Prakash Shrivastava, J.:— This order will govern the disposal of Income-tax Appeals Nos. 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 127, 128, 129, 130, 140, 141, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 175 of 2008 and 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36 of 2009.

2. In this order, we have noted the facts from I.T.A No. 86 of 2008 for convenience. It is not disputed by counsel appearing for the respective parties that all the appeals are on the same facts involving identical issue.

3. This appeal has been filed by the Department under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act” hereafter), against the common order dated March 28, 2008, passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) in I.T.A No. 615.Ind/07—Dawoodi Bohra Jamat v. CIT, [2009] 317 ITR (AT) 133 (Indore) and connected appeals. The appeal was admitted for final hearing on the following substantial questions of law:

“1. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in holding that all the objects of the trust are religious in nature?

2. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in holding that the applicability of the provisions of Section 13(1)(b) cannot be looked into at the time of examining the registration application under section 12A of the Income-tax Act contrary to their own decision in the case of Dhakad Samaj Trust in I.T.A No. 468.Ind/2003, dated November 24, 2003, and the hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the same case ?”

4. The controversy involved in appeal is about the entitlement of the respondent to get the registration under section 12A/12AA of the Act. The claim of the respondent is that it is a public religious trust having the objects soleiy religious in nature and, therefore, they are entitled to claim registration under section 12A/12AA of the Act; whereas the stand of the Department is that the object of the respondent-trust are charitable in nature and they are confined to a particular community and, hence, the provisions of Section 13(1)(b) of the Act are attracted. Section 11 of the Act excludes certain income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable and religious purposes from the total income. Section 12 of the Act by a deeming fiction holds voluntary contributions and some other incomes and value of services received by a trust wholly created for charitable or religious purposes to be the income derived from the property held under trust for the purpose of section 11 of the Act. In terms of section 12A of the Act, the benefit of sections 11 and 12 can be availed of if the recipient of the income satisfies the condition of registration prescribed under section 12A of the Act and is registered in terms of the provisions of section 12AA of the Act. Section 13 of the Act provides for the cases in which section 11 does not apply. Section 13(1)(b) of the Act excludes the income of the trust or institution created or established for the benefit of particular religious community or caste from the purview of section 11 ibid.

5. The respondent—“Dawoodi Bohra Jamat”—had filed an application under section 12A/12AA of the Act before the Commissioner of Incometax stating that all the objects of the trust are religious in nature and that it is a public religious trust. The Commissioner, vide order dated September 14, 2007, rejected the application made by the respondent seeking registration on the ground that the object of the trust are charitable in nature for a particular community and, hence, the provisions of Section 13(1)(b) of the Act are attracted. It was, therefore, held that the trust cannot be registered under section 12A/12AA of the Act. Aggrieved with this order of the Com missioner, the respondent-trust preferred an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Indore Bench, Indore. The applications for registration of Dawoodi Bohra Jamat of other localities were also rejected on the similar ground and they also assailed the order of the Commissioner Income-tax before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in appeal. All these appeals were filed on the same facts and, therefore, they were disposed of by the Tribunal by a common order dated March 28, 2008, or by separate order following the main order dated March 28, 2008. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeals by holding that the respondent-trust are public religious trusts and the provisions of sections 13(1)(b) of the Act are not attracted, and, therefore, they are entitled to claim registration under section 12A/12AA of the Act. Aggrieved with the order of the Tribunal, the Department has preferred these appeals under section 260A of the Act which were admitted by this court on the substantial questions of law as mentioned above.

6. On the first question of law, learned counsel appearing for the appellant (Department) submitted that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has committed an error in holding that all the objects of the trust are religious in nature. As against this, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that question No. 1 formulated by this court being a pure question of fact cannot be examined in this appeal. In other words, it was urged that question No. 1 not being a substantial question of law within the meaning of section 260A ibid and, hence, it cannot be answered in this appeal. He further submitted that the Tribunal has committed no error in holding that all the objects of the trust are religious in nature.

7. We have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties in detail and perused the record.

8. The objects of the respondent-trust as per the trust deed are as under:

“a. To arrange for nyaz and majlis (lunch and dinner) on religious occasion of the birth anniversary and Urs Mubarak of Awliya-e-Quiram (SA) and Saints of the Dawoodji Bohra community.

b. To arrange for lunch and dinner on religious occasions and auspicious days of the Dawoodi Bohra community.

c. For the betterment of the Dawoodi Bohra community to give and take Qardan Hasana according to Farma of Qurane Majid.

d. To arrange for religious education and to establish Madarsa and such organization.

e. To assist/help to the needy people for religious activities.

f. To carry out all religious activities according to Shariat and direction of Shariat-e-Mohammediyah for the prosperity of the Dawoodi Bohra community.”

