Chandra Reddy, C.J.:-

(1) There appeals arise out of two suits, o. S. Nos. 129 and 130 of 1951 respectively on the file of the court of the subordinate judge, tenali. Both the suits were filed for possession and future mesne profits. Though the plaintiffs are different, the defendants are the same in both the suits, the main facts being common to both. The two suits were tried together with the consent of parties and the evidence was recorded in o. S. No. 129 of 1951 as per the joint memo. , dated 10th january, 1955. The plaintiffs are residents of perala and chirala, two adjoining villages, while the defendants belong to a place called pallekona. The properties in dispute are situated in konetipuram. According to the plaintiffs, the two sale deeds, marked as exhibits a - 26 and a - 27 were executed in favour of the two plaintiffs, the extent of the land covered by each of the sale deeds being i acre 92 cents and 676 square links, and the consideration recited in each being rs. 7,000. The negotiation for these sales were initiated by one perumallu, who is examined as p. W. 11, at the request of the two plaintiffs.

(2) The properties in dispute were originally acquired by the mother of the first defendant, whose son is the 2nd defendant. The first defendant lost his father while he was a lad of two years. At that time, the first defendant and his father seem to have constituted members of a hindu joint family along with the father's brothers. At a subsequent partition, an extent of ac. 2 - 57 cents fell to the share of the first defendant's family. The mother of the first defendant happened to be the only daughter of one kaja baliah. This baliah left his properties by a will to his widow i lakshmamma. Lakshmamma gifted all her properties to her maternal grandson, the first defendant, in the year 1920. The mother of the first defendant assumed management of these properties as he was a minor and she purchased ac. 3 - 80 cents which is the subject - matter of these two suits, with the income realised therefrom on 14th january, 1932. She also acquired another plot of land in her own name out of the income of those properties.

(3) Immediately after the first defendant attained majority, he seems to have created some trouble to his mother in the enjoyment of these properties. This obliged her to file a suit, o. S. No. 176 of 1941 in the court of the district munsif, repalle,, claiming these properties as hers. That plaint is marked as exhibit a - 18. The suit was resisted by the first defendant on the plea that all the properties, the sale deeds for which s tood in the name of his mother, were purchased with the income of the properties conveyed to him by his maternal grandmother, the income of the ancestral properties being very small and a large family of theirs, consisting of himself, his mother and two sisters, having to be maintained therefrom. Besides contesting that suit, the first defendant raised another action as a counterblast for accounts against his mother. By a common judgment, which is marked as exhibit a - 21, dated 13th september, 1943, the mother's suit was decreed and that of the first defendant dismissed. On appeal, this was reversed and judgment entered for the first defendant in both the suits, with the result that the mother's suit was dismissed and that of the first defendant decreed. The mother took a second appeal to the high court of madras in s. A. No. 674 of 1945 but before the mother could be heard, they entered into a compromise, with the term that the suit properties should be allotted to the son, the first defendant, and the other item (referred to above) to his mother. This was on 22nd august, 1946. Within a few days thereafter, the first defendant's wife sent a notice to him on behalf of his minor son, obviously at his instance, impeaching the validity and the propriety of the compromise and asserting that all the properties constituted joint family properties of the father, the first defendant, and his son, the 2nd defendant, and that the compromise was entered into with a view to defeat the just rights of the son. The father did not send any reply to it. However, no further action was taken in regard there 10 nor was any attempt made to deprive the mother of the property that was assigned io her under the compromise. The parties continued to enjoy the properties allotted !o each of them under the compromise.

(4) While so, in the latter half of 1950, the first defendant thought of disposing of the properties in question. It is the plaintiffs' case that they were negotiating for the purchase of these lands through p. W. 11 a broker in that village. Before the sales could take a final shape, the first defendant conceived the idea of putting all t he properties in the name of his son by executing a document (marked as exhibit b - 1) on 21st november, 1950. As this document plays an important role in the context of this enquiry, we may extract it here :

" deed of relinquishment of rights to immoveable property executed on 21st of november of the year 1950 in favour of narla jagannadha rao's son venkata ramanayya, minor by guardian and mother jonamma, kamma, living by landed property, resident of pallekona village, within the registration sub - district of bhattiprolu, guntur district, by narla venkata ramanayya's son jagannadha. Rao, jiroyathi, kamma, at present residing at repalle, resident of pallekona village, bhattiprolu registration sub - district, guntur district. You are my son. In the property we both had in the villages of pallekona, karumaru, konetipuram villages, i had a right to the half share. As i am afraid that if i myself continue to manage the said property much loss may be caused to the family property, in the joint family property we had till this day, i am relinquishing all the rights i had with an arrangement that you shou d give the property to my daughters required for their marriages, and i have this day itself passed to you the same. Therefore from now onwards if you shall enjoy the entire property with absolute right, i shall not raise at any time any disputes whatsoever against you or your heirs, etc. I did not pass the rights i had to the family property in anybody's favour previously. No accounts whatsoever shall be demanded from your guardian mother jonamma."

It was about a month thereafter, i. E. , on the 27th of december, 1950, that the wo sales, covered by exhibits a - 26 and a - 27, were made in favour of the two plaintiffs. These documents recite that the bulk of the consideration was paid in cash to the vendor that morning at the time of the execution and that the balance of the consideration was to be utilised by the vendees in discharge of debts due by the first defendant's family. After the execution of the sale - deeds, the vendees, the attestors and identifying witnesses went to the sub - registrar's office at bhattiprolu and waited till the evening but the first defendant did not turn up there at all. The first defendant put off the registration of the documents for two days under some pretext or other, and finally when the vendees, p. W. 11 and some others went to the house of the first defendant and asked him as to the cause for the non - registration of the documents, he explained that unless the decree debts were discharged, he was not prepared to register the documents. This led the purchasers to pay off the decree debts as also his sundry debt. Notwithstanding this, the first defendant did not go to the sub - registrar's office to register the documents.

