R.S. Narula, J. - By a deed of mortgage dated February 7, 1943. (Exhibit P. 7) Daulat Ram, respondent No. 11 (since deceased) mortgaged his urban immovable property consisting of shops and residential portions in Jullundur City with possession to Mohammad Bibi for Rs. 10,000/-. Two subsequent mortgages for Rs. 6,000/- and Rs. 4,000/- were effected by Daulat Ram in favour of Mohammad Bibi on May 28 and August 2, 1943, respectively. By a registered mortgage deed dated 3rd June, 1947 Mohammad Bibi sub-mortgaged the property in question with possession in favour of Dan Fund Dharam Khata of late L. Sita Ram through Dr. Mangal Sen son of L. Sita Ram for Rs. 12,000/-. The possession of the mortgaged property was delivered by Mohammad Bibi to Dr. Mangal Sen. Exhibit P.6 is a copy of the mortgage deed dated 3rd June, 1947 referred to above Dr. Mangal Sen let out the property to Hari Krishan respondent at Rs. 75/- per mensum. Subsequently Hari Krishan's tenancy portion was reduced. The ultimately reduced portion was let out to Hari Kishan at Rs. 40/- per mensum and the remaining two portions were let out to Prem Chand respondent No. 2 and Girdhara Singh respondent No. 3 at Rs. 15/- and Rs. 20/- p.m., respectively. The rent deed in favour of Girdhara Singh dated 13th July, 1957 is Exhibit DW. 4/3. The last one in favour of Hari Kishan is dated 23rd May, 1958 and is Exhibit DW. 4/2. 2. After the partition of the country Mohammad Bibi had become an evacuee. Daulat Ram could not redeem the mortgaged property. Proceedings for separation of the evacuee interest in the composite property were therefore, taken up under the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 64 of 1951. By order (Exhibit P.2) dated March 2, 1957 Shri Chetan Dass Jain, State Competent Officer, Punjab, Jullundur granted two months time to Daulat Ram to make payment of Rs. 20,000/- due from him. Daulat Ram could not pay the amount and the property in question was, therefore, put to sale by public auction free of all encumbrances on the 23rd of June, 1958. At the auction the highest bid of Rs. 15,000/- was given by Shri Bhagwan Dass son of Shri Ram Lal on behalf of the Rashtrya Bartan Bhandar, Chowk Sudan, Jullundur City, the appellant before us. The bid was confirmed by Shri Harbans Lal District Competent Officer, Jullundur on October 31, 1958 by an order of which Exhibit P. 3 is a copy. It is not disputed that sale certificate in respect of the property in question was granted in favour of the appellant who, thereupon became the absolute owner of the freehold property without any encumbrances. 3. It is in the above circumstances that the appellant filed a suit in the Court of original civil jurisdiction at Jullundur on 15th July, 1959 for a decree for possession of the property in question as owner and for the property of Rs. 960/- at the rate of Rs. 80 per month (at double the rate of rent) from Hari Krishan, Rs. 360/- from Prem Chand, respondent No. 2 (at double the rate of rent) and Rs. 480/- from Girdhara Singh, respondent No. 3 (at double the rate of rent) for the period ending 23rd June, 1959 on account of mesne profits. The suit was contested by the three tenants. In his written statement dated 14th October, 1959 Hari Krishan pleaded that he had been a tenant of the mortgagee for a long period and was still in possession of the tenancy preemies. According to him his tenancy had not come to an end and his possession not being unlawful he was not liable to be dispossessed as his rights as a tenant had not ceased. Prem Chand, respondent No. 2 also pleased in para 4 of his written statement dated 14th October, 1959, that he had been in possession for a long time as a tenant and that even if the appellant had become the owner of the property the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the appellant was to subsist as before. Similarly Girdhara Singh, respondent No. 3 pleaded in his written statement dated August 24, 1959 that he was a tenant and was, therefore, not liable to ejectment not he had received any notice of ejectment under the Transfer of Property Act. As a result of the contest between the parties the trial Court framed the following eight issues :- 1. Whether the suit is bad for multifariousness ? 2. Whether the plaint is properly valued and properly stamped ? 3. Whether the defendants are not bound by sale in plaintiff's favour for reasons stated in para 2 of written statement of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 ? 4. Whether the Rent Restriction Act is not applicable to this case ? 5. Whether the plaint is properly verified ? If not its effect ? 6. To what mesne profits, if any is the plaintiff entitled ? 7. Whether the plaintiff firm is a registered partnership concern and person signing the plaint registered partner thereof ? If not its effect ? 8. Relief. 4. Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 5 had been treated as preliminary issues and were ultimately decided in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. In his final judgment dated 29th July, 1960 Shri Gian Chand Jain, Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Jullundur decided issue Nos. 3 and 7 also in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. On issue No. 4, however, the Court below has held that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the appellant in the one hand and respondent Nos. 1 and 3 on the other hand that, therefore, the tenants are protected against eviction by Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. On issue No. 6, the Court below has held that rate of Rs. 80/- per month for mesne profits against Hari Krishan, respondent No. 1 is justified, but mesne profits at the rate of double rent claimed for Prem Chand and Girdhara Singh, respondents are not justified. As a result the learned Subordinate Judge held that if the claim for mesne profits were to be decreed the plaintiff-appellant would be entitled to receive Rs. 960/- from Hari Krishan respondent but only Rs. 180/- and 240/-, respectively from respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The suit for possession was dismissed on the trial Court's finding on issue No. 4 and the claim for mesne profits was also dismissed on the ground that no mesne profits could be claimed from tenants. It is against the decree of the trial Court dated 29th July, 1960 dismissing the suit of the appellant in the above circumstances that this regular first appeal has been filed. 