9. The Tribunal has examined these objects in the light of the submissions made by the parties and material produced before it and after the elaborate analysis recorded the following findings (page 143 of 317 ITR (AT):

“16. Considering the submissions of the parties, we do find force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the assessee in contending that the assessee is a public religious trust. Section 2(4) of the M.P Public Trusts Act, 1951, provides the meaning of public trust means an express or constructive trust for a public, religious or charitable purpose and includes a temple, a math, a mosque, a church, a wakf or any other religious or charitable endowment and a society formed for a religious or charitable purpose. The words ‘religious purpose’ or ‘public worship’ as found in enactments relating to public trust have not been defined under the Income-tax Act. Therefore, there is a wide scope for interpretation of these words on the basis of definitions given elsewhere or precedents interpreting them. Broadly speaking ‘religious purpose’ under the Income-tax Act will include objects relating to observance of rituals and ceremonies and propagation of the tenets of religion as also its advancement. Income derived from property held by public trust as well as voluntary contributions received by the public trust are the subject-matter of exemptions from the taxation under the Act. The objects of the assessee-trust reproduced above clearly refer to the religion and are supported by reference made to different pages of Holy Quran. The learned counsel for the assessee referred to the true copies of several pages of Holy Quran written by two of the authors referred to above in which giving of food in days of hunger or orphan is considered as highly religious ceremony. Reference is also made that who will give to the people or poor then Allah will give them in return and, i.e, who will give loan then Allah will give double to them. Likewise, for helping the needy people for religious activities and to carry out religious activities or spend for good, spending wealth in the way of Allah, bestowing mercy, teaching were considered to be highly religious activities. On going through” several true pages of Holy Quran written by the authors referred to above, we are satisfied that the learned counsel for the assessee was justified in contending that all the objects of the assessee-trust are solely religious in nature because each of them refers either to religious occasions, religious education or to religious activities. The learned counsel for the assessee also explained that the words ‘Shariat-e-Mohammadiyah’ means the path shown by prophet Mohammed. Therefore, the objects of Shariat-e-Mohammadiyah are identical with those of ‘Dawat-e-Hadiyah’. For Dawoodi Bohras, true path shown by the prophet is the one indicated and shown by their living guide Dai-al-Mutlaq of the time who is the living and visible guide for Dawoodi Bohras. It is an undisputed fact that for the people believing in Islam, writings in Quran are words of Allah for them. The directions given in the Holy Quran are considered by the people of Islamic faith as orders from Allah and the people of Islamic faith obey such orders as holy and religious. The learned counsel for the assessee has been able to demonstrate that all the objects of the assessee-trust, as noted above, came out from the writings in Quran and as such these are the orders for them while observing Islamic faith. The learned Departmental representative referred to the registration granted to the assessee-trust under M.P Public Trusts Act and referred to the objects of the trust mentioned therein which are not from the objects of the trust as mentioned in the application for registration. The learned counsel for the assessee, however, objected to the submission of the learned Departmental representative because in registration certificate the objects of the trust were briefly mentioned to follow directions of ‘Dawat-e-Hadiyah’ and for Dawoodi Bohras the path shown by the prophet is one indicated and shown by their living guide Dai-ul-Mutlaq. The learned counsel for the assessee submitted that the objects given in the registration under M.P Public Trusts Act were briefly the same as above elaborated in the application for registration which are in the interest of Bohra samaj with regard to observing and solemnizing the religious activities and education for Bohra samaj and as such there is no difference in them. We agree with the learned counsel for the assessee that the objects of the assessee-trust, as explained in the registration application under section 12A/12AA of the Act, are derived from the objects of the trust, as have been mentioned briefly in the certificate of registration as noted above. The contention of the learned Departmental representatives is, therefore, rejected.

17. The learned Departmental representative submitted that no mosque or roza is created by the assessee-trust; therefore, it cannot be treated as religious trust. The learned counsel for the assessee, however, submitted that there is no requirement under the law. The learned Departmental representative thus has failed to bring to our notice as to how it was mandatory to create mosque or roza for treating the trust to be religious trust in such an event …

We have already observed above that all the objects of the assessee were religious in nature because the same are supported by the writings in Holy Quran and as such the assessee-trust following the directions from the Holy Quran on the religious occasions, religious education and religious activities for Dawoodi Bohra community, had been organizing various activities in pursuance with the objects of the trust and as such the decision cited by the Commissioner of Income-tax is clearly distinguishable on facts.

18. On consideration of the rival submissions and the material on record, we are of the view that the objects of the assessee-trust are solely religious in nature and as such the finding of the learned Com missioner of Income-tax in the impugned order that the objects of the assessee are charitable in nature is not justified. The findings of the learned Commissioner of Income-tax to this extent are set aside.”

10. Under section 260A(1) of the Act, the appeal to the High Court is on substantial question of law. The scope of appeal under section 260A is same as that of a second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court in a catena of decisions has ruled that finding of fact recorded by the final fact finding tribunal/court is binding on the High Court exercising second appellate jurisdiction and unless such finding is perverse in nature, it is binding on the second appellate court. Sub-section (4) of section 260A permits the respondent to argue at the hearing of the appeal that the appeal does not involve any such question though framed at the time of admission. Therefore, it is required to be seen by this court whether question No. 1 formulated by this court is concluded by the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal or not.