(5) Having failed in their attempts to make the first defendant register the documents voluntarily, they presented them for registration on the 29th december, 1950. The sub - registrar of bhattiprolu declined to register the documents with the result that they had to file appeals to the district registrar. The appellate tribunal after holding an elaborate enquiry into the matter, directed the registration of the documents and accordingly they were registered by the concerned sub - registrar. In spite of this, the first defendant did not put the plaintiffs in possession of the properties. So suits which have given rise to these appeals, were instituted by the two plaintiffs for the reliefs mentioned above. The main answers of the defendants to these suits were that the first defendant had not executed the sale deeds ; that the signatures therein purporting to be his were forged ; that, they were unsupported by consideration ; that, at any rate at the time of the execution of these documents, the first defendant had no title to or interest in the properties having divested himself of the same by relinquishing his interest therein under exhibit b - 1; and lastly, that it was not open to the plaintiff to plead that the suit properties were the self - acquisitions of the first defendant after having taken the sale deeds from both defendants 1 and 2.

(6) Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases in regard to all the issues that were raised in the suits. The trial court, on a consideration of the evidence, both oral and documentary, found as follows : both exhibits a - 26 and a - 27 were executed by the first defendant. They were fully supported by consideration. The properties in dispute were the separate properties of the first defendant but they became the joint family properties by his blending them with the joint family properties in which he relinquished his interest in favour of the second defendant. Consequently, he could not validlv convey the suit properties to the plaintiffs.

(7) As a result of these findings, both the suits were dismissed with costs. Dissatisfied with the result of these actions, both the plaintiffs have preferred the present appeals. The conclusion of the trial court as to the nature of the property at the time of the alienations is challenged by the appellants, while its opinion as to the execution of the two sale deeds and the payment of consideration is attacked by the learned advocate - general appearing for the first defendant. It is convenient to deal first with the execution of the documents as the defendants had denied their execution and the receipt of the consideration stated therein. We shall now proceed to consider whether the plaintiffs have placed material before the court from which it could be held that these sales were, in fact, made by the first defendant.

(8) The evidence of execution is furnished by p. Ws. 1, 12, 6, 7 and 11, p. Ws. 1 and 12 being the plaintiffs. P. W. 6 is the karnam of a neighbouring village ; p. W 7 one of the creditors of the first defendant ; and p. W. 11, the broker in these transactions. On the other side, d. W. 2, the first defendant, deposed that he never executed the documents, that they were got up by p. W. 11 with the help of p. Ws. 6 and 7 and that he did not know anything about them till he had notice of the petition for compulsory registration. In addition to these witnesses, both sides examined experts p. W. 13 and d. W. 1 who gave conflicting opinions as to the genuineness of these two documents. The facts as emerging from the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses are that as p. W. 11 was arranging sales of lands to the tune of about 60 acres in konetipuram in favour of weavers of perala and chirala, p. Ws. 1 and 2 also thought of making purchase of lands adjacent to them. For this purpose they approached p. W. 11 and he arranged the sales under exhibits a - 26 and a - 27 - p. W. 11 made enquiries about the title, then had the lands measured by p. W. 6, the karnam of that place, with the help of p. W. 5, the mohtad (village servant) and having been assured of the title of ' he first defendant, he settled the bargain. First a draft sale deed was prepared by p. W. 6 under the general instructions of p. W. 11 and the first defendant. A clause was inserted therein that the major part of the consideration should be paid before the sub - registrar by the vendees. But while preparing the final sale deeds, that clause was deleted as the first defendant took exception to it and wanted that the monies should be paid that morning itself. The documents were executed in the house of p. W. 6, the scribe, and were attested by p. Ws. 7 and 11. At that time the plaintiffs as also the first defendant were present. In the course of the day they went to he sub - registrar's office at bhattiprolu, within whose jurisdiction the properties lie, for getting the documents registered and were waiting for the first defendant to turn up there. He did not go there and as he was evading the registration of the documents for two days, they presented them for compulsory registration on the 29th, having discharged all the debts mentioned therein, between the 28th and the 30th. The documents were compulsorily registered by the orders of the district registrar on appeal after due notice to the first defendant and after having examined a number of witnesses on both sides.

(9) The case of the first defendant is that the plaintiffs were utter strangers to him,, that p. W. 11 who bore some enmity towards him, had conceived the idea of getting up these documents with a view to put him to some trouble, and for this purpose, with the assistance of p. Ws. 6 and 7, these two documents were got forged. Which of these two versions is to be accepted is the problem to be solved by us. At the inception we have to remember that the statement made by the first defendant in his written statement was that he did not know the plaintiffs or p. W. 11. Contrary to this in the evidence he trotted out the theory that there were misunderstandings between him and p. W. 11 on account of some water disputes, and that the latter brought into existence, the two documents exhibits a - 26 and a - 27, to put him to trouble. It is said that the lands, which were purchased by p. W. 11, for and on behalf of some of the residents of perala and chirala, were under his management and the drainage water from such lands had to be let into the suit lands, and as the first defendant was not agreeable to this, disputes arose between them, and it is this that induced him to forge these two documents choosing p. W. 1 and p. W. 12 as his dummies. It is significant that it was argued before the subordinate judge that p. W. 11 first tried to persuade the first defendant to sell these lands to him and when he refused to do it, he had to resort to this nefarious method. The suggestion of misunderstandings between him and the first defendant was refuted by p. W. 11, and as pointed out by the learned subordinate judge, there is not an iota of evidence in support of this suggestion. As pertinently remarked by him, any number of suggestions would not amount to proof of an assertion. Beyond this bare suggestion, there is nothing on record to indicate that p. W. 11 was inimically disposed towards the first defendant and that he was responsible for bringing into existence forged documents. The learned subordinate judge had observed and rightly, in our opinion that there was nothing to shake the credibility of p. W. 11.

