1. Dr. A.S Ramachandra was going on a scooter on 12-5-1975 with his son A.R Sathischandra on the pillion and his wife Dr. A.R Premalatha Chandra, sitting in the side car of the scooter bearing No. MEM 2132 from Bangalore to Mysore. At about 5-45 p.m they were on the road near Anchepalya when according to Dr. Ramachandra, suddenly the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation bus bearing No. MYF 2160 came from the opposite direction driven in a rash and negligent manner and, coming on the wrong side of the road, dashed against the said scooter, with the result that the side car of the scooter was turned towards the right and it was hit by the bus. The pillion, rider was thrown out, so as so the rider of the scooter and the scooter turned turtle with the result the lady sitting in the side car received severe injuries to the head and other parts of her body to which she later succumbed. A car came by and in the car the injured persons were sent to Victoria Hospital at Bangalore. It is further the case of the claimants that as a result of the accident, the son (Sathischandra) suffered fracture of the humerus and ulna in the left hand. He was treated. But, ultimately, his left hand became lifeless. On that count, Sathischandra, the boy aged nine years, represented by his father, has claimed compensation of Rs. 1,00,000.

2. Dr. Rameschandra and his son Sathischandra have filed another application claiming compensation for the death of Dr. A.R Premalatha Chandra, wife of Dr. Ramachandra and mother of Sathischandra. According to them, Dr. Premalatha Chandra was an Assistant Lecturer in the Government Medical College at Mysore and she was drawing Rs. 1,000 and odd per month. She was aged 34 years. On that basis, they have claimed Rs. 1,61,000 towards compensation for her death. The compensation is claimed against the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation in both the cases as the bus belongs to it. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation resisted the application firstly contending that the accident was not the result of the rash and negligent driving of the bus in question by the driver and, secondly, that it was entirely due to the rash and negligent driving of the scooter itself. Alternatively, the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation has contended that the compensation claimed is highly exorbitant.

3. These applications came to be heard together as the claims arose out of the same accident and common questions of law and facts were involved.

4. The Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and first Addl. District Judge, Bangalore, (hereinafter Tererred to as the Tribunal), raised the following issues as arising for his consideration in M.V.C No. 228 of 1975:

(1) Whether the petitioner proves that he Sustained injuries due to the negligence of the driver of the bus MYF 2100.

(2) Whether the petitioner is ??? to any compensation? If so, to what account and from whom?

5. The Tribunal raised the following issues as arising for its consideration in M.V.C No. 224 of 1975:

(1) Whether the petitioners prove that deceased Dr. Premalatha Chandra died due to the negligence of the diver of the bus MYF 2160?

(2) What was the age of the deceased and what was her income at the time of her death and what amount was she contributing towards the maintenance of the petitioners?

(3) Whether the petitioners are entitled to any compensation? If so, to what amount and from whom?

6. During enquiry, the claimants examined nine witnesses in all. As against that the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation examined the driver of the bus in question as RW 1 and, further, the Sub-Inspector of Police was examined as RW 2.

7. The Tribunal, appreciating the evidence on record, held that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus in question by RW 1. The Tribunal awarded general damages of Rs. 40,000 to the boy (Sathishchandra) since his left arm had become practically useless. The Tribunal further awarded Rs. 10,000 for pain and suffering as the boy had to suffer pain and suffering throughout his life. The Tribunal also awarded Rs. 1,000 as special damages for medical treatment. In all, therefore, the Tribunal awarded Rs. 51,000 to the injured boy as compensation.

8. In the other case, the Tribunal found that there was economic loss of Rs. 1,26.000 as a result of the death of Dr. Premalatha chandra and it awarded that sum to the claimants towards economic loss. It further awarded Rs. 4,000 towards loss of consortium to the first claimant, the husband of the deceased. It also awarded Rs. 4,000 to the second claimant towards loss of love and affection at the death, of his mother. It further awarded Rs. 5,000 to the claimants for loss of domestic services. Further, it awarded Rs. 1,000 towards funeral and obsequies. Thus, in all, the Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,40,000 to the claimants. The Tribunal deducted Rs. 15,000 from out of Rs. 20,000 the insurance amount received, towards acceleration of payment of insurance. Thus, the Tribunal awarded a total sum of Rs. 1,26,000 in the case of death of Dr. Premalatha chandra. Further, the Tribunal awarded Rs. 10,000 towards pain and suffering and injury sustained by Dr. Ramachandra.

