Cases referred :
1948(2) All Eng. Law Rep.767 [ 19 , 20 ]
1950 (1) All Eng. Law Rep.538 [ 19 ]
AIR 1988 SC 1247 [ 20 ]
AIR 1978 SC 851 [ 25 ]
AIR 1952 SC 16 [ 25 ]
AIR 1987 SC 849 [ 25 ]
Advocates appeared :
Shri M. Sonak, Advocate, for the petitioners.
Shri H.R. Bharne, Addl. Government Advocate, for the respondent No.1.
Shri V.P. Thali, Advocate, for the respondent No.2.
CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J. - More or less common facts and common questions of law arise in these two Writ Petitions. The petitioners in both Writ Petitions are working in Shri Durga English High School, Parsem, Pernem-Goa which is managed by the 2nd respondent. They complain that they were not paid salary from 22-6-1991 onwards by the 1st respondent though they were appointed and were working there regularly and continuously. We, therefore, propose to dispose of these two Writ Petitions by this common judgment.
2. The petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 in Writ Petition No.588 of 1993 are working as Assistant Teachers and the petitioner No.4 is working as Laboratory Assistant. Petitioner in Writ Petition No.22 of 1994 is working as Lower Division Clerk. In pursuance of an advertisement which appeared in Navhind Times issue dated 25-5-1989, the petitioners applied for the respective posts to the 2nd respondent. The interview was held on 4-6-1989. The petitioners in Writ Petition No.588 of 1993 were issued appointment letters dated 6-6-1989 as having been selected to the respective posts and the petitioner in Writ Petition No.22 of 1994 was appointed as per appointment letter dated 24-8-1989. The intimation was sent by the 2nd respondent to the 1st respondent with regard to these appointments in consistence with Rule 76(3) of the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Act, 1984 and the Rules made thereunder (hereinafter referred to as the said Act and the said Rules). As per Rule 76(4) of the said Rules, these appointments are deemed to have been approved, if, within 3 weeks from the date of the communication of appointments received by the Director of Education, he does not intimate his disapproval to the Managing Committee. Here, in this case, no communication of disapproval of appointment has been sent within 3 weeks. However, by Order dated 13-12-1990 and 14-12-1990, the appointment of the petitioner in Writ Petition No.588 of 1993 was approved for a period upto April, 1991 and the appointment of the petitioner in Writ Petition No.22 of 1994 was approved to the post of Lower Division Clerk only upto the academic year 1991. After the period of appointment was over, fresh steps have been taken for recruitment of teachers and staff in the School of the 2nd respondent as per instructions of respondent No.1. Accordingly, the Employment Exchange was reported the vacancies and advertisement was published in Navhind Times on 15th May, 1991 inviting applications for the respective posts. All the petitioners again applied and were invited for an interview. The interviews were held on 3-6-1991 and 19-6-1991. The Selection Committee, which includes the Department Representative, selected the petitioners in Writ Petition No.588 of 1993 again for the respective posts and they were also issued appointment orders dated 22-6-1991 to the respective posts. As far as petitioner in Writ Petition No.22 of 1994 is concerned, even though his appointment was renewed by appointment order dated 22-6-1991, he accepted that appointment under protest as he was entitled to continue without resorting to fresh procedure for appointment. As usual, these appointment orders of the petitioners in both Writ Petitions were forwarded to the Department for approval.
3. By order dated 30-9-1991, the appointments of the petitioners were also duly approved by the 1st respondent as per Exhibit D colly in Writ Petition No.588 of 1993 and as per Exhibit F in Writ petition No.22 of 1994. Subsequently, by Orders dated 2-12-1991 which were marked as Exhibit E and G in Writ Petition No.588 of 1993 and Writ Petition No.22 of 1994, respectively, the respondent No.1 instructed the 2nd respondent to keep the approval of the petitioners in abeyance until further orders. It may be noted that the petitioners were not paid any salary during the period from their appointment dated 22-6-1991. At this juncture, the petitioners approached this Court for a Writ of Mandamus directing the 1st respondent to disburse the salary of the petitioners and also for quashing the proceedings of the 1st respondent keeping in abeyance the approval already granted.