(10) The same is the case with regard to p. Ws. 6 and 7. P. W. 6 is the karnam of the place and the scribe of the documents. The veracity of this witness could not be impugned in any way except suggesting that he was a dramatist or that he used to write documents for the villagers. That does not in any way reflect on the truthfulness of the witness. There was nothing in his evidence which would affect the trustworthiness of this witness. Nothing could be attributed to p. W. 7 also which had prompted him to perjure himself in court. The subordinate judge had chosen to believe this witness and no infirmity in the evidence of this witness was pointed out to us to reject his testimony, we have also the evidence of p. Ws. I and 12. They supported their case as regards the execution of the documents and the payment of consideration. The subordinate judge, who had watched the demeanour of p. W. 12, remarked that he was an innocent person. On a careful perusal of the depositions of all these witnesses, we are impressed with their evidence. They have presented a consistent version. We could not find any flaw in their testimony which would warrant the rejection of their evidence. The subordinate judge has correctly appreciated their evidence and we find no ground to differ from him in this behalf.

(11) One may pertinently ask why p. Ws. 6, 7 and 11 entered into a conspiracy for the purpose of getting up these documents when no benefit would accrue to them or to any one of them. One could appreciate the motive to. Take a risk in a case like this if one or other at least of them could derive some advantage from these forgeries. The two plaintiffs have no manner of connection with p. W. 11, except that he arranged these transactions, and there is no ostensible reason why p. W. 11 should have thought of forging these documents in favour of these two persons it is not even suggested that the plaintiffs are the nominees of p. W. 11. The obvious inference is that the story of enmity between the first defendant and this witness is an afterthought and was invented tc belittle the evidence of an otherwise disinterested witness. Whatever may be said about p. W. 11, there is no motive for p. Ws. 6 and 7 to join this conspiracy and be parties to the forgeries. It was merely suggested and there was no basis for that suggestion - that p. W. 7 was doing joint trade along with p. W. 11. Assuming it to be so, that would not induce him to attest a false document and run the risk of being prosecuted. So far as p. W. 6 is concerned, not even a suggestion of interestedness could be made. The subordinate judge, who had heard the evidence of the witnesses, seen them in the witness - box and watched their demeanour, thought that they could be safely relied upon and there is no reason why we should disagree with him in the appraisal of their evidence.

(12) Further, these documents contain thirty - six signatures purporting to be those of the first defendant and it is not within the realm of probability that anybody would think of forging so many signatures. It is the case of the first defendant that some signatures of his would have served as a model for forging these documents but we are not told as to how p. W. 11 or p. Ws. 1 or 12 or p. Ws. 6 or 7 could have obtained the signatures of the first defendant for this purpose. The documents themselves furnish intrinsic evidence of their genuineness. They contain particulars as to the acquisition of the suit properties, the names of creditors of the defendants and of their decree - holders, with the numbers of suits, etc. , which clearly indicate that this information was furnished by d. W. `1or, at any rate, by one who was intimately connected with the family and with the litigation. These details could not have been known to p. W. 11 or p. W. 6 or p. W. 7 even or the plaintiffs. This circumstance lends much assurance to the version given by the plaintiffs' witnesses.

(13) As against this large body of evidence and the attendant circumstances which probabilise the version of the plaintiffs, the learned advocate - general draws our attention to certain features of the case which he says tend to discredit these witnesses and render ineffective the circumstances relied on by the plaintiffs. He urges that it was not likely that the plaintiffs would have paid large sums of money in the morning when the documents were expected to be registered in the course of the day. But this is a question which ought to have been addressed to the plaintiffs when they were in the witness - box. Discreetly enough, this question was not put to them. Moreover, p. W. 6 has stated that the first defendant did not agree to the payment of the cash before the sub - registrar and for that reason the clause in the draft bearing on this matter had to the omitted in exhibits a - 26 and a - 27. We have already said that this is a reliable witness and as such this statement could be safely acted upon. The advocate - general also argues that the theory of discharge of the debts on the 30th sounds improbable having regard to the plaintiff's case that the first defendant was evading the registration of the documents. But it must be noted that on those two or three days, the first defendant did not refuse to register them. He was simply putting it off under some pretext or other. On the 29th night when they went to his house, he said that he would not register them unless the decree debt was discharged. So it is that they went to p. W. 2 and paid up the decree debt, and it was only when they were proceeding towards bhattiprolu that the first defendant gave them a slip and went away by getting down the bus on the way. It is not as if they suspected that he would play them false when they paid these amounts. Even otherwise, having paid the bulk of the consideration, they would naturally like to discharge the debts also.

(14) Next, a point was sought to be made from an alleged discrepancy between the evidence of p. W. 12 as given before the district registrar and his deposition in the trial court, namely, that while he stated before the registrar that the creditors were present at the time of the execution of these documents, he deposed in the trial court that they were not present. For one thing his attention was not drawn to this aspect of the matter while he was in the witness - box in the trial court. In order to draw an adverse inference against a witness, the alleged contradiction must be brought out by putting that statement to him. This is required by section 145 of the indian evidence act. That section reads as follows : -

" a witness may be cross - examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved ; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him."

It is manifest that in order to establish discrepancies or contradictions, it is essential that the attention of the witness must be drawn to the earlier statements said to be inconsistent with the later ones. This proposition is also contained in bal gangadhar tilak v. Shrinivas pandit, (1915) i. L. R. 39 bom. 441. In which their lordships deprecated the practice of merely filing the previous writing without drawing pointed attention of the witness to a particular statement which is alleged to be inconsistent with the evidence given in court. This is what their lordships say at page 460:

" but there appears to have been no warrant whatsoever for using them for the purpose of either contradicting or discounting the evidence of the witness, given in this suit, unless the particular matter or point has been placed before the witness as one for explanation in view of its discrepancy with the evidence then being tendered."