11. A finding recorded by the Tribunal on the nature of activity and object of the trust is essentially a finding of fact. The Supreme Court in the matter of Hazarat Pirmahomed Shah Saheb Roza Committee v. CIT, [1963] 63 ITR 490, while dealing with similar issue held that (page 495):

“The Tribunal, therefore, held that the original purpose of the wakf was confined to the maintenance of the roza and the mosque and celebration of festive occasions and, therefore, the wakf was established for a wholly religious purpose. At the hearing of the reference, the High Court has interfered with the finding of the Tribunal on this point. The High Court considered that the maintenance of madrassas and the library must be taken to be one of the original purposes of the wakf and the finding of the Tribunal that the wakf was wholly for a religious purpose must be overruled. It is manifest that the question as to what was the object of the wakf is essentially a question of fact and the High Court had, therefore, no justification for interfering with the finding of the Tribunal on this point. It was pointed out by this court in India Cements Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras., [1966] 60 ITR 52 (SC) that in a reference under section 66 of the Act the High Court must accept the findings of fact made by the Appellate Tribunal, and it is not open to the High Court to reopen the findings of fact unless the party concerned has applied for a reference to challenge those findings first by an application under section 66(1) of the Act. If he has failed to file an application expressly raising the question about the validity of the findings of fact, he is not entitled to urge before the High Court that the findings are vitiated for one reason or another. Similarly, in another case, Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras v. M. Ganapathi Mudaliar, [1964] 53 ITR 623 (SC), it has been pointed out that, even if the question referred to the High Court is regarding the existence of material to support a finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court should not act as an appellate court and consider whether the finding was justified or not.”

12. In this appeal, the Tribunal on the basis of the evidence led by both the parties has recorded a finding that the respondent is a public religious trust. The appellant has neither assailed the aforesaid finding recorded by the Tribunal as perverse nor the counsel for the appellant has been able to point out any perversity in the said finding. Therefore, this finding is binding on this court. We, therefore, find no good reason to interfere with such finding of fact.

13. A perusal of the order of the Tribunal also indicates that the same issue had come up in respect of grant of registration to Dawoodi Bohra Jamat before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench. The application for registration submitted by Dawoodi Bohra Jamat was rejected by Commissioner of Income-tax but in appeal the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench by order dated March 10, 2006, had held the said assessee to be entitled for registration under section 12A of the Act. This also shows that not only the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Indore, but the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in other States on the same facts have found the trust of Dawoodi Bohra Jamat located within their jurisdiction is entitled to claim registration under the Act.

14. Thus, this court answers the first question by holding that question No. 1 is concluded by finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal and the Tribunal was justified in holding that all the objects of the trust are religious in nature.

15. With regard to the second question, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has committed an error while deciding the issue of applicability of Section 13(1)(b) of the Act and that the case of the appellant is covered by the judgment of this court in the matter of Shri Dhakad Samaj Dharamshala Bhawan Trust v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, [2008] 302 ITR 321 (MP) and in view of the said judgment the respondent is not entitled to claim registration. As against this, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the judgment in the case of Shri Dhakad Samaj Dharamshala Bhawan Trust, [2008] 302 ITR 321 (MP) is on different facts and it will have no application to the present case.

16. We have carefully perused the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal dated March 28, 2008, passed in the present case. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has examined the issue of applicability of the provisions of Section 13(1)(b) of the Act in the case of the respondent. While deciding this issue, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has relied upon the decisions of the Gujarat High Court in the matter of CIT v. Barkate Saifiyah Society, [1995] 213 ITR 492 and in the matter of CIT v. Chandra Charitable Trust, [2007] 294 ITR 86 (Guj). The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has held that since the respondent is a religious trust, therefore, the provisions of Section 13(1)(b) of the Act will not be applicable because the same are applicable in the case of the trust established for charitable purposes. There is no error in such a conclusion of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Section 13(1)(b) is attracted in the case of income of the trust for charitable purpose of a community or caste, which is not the case here.

17. We have also perused the decision of this court in the matter of Shri Dhakad Samaj Dharamshala Bhawan Trust, [2008] 302 ITR 321 (MP). In the case of Shri Dhakad Samaj Dharamshala Bhawan Trust, [2008] 302 ITR 321 (MP), in the application for registration, the purpose shown by the assessee was to provide dharmashala to persons from the samaj and outsiders and the charges for stay in the case of person not belonging to the samaj was many times higher than the charges payable by the persons belonging to the samaj. Therefore, in this background, this court held that the act of providing dharmashala was not for religious purposes and, therefore, the trust did not satisfy the requirement of section 11 of the Act. Reasonings given. by this court was that the provisions contained in Section 13(1)(b) of the Act cannot be construed de hors the purpose contained in section 11 of the Act.

18. The controversy involved in the present appeals is different. In the present appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has found as a fact after analysing the objects of the trust that the respondent is a public religious trust and its objects are solely religious in nature. In view of this finding of fact which has been recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the present case, the judgment of this court rendered in the matter of Shri Dhakad Samaj Dharamshala Bhawan Trust, [2008] 302 ITR 321 (MP) is distinguishable on facts and will have no application.

19. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we do not find any force in these appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. A copy of this judgment be placed in the record of connected appeals, as particularized above, for ready reference.

20. No costs.