T. N. K. SINGH, J.

Heard Mr. B. P. Sahu, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. R. S. Reisang, learned GA for respondent No. 1, Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned CGSC for respondent No. 2, Mr. N. Jotendro Singh, learned counsel for respondent 3 (i) and Mr. L. Sahashibhushan Singh, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 (ii).

2. The following brief in short compass will suffice for deciding the present case. The State of Manipur is the landed lock State and the requirements of the State for various petroleum products depend solely on the petroleum products transported by the oil tankers through the National Highway No. 39. The requirement of various petroleum products, i.e. M.S. (Petrol), Kerosene, High Speed Diesel (HSC) and Aero Turbine Fuel (ATF), are so important that without these petroleum products day-to-day life of the residents of Manipur are seriously affected. As there is no railway in the State of Manipur, without diesel and petrol, there cannot be transportation of the essential goods and movement of vehicles shall come to standstill. That being so, the transportation of various petroleum products by the oil tankers from outside the State of Manipur is a matter of great public importance.

3. The petitioner No. 1 is an association formed and constituted by the oil transport contractors of the State of Manipur for the welfare and development of its members. The petitioner No. 2 is an association formed and constituted by the owners of oil trucks of the State of Manipur for the welfare and development of its members. The members of the petitioners are the only transporters of various kind of petroleum products from the various part of Assam to the State of Manipur.

4. On 31.12.2000, one oil truck/oil tanker of one of the members of the petitioners was burnt down by the suspected underground extremists in between Tadubi and Mao on the National Highway No. 39. In that unfortunate incident, the said oil truck was exploded and all the petrols loaded in the said truck had been burnt down. The said incident was also published as news item in all the leading local dailies including the Imphal Free Press dated 1.1.2001. After the said incident, the members of the petitioners stopped lifting and transporting the petroleum products to Manipur. As a result thereof, the residents of Manipur suffered like anything because of the non-availability of petroleum products which are required very much for day-to-day life. The price of essential commodities was sky high and there was no transportation of goods and also the bus services were also very seriously affected. In the interest of public, the then Hon'ble Minister (PCS), Manipur convened a meeting on 10.1.2001 with the representatives of petitioner No. 1 so as to procure the most needed petroleum products for the residents of the State of Manipur. After serious deliberations, an agreement (Annexure-A/3 to the writ petition) was executed between the Hon'ble Minister (FCS), Government of Manipur and the representatives of the petitioners on 10.1.2001. The said agreement was witnessed by one of the officers of the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and the same is quoted hereunder :

"Agreement Made on 10.1.2001 between the all Manipur, Petroleum Products Transporters' Association, Imphal, Manipur For Resumption of Lifting/Transportation of Petroleum products meant for Manipur from outside state : A meeting convened by the Minister (FCS), Manipur with the representatives of the All Manipur Petroleum Products Transporters Association, imphal was held on 10.1.2001 at 11.00 a.m. in the conference room of the Hon'ble Minister (FCS), Manipur.

In the meeting the transporters Association expressed their grievances and made certain demands for protection of poetroleum products and the oil tankers while transporting the products from Khatkhati to Imphal. After a minute discussion the following agreements were arrived at :

i) The State Govt. will provide full security coverage from Imphal to Khatkhati and back for oil tankers while transporting petroleum products like M.S., HSD,S.K. Oil etc. ii) To compensate the loss suffered by the transporters association on 31.12.2000 as a result of burning down of one of its oil tankers on NH-39 near Tadubi, a committee comprising the representative of the Govt. the transporters assn. & IOC/AOD would be constituted to assess the extent of damages/loss suffered by the association.

iii) On receipt of the report of the committee the Govt. will determine the amount of relief to be paid to the owner through the association. Relief to be provided to the association will be made within the current financial year, iv) The Govt. will also take follow up action on the Govt. assurance given to the association on similar incidents that took place in the year 1998.

v) The transporters association will resume transportation of the above mentioned products as soon as the security escorts are provided by the Govt."

5. From perusal of the said agreement dated 10.1.2001 (Annexure-A/3 to the writ petition), it is clear that the State Govt. undertook (1) to provide full security coverage from Imphal to Khatkhati and, back to all the oil tankers while transporting petroleum products, like M.S. (petrol), HSC (Diesel), S.K. Oil, etc., and (2) to compensate the loss suffered by the transporters on 31.12.2000 and on the side of the transporters they undertook to resume transportation of the petroleum products as soon as the security escorts were provided by the Government.