9. Aggrieved by the said judgment and award, the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, the owner of the bus in question has come up in appeal before this Court.

10. Shri N.P Moganna, the learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the accident was due to actionable negligence on the part of the driver of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation bus. He further submitted that the Tribunal was not justified in awarding Rs. 40,000 towards general damages to the boy (Sathischandra). He also submitted that Rs. 1,26,000 awarded towards pecuniary loss to the husband and son of deceased Dr. Premalatha Chandra was exorbitant. He further submitted that the compensation towards loss of love and affection could not be awarded to Sathishchandra at the death of his mother. So also, he submitted that Rs. 5,000 awarded towards loss of domestic services could not be sustained. According to him, Rs. 10,000 awarded to Dr. Ramachandra, without even a prayer and an application on his part, could not simply be sustained.

11. As against these, the learned Counsel for the claimants argued supporting the judgment and award of the Tribunal in question.

12. The points, therefore, that arise for our consideration in these appeals are:

(1) Whether the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the accident in question was the result of the rash and negligent driving of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation bus MYF 2160 by RW 1, its driver?

(2) Whether the Tribunal was justified in awarding Rs. 40,000 towards general damages to Sathischandra?

(3) Whether the Tribunal was justified in awarding Rs. 1,26,000 towards pecuniary loss to the claimants at the death of Dr. Premalathe Chandra?

(4) Whether the Tribunal was justified in awarding Rs. 4,000 towards loss of love and affection and Rs. 5,000 towards loss of domestic services in the case of death of Dr. Premalatha Chandra?

(5) Whether the Tribunal was justified in awarding Rs. 10,000 to Dr. Ramachandra, without even an application and prayer by him?

13. We will take up the last point first. There is admittedly no application by Dr. Ramaschandra for any compensation for personal injuries. S. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, specifically stipulates that an application for compensation should be made by the person who has sustained the injury. Unless there is an application by the injured, the Tribunal would not get jurisdiction to decide the quantum of compensation on account of the injury sustained in a motor accident arising out of the, use of a motor vehicle. Since Dr. Ramaschandra has not submitted any application claiming damages for any injury sustained by him in the motor accident in question, the Tribunal was not justified in going into that question and awarding him compensation of Rs. 10,000 unasked and unsought for. The award to that extent has to be set aside without more and the appeal to that extent is entitled to succeed.

14. We would next take up the question of actionable negligence. It is the case of Dr. Rameshchandra, as stated above, that he was going on a scooter on 12-5-1975 by about 5-45 p.m near Anchapalya village on Mysore Bangalore road. His son Sathischandra was sitting on the pillion and his wife Dr. Premelatha Chandra was sitting in the side car. They were going on the left side of the road. Suddenly, the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation bus bearing No. MYF 2160 came from the opposite direction driven in a rash and negligent manner by its driver RW 1 and dashed against the scooter. In order to prove his case, Dr. Rameshchandra has examined PW 1. In addition, he has examined PWs. 7 and 3. PW 1 is Shri M. Subramanya. He is a broker in cars. He is not in any way related to either party. He is an independent witness. He has deposed that he was going behind the scooter and he saw the bus MYF 2160 coming from the opposite direction at a speed of 50 to 60 Kilometres per hour. The bus was proceeding in the middle of the road and it dashed against the scooter Similarly, PW 7A. Siddaramaiah, an agriculturist, has deposed that he saw the accident when he was returning to his village. He has spoken similarly as PW 1. The evidence of PW 3 Papaiah, who was going on the road with a cow, corroborates the other evidence. Thus, it becomes established in the evidence of these witnesses that the scooter was going on its proper side, that there was a middle line dividing the road into two halves, that the width of the road was about 25 feet, that the bus, which came on the offside of the road, hit the scooter.