(15) Consequently, no reliance can be placed on the earlier statement alleged to have been made by the witness before the registrar as to the presence of the creditors. Even otherwise, it is not of such a character as to render the evidence of p. W. 12 unworthy of credence. It is only a discrepancy of an immaterial particular. This variation may be attributed to lapse of memory. Another circumstance seized upon by the respondent in support of the theory of the non - execution of the documents, is a statement by p. W. 4 in the cross - examination that though he was in the house of p. W. 6 from 7 a. M. Till evening no document was executed. This is explained by him in the re - examination that when he went there in the morning, the amount due to him was calculated and he was requested to go in the evening and accordingly he went away and came back in the evening to get the payment. That apart, it should be remembered that the witness was giving evidence after four years and it might be that he was making a mistake as to the period of his stay in the house. Again, it might also be that he had not noted the exact time of his going to the house of p. W. 6. Be that as it may, it is not a piece of evidence which has the effect of outweighing the overwhelming evidence and the circumstance that have been mentioned above. In our opinion, the factors which have been pointed out above have not the effect of disproving the version presented by the plaintiff's witnesses.

(16) In this connection we have also the evidence of p. Ws. 3, 4 and 8 who, though they do not speak to the execution of the documents, say that on the previous day the first defendant went to them and told them that he had sold the properties to people of perala and chirala and that they would pay him the money the next day. In addition, p. W. 2 said that on the day the decree debt in o. S. No. 259 of 1949 was discharged, the fust defendant was also present. Thus their testimony has a bearing on the execution of these documents also in that it destroys the theory of the first defendant that he was utterly in the dark as to the execution of these documents, though it does not have a direct bearing on the execution thereof. We will presently show that they are witnesses of truth and that their credibility has not been impeached in any way. Fur all these reasons, we are in entire agreement with the trial court that exhibits a - - 26 and a - 27 were genuine documents having been executed by the first defendant as spoken to by the plaintiffs' witnesses.

(17) This loads us to the question as to whether the sale deeds were unsupported by consideration as alleged by the first defendant. It is useful at the outset to bear in mind the principle that when once execution is proved, recitals of payment of consi - deration are prima facie proof of it against the executant or persons claiming under him. Therte is abundant authority for this proposition. See subrahmanyam v. Bhavanarayana ruo, (1955) an. W. R. 28. , vagayya gowdu v. Chenganna gowdu, (1956) an. W. R. 65. Raghavendra rao v. Venkatasami naicken, a. I. R. 1930 mad. 951. And also thakur bhagwan singh v. Bishambhar nath, (1940) 2 m. L. J. 453 at 454 (p. C.).

(18) Now we have to see whether any material was placed before us to prove that the recitals are not true. Except the bare denial of the first defendant, there is nothing to establish the; want of consideration for these documents. As already stated, the only witness who speaks to it is d. W. 1. As against this, there is overwhelming evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiffe, viz. , that of p. Ws. 2, 3, 4 and 8, p. W. 2 being a practising lawyer at repalle. As remarked by the learned subordinate judge, p. W. A had no axe to grind by giving false evidence. The same is the case with regard to p. Ws. 3, 4 and 8. In fact, no attempt was made before us to discredit these witnesses. Thus the discharge of these debts is not open to question.

(19) The point for decision is whether the first defendant has succeeded in disproving the passing of the balance of consideration. While the defendants could not establish want of consideration, the plaintiffs have affirmatively proved by the evidence of p. Ws. 1, 12, 6, 7 and 11, which we have already held is of an acceptable character, that the balance of the price was paid that morning. It must also be remembered that the capacity of these two plaintiffs to purchase these properties was not questioned before the learned judge. The subordinate judge has discussed this matter at sonic length and it is unnecessary for us to cover the same ground. Suffice it to say that wo concur in his conclusion on this aspect of the matter. It also appears that after these transactions, the first defendant had made additions to his house and performed the marriage of one of his daughters. Without this money it is very doubtful whether he could be in a position either to make additions to his house 01 to perform his daughter's marriage. Be that as it may, there is abundant evidence in support of the case of the plaintiffs that the documents were executed by the first defendant and that they were supported fully by consideration. It was alternatively contended by the defendants that exhibit b - 1 stood in the way of the plaintiffs. The argument pressed upon us is that the first defendant having executed a relinquishment deed in favour of the second defendant and thus deprived himself of a share therein, there was no title which he could pass to the plaintiffs under exhibits a - 26 and a - 27

(20) We do not think that exhibit b - 1 would be an obstacle in the way of the recovery of the properties by the plaintiffs. These properties, as appears from the previous fitigation, constituted the separate properties of the first defendant. The above narrative conclusively proves that they were acquired with the income from the properties gifted to the first defendant by his maternal grandmother. That apart, the joint family property, which consisted of only ac. 2 - 57 cents, could not have formed the nucleus for the acquisition of the suit properties. It is also clear from the various documents filed on behalf of the defendants that the family properties were not reduced to possession till about the time of the purchase of the suit properties. It appears that a suit had to be filed for partition and separate possession of the share of the first defendant in the family properties in the year 1931 and it could have beea only thereafter that he would have got possession of that property. Further, the income that might have been given to the first defendant's family could have been barely sufficient for the maintenance of the first defendant, his mother and two sisters. Be that as it may, the finding of the subordinate judge, that they originally constituted the self - acquisitions of the first defendant, has not been impugned before us.