4. A further few facts also are necessary to be stated to complete the narration of facts. According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent has permitted another School to be opened in the near vicinity of the School and, resultantly, the students strength of the 2nd respondent School was considerably depleted and the petitioners have, consequently, become surplus. Since the approval of the petitioners was kept in abeyance, the petitioners were not deployed to some other School in terms of Rule 34 of the aforesaid Rules. The petitioners are, therefore, aggrieved by depriving the benefit of deployment which they are entitled to under Rule 34 of the said Rules.
5. The defence of the Department in keeping the Order of approval of the petitioners in abeyance is mainly on 3 grounds :
(1) That the Order of approval dated 30-9-1991 was passed by one Shri V.D.Naik, Assistant Director of Education who has issued that Order has no authority without the approval of the Director;
(2) The 2nd respondent has not followed the correct procedure for selection and the appointment was not made against the sanctioned posts; and
(3) There is an additional ground with regard to the petitioner in Writ Petition No.22 of 1994 that at the time of appointment dated 22-6-1991, the petitioner was overaged.
6. The questions, therefore, to be decided in these Writ Petitions, formulated in Writ Petition No.588 of 1993 are as follows :-
(a) Whether the action of the Respondents in refusing to pay salary to the Petitioners, despite the Petitioners having discharged/continuing to discharge their duties in the respective posts, infringes the Petitioners rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India ?
(b) Whether the Respondent No.1 is empowered to review its own orders, in matters of grant of approval for the appointments of the Petitioners ?
(c) Assuming that any such power of review exists, can the Respondent No.1 exercise the same without any compliance with the principles of natural justice ?
(d) In terms of Rule 76(4) of the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Rules, whether the Respondent No.1 becomes functus officio, upon the expiry of a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of the details regards appointment of employees, if within the said period of three weeks, the Respondent No.1 does not convey its disapproval for appointment ?
7. Before proceeding any further, we find it necessary to have a reference to certain Rules which are relevant to the disputes involved in this case. In order to provide better organisation and development of school education in the State of Goa while it was an Union Territory, the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Act, 1984 was enacted. In the said act, under section 2 defines the word Director which means the Director of Education, Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, and includes any other officer authorised by him to perform all or any of the functions of the Director under Act.
Managing Committee means the body of individuals which is entrusted with the management of any recognised private school.
Private School means a school which is not run by the Central Government, Administrator, or any other authority designated or sponsored by the Central Government or Administrator.
8. Under the said Act, the Rules were framed which are called the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Rules, 1986. These Rules provide mainly for the organization of schools, appointment of teachers, their conditions of service, activities to be taken for amelioration of standard of education, grant-in-aid, etc. etc. The following Rules are relevant for the purpose of this case. Rule 34 deals with abosorption of surplus employees etc. and reads as follows :-
34. Absorption of surplus, employees etc.- Where as a result of -
(a) the closure of an aided school or any class/classes or divisions in any aided school;
(b) withdrawal of aid from an aided school;
(c) withdrawal of recognition from an aided school,
any student or employee becomes surplus, such student or employee, as the case may be, shall be absorbed, as far as practicable, in such aided schools, as the Director of Education may specify:
Provided that the absorption in the aided schools of any employee who has become surplus shall be subject to availability of a vacancy and shall be subject further to the condition that the concerned employee possesses the requisite qualification for the post and the employee has not been retrenched by the management of the aided school, on any grounds other than the grounds of the closure, of school or any schools or classes of the School or withdrawal of recognition or aid from the school :
Provided further that where any such surplus employee is absorbed in an aided school, he shall be treated as junior to all the persons of the same category, employed in the aided school on the day immediately preceding date on which he is so absorbed.
9. Rule 74 reads as under :-
74. Recruitment and promotion.-
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter shall apply to an unaided minority school.
(2) Recruitment/promotion of employees in each recognised private school aided or unaided shall be made on the recommendation of the selection committee/promotion committee.
(3) .... .... .... ....
(4) .... .... .... ....
(5) Selection committee/Promotion Committee shall regulate its own procedure.
