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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (D.K. Seth, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (as plaintiff) instituted Suit No. 18 of 1989 in the Court of Munsif City/Small Causes Court, Farrukhabad, against respondent No. 3 for ejectment for default in payment of rent. The suit proceeded ex parte by order dated 3-10-1989 and was decreed ex parte on 11-1-1990.

One Ghulam Rabbani filed Suit No. 220 of 1990 against the petitioner and respondent No. 3 seeking a declaration that the ex parte decree of 11-1-1990 was void. In that suit the respondent No. 3 applied on 8-9-1990 for time to file a written statement. On 2-4-1991 respondent No. 3 filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree under Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act together with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The Munsif initially condoned delay and allowed the application under Section 17 by an order dated 28-4-1992; the petitioner preferred Revision No. 11 of 1992 to the District Judge, which allowed the revision and set aside the 28-4-1992 order by order dated 4-12-1992. That order contained an observation that the respondent may file requisite deposits to the satisfaction of the trial court, if permitted by the trial court. The petitioner moved a writ petition which resulted in an order dated 15-1-1993 allowing the petitioner to contest the depositing of security while observing that the defendant had to satisfy the trial court that the security could be deposited at that belated stage.

The trial Court (Munsif) by order dated 13-5-1993 allowed the defendant's application by condoning delay and setting aside the ex parte decree after accepting deposit of security. The District and Sessions Judge affirmed that order on 27-5-1993. These latter orders (13-5-1993 and 27-5-1993) are challenged in the present petition, which was amended to be treated as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act — requiring that an applicant for setting aside an ex parte decree must, at the time of presenting the application, either deposit the decretal amount or furnish security as previously directed by the Court — is mandatory such that non-compliance deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain the application.
  2. Whether the orders of the trial Court and the revisional court (allowing setting aside of the ex parte decree without prior deposit or prior direction permitting security) were legally valid and within jurisdiction.
  3. Whether subsequent or belated deposit of the decretal amount or security (after presentation of the application or after the order setting aside the decree) can be treated as substantial compliance with the proviso to Section 17 and thereby cure the jurisdictional defect.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (plaintiff)

  • Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act mandates that an application to set aside an ex parte decree must be presented only after depositing the decretal amount or after complying with a prior direction to furnish security; this provision is mandatory and non-compliance renders the application non-maintainable.
  • The defendant had knowledge of the ex parte decree (evidenced by the filing of Suit No. 220 of 1990 and by applying for time to file the written statement on 8-9-1990), so the application filed on 2-4-1991 was belated and could not obtain condonation; the courts below acted illegally and without jurisdiction in allowing the application.
  • No fresh or valid application for restoration or permission to furnish security preceded the application to set aside the decree; the restoration application filed on 2-4-1991 (registered 5/74/91, re-numbered 15/71/92) was the subject of later orders but did not cure the procedural defect.

Respondent No. 3's Arguments (defendant)

