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  • B.S. Gupta
  • Advocates.
  • M/s. G.P. Jain
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  • A.N.Grover
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  • A.N.Grover
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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — A.N. Grover, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

In March 1962 Shrimati Rajinder Kaur (plaintiff) filed a suit against her husband Sodhi Mohinder Singh (principal defendant) and two sons (Baljitinder Singh and Manjitinder Singh). The plaint sought rendition of accounts in respect of mesne profits and a declaration of ownership in relation to land measuring 3,689 kanals and 1 marla. The plaint alleged that the plaintiff became owner by gifts from her husband and that the husband had managed the land on her behalf but had not paid her profits.

It was pleaded that defendant No. 1 had earlier instituted divorce proceedings (application filed 25 January 1960) and that an order of 7 December 1960 under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act fixed expenses and maintenance (the plaintiff asserted Rs. 700 expenses and Rs. 350 per mensum maintenance; the defendant disputed these figures and claimed different amounts). The plaintiff alleged non-payment of amounts awarded by that order. The defendant in his written statement alleged the gifts were benami and denied the plaintiff's claims, asserting his own ownership of the property.

During the suit the parties reached an amicable settlement and on 24 April 1963 recorded statements in Court. The material terms recorded were that:

  • The plaintiff would be the absolute owner of a portion of the disputed land measuring 832 kanals and 3 marlas (Exhibit C.1) and the defendant would deliver vacant possession of it to her on or before 1 June 1963, including standing crops without compensation and without claiming tenancy rights thereafter.
  • The defendant would pay arrears of land revenue up to 1 June 1963; if he failed, the plaintiff could realise 1½ times the amount recovered from her by executing the maintenance order under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
  • The defendant undertook not to proceed against the plaintiff under the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage; if he did or revived proceedings, the plaintiff would be entitled to execute the maintenance order.
  • Kothi No. 72, Jhoke Road, Ferozepore Cantt., would remain the absolute property of the plaintiff.
  • The plaintiff agreed to withdraw an application for rateable distribution in an execution case, gave up claim to the produce of the suit land up to 1 June 1963, renounced rights of residence in the main residential haveli at Sodhi Nagar, and agreed not to claim maintenance from other property of the defendant so long as he did not institute or revive proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act; if he did, she could claim maintenance from his other property.
  • The parties were to bear their own costs.

The Court recorded an order in the terms of those statements. The present appeal challenges the order recording the compromise.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal is competent against an order recording a compromise when there was no contest between the parties at the time the compromise was recorded.
  2. Whether terms of the compromise (notably, the grant of possession of part of the land and recognition of Kothi No. 72 as the plaintiff's absolute property) were beyond the scope of the suit and thus could not be incorporated into a decree recorded on compromise.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as reported)

  • The appeal should be entertained because decisions of some Courts support the proposition that appeals against orders recording compromises can be competent; the appellant relied on cases said to take a contrary view to the bench decision relied upon by the respondent (Mathura Parshad Phool Chand v. Parmanand Thakur Das; Bansidhar Estate Collieries and Industries Ltd. v. The State; Provat Kumar Majumdar v. Santosh Kumar Majumdar).
  • The reliefs claimed in the plaint were confined to rendition of accounts and declaration of ownership; no relief for possession was sought. Therefore, under Order XXIII, rule 3, the Court could record and pass a decree only “so far as it relates to the suit,” and the compromise term requiring delivery of possession of 832 kanals 3 marlas was allegedly beyond the scope of the suit and could not be decreed.

Respondent's Arguments (as reported)