15. The bus was in the management of the driver. The bus was expected to go on its proper side. If it crosses the middle line, goes on the other side of the road and hits the scooter, without more, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is attracted and the burden shifts on to the driver to explain that aspect. The driver, instead of explaining how the bus came off the road, has given a different version. The version is not even consistent with what he has made out in the written statement. There is obvious improvement in his evidence and his evidence, is on the face of it, highly artificial and incredible. The driver says that he saw the scooter even when he was at a distance of about half a furlong. According to him, the hands of the scooter driver were shaky and when the bus was at a distance of about 50 feet, the scooter-driver raised both his hands. This, therefore is, fantastic to say the least. That is not the version made out by him in the written statement. Normally, it is too much for the bus-driver to say that he saw the hands of the scooter-driver were shaky seeing from a distance of about half a furlong. The witness may be audacious enough to make such a statement. But it requires greater degree of credulity to swallow it. The Tribunal has rightly rejected his version and has upheld the version of the three eye-witnesses and has rightly come to the conclusion that it was the bus which was directly responsible by its rash and negligent driving that caused the accident.

16. It is needless for us to point out that in the case of an accident, the oral evidence has to be tested on the basis of the circumstantial evidence. Accidents occur in a split second. It will be highly difficult for even an independent witness to closely observe the accident and meticulously reproduce it. There is chance of honest discrepancies. Hence, it is always advisable to test an accident or a collusion in the light of circumstantial evidence.

17. The circumstantial evidence which is proved on record in these cases is that the bus came on its off side of the road and hit the scooter. As already pointed out above, that attracts the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and actionable negligence on the part of the driver is prima facie established. The same is not explained by the driver in these cases. Hence, we agree with the finding of the Tribunal that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver.

18. Adverting now to the quantum of damages, we would first take up for consideration the case of the injured boy. It is in the evidence of the doctor who treated him that he suffered fracture of the humerus and radius. PW 4 Dr. Hemya Naik has deposed to it. He has identified the writing and the signature of Dr. P.S Samak who admitted the boy into the hospital. The accident register is at Ex-P-2. Ex-P-2(a) is the relevant entry in Ex-P-2 regarding the injuries sustained by the boy. The important injuries, as stated above, are fractures. PW 5 Dr. G. Venkatarangam has further deposed that he examined Sathischandra on 15-8-1975. He noticed that the boy had total paralysis of the left upper extremity. According to him, the disability is permanent. PW 9 Dr. Rameshchandra, the father of the boy, has, however, further deposed that the entire hand of the boy has become lifeless and that it is not likely to improve. This is what he has stated;

My son was treated as an impatient in Victoria Hospital for about 15 days. He had sustained 2 fractures in the left fore arm and another fracture on the left humerus. There was natural damage to the left axilla of my son. He had also sustained a head injury. The left hand of my son had been completely paralysed. Even now he is taking treatment at Mysore. There is no possibility of improving the left arm of my son. ..”

19. It may be noticed that PW 9 Dr. Ramashchandra has attempted to slightly improve the versions of the doctors. PW 6 Dr. G. Venkatarangam who examined the boy on 15-8-1975 has only stated that the boy had paralysis of the left upper extremity. He has not stated that the entire left hand of the boy was lifeless. Hence, relying on the evidence of PW 6 Dr. G. Venkatarangam, we hold that the left upper extremity of the boy has paralysis and that it is a permanent disability.

20. Thus, the boy has to be given general damages for the injury itself, for the disability in the working capacity, for pain and suffering and for loss of amenities.

21. As is observed by the Tribunal, the damages should be fair and reasonable. It should be in accord with the general run of assessments made over the years in comparable cases. When the Courts assess damages for personal injuries, they endeavour to arrive at a fair and social valuation and, in a sense, they become the mouth-piece of society reflecting the general consensus of opinion in a certain status of society. That being so, it would be necessary to find out the general run of assessment in comparable cases while awarding general damages for the injuries suffered in the left arm of the boy.

22. It is necessary to recall that when we use the term comparable cases’, we refer to those cases which arise in comparable society having the same economic standard of life and social patterns. We state this because it is our experience that damages awarded by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana would not be a proper guide for determining the compensation in cases arising in Karnataka and, if we may say so in the cases arising in Southern India. It is for that reason that we are not agreeable to accept the cases cited by the Tribunal from Punjab and Haryana while awarding general damages to the boy.