6. After signing of the said agreement dated 10.1.2001, the members of the petitioners' association resumed lifting of petroleum products from Assam and transporting the same to the State of Manipur. Again, on 23.1.2001, 9(nine) loaded oil tankers, i.e. 6 (six) petrol tankers, 2 (two) HSD (diesel) and 1 (one) SK Oil, were again set ablaze by the suspected underground militants on National Highway No. 39 near Karong, Senapati District, Manipur. The detail of the said incident was also published in various local dailies circulating in the State of Manipur on the next day, i.e. on 24.1.2001. Though the said nine oil tankers were burnt down inspite of the promises and the assurances made by the Government of Manipur for protection of the oil tankers, the Govt. of Manipur did not provide reliefer compensation to the aggrieved members of the petitioners, and in other words, the State Govt. failed to carry out their promises and assurances mentioned in the said agreement dated 10.1.2001. Therefore, the petitioners commenced indefinite strike from 23.1.2001 and there was no transportation of petroleum products for the State of Manipur, as a result thereof, the general public suffered seriously. In order to save the public, more particularly the residents of Manipur from the intolerable hardship due to the non-availability of petroleum products in the State of Manipur, the IOC had an informal meeting with the representatives of the petitioners and after consideration of {he serious difficulties faced by the oil tankers, the IOC sent the letter dated 25.1.2001 to the Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur appraising the demands of the petitioners' association, i.e., (i) full compensation should be paid for the nine burnt down tankers, (ii) Highway protection force along the NH-39 (Imphal to Dimapur) and (iii) for assurance that the State Govt. should be responsible for the loss and damaged vehicles as well as the products.

7. As the members of the petitioners' association were on strike demanding the demands mentioned above to the Government of Manipur, there were hue and cry from the public, day to day life of the residents of Manipur suffered like anything due to the non-availability of petroleum products. The State Government was to take up some steps to procure petroleum products from outside the State for the residents of Manipur and invited the members of the petitioners' association for a meeting to consider the demands of the members of the petitioners' association, Thereafter, the Government of Manipur represented by the Minister (PCS), Manipur and the representatives of the petitioners' convened a meeting on 30.1.2001 and signed an agreement dated 30.1.2001 (Annexure-A/9 to the writ petition), which is quoted hereunder:

"Agreement made on 30th January, 2001 in connection with burning down ten Nos. tank trucks in a fire incident.

The following agreements were made between the Hon'ble Minister (PCS), Manipur and the representatives of All Manipur Petroleum Products Transporters' Association and All Manipur Oil Tankers' Owners' Assn. on 30.1.2001. 1. The State Govt. will provide full security coverage to and from Imphal - Khatkhati for Oil Tankers in transportation of Petroleum Products to meet the requirement of Manipur State. Transporters / Owners should ensure to detail their Oil Tankers on the fixed date/day of escort for lifting and Transporting of petroleum products from Khatkhati/Dimapur. 2(i) To compensate the loss suffered by the Assn. Owners of the Oil Tankers on account of fire incident which took place on 31.12.2000 and 23.1.2001 on NH-39 near Tadubi and Karong in which the following tankers including petroleum products were burnt down by miscreants.

Sl No.TT No. Product cost Qty. Remarks (KL)

1. MN-01-4712 6,50,00 MS 12 Claim of the

2. MN-01-4764 6,50,00 3,35,000 MS 12 AMPTA

3. NLN-8841 5,70,00 2,20,000 - 10 Amoto

4. MN-01-4188 6,50,000 3,35,000 - 12 Iphal

5. MNA-1843 4,60,00 2,90,000 - 12

6. MN-02-5436 4,60,000 2,90,000 - 10

7. MN-01-4578 5,60,000 3,35,000 - 12

8. MN-01-3895 5,40,000 75,000 SKO 12

9. MNP-1712 3,50,000 - - -

10. MN-01-4242 5,50,000 2,90,000 - 12

,58,30,000 26,20,000

(ii) The State Govt. will constitute a Committee to access the extent of loss/damages immediately.

3.(i) On receipt of the report of the Assessment Committee Govt. will arrange all possible relief to be paid to the owners of ill-fated Tank Trucks by within the current financial year through Association.

(ii) It was also agreed that the State Govt. will arrange to pay a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) as immediate relief to the Assn. On or before 10.2.2001.

4(i) The Govt. will also approach the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas to write off the loss as a special case and AOD authority will also be appraised not to recover the loss of produce amount from the transporters' bill for sometime, i.e. till finalization of the request from MOP.

(ii) In case the M.O.P. rejects the request the State Govt. will make good the entire loss.

5. Any kind of unforeseen incident took place while coming under security coverage in which loss and damage of man and material will be taken into account as a part of agreement."

8. From the perusal of the above agreement dated 30.1.2001, it has been see that the Government of Manipur had made promise to the representatives of the petitioners that the State Government will arrange to pay a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- as immediate relief to the association on or before 10.2.2001, the State Government will approach the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas to write off the loss as a special case and AOD authority will also be appraised not to recover the loss of product amount from the transporters' bill for sometime i.e. till finalization of the request from MOP, in case the M.O.P. rejects the request the State Government will make good the entire loss and any kind of unforeseen incident took place while coming under security coverage in which loss and damage of man and material will be taken into account as a part of the agreement. (Emphasis added). The petitioner No. 1 also submitted an application dated 26.2.2001 to the Executive Detector IOC Ltd., (AOD), Digboi informing about the said agreement dated 30.1.2001 and requesting not to recover the amount of the value of the oil damaged in the said incident, i.e. on 23.1.2001 from the transporters' bill till the matter is settled.