10. Rule 75 reads as under :-
75. Relaxation to be made with the approval of the Director. - Where the relaxation of any essential qualification for the recruitment of any employee is recommended by the appropriate selection committee, the managing committee of the school shall not give effect to such recommendation unless such recommendation has been previously approved by the Director of Education.
Provided that the Director of Education shall not give relaxation to the training qualifications when trained candidates are available and when they satisfy the subject requirements as notified by the school.
11. Rule 76 reads thus :-
76. Appointing Authority.- (1)................
(2).... .... .... ....
(3).... .... .... ....
(3) The particulars of every appointment made by the Chairman of the managing committee of an aided school shall be communicated by such committee to the Director (either by registered post acknowledgement due or by a messenger who will obtain an acknowledgement of the receipt thereof), within 7 days from the date on which the appointment is made.
(4) The Director of Education shall be deemed to have approved an appointment made by the managing committee of an aided school subject to the provision of rule 75, if within 3 weeks from the date on which the particulars of the appointment are received by him under sub-rule (3), he does not intimate the managing committee his disapproval of the appointment.
(5) Where any appointment made by the managing committee of an aided school is not approved by the Director, such appointment may (pending the regular appointment to the post) be continued on an ad-hoc basis for a period not exceeding three months and the salary and allowances of the person so continued on ad-hoc basis shall qualify for the computation of the aid to be given to such school, provided the provision of rule 75 is not contradicted.
12. Rule 87(1) reads :-
87. Seniority.- (1) Seniority of employees in each category shall be determined by the order of merit in which they were selected for appointment to the concerned post, and those selected on an earlier occasion being ranked senior to those selected later.
13. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents has mainly concentrated his argument on the authority of Mr. Naik who has signed the Order dated 30-9-1991 giving approval to the appointment of the petitioners. he contended that the only authority under the Act and the Rules to approve the appointments of the teachers and the staff is the Director of Education. Without his specific authorisation, the subordinate Officers such as Assistant Director, Deputy Director, or any other Officers working under him, will not get any authority to approve the appointments. He also produced the relevant files to show that the proceedings dated 30-9-1991 approving the appointments of the petitioners were never put up before the Director of Education for his approval and were approved without the authority of the Director.
14. Another contention raised by Mr. Bharne, learned Government Advocate for the respondents, is that the Management has no authority to make appointments in the posts of Assistant Teachers. As far as the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 in Writ Petition No.588 of 1993 are concerned, according to him, the posts sanctioned for the school for the year 1989-90 and 1990-91 were only for the graduate teachers and the appointments in question were made for undergraduate teachers which action of the Management has no support of law. He further contended that the procedure of interview conducted by the Management in selecting the petitioners in the respective posts was not in order. In fact, interviews were conducted on two dates, namely, on 3-6-1991 and 19-6-1991 and two separate Select Lists were prepared instead of one Select List, as the interview held on 19-6-1991 is continuation of interview held on 3-6-1991. Therefore, since the procedure of selection was opposed to Rules, the approval given by Shri V.D.Naik, the then Assistant Director of Education was wrong and it is for this reason that the approval given by him was kept in abeyance by the impugned proceedings. He contended that the action of the Department could be justified if the appointments are not made in accordance with the said Act. and the Rules made thereunder.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Sonak, underlying his argument on the basis of the questions formulated above, submitted that the appointment of the petitioners made by the respondent No.2 for the year 1989-90 is a valid appointment and the respondents and the Department were not at all justified in limiting the appointment to that particular period, namely, till April, 1991. he submitted that the appointment of the petitioner for the year 1989-90 was perfectly in conformity with the Rules and this is testified by the approval given by the Department though restricted to April, 1990. If the appointment of the petitioners made in 1989-90 was irregular, the Department would have raised objections and the approval would not have been given. In these premises, Mr. Sonak contended that if the appointments are legal and valid and strictly in conformity with the Rules, then Rule 76(4) will come into play and the petitioners appointments during the year 1989-90 were deemed to have been approved. He contended that the petitioners are deprived of the benefit of the deeming provision and the Department has, in clear violation of the Rules, by specific Order, restricted their appointment upto 30-4-1990 after a few months. In order to fortify his argument, he relied upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court, in which one of us (T.K.Chandrashekhara Das, J.) is a party, rendered in Writ Petition No.220 of 1989 (Cultural Association of Nagoa & another Vs. State of Goa & Others) dated 2nd August, 1995. While examining the scope of the aforesaid sub-Rule this Court held as under :-
A perusal of the Rule shows that once the managing committee has sought the approval of appointment, it is the statutory obligation on the part of the Director to send a reply within three weeks to say whether the appointment has been approved or not. if no such reply is sent within the period of three weeks, then the appointment is deemed to have been approved by the Director of Education. Therefore, Rule 76(4) raises fiction of deemed approval when there is no reply by the Director of Education within the statutory period of three weeks.