  • No appeal is competent against an order recording a compromise where there was no contest at the time of recording; the correct remedy for an aggrieved party is an appeal from the decree passed on the compromise or to apply to the trial Court to reopen the matter (reliance placed on the Bench decision in Amarnath Radha Ram v. Sm. Matan).
  • Even on the scope question, the terms relating to possession and other ancillary matters fell within the scope of what could be recorded in a compromise decree given the form of the suit and the reliefs claimed (i.e., large claim to ownership and rents/profits over the wider area), and therefore the possession term was not outside the suit.
  • The agreement regarding Kothi No. 72 was supported by valid consideration (the plaintiff giving up claims for maintenance and rents/profits and the deed of conveyance standing in her name), and no specific ground in the memorandum of grounds challenged that portion of the compromise.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amarnath Radha Ram v. Sm. Matan, A.I.R. 1954 Punjab 259 Held that no appeal lies against an order recording a compromise where there was no contest at the time of recording; the proper remedy is an appeal against the decree passed on the compromise or to reopen in the trial Court. The Court regarded this Bench decision as binding and concluded the present appeal is incompetent on that ground.
Mathura Parshad Phool Chand v. Parmanand Thakur Das, A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 161 Cited by the appellant as authority taking a contrary view (i.e., supporting appellate competence in some circumstances). The Court noted the decision was relied upon by the appellant but held itself bound by the Bench decision in Amarnath Radha Ram and therefore did not follow the contrary view.
Bansidhar Estate Collieries and Industries Ltd. v. The State, A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 319 Cited by the appellant as another authority with a contrary approach to appeals against compromise orders. The Court acknowledged the citation but did not adopt its approach because the Bench decision it was bound to follow dictated the outcome.
Provat Kumar Majumdar v. Santosh Kumar Majumdar, I.L.R. 1955(1) Cal. 461 Cited by the appellant as an authority advancing a contrary view on the competence of appeals against compromise orders. The Court recognized the citation but maintained the appeal was incompetent in view of the binding Bench authority.
Ramaswamy Nayudu v. K.N.S. Subbaraya Thevar, A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 1101 Interpreted the phrase "so far as it relates to the suit" in Order XXIII, r.3 broadly — allowing terms outside the strict subject-matter of the suit to be incorporated in a compromise decree when they form part of the consideration for settlement. The Court relied on this reasoning to reject the contention that the possession term was necessarily beyond the scope of the suit.
Seth Harak Chandas v. Hyderabad State Bank, A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 56 Stated that whether a term of compromise relates to the suit must be decided from the form of the suit, the relief claimed and the relief granted; mutual connection of reliefs granted by a consent decree is important. The Court applied this principle to hold that the possession relief was sufficiently connected to the plaintiff's claims so as to be within the scope of settlement/decree; the decision was also cited regarding valid consideration for the Kothi agreement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two main stages:

  1. Competency of the appeal: The Court first addressed whether the appeal was maintainable. It observed that a binding Bench decision of this Court (Amarnath Radha Ram v. Sm. Matan) holds that where parties settle amicably and there is no contest as to the terms of compromise when recorded, an appeal against the order recording the compromise is not competent; the aggrieved party's remedy is an appeal from the decree passed on the compromise or to seek reopening in the trial Court. Because the Amarnath Radha Ram decision is binding, the Court held the present appeal incompetent and concluded it must fail on that ground.
  2. Merits (considered cumulatively and by way of abundant caution): The Court nonetheless examined the substantive objections raised by the appellant concerning scope of the suit and the propriety of incorporating certain terms in the compromise:
    • The appellant contended the suit sought only rendition of accounts and declaration of ownership and did not claim possession; therefore, a compromise term providing for delivery of possession of 832 kanals 3 marlas was argued to be beyond the scope of Order XXIII, rule 3. The Court reviewed authorities (notably Ramaswamy Nayudu and Seth Harak Chandas) and concluded that the words "so far as it relates to the suit" must be given a broad meaning. Where additional terms form the consideration for the settlement of matters in dispute, they may properly be embodied in the decree even if not strictly identical to the relief claimed in the plaint.
    • Applying that principle to the facts, the Court noted that the plaintiff had claimed ownership over a much larger area and alleged appropriation of rents and profits by the husband; given the nature of those claims, it was neither remote nor improper for the compromise to provide for possession of a portion (832 kanals 3 marlas) as part of the settlement. Thus the possession term was within the scope of permissible compromise terms.
    • Regarding Kothi No. 72, the Court observed that the plaintiff's renunciation of claims (maintenance and rents/profits) constituted valid consideration for confirming the Kothi as her absolute property; the deed of conveyance already stood in her name and no specific ground had been raised in the memorandum of grounds challenging that portion of the compromise. The Court therefore held it was not open to the appellant to raise that objection at this stage.