9. Thereafter the Government of Manipur in part compliance of there promises made in the said agreement dated 30.1.2001 started to escort the oil tankers' convoy of the petitioners by the security personnel provided by the Government of Manipur. The Government of Manipur, further, in part compliance of the said agreement dated 30.1.2001 sanctioned an amount of Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) only vide order of the Government of Manipur No. 1 / CS-96(Misc)/H dated 17.2.2001 and paid to the members of the petitioners' association. Again, on 8.3.2001 while the convoy of petroleum tankers of the petitioners carrying kerosene, diesel, ADF and petrol under armed escorts provided by the Government of Manipur, some armed militants ambushed the convoy and in that incident 15 fully loaded oil tankers were burnt down and one of the drivers was killed and 15 others were injured. The said unfortunate incident was also published on various local dailies on the next day and paper clippings of some local dailies are annexed as Annexures-A/11, A/12 and A/13 respectively in this writ petition. Thereafter the petitioners' association submitted an application dated 10.3.2001 to the Hon'ble Chief Minister, Manipur praying for granting ex-gratia to the bereaved family of the driver as immediate relief and also to pay damages to the owners of the petroleum tankers as per the agreement dated 30.01.2001. In that application dated 10.3.2001, the particulars of the 15 oil tankers, which had been burnt down, quantity of petroleum products and costs of the products had been mentioned. For easy reference, the said particulars are quoted hereunder:

1. NLN-1897 ATF 12 2,13,9157-

2 NLN-5252975297 ATF ' 12 2,13,9157-

3. NL03-A-135 ATF 14 2,49,568/-

4. MNA-2961 MS 10 2,90,0007-

5. AXH-0489 MS 10 2,90,0007-

6. AS09-1821 ms 10 2,90,0007-

7. MNA-1699 MS 10 2,90,0007-

A MN014759 SKO 10 75,0007-

9. MN-04/4786 HSD 12 1,94,426/-

10. MN014668 MS 12 3,35,0007-

11. MNW1-5371 MS 12 3,35,0007-

11 MNA-2536 HSD 10 1,62,0007-

13. AS-0144032 MS 12 3,35,0007-

14. ASV-2631 SKO 10 75,0007-

15. MNA-2947 SKO 10 75,0007-

Total amount of the product damage/burnt. Rs. 34,23,824.

10. Thereafter the petitioners filed a number of applications to the Hon'ble Ministers, Manipur for taking necessary action in pursuance of their promises made in the said agreement dated 30.1.2001, In the meanwhile, the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Sent demand notice to pay/deposit the value of the petroleum products damaged/lost due to the said incident on 8.3.2001 in which 15 (fifteen) fully loaded oil tankers were burnt down and one of the drivers was killed and fifteen drivers were seriously injured, vide different notices (Annexures-A/16 to A/27 to the writ petition). The State Government had to take actions to carry out their promises made in the said agreements dated 30.1.2001 (Annexure-A/9 to the writ petition and dated 10.1.2001 (Annexure-A-3 to the writ petition), but they failed to do so. Accordingly the writ petitioners filed the present writ petition.

11. The State Government also filed their affidavit-in-opposition. In their affidavit-in-opposition, they took the plea that the said agreements dated 10.1.2001 and 30.1.2001 were only signed by the Ministers (PCS), Government of Manipur and the agreements signed by the Minister (PCS), Manipur on behalf of the State Government is null and void. Further, it is also stated that any agreement entered into or executed with the Government should be signed in the name of the Governor by an Officer of the rank of Under Secretary or above as per Rule of Business. Therefore, the state is not liable to pay compensation for the loss/damage caused to the petitioners.

12. The only questions to be decided in this Case are that whether the State Government is barred by the Principle of Promisory Estoppel from refusing to comply their promise made in the said agreement dated 10.1.2001 and 30.1.2001, and also that whether the Minister (PCS), Government of Manipur can act on behalf of the State Government and took the decision for the State Government in the interest of the Public and can enter into agreement with the petitioners.

13. India is a democracy and the classic definition of the Government in democracy is "a Government of the people by the people for the people". The Ministers are the representatives of the people in the Government. Articles 77 and Article 166 of the Constitution of India speak about the conduct of business of the Government of India and conduct of business of a Government of State respectively. According to Article 74 and Article 163 of the Constitution of India, Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the Union Government and Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head in the State Government shall aid and advice the Governor in the State Government in exercise of their functions respectively. Therefore, the Governor of the State requires to function or to take decision on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. Vs. Sripati Ranjan Biswas and another reported in AIR 1975 SCI 755 held : "The decision of any Minister under rules of business made under Art. 77(3) is the decision of the President. Any reference to the President under any Rule made under the Constitution must needs be to the President as the constitutional head, as envisaged in the Constitution acting with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers" In that case, the Apex Court held that the decision of Minister is the decision of the Government. Paragraph-8 of the judgment in Sripati Ranjan Biswas and another (supra) is quoted hereunder:

"8. The question which is raised in this appeal relates to the domain of appointment or dismissal of a Govt. Servant. Such a question falls within the ambit of a purely executive function of the President in the case of the Union Govt. and of the Governor in the case of a State. In the present case, such a function being ultimately an executive function of the President, the fact that the final order is preceded or accompanied by a quasi-judicial enquiry held by the Minister does not affect the character of the exercise of that function by the President. There is, therefore, nothing in principle which can be distinguished in this appeal from the ratio of the decision in Samsher Singh's case. The legal position is brought out very clearly in para. 57 of the report in Shamsher Singh, AIR 1974 SC2192 = (1974 Lab 1C 1380) (Supra) in the following extracts:

Appointment or dismissal or removal of persons belonging to the Judicial Service of the State is not a personal function but is an executive function of the Governor exercised in accordance with the rules in that behalf under the Constitution."