16. Mr. Sonak has further contended that if the appointment of the petitioners made for the year 1989-90 was regular, then all the proceedings subsequently taken by the Department are contrary to the provisions of the Rules and cannot be countenanced to. The petitioners, therefore, are deemed to have been in valid service from their initial appointment made in 1989-90 as they actually perform their duties in the respective posts even now.
17. To counter this argument, Mr. Bharne, the learned Government Counsel for the 1st respondent, submitted that the petitioners cannot be heard to be said that their services are deemed to have been approved and that they are deemed to have been continued in service, as they have participated in the process of selection initiated by the Management for the year 1990-91 and they cannot contend and rely upon the deeming provision.
18. Examining the principal contention of the Government Counsel, Mr. Bharne, that Mr. V.D.Naik, Assistant Director has no authority to approve appointment of the petitioners, we find that this is the first time that such contention is taken before this Court by the Department. There was no such contention appeared to have been taken while passing the proceedings of keeping the petitioners appointment in abeyance. Moreover, on perusal of the files, we see that the reason for keeping the appointment of the petitioners in abeyance is not mainly based on lack of authority of Shri V.D.Naik who issued the proceedings for approval. We come across a Noting in the file at page 1/N. this is a Noting made by Shri. V.D.Naik on 24-9-1991. The Noting contains his comments with regard to the asking the Management to submit the A.B.C. information of the staff requirements. It also contains that the appointments were only permitted for the academic year 1990-91 and it also speaks about the directions given to the Management that the subsequent appointments should be made de novo. It also contains that the appointments cannot be approved unless the staff position of the school as regards the existing staff, enrolment, number of division is re-assessed. He then sent the file to the superior Officer for necessary action. The Deputy Director then endorsed that We may seek for a meeting once again asking the Management and headmasters to attend with details of staff position and work load etc. and this Note has been endorsed by the Director of Education. The first two objections, as shown above, were raised in the Noting with respect to staff position and the Management should furnish the A.B.C. information. By paras 4 and 5 of the Noting. it appears that the previous objections have been satisfactorily explained. That Note contains that subsequently, the admissibility of staff has been reassessed as per the worksheet placed at page 74/C to 66/C. As per the Noting, all the objections have been satisfactorily explained and the Note also contains that the appointment of petitioners Nos.1 to 3 has been properly done and the approval has been given. It appears to us that the file was not thereafter submitted to the Director of Education. Assistant Director of Education himself issued the Orders because he was satisfied that the objections contained in his Notes were clarified by the Management, probably with the knowledge of the Director of Education.
19. Before we deal with the problem involved in this case any further, we also have to examine what is the legal position as regards the authority of Shri V.D. Naik, who signed the approval order of the petitioners as Assistant Director of Education. When we address this question, the most important point to be borne in mind is that when an Order has been issued under a statutory provision conferring certain benefits to the citizen, can the action taken under the said Order be undone or discarded on the ground that the Officer who signed the Order had no authority ? Of course, it is a matter of concern by the respective Administrative Authority under which the Officer who signed the Order is employed. Issuance of order is governed and regulated by internal arrangement made within the Departments. But can it be used as a shield to deny the benefits conferred by that Order to the beneficiaries ? At this juncture, we have to remember an important passage of Lord Denning in Roberton v. Minister of Pensions (1948(2) All Eng. Law Rep. 767). Lord Denning, J. observed thus :-
... In my opinion, if a government department in its dealings with a subject takes it on itself to assume authority on a matter with which he is concerned, he is entitled to rely on it having the authority which it assumes. He does not know, and cannot be expected to know, the limits of its authority. The department itself is clearly bound, and as it is but an agent for the Crown, it binds the Crown also, and as the Crown is bound, so are the other departments, for they also are but agents of the Crown.