23. The Tribunal has first referred to the case of Gopala Krishnan v. Sankara Narayana(1). That was a case where a boy sustained injuries in the left leg and not in the left arm. That makes much difference and that cannot be a comparable case while awarding damages in the case of injuries to the left arm.

24. The 2nd case that is referred is the case of State of Punjab v. Lal Chand Sabhawal(2), obviously from Punjab and Haryana.

25. The third case that is referred is in the case of Union Of India v. Shri Om Prakash Chopra(3). That is a case from Jammu and Kashmir. But, the injury there was to the right arm. The injured was an Army Contractor. Rs. 36,000 were not awarded merely for the injury. But it was mainly due to the loss of income and disability of the injured. The facts of the present case reveal that the injury is to the left arm and the boy is a right-hander. Hence, that cannot be a comparable case.

26. The next case that is referred is in the case of P.S Batnagar v. State of Punjab(4), which again is from Punjab.

27. The next that is referred is in the case of Manmohan Sarup Kaushal v. Melaram(5), wherein a girl of six years suffered total disability in the leg. That obviously is a total disability of the leg and not of the left arm. Hence that case also cannot be considered to be a comparable case.

28. In the case of Ganga Sugar Corn. Ltd., Deoband v. Sukhbir Singh(6) the High Court of Allahabad awarded Rs. 10,400 for the injury, viz., the crush of the left arm.

29. In the case of M.R.V Bus Service Ltd. v. Ravi(7), the High Court of Madras awarded Rs. 15,000 towards general damages for serious injuries incurred by a boy to his right forearm incurring total disability. But, in that case, it was the right arm.

30. Thus, on a review of these cases, it becomes clear that a sum of Rs. 25,000 should be awarded as general damages to the boy for the injury suffered by him in the left arm, taking into consideration the loss of earning capacity also.

31. It is true that in the case of M.R.V Bus Service Ltd. v. Ravi, referred to supra, Rs. 15,000 were awarded with reference to the right forearm. Here, it is the case of a left arm and the fear of the father is that the entire left arm may become useless Besides, the accident in the instant case is of the year 1975. Hence, we think it just and proper to reduce the general damages from Rs. 40,000 to Rs. 25,000 since the entire left hand is likely to become useless. Besides, we have taken into consideration the likely disability in the earning capacity in awarding Rs. 25,000.

32. The Tribunal has awarded Rs. 10,000 for pain and suffering. It is true that for the rest of his life the boy has to suffer agony for the loss of his left hand. Further he has to suffer loss of amenities as he cannot do anything with his left hand. The Tribunal, however, may not be correct in observing that the joy and rose of life is gone from the boy for the rest of his life. It is too much of an exaggeration. He can still have the joy and love for life. Though as pointed out above he has to suffer the deprivation of certain amen ties for which compensation is granted & Rs. 10,000 which we affirm.

33. The boy has been granted Rs. 1,000 towards medical expenses which is just and proper which we affirm.

34. Thus, the boy is awarded Rs. 36,000 as global compensation.

35. We observe in passing that the observation made by the Tribunal that the rest of the life of boy is bleak morose, miserable and shocking cannot be correct. It is true that he might not be able to become a doctor or a surgeon. But, if he is endowed with intelligence and if he is really a bright and brilliant student, he can certainly choose other careers which are as attractive as the career of a doctor or a surgeon and which are no less remunerative also.

36. It is needless for us to point out that merely because the parents desire that the boy should be a doctor or a surgeon, their wishes are fulfilled in all cases. It would ultimately depend upon the brilliancy, aptitude and industry of the boy. The boy has still a bright career open to him and we wish him well.

37. Adverting now to the case of Dr. Premalatha Chandra, it cannot be doubted that she was employed in the Government Medical College at Mysore, It is not in dispute that she was 34 years at the time of death by accident. It is further not in dispute that she was drawing a salary of Rs. 1,003-90 p. per month and that she had prospects of becoming a professor reaching a maximum of Rs. 1,200 per month, as her basic salary.