Again in para -48 the Court observed- 'The President as well as the Governor is the Constitutional or formal head. The President as well as the Governor exercises his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion. Wherever the Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the exercise by the President or the Governor of any power or function, the satisfaction required by the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the President or Governor but the satisfaction of the President or Governor in the Constitutional sense in the Cabinet system of Government, that is, satisfaction of his council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President or the Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions. The decision of any Minister or Officer under rules of business made under any of these two Articles 77(3) and 166(3) is the decision of the President or the Governor respectively. These articles did not provide for any delegation. Therefore, the decision of Minister or officer under the rules of business is the decision of the President or the Governor'. We are, therefore, unable to see how the present case of the respondent can get out of the rule laid down in Shamsher Singh's case (supra)."

14. The Apex Court in AIR 2004 SC187, Air India Cabin Crew Assn. Vs. Yashawinee Merchant and others, held that)

"Executive action taken by the Government shall not invalid for want of name of President." In that case, the Apex Court held that letter written by the Government of India expressing the decision of the Government cannot be disowned by the Government of India only on the ground that the said decision of the Government expressed in the said letter are not in the name of the President of India. Again, in that case a plea has been taken that the letter dated 29.12.1989'written by the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism, Government of India cannot be treated as a letter of the Central Government clarifying or modifying that the original letter inasmuch as it is not in the name of the President of India formally expressing the decision of the Central Government in the name of the President. The Apex Court in the Air India Cabin Crew Assn. (supra) in para No. 30 of the order had quoted the said letter dated 29.12.1989, and made its findings/decisions in para Nos. 70 and 71.

Paragraph Nos. 30, 70 and 71 are quoted hereunder for easy reference:

"30. In reply to the above letter of the employer Air India, the Joint Secretary of Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism Deptt of Civil Aviation, Govt. of India wrote on 29.12.1989 and informed that the subject was reviewed and it is clarified that the age of retirement of Air hostesses would be 58 years but at the age of 35 the Air hostesses may be given suitable alternate jobs on ground till they attain the age of 58 years. The relevant part of the clarificatory letter dated 29.12.1989 also deserves full reproduction as the learned counsel for the respondent Assn has seriously questioned the legal effect of the same.

Joint Secretary,

Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism,

Govt. of India, New Delhi

Ravindra Gupta Phone .-352300

December, 29,1989

My dear Rajan,

Please refer to letter No. HC/65/6/6719 dated 15th December, 1989 from Secretary and Dy. Director, Admn, (Shri J. H. Jagtap) regarding discrimination against air hostesses in Air India and Indian Airlines.

2. The matter has been reviewed and it is clarified that the increase in age of retirement to 58 years does not specify the job functions after the age of 35. Airhostesses may be given suitable alternate jobs till they attain 58 years of age. Further, on being given alternate jobs there is no question of annual medical check up. The Government feels that the male cabin crew as well as airhostesses should turn out attractively and the management may explore the possibility of prescribing suitable medical examination and weight regime for both types of cabin crew.

3. As regards problems of salary grades job functions, promotion, etc., the management must sort them out and negotiate suitable agreements with the concerned Unions. With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Sd/-Ravindra Gupta

70 In the course of argument, learned senior counsel appearing for the app^llants/associa-tions also made a reference to Art. 77 of the Constitution of India which requires every executive action of the Government to be expressed to have been taken in the name of President."

71 In our option, reference to Art. 77 is wholly inappropriate. The exercise of statutory power under Section 34 by the Central Govt., even though not expressed to have been taken in the name of President does not render it invalid. clause 2 of art. 77 insulates an executive action of Govt. formally taken in the name of President from challenge on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the President. Even if an executive action of the Central Govt. is not formally expressed to have been taken in the name of President, Art. 77 does not provide that it would, therefore, be rendered void or invalid. We need not, therefore, deal with the argument advanced on the basis of Art. 77 of the Constitution because the respondent /association itself is relying on the directive dated 16.10.1989 of the Central Govt. which is not formally expressed in the name of President in terms of Art. 77 of the Constitution."

15. It is clear that the Apex Court in Air India Cabin (supra) held that even if an executive action of the Central Government is not formally expressed to have been taken in the name of President, Art. 77 does not provide that it would, therefore, be rendered void or invalid. In the earlier decision of the Apex Court in Bakshi Sardari Lal (dead) through L.Rs. & Ors etc. Vs. Union of India and anr., reported in AIR 1987 SC 2106, the Apex Court held that decision of the Minister or Officer under the rules of business is a decision of the President or the Governor.