Again, in Falmouth Boat Constructions, Ltd. v. Howell (1950(1) All Eng. Law Rep. 538), it is emphasized thus:-
...Whenever government officers, in their dealings with a subject, take on themselves to assume authority in a matter with which the subject is concerned, he is entitled to rely on their having the authority which they assume. He does not know, and cannot be expected to know, the limits of their authority and he ought not to suffer if they exceed it. That was the principle which I applied in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions (4) and it is applicable in the present case also.
20. Our Supreme Court has expressed similar line of opinion in Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Asst.) Dharwar and others v. Dharmendra Trading Co. etc. (AIR 1988 SC 1247). In para 5 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed thus:-
5. The next submission of learned counsel for the appellants was that the concessions granted by the said order dated 30th June, 1969 were of no legal effect as there is no statutory provision under which such concessions could be granted and the order of 30th June, 1969 was ultra vires and bad in law. We totally fail to see how an Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax who are functionaries of a State can say that a concession granted by the State itself was beyond the powers of the State or how the State can say so either. Moreover, if the said argument of learned counsel is correct, the result would be that even the second order of 12th January, 1977 would be equally invalid as it also grants concessions by way of refunds, although in a more limited manner and that is not even the case of the appellants.
It appears that in Robertson s case (supra), Lord Denning is trying to bring such case within the ambit of the doctrine of estoppel. The beneficiaries of an Order purported to have been passed by a statutory authority can be denied that benefit merely because there is a defect in that Order. Viewed in the perspective, assuming for a moment that the contention of the learned Government Advocate that the Order passed by Shri V.D. Naik has no approval of the Director, the contention could be sustained only if the Department succeeds in proving that Shri V.D. Naik has passed the Order by defrauding the Department or with malafide intention. Only in a case of fraud or other vitiation circumstances alone, could such a contention be sustainable. Going through the facts of this case, as pointed out earlier, we see that certain irregularities have been pointed out as regards the petitioners appointments. These irregularities are, according to us, not very fatal so as to vitiate the entire Order. It is not the case of the Department that unqualified teachers have been appointed against the sanctioned posts and though the Department was trying to make out a case in such a line, on facts it has been established that all the petitioners are qualified to hold the posts.
21. Another contention is that the Department has sanctioned the posts of Graduate Teachers and against which only the Graduate Teachers could be appointed. There is no dispute with regard to this principle. But what had happened in this case is that when the Department has sanctioned the Graduate Teachers posts, the Management acted in consonance with Rule 86(1) of the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Rules, 1986. As per this Rule, direct recruitment could be resorted to for higher category only if a person entitled to promotion is not available in the lower category. Therefore, when the five Graduate Teachers posts were sanctioned, the Management has filled up those posts by promotion from the lower category and direct recruitment was resorted to for the lower category posts. We find no illegality in the action of the Management. Next complaint of the Department is that the promotion made to the higher post has not been intimated. That is an entirely different matter when we examine it as far as the petitioners rights are concerned.
22. Another objection raised by the Department is with regard to the conduct of the interview. Admittedly, the Selection Committee consists of Departmental Representative. He has not raised any objection with regard to the procedure adopted by the Management in the selection. The main intention of the Rule to have Departmental Representative in the Selection Committee is to control the Management who go astray in violation of the Rules while conducting the process of selection. Therefore, that objection also cannot be made as a shield to cancel the order of approval to the petitioners.
23. Another important aspect of the matter is that even in the first objection raised by the Department, they have not stated that Shri. V.D.Naik had behaved fraudulently. As we pointed out earlier, all the defects pointed out by the Department are minor defects and no allegation of fraud is alleged against Mr. V.D.Naik. We do not, therefore, find any reason to withhold that Order passed by Mr. V.D.Naik on 30-9-1991.