38. The learned Counsel for the appellants, however, submitted that there was no pleading for dependency by the husband of the deceased and under S. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, compensation has to be given only for the loss of dependency. He, however, fairly conceded that would not apply in the case of the boy who is entitled to benefits from the mother.

39. S. 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, contemplates award of compensation by the Tribunal. It states that the Tribunal shall award compensation which appears to it just, specifying the person or persons to whom compensation should be paid. Thus, S. 110B of the said Act does not specify the heads under which compensation is to be awarded. For that, we have necessarily to fall back on the general law, viz., the Fatal Accidents Act, in the case of death of a victim of accident.

40. S. 1(a) of the Fatal Accidents Act speaks of loss of dependency. It should be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child, if any. Hence, there is no bar under S. 1(a) of the said Act that the husband cannot claim dependency from the wife. S. 2 of the said Act speaks of loss to the estate of the deceased.

41. It is true that on the facts of the present case, PW 9 Dr. Rameshchandra has not claimed any dependency from his wife. But, the son of the deceased, viz., Sathischandra is also a claimant. He is entitled to the lose to the estate of the deceased; so is claimant No. 1. Hence, though it may not be said that Dr. Ramashchandra has not claimed loss of dependency, both claimants are certainly entitled to the loss to the estate of the deceased which consists of the economic loss by the death of Dr. Premalatha Chandra. That has also to be awarded under S. 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and the point is settled by the decisions of several High Courts, including the Supreme Court of India, (vide: C.K Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhi Kuttan Nair(8).

42. The Tribunal, therefore, was perfectly justified in calculating the economic loss and awarding it. The real question, however, is whether the amount of Rs. 1,26,000 awarded by the Tribunal is highly exorbitant.

43. If we invest Rs. 1,22,000 in a scheduled bank for some length of time, we would get interest of more than Rs. 12,000 per annum, at 10% per annum, which would work out at more than Rs. 1,000 per month. When the total salary of the deceased was Rs. 1,000 per month and when, even according to the Tribunal, she could spare only Rs. 500 per month, it is obvious that the amount awarded by the Tribunal is highly exorbitant. A misfortune should not be converted into fortuitous windfall in the award by the Tribunal. Hence, we have no hesitation to observe that the amount awarded is highly exorbitant which calls for interference at our hands.

44. It is in evidence that she was getting Rs. 1,000 at the time of her death and that she had prospects of earning Rs. 1,200 per month as her basic salary. It may also be remembered however, that if she were alive there were prospects of her getting more children. As it is, they have only one son by name Sathischandra; the family would have grown, the expenses would have been more and the sparing capacity should have been less. That aspect also cannot be ignored. At the same lime, some allowance has to be made for prospects of promotion.

45. This Court has discussed and elucidated two methods of working out loss of dependency and economic loss in the case of Indian Mercantile Insce. Co. v. Gowramma(9). It is not necessary for us to further elaborate them in the instant case. Any one method adopted needs to be checked up by the other method lest the total amount awarded should become exorbitant.

46. It may be mentioned in this context that the damages awarded should be such that the ordinary sensible man would not instinctively regard them as either mean or extravagant but would consider them to be sensibly fair. (Vide: Ward v. Jones(10). Lord Denning, in the said case, has observed thus:

The award of damages in personal injury cases is basically a conventional figure derived from experience and from awards in comparable cases. The word conventional does not mean that the amount is arbitrary but that it is in conformity with the general custom and agreement and reflects a general consensus of opinion in a certain state of society. It is necessary to remember that in this view comparable figures are a guide and a too and not the essence of the award.”

47. Noble Lord Denning has stressed in the case of Fletcher v. Autocar and Transportere Ltd.(11), that the heads of damages are merely aids and that the total figure awarded should always be reconsidered to find out whether it is fair. This is what his Lordship has observed:

..There is, to my mind, a considerable risk of error in just adding up the items. It is the risk of overlapping.

10. … And at the end we must look at the overall figure to see that it is fair compensation.”

48. In the instant case, we can check up the figure or reach at a reasonable compensation by adopting the multiplier method.

49. We have already observed above that there is no substance in the contention that the compensation should be limited only to the amount of dependency and that it cannot be based on loss of estate of the deceased.