For easy reference, para-6 of the Bakshi Sardari (supra) page 2108 of AIR) is quoted hereunder:

"6 The first aspect argued by Mr. Nariman is on the basis of the reversal of the view expressed by this Court in Sardari Lal's case (AIR 1971 SC 1547) (Supra) by a later larger Bench judgment of this Court. The ratio in Sardari Lal's case came to be considered in Shamsher Singh' case (AIR 1974 SC 2192) (supra) by a seven-Judge Bench. Ray, CJ., who spoke for five members of the bench and with whom by a separate Judgment, the remaining two learned Judges agreed spoke thus (at p. 2202 of AIR)". "The decision in Sardari Lal's case that the President has to be satisfied personally in exercise of executive power or function and that the functions of the President cannot be delegated is with respect not the correct statement of law and is against the established and uniform, view of this court as embodied in several decisions to which reference has already been made. These decisions are from the year 1955 up to the year 1971. The decisions are Rai Saheb Ramjawaya Kapur Vs. State of Punjab (1955) 2 SCR225: (AIR 1955 SC 549), A Sanjeevi Naidu Vs. State of Madras (1970) 3 SCR505;(AIR 1970 SC 1102) and U.N.R. Rao Vs. Smt Judira Gandhi, (1971) Suppl. SCR46: (AIR 1971 SC 1002). These decisions neither referred to nor considered in Sardari Lal's case.'

"The President as well as the Governor is the Constitutional or formal head. The President as well as the Governor exercises his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion. Wherever the Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the exercise by the president or the Governor of any power or function, the satisfaction required by the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the President or the Governor but the satisfaction of the President or the Governor in the constitutional sense in the cabinet system of Government, that is satisfaction of his Council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President or the Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions. The decision of any minister or officer under rules of business made under any of these two Articles 77(3) and 166(3) is the decision of the President or the Governor respectively. These Articles did not provide for any delegation. Therefore, the decision of minister or officer under the rules of business is the decision of the President or the Governor.'

In their writ petitions, each of the appellants had contended before the High Court, following the ratio of Sardari Lal's case which was then the law, that the President had not been personally satisfied before exercise of the power under the proviso to dispense with the inquiry and the respondents had taken pains to establish by pleading and producing the original records that the President had satisfied himself personally before he made the order dispensing with the inquiry. To reduce the argument on this aspect and to have an exact impression of how the impugned orders were made, we directed learned counsel appearing for'the Union of India to produce the original record and the same has been put before this Court. It transpires therefrom that the papers were placed by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the consideration of the President by the Joint Secretary of the Union Territory of Delhi on 22nd of March, 1971 and were returned with a note of 20th of April, 1971, to the effect that the President would like to have the advice of the Council of Ministers in the matter. A draft note for the Cabinet was prepared relating to the matter and as the record indicates it got through the Cabinet and the Prime Minister recorded her approval. Thereafter, it was again placed before the President along with a note prepared on 25th May, 1971. The note clearly indicated 'President's Secretariat may kindly see their note extracted at pre-page 7/n. As desired by the President, the matter was placed before the Council of Ministers. A copy of the Note submitted to the cabinet may kindly be seen at flag . 'H'. The cabinet has approved the proposal contained in paragraph 6 thereof. Minutes of the cabinet meeting may be seen at flag T. 'It is requested that the matter may now be placed before the President for consideration.' On 2nd June, 1971, the President made the following orders"-

'I have considered the cases of the eighteen police officers, whose names are given in the list appended to this order. I have also considered all the facts and circumstances of their cases stated in the notes of the Ministry of Home Affairs, dated March 22,1971, and May 25,1971'.

'I am satisfied, under paragraph (C) of the proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold an inquiry into the case of any one of those police officers. I accordingly order that these eighteen police officers be dismissed from service with immediate effect'.

It is clear from what has been extracted above that the order of the President was not on the basis of his personal satisfaction as required by the Rule in Sardari Lal's case (AIR 1971 SC 1547) but was upon the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, as required in Shamsher Singh's case (AIR 1974 SC 2192). In view of this factual position, learned counsel for the appellants fairly stated that there was no force in his first contention."

16. From the above discussions, I am of the considered view that the decision of the Minister is the decision of Government and executive action of the Minister or the Officer of the Government cannot be invalid only on the ground that it was not expressed in the name of the Governor according to the rules of business. Further, the Minister also can represent the Government of Manipur for entering into the said agreements dated 10.1.2001 and 30.1.2001.