On the cumulative analysis, the Court found that even on merits the appellant's contentions lacked force, but the decisive ground for dismissal was the binding Bench authority on competency.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED as incompetent. On the merits, the Court also found no sufficient ground to disturb the order recording the compromise. The Court made no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The recorded order embodying the parties' compromise stands affirmed by the dismissal of the appeal; the terms as recorded (including delivery of possession of 832 kanals 3 marlas, payment of land-revenue arrears up to 1 June 1963, the status of Kothi No. 72, and reciprocal undertakings regarding proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act and execution of maintenance orders) remain effective between the parties as recorded.
  • The Court treated the controlling precedent (Amarnath Radha Ram v. Sm. Matan) as determinative on the procedural point, and therefore did not allow the present appeal to proceed; the decision does not purport to lay down a new rule of law but applies existing Bench authority to the facts before it.
  • No order as to costs was made in the appeal.

This summary is strictly confined to the statements and conclusions contained in the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or interpret facts or rulings beyond what the opinion expressly states.

Show full summary ...

    Sodhi Mohinder Singh v. Shrimati Rajinder Kaur And Others

    A.N. Grover, J. - This appeal is directed against an order recording a compromise in a dispute relating to property and other matters which arose primarily between husband and wife. 2. In March, 1962 Shrimati Rajinder Kaur wife of Sodhi Mohinder Singh filed a suit against her husband the principal defendant impleading two of sons, namely, Baljitinder Singh and Manjitinder Singh also as defendants. In the suit she claimed rendition of accounts with regard to mesne profits etc. in respect of the land, the area of which was 3689 kanals and 1 marla. She also prayed that she be declared to be the owner of the suit property. In paragraph 12 of the plaint it was pleaded that the plaintiff became the owner of the suit property by virtue of gifts made by the husband because he did not have any son and he wanted to marry another wife and he decided gift the property to her. It was alleged that the husband had been managing the land in suit on her behalf and had not paid her any profits received from the produce of the land. It was stated, inter alia, that on 25th January, 1960 defendant No. 1 (the husband) had instituted an application for divorce against the plaintiff in which an order was made by the Court on 7th December, 1960 under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act that she should paid expenses to the extent of Rs. 700/- and maintenance at the rate of Rs. 350/- per mensum with effect from 13th May, 1960. Defendant No. 1 filed an appeal to this Court against that order but the same was dismissed. It was asserted that defendant No. 1 had not paid even a rupee towards the aforesaid amount. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement pleading, inter alia that the gifts which had been made in respect of the suit land were purely benami transactions. It was further pleaded by him that according to the orders of the Court in the petition for dissolution of marriage the plaintiff had been awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300/- per mensum and not Rs. 350/- and that the amount of expenses had been fixed at Rs. 400/- and not Rs. 700/-. He also claimed that he was the owner of the property and denied other allegations made by the plaintiff. During the pendency of the suit the parties came to a settlement and on 24th April, 1963 the Court recorded the following order :- "At this stage the parties have volunteered to make their statements regarding the matters in dispute between them and their solution arrived at emicably between them. The statements of the parties and their counsel be recorded". Sodhi Mohinder Singh then made a statement in the following terms :- "Smt. Rajinder Kaur plaintiff shall be absolute owner of the land measuring 832 kanals 3 marlas situated in village Sodhi Nagar detailed in khatauni takseem Ex. C. 1 out of the land in dispute measuring 3689 kanals 1 marlas situated in the said village. I shall deliver possession of the land mentioned in Exhibit C. 1 to the plaintiff on or before 1st June, 1963. I will give vacant possession of this land to the plaintiff on or before 1st June, 1963. If any crops are standing on this land on the said date that I will deliver possession of the same with the standing crops on or before 1st June, 1963 and will not claim any compensation for the standing crops. The land is under my self-cultivation and I will not claim any tenancy rights in this land after 1st June, 1963. I shall pay all arrears of land revenue in respect of the land in dispute due up to 1st June, 1963 from Rajinder Kaur plaintiff regarding the land situated in village Sodhi Nagar, Kothi No. 72, Jhoke Road, Ferozepore Cantt, will remain the absolute property of the plaintiff. I shall not take any proceedings against the plaintiff under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for divorce, judicial separation, nullity of marriage. If I fail to pay the land revenue in respect of the land mentioned in Exhibit C. 1 the plaintiff shall be entitled to realise 1 1/2 times of the amount so recovered from her by the Revenue Authorities by taking out execution of the order of maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act already passed against me. If I take out any proceedings for divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or revive the proceedings for divorce already filed by me against her she shall be entitled to take out execution of the order of maintenance passed against me under Section 24 of the said Act. The land revenue pertaining of the land mentioned in Exhibit C. 1 also includes the land revenue pertaining to the land in dispute being 1/3rd share of 3689 Kanals 1 marla situated in village Sodhi Nagar due from Rajinder Kaur plaintiff. The parties shall bear their own costs. I have been realising the produce of the land in dispute situated at Sodhi Nagar till today". Shrimati Rajinder Kaur plaintiff also made the following statement :- I have heard the statement by Sodhi Mohinder Singh defendant today. I agree to this statement. I shall be absolute owner of the land detailed in Exhibit C. 1 situated in village Sodhi Nagar. Sodhi Mohinder Singh defendant shall be liable to pay land revenue of the land in dispute pertaining to my share due upto 1st June, 1963. If he fails to pay this land revenue I shall be entitled to realise 1 1/2 times of the amount of land revenue paid by me by taking out execution of the order of maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 obtained by me against him. I will remain absolute owner of Kothi No. 72, Jhoke Road, Ferozepore Cantt. Sodhi Mohinder Singh defendant shall deliver vacant possession of the land mentioned in Exhibit C. 1 to me on or before 1st June, 1963, and he shall not be entitled to give this land to any tenant in future. In case Sodhi Mohinder Singh does not take out any proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 against me for judicial separation divorce or nullity of marriage, I shall not be entitled to take out execution of the order of maintenance passed in my favour under Section 24 of the said Act. If Sodhi Mohinder Singh defendant revives the proceedings for divorce already instituted by him and consigned to the Record Room or he institutes any fresh proceeding under the said Act for divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage I shall be entitled to take out execution of the order of maintenance passed in my favour under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. I have applied for rateable distribution by taking out execution of the order of maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the execution case Sodhi Harman Singh v. Sodhi Mohinder Singh. I shall withdraw the said application. I give up my claim regarding the produce of the suit land upto Ist June, 1963. I will claim no right of residence in the main residential Haveli situated at Sodhi Nagar. I will not claim any right of maintenance in any other property of Sodhi Mohinder Singh. If Sodhi Mohinder Singh takes proceedings against me under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or revives the proceedings already taken by him for divorce and consigned to the Record Room. I shall be entitled to claim maintenance from his other property as well. The parties shall bear their own costs". The counsel for defendant Baljitinder Singh made a statement agreeing to the statements made by the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. The Court then recorded an order in terms of the statements of the parties and it is against that order that the present appeal has been brought. 3. Mr. Jagan Nath Seth, who appears for the plaintiff respondent, contends that no appeal is competent in the present case as the parties settled their disputes amicably, and there was no contest about the terms of the compromise in the Court below. He has relied on a Bench decision of this Court in Amarnath Radha Ram v. Sm. Matan, (A.I.R. 1954 Punjab 259), in which it was held by Khosla J. and Falshaw J.(as he then was) that no appeal would lie against an order recording a compromise where there was no contest at the time between the parties regarding the recording of the compromise. In such a case the proper remedy of the aggrieved party is either to appeal against the decree passed on the compromise or to reopen the matter in the trial Court either by way of review or otherwise. This decision is binding on me and I must hold that the appeal is not competent. Mr. Ganga Parshad has sought to challenge the correctness of this decision and has relied on decisions of other Courts, namely Mathura Parshad Phool Chand v. Parmanand Thakur Das, A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 161, Bansidhar Estate Collieries and Industries Ltd. v. The State, A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 319 and Provat Kumar Majumdar v. Santosh Kumar Majumdar, (I.L.R. 1955(1) Cal. 461, in which he says a contrary view has been taken. As I am bound to follow the Bench decision of this Court, I must hold that the appeal against the order recording the compromise in the present case is altogether incompetent and must fail on that ground alone. 