  • The order dated 4-12-1992 (allowing revision) and an order dated 15-1-1993 in a writ petition left the defendant entitled to deposit the decretal amount; therefore the subsequent orders (including deposits) make the impugned orders valid.
  • Once the earlier order was set aside by the revisional court, parties were restored to their original position and the defendant was entitled to present a fresh application under Section 17 after compliance; the belated deposits should be accepted as substantial compliance with the proviso.
  • Reliance was placed on precedents where courts permitted later deposit or accepted deficient deposit as satisfying the proviso in substance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mananand Maheshwari & another v. U.P. State Electricity Board & another, 1992 (2) ARC 41 Principle that deposit/deficiency might be cured where deposit preceded application (facts of that case). The court observed the ratio did not assist respondents because in that case the (short) deposit preceded the application, whereas in the present case no deposit or prior permission preceded the application; thus it was distinguished.
Hukum Khan v. 1st Additional District Judge, 1983 (1) ARC 438 Court has power to extend time for furnishing security and accept deposit later where there was an earlier application seeking permission to furnish security and the court directed deposit within an extended time. Distinguished: in Hukum Khan there was a previous application for permission to furnish security and a court direction; in the present case there was no prior application or direction, so Hukum Khan did not support the respondent's contention.
Rais Ahmad v. Tarn Chandra Kesharwani, 1984 (2) ARC 13 Where an application for setting aside is presented within time together with an application for permission to furnish security, and the court later directs security which is complied with, the requirement of the proviso can be treated as fulfilled. Distinguished: the facts involved an application presented within thirty days along with permission to furnish security; in the present case no such contemporaneous or prior permission application existed.
Dullan Prasad v. Smt. Rajeshwari Bibi, AIR 1977 All 151 Held that compliance with Section 17 is a jurisdictional fact; revisional courts may examine whether jurisdictional fact exists under Section 115 CPC. Relied upon by the Court to hold that whether the proviso to Section 17 was complied with is a jurisdictional question and that superior courts can examine and decide that question; the Court cited and applied this principle.
Mrs. Mashi Das & others v. Court of Additional District Judge & others, 1992 (1) Vol (19) ALR 529 Case where an applicant sent money order before decree and later the court permitted part-cash deposit and security for balance within time, and the requirement was treated as complied with. Distinguished: the facts involved earlier initiative (money order before decree) and subsequent court direction; the Court found these facts different from the present case and that the precedent did not support belated deposit without prior compliance.
Mohd. Yaseen v. Jai Prakash, 1989 (1) AWC 17 Where the proviso to Section 17 is not satisfied, the court has no jurisdiction left to pass orders allowing late furnishing of security or late payment of the decretal amount. Relied upon: Court cited this decision to support the proposition that non-compliance with the proviso deprives the court of jurisdiction to entertain the application or to permit later compliance.
Ram Chandra v. IX Addl. District Judge, 1991 AWC 670 Deposit of the amount due under the decree must be made at the time of presentation of the application (Order IX, Rule 13 CPC); absence of deposit at or before presentation renders the application invalid for non-compliance with the proviso to Section 17. Relied upon: Court cited and applied this authority to hold that, similarly, failure to deposit at presentation in the present case meant the application was of no value and the trial court lacked jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began with a textual analysis of Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and its proviso. The proviso requires that an applicant seeking an order to set aside an ex parte decree or for review must, at the time of presenting the application, either:

  • deposit in court the amount due under the decree, or
  • obtain, on a previous application, a direction from the Court permitting the applicant to give security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment, and furnish such security at the time of presenting the application.

The Court emphasized that the proviso uses mandatory language ("shall") and sets out only those two alternatives, without provision for relaxation or exemption. Therefore, the requirement is mandatory and constitutes a jurisdictional condition precedent to the presentation of a valid application to set aside an ex parte decree.

The Court analyzed the factual record and concluded that in the present case there was no compliance with the proviso: no deposit was made at or before presentation of the application filed on 2-4-1991, and no prior application for permission to furnish security was presented before that application or along with it. The Court also found there was no situation where the trial court had issued notices without first passing an order on a permission-to-furnish-security application, so the argument of substantial or later compliance could not arise.

The Court addressed the respondents' reliance on several decisions where courts either accepted slightly deficient deposits made at the time of presentation or allowed extension where a previous application for permission to furnish security had been made and directions issued. In each instance the Court distinguished those authorities on their facts because in those cases the deposit or permission either preceded or accompanied the application or there was a specific court direction prior to notices being issued. The Court held those factual patterns were absent here and thus the precedents did not assist the respondent.

The Court relied on authorities (notably Dullan Prasad, Mohd. Yaseen and Ram Chandra) establishing that compliance with the proviso is a jurisdictional fact, and that non-compliance leaves the court without power to entertain the application; superior courts may inquire into that jurisdictional fact under Section 115 CPC. Applying that principle, the Court concluded the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application which had not satisfied the proviso's conditions.

The Court further reasoned that an order of the revisional court (dated 4-12-1992) setting aside an earlier order cannot, by that act alone, create jurisdiction in the trial court when the jurisdictional preconditions mandated by statute were never met. The subsequent writ order (15-1-1993) allowing the petitioner to contest deposit did not operate as authorization to render the earlier non-compliant application valid. On the facts the defendant failed to show bona fides or diligence in seeking prior permission or timely deposit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders (the Munsif's order dated 13-5-1993 and the District and Sessions Judge's order dated 27-5-1993, which had condoned delay and set aside the ex parte decree after accepting deposit of security) are set aside.

Direct consequences:

  • The orders that had allowed setting aside of the ex parte decree were quashed because the proviso to Section 17 was not complied with and the trial court therefore had no jurisdiction to entertain the application.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion does not discuss broader precedential consequences in detail; the decision addresses the direct effect on the parties (setting aside the impugned orders) and rests on the established principle that compliance with the proviso to Section 17 is jurisdictional. The Court applied and distinguished prior decisions on their facts rather than announcing a novel legal rule.

Disposition

Petition allowed.