17. In the present set up of the Government as well as in the present system of judiciary, it is now well settled that the principle of promissory estoppel could not only be used as defence but also as sword (as cause of action). The Apex Court in M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. The State ofUttarPradesh and others, reported in AIR 1979 SC 621 and (1979) 2 SCC'409, held that promissory estoppel applies to the" government or State in whichever capacity it acts and for attracting the doctrine of promissory estoppel what it necessary is only that the promisee should have altered its position for relying on the promise and it is not necessary that he should suffer in detriment elsewhere. The principle of promissory estoppel had been clearly explained by the Apex Court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (supra), that where one party by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is, in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the other party making it and it would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. Para-8 and 14 of the Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills (supra) are quoted hereunder:

"8. This principle of equity laid down by Lord Cairns made sporadic appearances in stray cases now and then but it was only in 1947 that it was disinterred and restated as a recognized doctrine by Mr. Justice Denning, as he then was, in the High Trees' case. The facts in that case were as follows. The plaintiffs leased to the defendants, a subsidiary of the plaintiffs, in 1937 a block of flats for 99 years at a rent of 2500 a year. Early in 1940 and because of the war, the defendants were unable to find sub-tenants for the flats and unable in consequence to pay the rent. The plaintiffs agreed at the request of the defendants to reduce the rent to 1250 from the beginning of the term. By the beginning of 1945 the conditions and improved and tenants had been found for all the flats and the plaintiffs., therefore, claimed the full rent of the premises from the middle of that year. The claim was allowed because the court took the view that the period for which the full rent was claimed fell outside the representation, but Mr. Justice Denning, as he then was, considered obiter whether the plaintiffs could have recovered the convenanted rent for the whole period of the lease and observed that in equity the plaintiffs could not have been allowed to act inconsistently with their promise on which the defendants had acted. It was pressed upon the Court that according to the well settled law as laid down in Jorden Vs. Money (1854) 5 HLC 185, no estoppel could be raised against the plaintiffs since the doctrine of estoppel by representation is applicable only to representations as to some state of facts alleged to be at the time actually in existence and not to promises de future which, if binding at all, must be binding only as contracts and here there was no representation of an existing state of facts by the plaintiffs but it was merely a promise or representation of intention to act in a particular manner in the future. Mr. Justice Denning, however, pointed out.

The law has not been standing still since Jorden V. Money. There has been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although they are said to be cases of estoppel, are not really such. They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made, and which was in fact so acted on. In such cases the courts have said that the promise must be honoured.

The principle formulated by Mr. Justice Denning was, to quote his own words,

"that a promise intended to be binding intended to be acted on and in fact acted on, is binding so far as its terms properly apply"

. Now Hughes Vs. Metropolitan Railway Co. (supra) and Birmingham and District Land Co. V. London & North Western Rail Co. (supra), the two decisions from which Mr. Justice, Denning drew inspiration for evolving this new equitable principle, were clearly cases where the principle was applied as between parties who were already bound contractually one to the other. In Hughes Vs. Metropolitan Railway Co. (supra) the plaintiff and the defendant were already bound in contract and the general principle stated by Lord Cairns, L.C. was:

If parties who have entered into definite and distinct terms involving certain legal results afterwards - enter upon a course of negotiations. Ten years later Bowen, L. J. also used the same terminology in Birmingham and District Land Co. Vs. London and North Western Rail Co. (Supra) that:

If persons who have contractual rights against others induce by their conduct those against whom they have such rights to believe. These two decisions might, therefore, seem to suggest that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is limited in its operation to cases where the parties are already contractually bound and one of the parties induces the other to believe that the strict rights under the contract would not be enforced. But we do not thmk any such limitation can justifiably be introduced to curtail the width and amplitude of this doctrine. We fail to see why it should be necessary to the applicability of this doctrine that there should be some contractual relationship between the parties. In fact Donaldson, J. pointed in Durham Fancy goods Ltd. Vs. Michael Jackson (Michael) Fancy Goods) Ltd. (1968) 2 All ER 987:

"Lord Cairns in his enunciation of the principle assumed a pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties, but this does not seem to me to be essential, provided that their is a preexisting legal relationship which could in certain circumstances give rise to liabilities and penalties."

But even this limitation suggested by Donaldson, J. that there should be a pre-existing legal relationship which could in certain circumstances giye rise to liabilities and penalties is not warranted and it is significant that the statement of the doctrine by Mr. Justice Denning in the High Trees case does not contain any such limitation. The learned Judge has consistently refused to introduce any such limitation in the doctrine and while sitting in the Court of Appeal, he said in so many terms, in Evenden Vs. Guildford City Association Football Club Ltd.:(1975)3All ER 269.

"Counsel for the appellant referred us, however, to the second edition of Spencer Bower's book on Estoppel by Representation (1966) pp 340-342) by Sir Alexander Turner, a judge of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. He suggests that promissory estoppel is limited to cases where parties are already bound contractually one to the other. I do not think it is so limited; see Durham Fancy Goods Ltd. Vs. Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd. It applies whenever a representation is made, whether of fact or law, present or future, which is intended to be binding, inended to induce a person to act on it and he does act on it."

This observation of Lord Denning clearly suggests that the parties need not be in any kind of legal relationship before the transaction from which the promissory estoppel takes its origin. The doctrine would seem to apply even where there is no pre-existing legal relationship between the paries, but the promise is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship which will arise in future. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edn., p. 1018, Note 2 to para 1514. Of course it must be pointed but in fairness to Lord Denning that he made it clear in the High Trees case that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot found a case of action in itself, since it can never do away with the necessity of consideration in the formation of a contract, but he totally repudiated in Evenderi's case the necessity of a pre-existing relationship between the parties and pointed out in Crabb Vs. Arun District Council (1975) 3 All ER 865, that equity will, in a given case where justice and fairness demand, prevent a person from insisting on strict legal rights, even\there they arise, not under any contract, but on his own title deeds or under statute. The true principle of promissory estoppel, therefore, seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not.