50. It is true that in the case of Ramji Das v. Sham Singh(12) the High Court of Delhi has observed thus:

“In a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1885, the legal representatives can claim to be compensated for the pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased. But in an application for compensation under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, it is not the pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased which determines the quantum of compensation; it is the pecuniary loss suffered by the dependents which alone has to be determined. In other words, the question as to what amount of compensation the legal representatives are entitled will depend not on their capacity as the legal representatives but as dependents of the deceased.”.

51. With great respect, we are unable to subscribe to this view. As pointed out above, S. 110B empowers the Tribunal to award just compensation. It does not say that only the amount of dependency should be awarded nor that the loss to the estate of the deceased should not be awarded. The term ‘just compensation’ is wide enough in its connotation to take in its fold the compensation to be awarded both under Ss. 1(a) and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, which is the general law regarding such compensation.

52. The Supreme Court of India has also pointed cut in a recent decision in the case of Minu B. Mehta v. Balakrishna Ramachandra(13) that the provisions under Ss. 110A to 110F in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, only provide for a speedy procedure and for cheap remedy. But, that does not affect substantially the law contained in the Law of Torts or in the Fatal Accidents Act. This is what the Supreme Court has laid down in the aforesaid decision in para-23 of the Judgment:

“The Claims Tribunal is a tribunal constituted by the State Government for expeditious disposal of the motor claims, The general law applicable is only common law and the law of torts. If under the law a person becomes legally liable then the person suffering the injuries is entitled to be compensated and the Tribunal is authorised to determine the amount of compensation which appears to be just.”

53. Hence, we are of the considered view that the Claims Tribunal should award not only loss of dependency but also loss to the estate of the deceased, provided the two do not everlap.

54. In the leading case, viz., Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. Veluswami(14), these 2 terms, viz., loss of dependency and loss to the estate of the deceased, have been explained by the Supreme Court of India. In para-11 of the Judgment, towards the end, it is stated thus:

“..An illustration may clarify the position. X is the income of the estate of the deceased, Y is the yearly expenditure incurred by him on his dependents (we will ignore the other expenditure incurred by him) X-Y, i.e, Z, is the amount he saves every year. The capitalised value of the income spent on the dependents, subject to relevant deductions, is the pecuniary loss sustained by the members of his family through his death. The capitalised value of his income, subject to relevant deductions, would be the loss caused to the estate by his death. If the claimants under both the heads are the same, and if they get compensation for the entire loss caused to the estate, they cannot claim again under the head of personal loss the capitalised income that might have been spent on them if the decease were alive.”

55. Thus, it is obvious that loss to the estate means the capitalised value of the income of the deceased subject to relevant deductions.

56. It is no doubt true that in the instant case, the husband of the deceased, viz., Dr. Rameshchandra, has not in his deposition stated that he has lost any dependency or that he was depending for running the family on any part of the income of his wife. But, in the case in question, both Dr. Rameshchandra and his son Sathischandra are parties. Both of them are entitled to the loss of estate of the deceased Dr. Premalatha Chandra. Hence, we have to find out the loss of estate of the deceased by her untimely death. She was 34 years. She was drawing Rs. 1,003 per month as salary. She had basic salary which would have reached Rs. 1,200 per month. She had 21 years of service. Even after superannuation, she had prospects of earning by private practice. Taking these into consideration, we have got to fix the datum or the multiplicant and then fix the mutiplier. The Tribunal has fixed the probable income that she could save at Rs. 500 per month. It has, however, not taken into consideration the prospects of promotion. That being so, we would taka the multiplicant at Rs. 600 instead of Rs. 500 per month having due consideration to the fact that she had prospects of promotion.

57. Next, we have to consider the multiplier of the ‘years purchase’. The death is in the year 1975. The rate of interest on fixed deposits was well over 10% per annum. Therefore, the multiplier of ‘10’ would be just and proper on the facts of this case. The annual loss to the estate of the deceased would be Rs. 600 × 12, Rs. 7,200. Multiplying this by ‘10’, we get. Rs. 72,000. That, in our considered view, would be proper economic loss to the estate, of the deceased by her untimely death. From this Rs. 15,000 towards accelerated payment of insurance has to be deducted, as is done by the Tribunal, giving us the balance of Rs. 57,000. To this, has to be added Rs. 5,000 as the lady lost the prospects of her future happy Life. That is a conventional figure agreed upon by the Courts. Hence, totally, Rs. 62,000 would be the loss to the estate of the deceased.