(21) An attempt was made to sustain the judgment of the subordinate judge that they became joint family properties by the first defendant throwing them into the joint stock ; in other words, that they were impressed with the character of joint family property by being blended with the admitted joint family properties. At the outset, it may be remembered that this case was not put forward in the written statement of either the first defendant or the 2nd defendant. Nor has the first defendant examined as d. W. 2, said a word about it. The only basis for the theory of treatment by blending is exhibit b - 18, a notice issued to the first defendant by his wife on behalf of their son, questioning the legality and the binding nature of the compromise entered into by the first defendant and his mother, a few days after the compromise. This notice was issued evidently with the ulterior motive of getting something from the mother out of the properties allotted to her, the prime mover in this regard undoubtedly being the first defendant himself. Ultimately nothing was done in pursuance of this notice. That apart, there is no whisper of any blending in that notice. It proceeds on the assumption that the properties divided between the first defendant and his mother constituted joint family properties. Nor exhibit b - 27, dated 10th june, 1941, a mortgage created by the first defendant and the 2nd defendant, his son, with the former as the guardian of his son, over an item of the property gifted by the first defendant's maternal grandmother, comer to his assistance. It is specifically recited therein that this property belonged to the first defendant. The statement called in aid by the respondents in support of the theory of blending is "which was from that time under our possession and enjoyment", etc. It is to be noted that these properties could not have been in the joint possession of defendants 1 and 2 from the time of the gift for the reason that while the gift was made in the year 1920, the 2nd defendant was born only in or about the year 1939 therefore, much significance cannot be attached to that recital. Even otherwise, the mere fact that a part of the income therefrom was used for the benefit of the 2nd defendant could not have the effect of converting self - acquisitions into joint family property. It is to be borne in mind that at the time of exhibit b - 27, the first defendant was only a minor, aged 2 years, and there was no question of the property being enjoyed by him also.

(22) Again, this document does not bear on the suit property. Therefore, exhibit b - 27 cannot have the effect of converting the separate properties of the first defendant into the joint family properties of the first and 2nd defendants, that is sought to be attributed to it. Exhibits b - 26 and b - 27 have no bearing on the present enquiry for the reason that they dealt with admittedly joint family property and do not throw any light on the question of the treatment of the self - acquisitions of the father as the joint property of both the parties. That apart, exhibit b - 27 is only a piece of evidence, which has to be taken into account in considering the question. This has to be assessed along with other factors. There is no other evidence, oral or documentary which lends any support to this theory of blending. Even exhibit b - 1, which is said to disentitle the plaintiffs to get the property, does not speak of the self - acquired property of the first defendant being converted into joint family property. It definitely says that the properties in which the rights of the first defendant were released in favour of the and defendant constituted joint family properties. It is not a case of conversion of separate properties into joint family properties. Moreover, that is the document which was executed for the purpose of defrauding the creditors and the intending purchasers as we will show presently. We cannot countenance the proposition of shri venkatarama sastri for the respondents that if an item of the self - acquisition is converted into joint family property, all the other self - acquisitions must be deemed to have been blended with the joint properties of the acquirer and the other members of the family. We do not think that sadasiva vittal v. Bolla rattain , (1957) 2 an. W. R. 16 : a. I. R. 1958 a. P. 145. Rendered by a bench of this court, consisting of umamaheswaram and krishna rao, jj. , lends any support to the contention advanced by the counsel for the respondents in this regard. All that was laid down in that case was that a person might impress his self - acquired or separate properties in whole or in part with joint family character. It is not an authority for the proposition that when once a part of the separate property was converted into joint family property, the whole of the self - acquisition must be deemed to have been impressed with the same character. It should be remembered that when a person acquires some property, presumably he intends to retain domain over it and the intent to abandon his exclusive title must be manifest by acts which are inconsistent to keep it at his absolute disposal. Our attention is not drawn to any acts of the first defendant, at any rate, prior to exhibit b - 1, which can raise the reasonable inference of his intention to renounce his exclusive title to the property and to treat it as joint family property of the son and himself. Consequently, the suit property remained his self - acquisition till the disposal thereof under exhibits a - 26 and a - 27.

(23) In this position, could the first defendant convey a valid title to the 2nd defendant under the relinquishment deed, exhibit b - 1 ? in our opinion, that document could not have the effect of conveying the property in the self - acquisitions of the first defendant. A relinquishment deed would be effective in regard to join family properties but so far as separate properties are concerned, that could be done only under a conveyance. This aspect of the matter was missed by the trial court. Shri venkatarama sastri tried to buttress exhibit b - 1 on the theory that though it was styled a relinquishment deed, it was in effect a settlement deed. We do not think we can give any weight to this argument. It is true that the character of a document is to be determined with reference to the contents and not with reference to the name given to it. Bearing that in mind, if we scan the recitals in exhibit b - 1 there can be little doubt that it was an out and out relinquishment deed. It is specifically stated therein that it was the joint family property in which the first defendant was releasing his interest. There is no scope for construing the document as a gift or settlement when there is no indication therein that he treated the properties as his self - acquisitions and intended to transfer them to his son. Further, in the written statement of the first and second defendant it was asserted that this was a relinquishment deed and the first defendant's share in the joint family property was properly relinquished. It was not suggested even in the witness - box by the first defendant that that document was meant to operate as a conveyance. It is also worthy of note that it was stamped as a relinquishment deed. In that position, it is futile to say that the deficiency in the stamp could not render a document invalid. This contention would have been valid if the document was a conveyance but it was insufficiency stamped. That is not the position here. It was styled a relinquishment deed and throughout the parties struck to the theory that it was a release deed and it was meant to be so. That being the situation, we do not think that it would be of any avail to the defendants to argue that the defect could be cured by paying the deficit stamp, etc.