    Sagir Khan v. District Judge, Farrukhabad

    D.K. Seth, J.-

    Leave is granted to; amend the cause title so as to convert this petition into one under Article 227 of the Constitution.

    2. The petitioner, as plaintiff, instituted Suit No. 18 of 1989 against the respondent No. 3, herein as defendant in the Court of Munsif City/Judge Small Cause Courts, Farrukhabad, for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of the rent. By an order dated 3-10-1989 the said suit was ordered to be proceeded ex pane. Ultimately the suit was decreed ex pane on 11-1-1990. One Ghulam Rabbani filed suit No. 220 of 1990 against the plaintiff herein and the defendant-respondent No. 3 herein as defendants for declaration that ex pane decree dated 11-1-1990 is a nullity and void. In the said Suit No. 220 of 1990 the defendant-respondent No. 3 herein made an application on 8-9-1990, praying for time for filing written state­ment. The petitioner alleged that it was the defendant-respondent No. 3 herein who got the said suit No. 220 of 1990 filed through Ghulam Rabbani to avoid execution. After having found that the purpose would not be achieved through the said suit the respondent No. 3 on 2-4-1991 filed an application for setting aside ex pane decree under Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act together with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

    3. The plaintiff filed his objection to the said two applications. But, however, by an order dated 28-4-1992 the learned Munsif, condoned the delay and allowed the application under Section 17 of the Act setting aside ex pane decree. The petitioner then preferred Revision No. 11 of 1992 before the learned District Judge, against the said order dated 28-4-1992 which was ultimately allowed by an order dated 4-12-1992 by setting aside the order dated 28-4-1992. The learned Dis­trict Judge in his order dated 4-12-1992 was pleased to observed that the respon­dent may file requisite deposits to the satisfaction of the trial Court, if permitted by the trial Court. Against this observation in the said order, a Writ Petition No. Nil of 1993 was moved by the petitioner. The said writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 15-1-1993 by allowing the petitioner to contest the depositing the amount of security while observing that the defendant shall have to satisfy the trial Court that even at this belated stage the security could be deposited. Thereupon the defendant filed an application for permitting him to file security to which the petitioner had filed his objection. It is contended by the petitioner that no fresh application for restoration, however, has been filed, by the defendant, inasmuch as restoration application moved on 2-4-1991, registered as 5/74/91 and re-numbered as 15/71/92 was the application which was being decided by an order dated 13-5-1993. By the said order dated 13-5-1993 the learned Munsif had allowed the ap­plication of the defendant by condoning the delay and setting aside ex pane decree rejecting the petitioner's objection after allowing the deposit of security of the petitioner. The petitioner's Revision No. Nil of 1993 was dismissed by the District and Sessions Judge, Farrukhabad, by an order dated 27-5-1993, affirming the order dated 13-5-1993. It is against this order dated 27-5-1993 affirming the order dated 13-5-1993 which are under challenge in the present petition.

    4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in view of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the application for setting aside of a decree is to be presented upon depositing the decretal amount or upon furnishing security for performance of the decree as directed by the Court on the previous application. In the present case the application has not been proceeded either by any deposit or by any previous application or any direction for furnishing the security. The provision of section 17, according to him is mandatory. The non-compliance thereof makes such application non-maintainable. Secondly, he contends that the defendant had knowledge about the said decree which is apparent by filing of the Suit No. 220 of 1990, which he got filed through Ghulam Rabbani. Even if the said proposition is not accepted even then the defendant had knowledge of the ex parte decree as soon he appeared in Suit No. 220 of 1990. By no manner his knowledge could be placed at a date later than 8-9-1990 on which date he had applied for time for filing the written statement in Suit No. 220 of 1990. Therefore, filing of the application on 2-4-1991 is wholly belated and no amount of explanation could be put forward, to obtain condonation therof. Therefore, according to him both the learned courts below have acted illegally and within material irregularity and wholly without jurisdiction in allowing the defendant's application.

    5. Learned counsel for the defendant-respondent No. 3 on the other hand contends that in view of the order dated 4-12-1992 which was not interfered with by the order dated 15-1-1993 passed in Writ Petition No. (sic) of 1995 and the obser­vation made in the said order dated 15-1-1993 the defendant is entitled to deposit the said amount and, therefore the orders impugned are valid and legal, lie further contends that as soon the order is set aside by order dated 4-12-1991 the parties were reverted back to the same situation, namely, to square and and, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to present a fresh application under Section 17 of the Act upon compliance with the deposit. Since the deposits have been made though be­latedly, therefore the same should be accepted as substantial compliance,

    6. In order to appreciate the situation it is necessary to refer to Section 17 of the said Act which runs as under:

    "17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure.-(1) The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall save in so far as is otherwise, provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits:

    Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex pane or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application either deposit in the court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment or give such security for the performance of the decree of compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed.