5. The main arguments before us have been addressed in this appeal on issue No. 4. The facts relevant for the decision of that issue are more or less admitted. The only question which arises for decision in this respect is whether the tenancies of respondent Nos. 1 to 3, who has been inducted into their respective premises as tenants by the mortgage, came to an end on the determination of the mortgage by order of the Competent Officer or not. The law in this respect has been settled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Gope and others v. Harbans Narain Singh and others, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 205, in the following words :- "The general rule is that a person cannot be transfer or otherwise confer a better title on another than he himself has. A mortgage cannot, therefore, create an interest in the mortgaged property which will enure beyond the termination of his interest as mortgagee. Further, the mortgagee, who takes possession of the mortgaged property, must manage it as a person of ordinary prudence would manage it if it were his own; and he must not commit any act which is destructive or permanently injurious to the property; see Section 76, sub-clauses (a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act. It follows that he may grant leases not extending beyond the period of the mortgage; any leases granted by him must come to an end at redemption. A mortgagee cannot during the subsistence of the mortgage act in a manner detrimental to the mortgagor's interests such as by giving a lease which enable the tenant to acquire permanent or occupancy rights in the land thereby defeating the mortgagor's right to 'khas' possession' it would be an act which would fall within the provisions of Section 76, sub-clause (e) of the Transfer of Property Act. A permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tenant conferred or created by statute based on the nature of the land and possession for the requisite period is a different matter altogether. It is an exception to the general rule. The tenant cannot be ejected by the mortgagor even after the redemption of the mortgage. He may become an occupancy 'raiyat' in some cases and a non-occupancy 'raiyat' in other cases. But the settlement of the tenant by the mortgagee must have been a 'bona fide' one. This exception will not apply in a case where the terms of the mortgage prohibit the mortgage from making any settlement of tenants on the land either expressly or by necessary implication". 6. There is, therefore, no doubt that the tenancy of the contesting respondents came to an end on the determination of the mortgage. On behalf of the tenants, however, it is argued that their case falls within the exception referred to in the above-said dictum of the Supreme Court and that they are not liable to be dispossessed even after the redemption of the mortgage as the settlement of the tenants by the mortgagee in this case was bona fide and had been made by the mortgagee as a person of ordinary prudence and, therefore, fell within the exception contained in Section 76, clauses (a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act. Admittedly there was no prohibition against the mortgagee for inducting tenants into the property. At the same time it is not disputed that the mortgagee had not been specifically authorised to induct tenants into the premises for any period beyond the expiration of the period of the mortgage though express authority had been conferred on the mortgagee to let out the mortgaged property. Once it is held that the tenants in these circumstances would be liable to ejectment unless their case falls within the exception contained in Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act it would always be for the tenants to prove that their case falls within the exception. Whether in a given case the tenants can claim protection of the exception to the rule or not would always depend on the facts of that case. A question of fact of this type has to be decided only if a plea to that effect is taken up by the party concerned. In this case none of the tenants took up any such specific plea. Nor is any such plea covered by any issue; nor has any evidence been led by the tenants to prove any such thing. Mr. Ganga Prashad Jain, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents referred to the plea contained in paragraph 4 of the written statement of Prem Chand, respondent No. 2, which is in the following words :- "4. The allegations made in para No. 4 of the plaint are absolutely denied. I, the defendant have been in possession for a long time as a tenant and I, the defendant am continuing in the said capacity even now. In case the plaintiff has become owner of the portion in my, the defendant's possession, the relation of landlord and tenant between me, the defendant and the plaintiff is to subsist as before". 