1. There are two applications before me for disposal. C.M.P. No. 671 of 1911 is an application by the appellants in the second appeal pending in this Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the respondents from carrying the idol of Desikar in procession through any of the streets within the seven Prakarams of the Srirangam temple. C.M.P. No. 926 of 1912 is an application by the appellants to suspend the injunction granted by the Lower Courts restraining them from interfering with the Vadagalais carrying Desikar in procession through streets. The Vadagalais of Srirangam instituted a suit against the trustees of the temple and the Thengalais for a declaration of their right to carry the idol of Desikar, which they have apparently recently made, in procession through any of the 5, 6 and the 7th Prakarams of the Srirangam temple and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their right to do so. Their case was that the streets were public streets and that as members of the public they had the right they claimed. The defendants denied that the streets were public streets and contended that they belonged to the temple. They alleged also that even if the public had the right of passage through the streets such right was a restricted one and that it was also contrary to the local usage that the Vadagalais should carry the Desikar idol in procession through the streets. Both the lower Courts held that the Vadagalais had the right to carry the idol in procession. With respect to C.M. P No. 671 I have had considerable doubts whether this Court has jurisdiction to give the appellant an injunction of the sort they claim. The application would admittedly not come within the purview of Rule 1 order XXXIX. The appellants' contention is that it would be allowable under the provisions of Rule 1 of order XXXIX and that apart from that rule this Court has inherent jurisdiction to give such an injunction for the protection of the right of a party in a matter in controversy before the court. It is pretty clear to my mind that the language of the rule would not allow an application of this kind. It cannot be said that there is any proceeding before this Court in which the appellants' claim to restrain the respondents from doing a wrongful act and that till the matter is tried it is necessary to give an interim relief of the kind which the appellants seek as the result of their appeal. It does also look to me somewhat extraordinary that, when a party goes to court claiming an injunction against his opponent to restrain him from doing something wrongful, the opponent should have the right as a matter of interlocutory relief to restrain him from doing the very act which he claims to be entitled to do and which he asks the court to be allowed to be done without obstruction from his opponent. No case was cited in which an application of this kind has been allowed nor am I aware of any. I do not wish however to express a definite opinion on this point as, in the view I take of the merits of the application, it is not necessary to do so.