or categorical provisions in the rules or byelaws of the Society constituted under the Act, only such person shall be entitled to represent a Society who is being duly authorized by the governing body of the Society vide its resolution. (iv) A petition or suit filed by a person duly empowered shall be maintainable only in case it is being filed to represent the cause of Society in accordance to its aims and objects or rules or in accordance to the resolution of the Committee of Management. In the absence of such specific pleading in a petition or suit, such suit or petition shall not be maintainable. (v) Ordinarily under extraordinary remedy of Article 226 of the Constitution of India writ petition shall not be maintainable in case the outcome of the election or irregularity committed during the course of election can be challenged by adopting other alternative remedy provided by the Act or Statute or bye laws of the Society. (vi) While exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution it is not open for this Court to decide a disputed question of fact co-related with the membership issue of a Society registered under the Act. Membership issue should be decided in accordance to provision contained in the Act or Rules framed thereunder or according to byelaws of the Society or aggrieved party may approach the competent civil Court by filing a regular suit. Accordingly interference by Hon'ble Single Judge on membership issue by recording a finding seems to be not permissible. (vii) In the present case Shri Y.C. Rai who had filed the writ petition has not been conferred power either by the rules, or the constitution of the Society or by the resolution of the executive body, hence, he was not competent to file the writ petition in this Court. Accordingly the writ petition was not maintainable. (viii) The writ petition was also not maintainable because of the fact that there is no pleading on record in the memo of writ petition that it was filed to represent or protect the cause of the Society. (ix) Legally and technically the judgment delivered by Hon'ble Single Judge does not seem to suffer for want of jurisdiction on the ground that Hon'ble Single Judge was one of the member of the Division Bench and after remanding the matter he had decided the writ petition on merit. However, in view of discussion made hereinabove ordinarily in such circumstances special care should be taken not to decide a controversy on merit by Hon'ble Judge of this Court who had been the member of Division Bench while remanding the matter for adjudication by Hon'ble Single Judge to maintain and strengthen the people's faith in the administration of justice. In case any objection is raised by the member of bar then it shall always be incumbent upon Hon'ble Single Judge transfer such cases to other Hon'ble Judge to decide the controversy. (x) While finalizing the electoral roll in pursuance to power conferred by the sub-section 2 of Section 25 of the Act it shall always be incumbent upon the Deputy Registrar or the competent authority to comply with the principle of natural justice keeping in view the observation made in the present judgment Without providing reasonable opportunity, to defend the members of the.Society can not deprive to participate in the election process., 69. Election process was initiated by the Deputy Registrar in pursuance to impugned judgment of Hon'ble Single Judge. Hence by a interim order dated 5.7.2006 this Court had restrained the Deputy Registrar from proceeding with the election. A special Leave to Appeal was filed in the Apex Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to stay the interim order passed by this Court on 12.7.2006 and permitted Deputy Registrar to proceed with election with rider not to declare the result. However, the appeal filed in the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dismissed by an order dated 21.7.2006. While dismissing the appeal Hon'ble Supreme Court had declined to pass any order for the declaration of result. Their Lordship of Apex Court had provided that the election held shall be subject to result of pending present special appeal. Since the election was held in pursuance to judgment of Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court and we have recorded a finding that writ petition was liable to be dismissed being not maintainable and filed by incompetent person, hence the election conducted by the Deputy Registrar shall also be void and not sustainable. For one more reason the election held shall not be sustainable. As held hereinabove, the names of large number of members of the Society were excluded while preparing the list dated 13.1.2003 in utter disregard of principle of natural justice which is not permissible under law. Therefore, in case the outcome of election is sustained and permitted to come in operation, then it shall amount to perpetuate an illegality which shall neither be just nor proper keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstance of the present case. 70. In view of above, special appeals are deserves to be allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 7.10.2005 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge is set aside. The writ petition No.884 (MS) of 2003 is also dismissed. Deputy Registrar is directed to reschedule the afresh election keeping in view the observation made in the present judgment and complete entire process to elect the office bearers of the Committee of Management in accordance to law expeditiously and preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Special appeals are allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. (Ordered accordingly) _____________