4. Even on the merits there is hardly anything much which Mr. Ganga Parshad can urge. He contends that the reliefs claimed in the suit were confined to rendition of accounts etc. and declaration relating to ownership of land and there was no relief in respect of possession. According to the compromise, the possession of 832 kanals and 3 marlas which have been declared to belong to the plaintiff has to be given by the stipulated date by defendant No. 1. This part of the compromise is, therefore, beyond the scope of the suit. He has relied on the language of Order XXIII, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code which says that the Court shall order agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far it relates to the suit. According to Mr. Ganga Parshad, since no relief was claimed with regard to possession that part of the compromise which relates to it cannot be included in the decree which is to be passed on the compromise. Mr. Seth has invited my attention to Ramaswamy Nayudu v. K.N.S. Subbaraya Thevar, A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 1101, in which the words "so far as it relates to the suit" came up for consideration. It was said that these words could not be said to have reference only to the subject-matter of the suit. The language used being wide and general it was obvious that it would brightly inconvenient if the parties were not allowed to settle their disputes on such lawful terms as they might agree to without being restricted to such relief as one of the parties had chosen to claim in the plaint. If certain other conditions formed the consideration for the compromise of the subject-matter of the suit, they must be incorporated in the decree. In Seth Harak Chandas v. Hyderabad State Bank, A.I.R. 1960 Andh, Pra. 56, it has been said that the question whether any particular term of the compromise relates to a suit or is covered by the subject-matter must be decided from the form of the suit, the relief claimed and the relief granted. The mutual connection of the different parts of the reliefs granted by a consent decree is an important element for consideration in each case in deciding whether any portion of the relief is within the scope of the suit. The relief granted in a compromise decree need not be confined to the relief prayed for in the plaint. It has even been held that the fact that the compromise relates to property, not the subject-matter of the suit, is not in all cases decisive of the question whether the compromise does not relate to the suit. All the terms which form the consideration for the adjustment of the matters in dispute, whether they form the subject-matter of the suit, or not, become related to the suit and can be embodied in the decree. Mr. Ganga Parshad has sought tot distinguish these cases on facts but the principle appears to be clear and I have no manner of doubt that the ratio of these decisions is that the relief granted in the compromise decree need not be confined to the relief prayed for in the plaint. In the present case the plaintiff had filed the suit with regard to much larger area, namely, 3689 kanals and 1 marla and had claimed ownership in it. She had also alleged that defendant No. 1 had been in possession and had been appropriating all the rents and profits of the land which legally belonged to her by virtue of the gifts. By means of the compromise, she was declared owner of only a fraction of that area, 832 kanals and 3 marlas and it was only to be expected that she should get possession of that area; otherwise the disputes between the parties would have remained outstanding. Apart from that, the claim which she had made for rents and profits were of such a nature that the relief relating to possession could not be regarded as any thing remote from what she was actually claiming. It is not necessary that the relief granted according to the compromise must be the same as the relief claimed in the plaint. I do not consider, therefore, that Mr. Ganga Parshad is right when he says that the relief relating to possession could not have been legally granted and it did not relate to the suit. 5. The compromise mentioned another property, namely, Kothi No. 72, situated in Ferozepur Cantt. It was declared that would remain the absolute property of the plaintiff. It was further agreed that Sodhi Mohinder Singh would not take any proceedings against the plaintiff under the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage etc., and, if he did not do so, the plaintiff would not take out execution of the order of maintenance passed in her favour under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Furthermore, the plaintiff gave up her claim regarding the produce of the suit land upto 1st June, 1963, and also undertook not to claim any right of maintenance in the main residential Haveli situate at Sodhi Nagar. Now, it is not disputed that according to the plaintiff the amount of maintenance came to about Rs. 11,000/- and of rents profits of the property to Rs. 1,00,000/- towards which no payment whatsoever had been made by the husband, when she gave up all these claims that would form a valid consideration for the agreement relating to Kothi No. 72, Ferozepur Cantt. vide A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 56. It is also common ground that the deed of conveyance of the Kothi stood in her name and that is why it was agreed that she would remain the absolute owner of that property. It is further significant that in the memorandum of grounds no specific ground was raised in respect of the agreement relating to the Kothi being outside the scope of the suit. In view of all this, I do not consider that it is open to Mr. Ganga Parshad to raise any contention with regard to Kothi No. 72, Ferozepur Cantt. It may also be mentioned that even if there is some justification for the view that in the decree itself the agreement relating to the Kothi could not be incorporated because the suit did not relate to it, that question cannot arise at this stage, at which only the legality and validity of the order regarding the compromiser could be assailed. 6. I have expressed my opinion on the merits by way of abundant caution but since the Bench decision is binding on me, the appeal has to be dismissed in any event as being incompetent. I dismiss it but in the circumstances I make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.

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    Sodhi Mohinder Singh v. Shrimati Rajinder Kaur And Others
    (Oct 18, 1965)