    (2) Where a person has become liable as surety under the proviso to sub-section (1), the security may be realised in manner provided by Section 145 of the Code of Civil Proce­dure, 1908 (5 of 1908)."

    The Proviso to sub section (1) of Section 17 lays down two conditions for making an application for setting aside ex pane decree or for review of the judg­ment, the first condition is that at the time of presenting the application the ap­plicant should deposit the amount due from him under decree. The second condi­tion enables the applicant to furnish security at the time of presenting such an application provided he obtains a directions from the Court on an application made previous to the presentation of the application for settings aside ex pane decree, permitting the applicant to deposit such security.

    7. A plain reading of the said section makes it clear that the condition is a must and, as such, mandatory because of the expression 'shall* used in the said proviso making only two alternates without providing any relaxation or exemption. When the intention of the Legislature is explicit in an unambiguous expression used in the legislation, it is not necessary to read something else which is altogether absent in the Statute and import a different meaning thereto.

    8. Therefore, it is clear from the reading of the said proviso that in order to present an application for setting aside ex pane decree the applicant has to fulfill the said two conditions without which there can not be any valid presentation of any such application. If there is no valid presentation the court can not assume jurisdiction. Therefore, the question goes to the root of assuming the jurisdiction. In case the Proviso is not complied with the court can not assume jurisdiction. In as much as in absence of compliance of the said conditions in the eye of law there is no application.

    9. Learned counsel for the respondents attempted to contend that the deposit may be made or security may be furnished afterwards and if the court is satisfied and accepts the same in that event the same can not be interfered with by the superior Court. According to him since the order setting aside ex pane decree has been set aside by the Revisional court, therefore, the learned Munsif exercises juris­diction right at the initial stage. Therefore any deposit made before the application is decided would be substantial compliance of the Proviso to Section 17. He relies on the decision in the case of Mananand Maheshwari and another v. U.P. State Electricity Board and another, 1992 (2) ARC 41, and contended that the court in spite of deficient amount has set aside the ex pane decree which was challenged. But upon finding that thereafter the defendant had deposited more than the defi­cient amount after setting aside of the decree, namely, when the deficiency' was made good, though at a later stage, yet it can not be said that there was no com­pliance of the Proviso. But the ratio decided in the said case does not help him. In asmuch as in the said case the deposit was made short by 300 on 15-1-1980 and the application under Section 17 of the Act was made on 15-2-1980, though deficit but the deposit had preceded the application.

    10. Sri D.R. Chaudhary learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 then relied on the decision in the case ofHukum Khan v. 1st Additional District Judge, 1983 (1) ARC 438. In the said case the application had made an application for setting aside ex parts decree on 4-7-1981 alongwith the application seeking permission to furnish security for the decretal amount. On the said application for furnishing security by an order dated 4-7-1981 the trial Court directed the applicant to deposit Rs. 2,000 by 14-7-1981 and the security in respect of the balance amount on the same date. The respondents could not furnish the security or deposit the cash by 14-7-1981, the trial Court OR the application, extended time till 1-8-1981. On which date the applicant deposited Rs. 2,000 in cash and furnished bond for Rs. 3,000. Learned court thereupon accepted the said deposit and the security and only thereupon had issued notices to the respondents. Therefore, in the present case the application was not presented alongwith previous application for permitting to furnish security. Therefore the ratio decided in the said case by which it was held that the court has power to extended' time for furnishing security and allowed the deficit of Rs. 200 by depositing later can not come to any help to support the contention of Sri Chaudhary, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. He then relied upon a decision in the case of Rais Ahmad v. Tarn Chandra Kesharwani, 1984 (2) ARC 13. The said decision also does not support the contention of Sri Chaudhary in the given facts of this case. Inasmuch as in the said case application for setting aside ex pane decree was presented within thirty days alongwith the application for permis­sion to furnish security in respect of the amount due under decree. The court in­stead of passing order regarding depositing of any amount or furnishing of security issued notices to the plaintiff requiring him to file objection. In the process whereof three months time had passed and after that period of three months the court directed the applicant to furnish security, which was deposited. In the said case it was held that it was the court which gave a direction after expiry of one month's time. Therefore the defendant cannot be penalised and such contention was accepted as fulfilment of the requirement of the Proviso.

