1. Taluk Land Board, Alwaye as per order dated 22-10-1976 determined the surplus land liable to be surrendered by the revision petitioner under S. 85 of Act 1 of 1964 (for short ‘the Act’) as 83,900 cents. This order was passed after exempting 20.57 acres of land as rubber plantation under S. 81(1)(e) of the Act. Later the Taluk Land Board was doubtful of the eligibility of this land for exemption and issued a notice under S. 85(9) of the Act and in due course set aside the earlier order. A fresh draft statement was issued on 26-4-1978. However, the Taluk Land Board in the revised final order reiterated its earlier finding upholding the exemption of 20.57 acres of land and disposed of the case accordingly. That was on the basis that 20.57 acres of land was a rubber plantation on 1-4-1964 and as such eligible for exemption though the rubber trees were cut and removed after 1-1-1970. On 5-4-??? the Taluk Land Board initiated proceedings under S. 87 of the Act and issued a draft statement calling upon the revision petitioner to surrender excess land of 20.57 acres. It was found that 14,77,650 acres was acquired by the Government for the purpose of I.S.R.O Ultimately the impugned final order was passed holding that S. 87 applies to the facts of the case and determining the surplus land to be surrendered as 6,64,900 acres. This order is now challenged. It is admitted that on 1-4-1964 as well as 1-1-1970, the land of an extent of 20.57 acres in Sy. Nos. W/IB and 1C and 982/1A and IB was rubber plantation eligible for exemption under S. 81(1)(e) of the Act. It is also admitted that after 1-1-1970 the rubber trees were slaughter-tapped. According to the revision petitioner, the rubber trees became old and practically non-yeilding and therefore he had them cut with a view to replant. Replantation was not done till 1978, though learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that since then replanting has been done. Revision petitioner urged certain reasons why he could do replanting only long after slaughter tapping. Taluk Land Board held that since rubber trees were cut after 1-1-1970 and replanation was not done for a number of years, it is a case of conversion of exempted land into a non-exempted class of land namely, other dry land, and the reasons urged for not replanting in time are not bona fide and therefore Explanation II to S. 87 of the Act is attracted. This finding is now challenged.
2. The question of “conversion” has been considered by this Court in some cases. In C.R.P Nos. 126, 127, 128, 129, 583 and 585 of 1975, this Court had to consider the question under what circumstances private forest exempted under Sec. 81(1)(d) of the Act would cease to be a private forest. Dealing with the particular facts of the case, G. Viswanatha Iyer, J. observed as follows:
“The records produced by the petitioners show that these areas were prepared for planting rubber even before Act 1 of 1964 came into force. The preparing the ground and planting them with rubber, coffee or cardamom is an integrated activity and when that has been shown to have been started long before Act 1 of 1964 came into force, it can safely be concluded that when the Act came into force this has been used principally for cultivating the above mentioned crops. In that view also these are areas which are plantations on ground at the time when the ceiling case was taken should be exempted.”
3. In C.R.P 2575 of 1976 this Court had to consider a similar question. M.P Menon, J. in the course of judgment observed as follows:
“It is said that the petitioner and his brothers had purchased the extensive forest lands in question for converting them into plantations. The partnership was also formed for this purpose. The planting process had admittedly begun before 1-1-1970 and was continued thereafter also, though the exact interval between clear felling and planting in respect of every part of the area is not known. In these circumstances, the relevant question to be asked would be: had they ear-marked the lands for such conversion? Had they prepared the land or done other things necessary for such conversion? If they had, and it was only a matter of mere accident that the actual planting was after 1-1-70, it is not impossible to say that the case was purely one of conversion from one exempted category to another exempted category. The ear-marking and the intention are material because, if as a matter of fact such extensive areas were really “planted with rubber etc. soon after 1-1-70, but as part and parcel of an activity which had commenced earlier, it will be defeating the aim of the Act to permit the plantations being taken over and destroyed in the process of distribution.”
4. Dealing with a case of private forest which was clear-felled in 1965 in C.R.P 2793 of 1979, (1981 KLT 731) I had occasion to observe as follows:
“If clear felling was over and the land ceased to be private forest prior to 1-4-1964 it may have to be held that the exemption under Section 81(1)(d) is not available. Even then the intention with which the clear-felling was done will have a bearing on the decision of such question. Clear felling, under all circumstances will not make the land cease to be private forest. If felling was done with the intention of exploiting the forest wealth and to leave it for degeneration the land will not cease to be private forest. If clear-felling was done with the intention of making the land nilam or garden or plantation the land cannot be treated as continuing to be private forest.”
5. S. 87 reads thus:
“87. Excess land obtained by gift, etc., to be surrendered.—
(1) Where any person acquires any land after the date notified under S. 83 by gift, purchase, mortgage with possession, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise and inconsequence thereof, the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, such excess shall be surrendered to such authority as may be prescribed.
Explanation—Where any land is exempted by or under S. 81 and such exemption is in force on the date notified under S. 83, such land shall, with effect from the date on which it ceases to be exempted, be deemed to be land acquired after the date notified under S. 83.
(1A) Any person referred to in sub-section (1) shall file a statement containing the particulars specified in sub-section (1) of S. 85A within a period of three months of the date of the acquisition.