24. Another point which has been highlighted by the Government Advocate is that the 3rd respondent in Writ Petition No.22 of 1994 was also selected in the same process and approval order was signed by Shri V.D.Naik. The counsel for the petitioner pointed out that for the reasons best known to the Department they did not cancel the appointment of Mr. Tulaskar on the ground that Mr. V.D.Naik has no authority. This argument has been met by the Government Advocate saying that the appointment of Mr. Tulaskar was approved by the Director. But one thing is indisputably clear that Shri. V.D.Naik used to issue Orders purported to be issued by the director of Education. There are enough materials in this case that Shri V.D.Naik in ordinary course of administrative exigencies used to sign orders purported to be issued by the Director of Education.
25. The learned counsel for the petitioners has argued before us, as pointed out earlier, that the main reason stated in the affidavit filed in this case for keeping the approval in abeyance is that the person (Mr. V.D.Naik) who signed the approval order has no authority. This contention, of course, has been taken by the Department only in the reply affidavit. This reason is not contained in the Order passed by the Department during the proceedings. Therefore, the learned counsel contended that if a statutory functionary makes an order, its validity must be judged by the reasons mentioned in the order and it cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. He fortifies his argument by citing the decision in Mohinder Singh Gill and another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others (AIR 1978 SC 851). In that decision, the Supreme Court held, in para 8, thus :-
8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here drew attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR 1952 SC 16) (at p.18): Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the Officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.
A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in The Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya and Others (AIR 1987 SC 849). In para 5 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held :-
5..... After the society communicates a resolution for the expulsion of a member of acts detrimental to the working of the society passed in the manner required by sub-s. (1) of S.36 to the Registrar for his approval under the first proviso, there is a duty cast on the Registrar to exercise his power of according approval or disapproval within a period of three months from the date of such submission, as provided by the second proviso. According to its plain terms, the second proviso places a limitation on the powers of the Registrar. it appears to us that the obvious intention of the Legislature was that once the period of three months stipulated expires, the Registrar becomes functus officio and his power to accord approval or disapproval to the resolution passed by the society for expulsion of a member under sub-s (1) of S.36 of the Act lapses....
26. Another contention was raised on behalf of the Government that the reason for keeping the approval of the petitioner in Writ Petition No.22 of 1994 is that he was overaged and the relaxation has not been applied for. We verified the files and the relevant proceedings. We find that the very proposal has been sent by the Management for relaxing his age since he was overaged at the time of subsequent appointment. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner in Writ Petition No.22 of 1994 that such an approval and relaxation is not necessary, as his first appointment in t he year 1989-90 itself was regular and, therefore, there was absolutely no necessity for the Department to undergo a fresh selection process. It was argued on behalf of that petitioner that all the exercises of the Department were to deprive the petitioners the benefit of Rule 34 deployment in the event of becoming surplus.
27. In view of the totality of consideration of all the facts and law governing this subject, we come to the following conclusions :-
(1) That the appointment of the petitioners during the year 1989-90 itself was regular and it was unnecessary for the Department to restrict the approval till April, 1990;
(2) The defects noted in the appointment of the petitioners made during the year 1990-91 are only minor irregularities which cannot, in any event, vitiate the legality of the appointment; and
(3) We find that Shri V.D.Naik has bonafide issued that Order of approval and it is not vitiated by any fraud and, therefore, mere allegation that Order has not been approved by the Director of Education will not vitiate the order of approval given by Mr. V.D.Naik.
28. On the aforesaid conclusions, we grant the following reliefs :-
(a) We set aside the impugned letter dated 2-12-1991 issued by the 1st respondent;
(b) We declare that the petitioners service is legal and valid from the initial period of 1989-90 and they are entitled to continue as such as if there is no break in service;
(c) We direct the respondents to pay all the arrears of salary due to the petitioners according to law upto date, if anything is left unpaid; and
(d) The petitioners are entitled to protection under Rule 34 of the Rules in case any of them are found surplus.
29. With the above directions, both the Writ petitions are allowed. The Rule is made absolute in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.
Petition allowed.
.
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