    11. Sri Chaudhary, then relied on para 17 of the decision in the case of Dullan Prasad v. Smt. Rajeshwari Bibi, AIR 1977 All 151, which runs as under:

    "On an analysis of the cases cited above, it is quite apparent that once the application for depositing cash security was accepted by the court there was sufficient compliance of the requirements of second part of the proviso and even if the security furnished by the applicant was a little less than the decretal amount but if it satisfied the court no exception, in my opinion, can be taken to any defecit in the deposit of the cash security amount"
    .

    In the said case the application for setting aside ex pane decree was filed on 30-1-1974 alongwith the application seeking permission to deposit security and deposited a sum of Rs. 924 in the court as cash security. On these facts after analysing various cases the above observation was made in para 17, quoted above. The said proposition also clearly lays down that if the application for depositing cash security is accepted though there was short deposit, still then it can be said to be sufficient compliance but then such an observation was made on the basis of the facts of the said case, where deposit was made at the time of presentation of the application itself. Therefore the said case does not help Mr. Chaudhary.

    12. Then he refers to the decision in the case of Mrs. Mashi Das and others v. Court of Additional District Judge and others, 1992 (1) Vol (19) ALR 529. In the said case ex pane decree was passed on 5-5-1987 and the application for setting aside the said decree was made on 6-5-1987 and before the notices were issued the applicant made an application on 14-5-1987 for permitting to submit bond in compliance of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, showing receipt that the applicant had sent a sum of Rs. 975 through Money Order before the ex pane decree was passed and the said money order was received by the plaintiff on 21-4-1986. whereupon by an order date 14-5-1987 the court permitted the defendant to deposit half of the decretal amount in cash and furnish security for the balance half by 10-7-1987. The court, however, had granted certain time to furnish security after ascertaining the decretal dues which was complied with before the application for setting aside ex pane could be proceeded with. Therefore, this judgment also does not come to any help to support the contention of Sri Chaudhary.

    13. On the other hand the decision in the case of Dullan Prasad (supra) it has been held

    "Whether the applicant has complied with the requirements of the provisions of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is a question on which depends the jurisdiction of the court. If there has been non-compliance the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application. Now if the revisional court has misconstrued the provisions of section 17 and thereby failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it this court can certainly enter into the question and find out whether there has been compliance of it because that would be a jurisdiction fact and it would always be open to a revisional court under Section 115, C. P.C. To see whether the jurisdictional fact has been correctly decided"
    .

    14. In the present case, admittedly, there was no compliance of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act. Inasmuch as no application for permission to deposit the decretal amount or to furnish security was either moved previous to the application for setting aside ex pane decree or presented alongwith the same nor any such attempt was made by the defendant before the notices were issued nor there is any question of the court's error to issue notice without passing any order upon such an application for permission to deposit or to furnish security. Therefore the question of substantial compliance can not be said to have been arisen.

    15. In the case of Mohd. Yaseen v. Jai Prakash, 1989 (1) AWC 17, it has been held while dealing with Section 17 of the said Act that, in case requirement of the said Proviso are not satisfied the court has no further jurisdiction left to pass any order with regard to furnishing of security or to allow the defendant to pay the decretal amount later on.

    16. In the case of Ram Chandra v. IX Addl. District Judge, 1991 AWC 670, it has been held,

    "the deposit of the amount due from the petitioner under the decree was to be made at the time of presentation of application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No deposit was made either before presentation or at the time of presentation of the application Under Order IX, Rule 13 of Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently the application filed by the petitioner on 7-11-1984 would be of no value because it is not in compliance of the Proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act"
    . In the said case admittedly application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on 3-7-1984.

    17. In the present case the fact discloses that the defendant was never diligent nor he had applied within reasonable time for permission to deposit or furnish security and setting aside of the order does not reopen the matter. The order dated 4-12-1992 can not create jurisdiction in the learned Munsif when he had none. On the setting aside of the order it does not amount that the application would be deemed to have been made on a date after the order was set aside. The order passed by this Court in the Revision on 15-1-1993 can not have the effect of per­mitting the defendant to make any such application, which grants liberty to the plaintiff to oppose the prayer while the defendant was required to satisfy the trial court that even at this belated stage he could deposit the security. Even on facts no bona fide could be shown by the defendant. In that view of the matter I am unable to accept the contention of Sri Chaudhary. Therefore, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders are hereby set aside.

    18. There will be, however, no order as to costs.

    Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Sagir Khan v. District Judge, Farrukhabad
    (Feb 13, 1996)