58. It is settled law that the persons entitled to succeed to the loss to the estate of the deceased are her personal heirs. Under S. 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, the property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve, according to the rule constituted under S. 16(a) of the said Act, firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children, if any of predeceased son or daughter) and the husband. Therefore, both the husband and son would be the heirs to succeed to the loss of the estate of the deceased.

59. In fact, this proposition of law is clarified in a recent decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Union Co-op. Inse. Society Ltd. Bharatiben(15). That was a case under S. 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Therein, a Bench of that High Court has observed in para-17 of the judgment that claim to the loss of the estate of the deceased by way of compensation can only be made by those who would succeed to the estate or on their behalf. It cannot be made by some one who has no legal right to succeed to the estate under personal law.

60. That being so, we direct that this sum of Rs. 62,000 shall be awarded both to the first and the second claimants in equal proportion.

61. The Tribunal, calculating the loss under ‘Nance method’, was not justified in not deducting any amount for lumpsum grant and uncertainties of life, merely because he had not taken the promotion of the deceased into consideration. He should have remembered that the working life of the lady was calculated for 21 years and when such a long period was calculated, it was necessary to deduct for uncertainties of life and lumpsum grant at not less than 50% of the total catenation made for 21 years. If it had done so, the Tribunal would have arrived at the proper figure.

62. The Tribunal has awarded Rs. 4,000, for loss of consortium which cannot be considered as unreasonable. We affirm it. That should exclusively go for the benefit of the first petitioner, the husband.

63. The Tribunal has awarded Rs. 1,000 towards obsequies which is also reasonable end that should be awarded to the husband, the first petitioner.

64. Having taken the loss to the estate of the deceased, it is not necessary to separately award Rs. 5,000 towards loss of domestic services. It is well to remember that she was a doctor who was employed in the Medical College and it is too much to expect that she could spare her time for domestic services like cooking, sweeping etc. Hence, that is disallowed.

65. Similarly, Rs. 4,000 awarded by the Tribunal for loss of affection to the second petitioner, viz., Sathischandra is also not justifiable on the facts of the present case. Normally, a son is under the care and protection of the mother for five years and not thereafter. He cannot for ever he under the care and protection of his mother basking in the sunshine of her affection and doing nothing else.

66. Thus, the global compensation, in MFA No. 809 of 1978 is Rs. 67,000 Out of this, Rs. 36,000 shall go to the first petitioner and the remaining Rs. 36,000 shall be paid over to the second petitioner, represented by the first petitioner.

67. Thus, in MFA No. 783 of 1978, Rs. 36,000 are awarded in favour of the minor, represented by his father, instead of Rs. 51,000 awarded by the Tribunal. The same shall be paid over by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (respondent-1) from out of its special insurance fund along with interest at 6% p.a from the date of petition till payment, as also costs of the proceeding throughout. Since the claimant is a minor, the entire amount realised, apart from costs, shall be deposited by his father and guardian in the name of the minor in a scheduled bank till such time as the minor boy attains the age of majority. The guardian is at liberty to draw and utilise the interest derived for the benefit of the minor claimant. In MFA No. 809 of 1978, instead of Rs. 1,25,000 awarded by the Tribunal, we award Rs. 36,000 to the first petitioner, the husband of the deceased, towards compensation and award Rs. 31,000 in favour of the second petitioner, the son of the deceased. The entire amount shall be paid over by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation from out its special insurance fund, along with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the petition till payment, as also costs of the proceeding throughout. The first petitioner, the father, who is also the guardian of the minor second petitioner, shall deposit in a scheduled bank the compensation of Rs. 31,000 awarded to the minor till such time as he attains the age of majority. The guardian is at liberty to draw and utilise the interest realised on the amount for the benefit of the minor claimant.

68. With the above modifications in the awards, both these appeals stand partly allowed.

69. No costs.