7. In whatever way the above plea of Prem Chand, respondent is read it is impossible to construe from the above-quoted words any claim for being brought into the exception contained in Section 76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act. Mr. Jain then referred to issue No. 4 and stated that this issue covers the plea in question. We do not think so. The plea of protection under the Rent Restriction Act is distinct from a plea under Section 76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act. Independently of the Rent Restriction Act an erstwhile tenant of a mortgage would not be liable to be dispossessed if his case falls within the exception contained in Section 76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act. On the other hand even if a tenancy is not continued after the redemption of a mortgage by operation of Section 76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant may still be protected against eviction by a statutory provision made in a Rent Restriction Act. We do not, therefore, think that the contesting respondents either raised the plea which is now sought to be pressed or that any such plea is covered by issue No. 4. Suppose such a plea was to be spelt out from the written statement of the contesting respondents and assume for a moment that there is an issue covering that plea, the best evidence then to prove that the case falls within the exception would be that of the mortgagee who inducted the tenants. The mortgagee has not been produced in this case. Even the contesting respondents themselves have not stated that the mortgagee let out the respective premises to the contesting respondents as an act of prudence. Nor has any independent evidence to prove that exception been produced by the tenants. We, therefore, hold that there is no evidence on record to prove that the case of the contesting respondents falls within the exception contained in Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants referred to a large number of cases to show that the judgment of the trial Court on issue No. 4 is erroneous and is liable to be reversed. So far as this Court is concerned, the law in this respect has since been settled by two Division Benches. The facts of The All India Film Corporation Ltd. and three others v. Shri Raja Gyan Nath and seven others, R.F.A. No. 281 of 1960, were almost similar to those of the instant case. That was also a case of composite property. The claim of the auction purchaser, Raja Gyan Nath for possession was decreed against the tenants of the mortgagee. It was held that the tenants of the mortgagee did not become the tenants of the auction-purchaser by reason of the lease created by the mortgagee in their favour during the currency of the mortgage. The judgment of the Division Bench (Mahajan and Pandit, JJ.) dated 19th March, 1963 in the case of the All India Film Corporation Ltd., is on all fours with the instant case and binds us. 9. Mr. Hira Lal Sibal, the learned counsel for the appellants then referred to our judgment dated May 12, 1965 in Bishan Singh v. Kartar Singh and others, R.F.A. No. 6 of 1961, wherein we set aside decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit of a mortgagor for possession against a tenant of the mortgagee and ourselves decreed that claim in somewhat similar circumstances. In that case, after considering almost all the judgments relevant for the decision of the matter we held that the following propositions of law are well settled :- "1. The general rule is that a person cannot confer on another a title better than he himself. Normally, therefore, a mortgagee cannot create an interest in the mortgaged property which might enure beyond the termination of his own interest as a mortgagee. The result is that the interest of a tenant inducted by a mortgagee in the mortgaged property terminates with the extinction of the mortgage. 2. Three are exceptions to the general rule enunciated above and some of them are :- (a) where the mortgagee is authorised by an express stipulation to lease out the property for any period beyond the continuance of the mortgage the tenant brought in by the mortgagee on the basis of such a stipulation is in law to be deemed to attorn to the mortgagor after the extinction of the mortgage provided the transaction of letting out to such a tenant is bona fide and otherwise valid in law. (b) an agricultural lease created by a mortgagee would be binding on the mortgagor even though the mortgage has been redeemed provided it is of such a character that a prudent owner of property would enter into in the usual course of management of his own property. In such a case, however, the tenant who claims the benefit of this exception, has to strictly establish it. This is based on the rule contained in Section 76(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. But the case will not fall in this exception to the general rule if such letting beyond the period of mortgage is prohibited in the deed of mortgage; (c) where some statute grants protection to the lessee whose interest would otherwise have come to an end with that of the mortgagee, against eviction despite the termination of the interest of the mortgagee, or where any such law makes the mortgagor, by fiction the landlord of the mortgagee's tenant after redemption. 