Lord Denning in the High Trees' case (1956) 1A11ER 256 but antedates this decision by a number of years; perhaps it is possible that it may have helped to inspire that decision. It was long before the decision in the High Trees' case that the American Law Institute's "Restatement of the Law of Contracts" came out with the following proposition hi Article 90: A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only be enforcement of the promise. This proposition was explained and elucidated by several illustrations given in the article and one of such illustrations was as follows : A promises B to pay him an annuity during B's life. B thereupon resigns a profitable employment, as A expected that he might B receives the annuity for some years, in the meantime becoming disqualified from again obtaining good employment. A's promise is binding. It is true that the Restatement has not the same weight as a source of law, as actual decisions of courts of high standing, yet the principle set out in Article 90 has in fact formed the basis of a number of decisions in various states and it is now becoming increasingly clear that a promise may in the United States derive contractual enforceability if it has been made by the promisor intending that it should be acted on and the promisee has altered his position in reliance on it, notwithstanding that there is no consideration in the sense in which that word is used in English and Commonwealth jurisprudence. Of course the basic requirement for invoking this principle must be present namely, that the fact-situation should be such that "injustice can be avoided only be enforcement of the promise". There are numerous examples of the application of this principle to be found in recent American decisions. There is, for instance, the long line of cases in which a promise to give a charitable subscription has been consistently held to be enforceable at the suit of the charity. Though attempts have been made to justify these decisions by reasoning that the charity by commencing or continuing its charitable work after receiving poromise has given good consideration for it, we do not think that, on closer scrutiny, the enforceability of the promise in these cases can be supported by spelling out the presence of some form of consideration and the true principle on which they are really based is the principle of promissory estoppel. This is also the view expressed in the following statement at page 657 of Vol. 19 of American Jurisprudence.

A number of courts have upheld the validity of charitable subscriptions on the theory of promissory estoppel holding that while a mere promise to contribute is unenforceable for want of consideration, if money has been expended or liabilities have been incurred in reliance on the promise so that non-fulfilment will cause injury to the payee, the donor is estoppel to assert the lack of consideration, and the promise will be enforced.

Chief Justice Cardozo, presiding over the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, explained the ratio of these decisions in the same terms in Allengheny College V. National Chautaugus County Bank 57 ALR 980: The half-truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in the law as the whole truths of another, when constant repetition brings it about that qualifications, taken once for granted, are disregarded or forgotten. The doctrine of consideration has not escaped the common lot. As far back as 1881, Justice Holmens in his lectures on the Common Law (p. 292) separated the detriment which is merely a consequence of the promise from the detriment which is ip truth the motive or inducement, and yet added that the court 'have gone far in obliterating this distinction'. The tendency toward effacement has not lessened with the years. On the contrary there has grown up of recent days a doctrine that a substitute for consideration or an exception to its ordinary requirements can be found in what is styled a 'promissory estoppel' Williston Contract, Sections 139, 116. Whether the exception has made its way in this state to such an extent as to permit us to say that the general law of consideration has been modified accordingly, we do not now attempt to say. Cases such as 234 NY 479 and 221 NY 431 may be signposts on the road. Certain at least it is that we have adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in connection with our law of charitable subscription. So long as those decisions stand, the question is not merely whether the enforcement of a charitable subscription can be squared with the doctrine of consideration in all its ancient rigor. The question may also be whether it can be squared with the doctrine of consideration as qualified by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

We have said that the cases in this State have recognized this exception, if exception it is thought to be. Thus, in 12 NY 18 the subscription was made without request, express for implied that the church do anything on the faith of it. Later the church did incur expense to the knowledge of the promisor, and in the reasonable belief that the promise would be kept. We held the promise binding, though consideration there was none except upon the theory of a promissory estoppel. On 74 NY 72 a situation substantially the same became the basis for a like ruling. So in 103 NY 600 and (1901) 167 NY 96 the moulds of consideration as fixed by the old doctrine were subject to a like expansion. Very likely, conceptions of public policy have shaped, more or less subconsciously, the rulings thus made. Judges have been affected by the thought that defences of that character are breaches of faith towards the public, and especially towards those engaged in th^ same enterprise, and an unwarrantable disappointment of the reasonable expectations of those interested'. WE Alien, J., in 12 NY 18 and of 97 Vt. 495 and cases there cited. The result speaks for itself irrespective of the motive. Decisions which have stood so long, and which are supported by so many considerations of public policy and reason, will not be overruled to save the symmetry of a concept which itself came into our law, not so much from any reasoned conviction of its justice, as from historical accidents of practice and procedure. (8 Holdsworth,. History of English Law, 7 et seq.) The concept survives as one of the distinctive features of our legal system. We have no thought to suggest that it is obsolete or on the way to be abandoned. As in the case of other concepts, however, the pressure of exceptions has led to irregularities of form.