(24) Even if it could be regarded as a conveyance, it would not very much help the defendants having regard to the way in which it was registered. It is to be noted that no schedules of property were appended to exhibit b - 1 nor even a description thereof was furnished in the document. Further, it was registered in book no. 4 while documents affecting immoveable property whose value is over rs. 100 are to be registered in book no. 1. We will do well here to reproduce some of the relevant sections of the indian registration act. Section 21 says :

" (1) no non - testamentary document relating to immoveable property shall be accepted for 'registration unless it contains a description of such property sufficient to identify the same. (2) houses in towns shall be described as situate on the north or other side of the street or road (which should be specified) to which they front, and by their existing and former occupancies, and by their numbers if the houses in such street or road are numbered. (3) other houses and lands shall be described by their name, if any, and as being in the territorial division in which they are situate, and by their superficial contents, the roads and other properties on which they abut, and their existing occupancies, and also, whenever it is practicable, by reference to a government map or survey. (4) no non - testamentary document containing a map or plan of any property comprised therein shall be accepted for registration unless it is accompanied by a true copy of the map or plan, or, in case such property is situate in several districts, by such number of true copies of the map or plan as are equal to the number of such districts."

Section 22 is in these terms : -

" (1) where it is, in the opinion of the provincial government, practicable to describe house, not being houses in towns, and lands by reference to a government map or survey, the provincial government may, by rule made under this act, require that such houses and lands as aforesaid shall, for the purposes of section 21, be so described. (2) save as otherwise provided by any rule made under sub - section (1) , failure to comply with the provisions of section 21, sub - section (2) or sub - section (3) , shall not disentitle a document to be registered if the description of the property to which it relates is sufficient to identify that property."

It is plain that in spite of non - compliance with the provisions of section 21, a document will be registered provided the description of the property is sufficient to identify it only if it is not otherwise provided by the rules to be framed by the provincial government. The government of madras, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub - sectioa (1) of section 22, had framed rules which are as follows : - " in supersession of notification, no. 497, dated 8th december, 1902. His excellency the governor - in - council is pleased to enact, under section 22 (1) of the indian registration act (xvi of 1908) , that the following rule shall take effect from and after the 1st july, 1919, in the districts and portions of districts mentioned in the accompanying list : - (a) every non - testamentary document presented for registration and relating to land shall, if the land comprises one or more entire survey fields or sub - divisions, specify the number of each field or sub - division as given in the government village map. (b) if the land has no separate number assigned to it in the government village map, the document shall specify the number assigned in such village map to the survey field or sub - division in which the land is situated, together with such description of land as is sufficient for its identification. We shall presently deal with the effect of failure to satisfy the condition as to the description of the properties to be attached.

(25) We will now proceed to read section 51 of the act which requires certain registered books to be kept in the office of the sub - registrar. That section reads :

" (1) the following books shall be kept in the several offices hereinafter named, namely : - (a) in all registration offices - book 1 : ' register of non - testamentary documents relating to immoveable p ro erty ' book 2 : ' record of reasons for refusal to register ; book 3 : ' register of wills and authorities to adopt '; and book 4 : ' miscellaneous register '. (s) in the offices of registrars - book 5 : ' register of deposits of wills '. (2) in book 1 shall be entered or filed all documents or memoranda registered under sections 17, 18 and 89 which relate to immoveable property, and are not wills. (3) in book 4 shall be entered all documents registered under clauses (d) and (/) of section 18 which do not relate to immoveable property. (4) nothing in this section shall be deemed to require more than one set of books where the office of the registrar has been amalgamated with the office of a sub - registrar."

(26) At this juncture, we have also to look at the terms of section 18, which runs as follows : -

" any of the following documents may be registered under this act, namely : - (a) instruments (other than instruments of gift and wills) which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of a value less than one hundred rupees, to or in immoveable property ; (a) instruments acknowledging the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest ; (c) leases of immoveable property for any term not exceeding one year, and leases exempted under section 17 ; (cc) instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a court or any award when such decree or order or award purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of a value less than one hundred rupees, to or in immoveable property ; (d) instruments (other than wills) which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest to or in moveable property ; (e) wills ; and (f) all other documents not required by section 17 to be registered."

(27) A reading of these two sections establishes that the registration of immoveable properties, whose value is over rs. 100, has to be made in book no. 1. It is only documents contemplated by section 18 that are normally registered in book no. 4. In this case, the registration of these documents was effected in book no. 4. What is the effect of this registration ? does it result in the whole document being invalidated ? in other words, is it void or voidable at the instance of persons who are sought to be affected by the registration of these documents ? it is submitted by shri ramachandra rao that such registration does not exist in law as it contravenes the provisions of sections 18 and 51 and the rules framed by the provincial government pursuant to the powers conferred on them by section 21. The learned counsel urges that the rules framed by the government require schedules of properties to be annexed to documents and if that requirement is not satisfied, it will invalidate registration. He rays that all the cases which laid down that the failure to furnish the description of the property or a schedule thereof being only a defect in procedure, cannot render them void as it is cured by section 87 of the indian registration act, were decided prior to the amendment of the rule adding sub - rule (c) which provides: " failure to provide with the contents of this rule will disentitle a document to be registered. " it is unnecessary for us to go into the larger question as to whether the non - observance of the requirements of the rules would have the consequence of making the registration nugatory having regard to rule (c) in the view we take of the effect of registration in book no. 4. The stand taken by the respondents in this behalf is that so far as the applicability of section 3 of the transfer of property act is concerned, it does not make any difference whether the registration is made in book no. 4 or in book no. 1. The registration of the document is sufficient to attribute notice thereof within the meaning of section 3 of the transfer of property act.