3. Different considerations may apply to agricultural land when compared with cases of urban property and this would mainly depend in the relevant statute law and the attendant circumstances of the case. 4. The protection against eviction afforded by the Rent Restriction Acts is available to a tenant only against a claim for possession by the landlord or against such a claim by a person who could be described to be in the position of a landlord; and the scope of such protection would depend on the words of the particular Rent Restriction Act. 10. Before parting with this point it is necessary to refer to two other judgments of this Court to which our attention was invited by Mr. G.P. Jain. He referred to the judgment of Grover, J. and of my learned brother, Dua, J. in Gian Singh v. Mohan Lal and another, 1964 (Punjab) Current Law Journal 192, wherein protection of the Rent Restriction Act was allowed to a tenant of a mortgagor who had continued as a tenant under the mortgagee and whose eviction was sought by the mortgagor after redemption of the mortgage. That case is not at all in pari materia with the instant dispute. The tenant had been inducted by the mortgagor himself and the attornment of the tenant to the mortgagor having come to an end of the redemption of the mortgage, the original relationship of landlord and tenant between the mortgagor and the tenant was merely resuscitated. No such thing has taken place in the instant litigation and the judgment in Gian Singh's case (supra), is therefore, of no assistance to us for deciding this appeal. 11. The other case to which reference was made by Mr. Ganga Prashad Jain is the judgment of Falshaw, C.J. and Harbans Singh, J. in Bhola and others v. Jhundoo and others, 1965 (Punjab) Current Law Journal 64. We have already distinguished that case in our judgment in Bishan Singh's case (supra), and have held that the said judgment was given in the case of agricultural property on account of the special definition of "landowner" contained in Section 2(f) of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955. 12. We are bound by both the Division Bench judgments of this Court referred to above and must, therefore, hold that the decision of the trial Court on issue No. 4 is liable to be reversed and in the absence of anything more the appellant is entitled to a decree for possession against Hari Krishan, Prem Chand and Girdhara Singh, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in respect of the premises in their possession in the property in dispute. 13. Mr. G.P. Jain, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents then argued that our decision in R.F.A. No. 6 of 1961 declining to afford protection of Section 13 of the Rent Restriction Act to the tenants to the mortgagee is erroneous and needs reconsideration. Mr. Jain's argument is that while declining to afford such protection to a tenant of an erstwhile mortgagee we took into account in the last case the definition of "landlord" as contained in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, No. 3 of 1949 and not that of the "tenant". "Landlord" is defined in Section 2(c) of the said Act as follows :- " "landlord" means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord". 14. In our judgment in Bishan Singh's case (supra), we held that a mortgagor to whom the property reverts after redemption is not a landlord within the meaning of the above-quoted definition in the Rent Restriction Act. "Tenant" is defined in Section 2(i) of the East Punjab Act as follows :- " "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in has favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, unless with the consent in writing of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent of fees in a public market cart-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a municipal town or notified area committee". 15. The argument of Mr. Ganga Prashad is that his clients fall within the following expression contained in the definition of "tenant" quoted above :- "tenant" _________________ includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour". 16. Admittedly the case of the contesting respondents does not fall within any of the exceptions to the above rule contained in the latter part of Section 2(i) of the East Punjab Act. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents submits that unlike the Bombay Rent Restriction Act where the bar is against a landlord claiming eviction of his tenants except in certain specified circumstances, Section 13 of the East Punjab Act affords protection to tenants against eviction and that, therefore, for deciding a case in which the protection of the East Punjab Act is claimed all that has to be seen whether the person claiming protection fall within the definition of "tenant" contained in Section 2(i) of that Act or not. This argument appears to us to be fallacious. A trespasser may induct a tenant. He would be a good tenant and may be entitled to protection in a claim for eviction by the trespasser but will have no protection against a claim for possession filed by the owner of the property against the trespasser in which suit the tenant of the trespasser is also impleaded. Relationship of landlord and tenant has sometimes been referred to as triangle in which landlord, tenant and rent must all exist. The protection afforded to a tenant against his ejectment is only against the claim of the landlord and not the claim of anyone else. The protection under Section 13(1) of the East Punjab Act is, therefore, not available in a case where either the defendant is not a landlord. Mr. Ganga Prashad has not been able to argue in the face of the previous judgment of this Court, that the appellants fall within the definition of "landlord" as contained in the East Punjab Act. Moreover we are bound by the earlier Division Bench judgments of this Court in Lala Som Nath v. L.D. Desai and others, A.I.R. 1951 Punjab 404, (Weston C.J. and Soni J.) and Balkishan and others v. Baldeo Kumar and others, A.I.R. 1953 Punjab 297, (Falshaw and Kapur, JJ.) wherein it has already been held that when a building is under mortgage with possession the tenants under the mortgagee are not tenants of the owner and the mortgagor is not the landlord of such