Seth, J.:— This a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent. The suit was decreed by the trial court and the decree of the trial court has been affirmed by the lower appellate court.
The first ground upon which the decree of the lower appellate court is attacked is that the notice of ejectment was not according to law and therefore it did not terminate the tenancy. The notice stated that the tenancy of the defendant commenced from the 19th of every English month. The defendant was, therefore, required to vacate the premises “on the 18th May, 1944, or on such date as your then current month of tenancy will end.”
It was alleged on behalf of the defendant that the tenancy commenced from the 1st of every English month. This allegation has been found to be correct. The courts below have held that even though the tenancy commenced from the 1st of every English month, the notice was a valid notice because it did not make it obligatory upon the defendant to vacate the premises on the 18th of May, 1941, but gave him an option to vacate on another definite date if the tenancy did not terminate on the 18th viz., the date on which the month of the current tenancy was to end. In support of the view, that such a notice was a valid notice, under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, both the courts below have relied upon a decision of the Patna High Court in Banker Ram v. Tulsi Bhagat in which a similar view has been taken of a similar notice. It appears from a note by the author of Mulla's Transfer of Property Act that it is usual, after mentioning the date of the anniversary of the tenancy to add, in the alternative, some such general words as “at the end of the year of the tenancy which will expire next after the end of one-half year from the date of the service of this notice (vide Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 1933 Edn., p. 539)”. The requirements of a notice under the English law are similar to the requirements of a notice under the Transfer of Property Act. It has been held by English courts that a notice to quit “at the expiration of the current year of your tenancy, which shall expire after the end of one-half year from the service of the notice.” is a valid notice. Reference may be made to Doed Digby v. Steel, and Doed Gorst v. Timothy(2).
The object of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is only to allow a tenant sufficient time to vacate the premises. It has been laid down by their lordships of the Privy Council in Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy(3), that notices should be liberally construed and the only point to be considered in respect of notices is whether the person on whom the notice is served could understand what was really meant by the notice. The Privy Council case was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Tika Ram v. Sri Thakur Daoji Maharaj(4), where a notice given on the 9th of November, 1927, required the tenant to vacate the land on the 13th of May, 1927. If was held that the intention of the lessor was that the tenant should vacate on the 13th of May, 1928. It was observed that the defendant could not have understood it to mean that the plaintiff wanted him to vacate the land on a date which had already expired. The learned Judges quoted with approval the following passage from Doe d. Williams v. Smith(5):
“This is certainly a lame and inaccurate notice; but, such as it is, we must endeavour to give it a rational interpretation.”
I am satisfied that the appellant well understood what was meant by the notice, namely, that he was called upon to vacate only on the termination of the month of tenancy and that he was not required to vacate on the 18th May, 1944, if the month of tenancy did not terminate on that day. I am also in agreement with the decision of the Patna High Court. There is no force in the contention that the notice was invalid.
[His Lordship after considering some other points raised in the appeal concludes as follows:]
I have heard learned counsel for the appellant at great length and have given my anxious consideration to the case I have ultimately reached to the conclusion that there is no force in this appeal. It is accordingly, dismissed with costs.
Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is asked for. It is refused.
Appeal dismissed.
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