(28) We do not think that this argument is substantial. According to section 3 of the transfer of property act, a person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from any inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. Explanation i reads as follows : -

" where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration, or, where the property is not all situated in one sub - district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub - section (a) of section 30 of the indian registration act, 1908, from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any sub - registrar within whose sub - district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share of interest is being acquired, is situated : provided that - (1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by (he indian registration act, 1908, and the rules made thereunder, (2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be in books kept under section 51 of that act, and (3) the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under section 55 of that act."

It is clear from proviso (3) that in order that notice of registration of document could be ascrided to a person, the condition envisaged therein should be fulfilled. We have already seen that the documents registered under secticns 17, 18 and 89 which relate to immoveable property, should be entered in book no. 1, and the documents registered under clauses (d) and (f) of section 18, which do not relate to immoveable property, should be entered in book no. 4. It is only an executant of the document or the person in whose favour it is executed that is entitled to obtain a copy of it, if it is registered in book 4. No one else could get a copy or even an extract, thereof. It is not accessible to third parties. That being the position it would be unreasonable to impute constructive knowledge of the existence of such a document to third parties. An interpretation of a statute which leads to absurd results should be avoided if it is permissible on the language thereof.

(29) The effect of registering documents relating to immoveable property of the value of more than rs. 100 in book no. 4 instead of book no. 1 has been considered by a bench of the madras high court in narasamma v. Subbarayudu ,. (1895) i. L. R. 18 mad. 364. In that case a deed was executed in favour of a hindu widow by her husband's relation releasing all the rights he had in the properties of her deceased husband. On the basis of this document, the widow conveyed those properties to two individuals, defendants 1 and 2 in the suit. After executing the release deed, the releasor sold the same to another person, plaintiff in that case. As defendants 1 and 2 were not willing to recognise his title, he instituted the suit for recovering possession of the property. The release deed was entered in book no. 4 and not in book no. 1 as prescribed by section 51 of the registration act. The question that called for determination was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the property from defendants 1 and 2. The answer was in the affirmative. Dealing with the question as to the effect of the document being registered in book no. 4, instead of book no. 1 this is what best, j. , remarked :

" the object of the registration act is to provide not only a guarantee of the genuineness of instruments, but also a record from which persons who may desire to enter into dealings with respect to property may be able to obtain information as to title - or to quote the words of the privy council in mohammed ewas v. Biraj lal (1876) l. R. 4 i. A. 166 at 175. - ' registration is mainly required for the purpose of giving notoriety to the deed '; and such being the case, it is difficult to see how this object is attained, if a document relating to immoveable property is registered in a book expressly prescribed for document' which do not relate to immoveable property '. Section 60 of the act requires that the document registered shall have endorsed on it a certificate of the fact of registration ' together with the number and page of the book in which the document has been copied ', and this is the certificate which is ' admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in manner provided by the act". "

They held that such registration would not affect property which had passed into the hands of third parties, though, as against the executant of the document, it might be enforceable on the principle certum est quod cerium reddi potest. It is urged by sri venkatarama sastri that this is no longer good law having regard to the decision of the privy council in sah mukhun lal panday v. Sah koondun lall, (1875) l. R. 2 i. A. 210. And also the decision of the bombay high court in parasharam pant v. Rama, (1909) i l. R. 34 bom. 202. And two decisions of the madras high court: in subbalakshmi ammal v. Narasimiah, (1926) 52 m. L. J. 482 and varadaraja ayyar v. Kailasam ayyar, (1946) 2 m. L. J. 355. We do not think this submission has any force. Narasamma v. Subbarayudu, (1895) i. L. R. 18 mad. 364. Is not in any way inconsistent with the dictum of the judicial committee of the privy council in sah mukhum lal panday v. Sah kuondum lall, (1875) l. R. 2 la. 210. The passage which contains the principle which is said to be opposed to the doctrine of narasamma v. Subbarayudu , (1895) i. L. R. 18 mad. 364. Is this ; " in considering the effect to be given to section 49, that section must be read in conjunction with section 88, and with the words of the heading of part 10, 'of the effects of registration and non - registration '.

(30) Now, considering that the registration of all conveyances of immoveable property of the value of rs. 100 or upwards is by the act rendered compulsory, and that proper legal advice is not generally accessible to persons taking conveyance of land of small value, it is scarcely reasonable to suppose that it was the intention of the legislature that every registration of a deed should be null and void by reason of non - compliance with the provisions of sections 19, 21 or 36, or other similar provisions. It is rather to be inferred that the legislature intended that such errors or defects should be classed under the general words ' defect in procedure ' in section 88 of the act, so that innocent and ignorant persons should not be deprived of their property through any error or inadvertence of a public officer, on whom they would naturally place reliance. If the registering officer refuses to register, the mistakes may be rectified upon appeal under section 83, or upon petition under section 84, as the case may be ; but if he registers where he ought not to register, innocent persons may be misled,, and may not discover, until it is too late to rectify it, the error by which, if the registration is in consequence of it to be treated as a nullity, they may be deprived of their just rights. " we do not find anything in this which lends any countenance to the theory that the registration of documents in book no. 4, which properly should be entered in book no. 1, affects the right of innocent third parties also. Far from that, it gives some colour to the proposition that innocent persons should not in any way be injured by such registry. Nor does subbalakshmi ammal v. Narasimiah , (1926) 52 m. L. J. 482. Give expression to an opinion which it, not in conformity with narasamma v. Subbarayudu , (1895) i. L. R. 18 mad. 364. Waller and madhavan nair, jj. , approved of the principle enunciated in narasamma v. Subbarayudu,. (1895) i. L. R. 18 mad. 364.