tenants and that, therefore, the provisions of the Punjab Rent Restriction Act do not apply in favour of such tenants and no restriction is placed by the Rent Act is the way of the landlord to obtain possession from such occupants. It has been held in those cases that if the mortgage is redeemed and the owner becomes entitled to possession the tenants of the mortgagee cannot setup any title as against the owner and cannot claim protection of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. In view of the above-said binding judgments of two earlier Division Benches of this Court and our own judgment in Bishan Singh's case (supra), we do not think that there is any force in this contention of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents. 17. Reference was also made by Mr. Ganga Prashad Jain to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Asa Ram and another v. Mst. Ram Kali and another, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 183. In that case, however, no law different to that settled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Gope's case (supra), was laid down. We have not considered it necessary to deal with the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Rajendra Nath Chandra and another v. Dinu Prodhan and others, A.I.R. 1030 Cal. 738, and with the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Hardei v. Wahid Khan and another, A.I.R. 1954 All. 16, as this Court has not followed those cases in the earlier decisions referred to above. In Kamlakar and Company v. Gulamshafi Imambhai Musalman, A.I.R. 1963 Bombay 42, it was no doubt laid down by a Division bench of the Bombay High Court as follows :- "It is undoubtedly true that this definition of the word "tenant" is very widely worded and may possibly include even a tenant in possession of the premises under the circumstances of the present case. But then Section 12 does not give the tenant a right to remain in possession of the properties, but it imposes a disability on the landlord and unless the person who seeks to recover possession is brought within the definition of the word "landlord" the tenant cannot claim possession. The word "landlord" has been defined to mean any person who is for the time being, receiving or entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person. It also further includes a tenant who has sublet the premises to a sub-tenant. Now clearly, unless it could be shown that the mortgagor claims the property on redemption through the mortgagor it is impossible to hold that he is within the definition of the word "landlord". Mr. Kotwal emphasises the words "who is for the time being, receiving, or entitled to receive, rent" in the definition and argues that the mortgagor would be within this definition. But there is no legal basis for this contention. If the law had contemplated that the tenancy of the tenant continued in spite of redemption then and only then the mortgagor would have been the person "entitled to receive the rent" whether he consented to the continuance of the tenancy or not. In view, however, of the provisions of Section 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, it cannot be said that the tenancy continued and, therefore, the mortgagor was entitled to recover the rent of the premises. There is no relationship either contractual or by privity of estate between the mortgagor and the tenant. He not being a landlord Section 12 does not come in his way of recovering possession". 18. Though the judgment of the Bombay High Court is against the tenants, Mr. Ganga Prashad wanted to argue on the basis of certain observations contained in the above passage that keeping in view the difference in the phraseology used in Section 12 of the Bombay Act on the one hand and Section 13 of the East Punjab Act on the other we should hold that the tenants falling within the definition of that phrase in the East Punjab Act are entitled to the protection contained in Section 13(1) of that Act irrespective of the claim for possession against them being by somebody other than a person falling within the definition of "landlord" contained in the Act. We have already repelled this contention in an earlier part of this judgment. All the contentions of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents have, therefore, failed. 19. Mr. Hira Lal Sibal, the learned counsel for the appellants then prayed that the dismissal of the claim for mesne profits by the trial Court should also be set aside and that claim should be decreed along with his claim for future mesne profits. In view of our finding on issue No. 4 the claim for mesne profits for the period in suit cannot possibly be resisted and has indeed not even been sought to be restricted by the contesting respondents. The learned counsel for the appellants has not contested the findings of the trial Court on the quantum of mesne profits under issue No. 6. The claim for future mesne profits at the rate decreed for the previous period by the trial Court till the date of payment by the contesting respondents is also allowed. 20. We, therefore, accept this appeal without any order as to costs, and decree the claim of the plaintiff-appellants for possession of the respective premises against the respondents and for payment of Rs. 960/-, 480/- and 360/- with future mesne profits till the date of realisation against Hari Krishan, Girdhara Singh and Prem Chand, respondents, respectively. In the interest of justice, however, we direct that the contesting respondents will not be liable to be actually dispossessed of their respective premises in execution of the appellant decree passed by this Court for a period of one month from today. Inder Dev Dua, J. - I agree. Appeal Accepted.