(2) The provisions of Ss. 85 and 86 shall, so far as may be, apply to the vesting in the Government of the ownership or possession or both of the lands required to be surrendered under sub-section (I).”
6. By Act 27 of 1979, Explanation to S. 87 of the Act has been re-numbered as Explanation No. I and the following Explanation has been inserted as Explanation No. II.
“Explanation II.—Where, after the date notified under S. 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under S. 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.”
7. A reading of the above provisions shows that where a land has been converted from one category into another category after 1-1-1970 as laid down in Explanation II, and thereby the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, the land in excess of the ceiling area has to be treated as land acquired after 1-1-1970. Such land has to be surrendered under S. 87 of the Act in the same way excess land as on 1-1-1970 has to be surrendered under S. 85 of the Act.
8. Explanation II to S. 87 of the Act contemplates two types of conversion; one is conversion of a class of land specified in Schedule II into another class of land specified in that schedule and the second is conversion of any land exempt under S. 81 from the provisions of Chapter III of the Act into any class of land not so exempt. To the present case we are concerned with the second type of conversion.
9. What is meant by conversion or converting a land from one class to another? When is one class of land said to be converted into another class of land? According to the Chamber's 20th Century Dictionary, “convert” means to change or turn from one thing, condition to another; to alter one thing into another; to apply to a particular purpose. Conversion would normally be a conscious and voluntary act. A coconut garden can be converted into paddy field or vice versa or into arecanut or rubber plantation etc. These conversions would be the result of a definite intention on the part of the converter to do so. A person entertains an intention to convert and does an act in furtherance of the intention which results in the alteration of one state of thing into another. Just as the action is important, the intention also is important. That is what has been stressed by this Court in the unreported decisions referred to above. There may also be cases where by utter neglect a plantation is allowed to deteriorate as a result of which it ceases to be a plantation.
10. Let us take a case of rubber plantation containing very old trees whose income is sharply dwindling. The owner of the plantation may desire to do one of several things. He may desire to cut down the old trees and replant the area with rubber plants. He may desire to cut down the old trees and use the land for paddy cultivation or tapioca cultivation. Or he may intend to plant coconut plants in the land. It is in pursuance of such varied intentions that work will be commenced, proceeded with and finished. In each of these cases there will be a given point of time when old rubber trees are already cut but the next phase of work has not commenced or has not progressed or has not finished. If the intention is to convert a plantation into a coconut garden, rubber trees have to be cut, the area cleared, pits dug for coconut plants and then the planting work has to be done. Similarly, in the case of replanting with rubber plants there may be an interval of time between the cutting down of the rubber trees and planting rubber plants. If the cutting has been done after 1-1-1970 and if the replanting rubber plants is delayed for one reason or the other it cannot be said that rubber plantation has been converted into other dry land. That depends mainly on the intention of the person and the work he does in the land. There can be a case where trees are cut down and thereafter on account of financial stringency or ill-health or other reasons the work of replanting is postponed. That will not mean that he has abandoned the intention of replanting rubber plants and the land is converted into other dry land and it cannot be said that there has been a change from one class or state to another. The condition in which the land finds itself after the old rubber trees are cut and before replanting is done is not a permanent condition but only a temporary phase. The fact that a particular work passes through an intermediate stage cannot necessarily mean that there is no intention to retain the character of the land as plantation of course, there may be other cases where a person intends to convert a rubber plantation into coconut garden or paddy field. That is different from a case where the intention is to replant with rubber plants but he has been prevented from doing so in time. The decision on a controversy like this has to be arrived at on an appreciation of the relevant materials in each case. There can be no rule of the thumb by which one can say that if the replanting is done, say, within two months or six months or one year there is no conversion involved or that if the replanting is done after one year or two years it has to be treated as a case of conversion of plantation into some other category of land. Each case will have to be decided on the circumstances existing and material available in such case. The act of cutting down old rubber trees by itself cannot lead to the inference that the land is converted into other dry land. It may be so in certain circumstances. It may not be so in other circumstances. If there is a scheme for replantation, if the land has been ear-marked for the purpose of replanting and if the act of cutting rubber trees is in pursuance of the scheme and part of an integrated activity towards such an end, from the mere fact that there has been delay in carrying out the work of replanting, it cannot be said that the land has been converted from plantation into other dry land. The act of cutting rubber trees may be part of an act of such conversion or it may be part of the scheme of replanting Whether it is one or the other depends upon the intention, ear-making, scheme and other attendant circumstances.
11. Turning to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the Taluk Land Board has not properly considered this question. It is seen that a number of documents were produced before the Taluk Land Board at various stages by the revision petitioner to prove that he wanted, all along to replant the land with rubber plants and the planting work was delayed initially on account of legal proceedings and subsequently on account of acquisition proceedings and other difficulties. He also produced some records to show that he has been in correspondence with the Rubber Board for the purpose of enabling replantation. Most of the records are not seen in the file sent up to this Court. It is submitted that the Taluk Land Board sent these records to the State Land Board and the same were not received back. The Taluk Land Board will have to get back all the records and decide the matter afresh applying the correct principles to the facts of the case. The impugned order is therefore set aside and the case remanded to the Taluk Land Board for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Revision petitioner will be allowed to adduce further evidence, if he desires to do so. The revision is allowed but without costs.
12. Allowed.
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