(31) But they distinguished it on the ground that in the case before them, the widow, who got no conveyance in her favour, could not in any way be said to be prejudiced by the wrong entry of exhibit c in book no. 4. They said that that decision should be understood strictly with reference to the particular facts. Referring to narasamma v. Subbarqyudu 2, this is what the bench said :

" the learned judges thought that a stranger like the plaintiff in that case should not be made tt. Suffer for a mistake which the fourth defendant could have easily rectified and that she had herself to blame if she became a loser thereby and her transferees of course stood in her shoes. The subsequent observations in the judgment also show that one of the main considerations which influenced them in arriving at their conclusion was the fact that in that case the property had passed to a third party for consideration and that he should not be made to suffer because the parties to the document did not take sufficient care to get the document entered in the proper book in the registration office."

These remarks reveal that the bench, far from demurring the proposition enunciated in narasamma v. Subbarayudu, (1895) i. L. R. 18 mad. 364. Accepted, it but thought that it was inapplicable to the case before them. Parasharampant v. Rama, (1909) i. L. R. 34 bom. 202. Also does not render any assistance to the respondents. That was not a case where the rights of innocent third parties were affected by registering the document in book no. 4. That bore only on the rights of the releasor and the releasee and therefore, we cannot derive any help from that decision in this enquiry.

(32) In mulla's transfer of property act, 1956 edition, page 34, gordhandas v. Mohanlal , (1920) i. L. R. 45 bom. 170. Is relied upon to establish the proposition that the purchaser was not affected with notice of a registered agreement restricting the use of the property purchased because it was not shown that the agreement was indexed in relation to the property sold. It is stated there :

" however that may be, the second proviso shows that such misplaced entries will not operates as notice."

it is futile to contend that the registration of a document in a wrong book would still prejudice the rights of innocent third parties especially after the pronouncement of the privy council in rai satindra nath choudhury v. Rai jatindra nath choudhury , (1935) 69 m;l. J. 503 : l. R. 62 i. A. 265 (p. C.). Say their lordships :

" as held by the high court, the document should have been entered in book no. 1, and the mistake, which was made by the registering officer in good faith, has not injured any innocent person."

It follows that whatever might be the effect of the registration of a document in a wrong book, like book no. 4 instead of book no. I it would not operate to defeat the rights of innocent third parties. On this discussion it follows that there is really no conflict between narasamma v. Subbarayudu, (1895) i. L. R. 18 mad. 364. And sah mukhun lall panday v. Sah koondum lall ,. (1875) l. R. 2 la. 210 this principle finds acceptance in subbalakshmi ammal v. Narasimiah', (1926) 52 m. L. J. 482 and rai satindra nath choudhury v. Rai jatindra nath choudhury, (1935) 69 m;l. J. 503 : l. R. 62 i. A. 265 (p. C.). It is true that varadaraja ayyar v. Kailasam ayyar, (1946) 2 m. L. J. 355. Strikes a discordant note. Horwill, j. , lays down that the mistake of a registering officer could not render the registration invalid and the transaction would be binding provided it did not injure innocent third parties, but that the subsequent mortgagee by his failure to apply for an encumbrance certificate must be deemed to have had notice of the charge and hence the charge was binding on the parties. We do not think that the law as expounded by the learned judge is correct. He overlooked that any amount of search of book no. 4 would not enable parties other than the executant of the document or those claiming under him to have any information about the registration of the document. It is not disputed that third parties have no access to book no. 4 and cannot obtain any extract therefrom. In such a situation the application for encumbrance certificate could not serve any useful purpose. The decision of the learned judge is in the teeth of the third proviso to the clause ' a person is said to have notice of a fact, etc. , occurring in section 3 of the transfer of property act. We do not think that we can subscribe to the principle adumbrated by the learned judge. Further, in this case the parties had made enquiries as to the existence of encumbrances affecting this property and they were informed that none existed.

(33) There is another ground of attack against exhibit b - 1. It is contended by the counsel for the appellants that even as a conveyance it is liable to be avoided under section 53 (2) as it was intended to defraud not only the existing creditors but also the intending purchasers also. It is beyond doubt that this document was designed to achieve that purpose. Admittedly, on the date of the execution of this document,. In addition to the debts mentioned in exhibits a - 26 and a - 27, the first defendant owed to the tune of rs. 3,000 or rs. 4,000 to third parties. He had no property other than those which are supposed to have been released under exhibit b - 1. Quite apart from that, there are various circumstances which are a pointer to the conclusion that the intention in executing the document was to defraud the creditors and intending purchasers of the property. While all the previous documents were executed at pallekona, exhibit b - i was executed at repalle. It was attested by persons belonging to repalle unlike on the previous occasions when all the documents were attested by people of pallekona or konetipuram. The registration was also effected at repalle instead of bhattiprolu. We are not concerned with the validity of the registration because even if a small portion of a property is situated within the jurisdiction of a sub - registrar's office, registration of a document covering all the properties of the executant could be effected in that office. But this is one of the factors to be taken into consideration in judging the motive of the executant in getting it registered at repalle. This transaction surely bears a badge of secrecy. There is also the fact that the schedule was not furnished and the registration was entered in book no. 4 which would prevent third parties from getting any information about it. All these things are a clear indication that the motive for executing this document was to defeat the creditors and persons who might be induced to purchase property on the assurance that the vendor had a valid title to the property. It is also significant that on two occasions when these properties were attached in execution of decrees obtained against the first defendant, though the mother as the guardian of the 2nd defendant preferred claim petition, ultimately either the debts were paid off by the first defendant himself or the claim petitions, were not pressed. This also shows the object of the executant of the document. On this ground also the document could be avoided as being in fraud of intending purchasers for all these reasons, we hold that exhibit b - 1 is out of the way of the plaintiffs and that it was quite competent for the first defendant to convey title to the suit properties under exhibits a - 26 and a - 27.

(34) In the result, we allow both the appeals, set aside the judgment and decrees of the trial court and decree the suits with costs throughout. A decree for mesne profits to be determined under order 20, rule 12, civil procedure code, will follow: appeals allowed; suits decreed.