It is also interesting to note that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been widely used in the United States in diverse other situations as founding a cause of action. The most notable instances are to be found in what may be called the "sub-contractory bid cases" in which a contractor about to tender for a contract, invites a sub-contractor to submit a bid for a sub contract and after receiving his bid, the sub contractor has been held unable to retract his bid and be liable in damages if he does so. It is not possible to say that any detriment which the contractor may be able to show in these cases would amount to consideration in its strict sense and these decisions have plainly been reached on an application of the doctrine of Promissory estoppel. One of such cases was Drennan Vs. Star Paving Company (1958) 31 Cal. 2d 409 where Traynor, J. explicitly adopted as good law the text of Article 90 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts quoted above and stated in so many words that "the absence of consideration is not fatal to the enforcement of such a promise". There are also numerous cases where the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been applied against the Govt. where the interest of justice, morality and common fairness clearly dictated such a course. We shall refer to these cases when we discuss the applicability of he doctrine of equitable estoppel against the Govt. Suffice it to state for the present that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been taken much further in the United States than in English and Common wealth jurisdictions and in some States at least, it has been used to reduce, if not to destroy the prestige of consideration as an essential of valid contract. Vide Spencer Bower and Turner's Estoppel by Representation (2nd) page 358."

18. The Apex Court in Union of India and another Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., reported in 1986 SC 806 had discussed principle of promissory estoppel and also held that for attracting the principle of promissory estoppel formal contract contemplated in Art. 299 of the Constitution of India is not necessary. The Apex Court again in the case of State of Orissa and Anr Vs. Mangalam Timber Products Ltd. reported in (2004) 1 SCC139 held that the principle of promissory estoppel can even be applicable in the case of unwritten contract. The Apex Court, further, held that the State Government cannot take advantage of its own omission. Para-4 of Mangalam Timber Products (supra) is quoted hereunder:

"4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that no case is made out for interference with the judgment of the High Court. Before the High Court, the principal plea of the respondent was that there was no contract in writing and therefore, the applicability of the principle of promissory estoppel was not established. The High Court has rightly discarded this plea. To attract the applicability of the principle of estoppel it is not necessary that there must be a contract in writing entered into between the parties. We are not satisfied even prima facie that it was a case of an error committed by the State Govt. of which it was not aware. The state of Oriss should have, while holding out the representation taken into consideration the fact - who will have to do the replantation and that the permission of the Govt. of India would be needed for the purpose. The State cannot take advantage of its own omission. The State Govt. having persuaded the respondent to establish an industry and the respondent having acted on the solemn promise of the State Govt., purchased the raw material at a fixed price and also sold its products by pricing the same taking into consideration the price of the raw material fixed by the State Govt. and supplied; the State Govt. cannot be permitted to revise the terms for supply of raw material adversely to the interest of the respondent and effective from a back date and place the respondent in a situation which it will not be able to resolve. The respondent could not have revised its price from a back date and recovered it from innumerable consumers to whom its finished products were supplied at a fixed price."

19. In the present context, I am of the considered view that the State Government is to abide by the conditions and promise made by them in the agreements dated 10.1.2004 and 30.1.2001 inasmuch as the State Government made clear and unequivocal promises in the said agreements mentioned above knowing quite well that it would be acted upon by the other parties, i.e. the present petitioner, to whom promises are made and, in fact both the petitioners and the State government had acted upon the said agreements. It may not be out of place to mention that the State Government in part compliance of the promise made in the said agreements had already paid damages at the tune of Rs. 20,00,000 (Rupees twenty lakhs) only to the petitioners and also had provided security escort to the convoy of petroleum tankers of the petitioners. Another question also arises to be decided by this Court as to the applicability of the promissory estoppel in the present case. The Apex Court in the case of Shrijee Sales Corporation and Anr Vs. Union of India, reported in (1997)3 SCC 398 held that the principle of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government but the determination of applicability of promissory estoppel against the public authority of the Government hangs upon the balance of equity and public interest. In case there is a supervening public equity the Government would be allowed to change its stand, it should then be able to withdraw the representation made by it which induces persons to take certain steps which moves actions adverse in the interest of such persons on account of such withdrawal. In the present case, as stated above transportation of the petroleum products for the residents of the State of Manipur is for the public interest for the people of Manipur and the State Government has duty in the interest of the public to make the petroleum products available to the residents/people of the Manipur and the Minister (PCS) in the Government of Manipur had entered into the said agreements, i.e. 10.1.2001 and 30.1.2001 for the interest of the public and not for the personal gain. I am fully satisfied that the agreements dated 10.1.2001 and 30.1.2001 are for the interest of the public and the Government would not be allowed to change its stand and withdraw from representations made by them which induces the members of the petitioners association to take up the steps in compliance of the said agreements.

20. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed and the respondent No. 1 is directed to carry out their / its promises made in the said agreements dated 10.1.2001 and 30.1.2001. It is made clear that the respondent No. 1 is directed to make good for the entire loss suffered by the members of the petitioners' association, in the said incidents on 31.12.2000, 23.1.2001 and 8.3.2001 in case, MOP rejects the request of the State Government to M.O.P. to write off of the loss as a special case within 5 (five) months from the date of receipt of this judgment & order. No order as to costs.