Madhava Reddy, J.:— This batch of revision petitions filed under Sec. 21 of the A.P Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the “Land Reforms Act”) comes up before us on reference by our learned brother Ramachandra Rao, J.
2. The Civil Revision Petition No. 1395 of 1976 by the Government of Ahdhra Pradesh is directed against the order of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Krishna in L.R.A.C 26/76. The respondent-declarant had set up six contracts for sale under which he claimed that. He had sold various extents of land comprised in Survey Nos. 27, 28, 19/3, 135, 137, 42, 44/2 to 6 to various persons and put them in possession in part performance of the said contracts as detailed hereunder:—
Sl. No.
Survey No.
Extent.
Date of agreement under which land was sold.
Name of person to whom sold.
Place at which land is situated.
1.
27
Ac. 5.56
11-1-1964
Kalyanam Narayana
Pedamoduga palli.
2.
R.S Nos. 27 & 28
Ac. 5.15
11-1-1964
M. Veerabhadriah
do.
3.
R.S Nos. 28 & 19/3.
Ac. 6.56
11-1-1964
K. Subbarao.
do.
4.
S. Nos. 135 & 137.
Ac. 6.85
5-3-1964
K. Pitchaiah Nagaiah & Narayana.
Buchavaram
5.
S. Nos. 42 & 44 to 6
Ac. 5.15
15-1-1967
K. Udaya Lakshmi.
Pedamodugu Palli.
6.
R.S Nos. 135 and 137.
Ac. 6.53
22-4-1972
N. Venkata Narasaiah and Apparao.
Buchavaram.
3. The Land Reforms Tribunal held that as neither any registered sale-deeds were executed in respect of these sales nor the purchasers had perfected their title by adverse possession the declarant continued to be the owner of those lands and computed the extents covered by the said contracts for sale in the holding of the declarant. The original Tribunal accordingly found the holding of the declarant's family unit to be at 1.8621 standard holdings. As the declarant's family unit was entitled to one Standard holding towards the ceiling area, the excess over the ceiling area which they were required to surrender under Sec. 10(1) of the Land Reforms Act was determined at 0.8612 standard holdings. The declarant carried the matter in appeal. The Appellate Tribunal found that in part performance of the contracts for sale Exs. A1, A4, A6, A8 and A10 the transferees were put in possession of the land and as such the declarant transferor was not entitled to recover possession from them his remedy was only to file a suit for recovery of the unpaid purchase money, if any. The declarant not being in possession of the land was not ‘holding’ the land; and the possession of the transferee could not be deemed to be on behalf of the transferor. In that view, the appellate ‘Tribunal directed the exclusion of the extents covered by the said contracts for sale from the declarant's holding. Accordingly the ‘holding’ of the declarant's family unit was found to be 1.0576 standard holdings. The declarant's family unit was therefore directed to surrender 0.0576 standard holding held by it in excess of the ceiling area to which it was entitled. The finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the land in possession of a person in part performance of the contract for sale cannot be deemed to be held by the transferor as well and that the same land cannot be included in the ‘holding’ of both the transferor and the transferee was in consonance with the judgment of this court in Mohd. Ashrafuddin v. State of A.P through Land Reforms Tribunal, Adilabad (1976) (II) A.P.L.J 254).
4. In this revision petition the learned Government Pleader, Mr. Sardar Ali Khan, while not challenging the finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the transferees were put in possession of the lands purchased by them under the contracts for sale and that they continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the said lands contended before our learned brother Ramachandra Rao, J., as he is contending now that these lands should be included in the ‘holding’ of both the transferor and the transferee and that the decision of this court in Mohd. Ashrafuddin v. State of A.P (1976 (II) APLJ. 254) which holds to the contrary requires reconsideration.
5. Our learned brother, Ramachandra Rao, J., while pointing out some of the aspects which required to be considered in this behalf thought “appropriate that the matter should be authoritatively decided by a Bench of this court”. Though in some of the other Civil Revision Petitions, certain other questions also arise for consideration, this question is common to all the revision petitions. In view of the reference of this question to a Bench, the other Civil Revision Petitions also were directed to be posted a long with the Civil Revision Petition No. 1395/1976.
6. The Land Reforms Act which is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings and taking over of surplus lands and to provide for matters connected therewith makes provision for the determination of the holding of every person as on the notified date. It also fixes the ‘ceiling area’ of the land which a person may hold. The Tribunals constituted under the Act are required to determine “whether a person holds or is deemed to hold on the notified date any extent of land in excess of the ceiling area and if so the extent of the land so held in excess on that date”. If the extent of the holding of a person is in excess of the ceiling area, such person shall be liable to surrender such excess land. The land so surrendered would vest in the Government. The Government is empowered to dispose of the lands vested in it by allotting the same to agricultural labourers, village artisans or other poor persons for house sites and for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto. The amount calculated at the rates specified in the Schedule to the Act is payable to the person who has surrendered the land. The ‘Ceiling Area’ is defined under S. 3(c) as follows:—
“Sec. 3(c): ‘Ceiling Area’ means the extent of land specified in Sec. 4 or section 4-A to be the ceiling area.”
Sections 4 and 4-A read follows:—
“Sec. 4(1) The ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of not more than five members shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding.
(2) The ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of more than five members shall be an extent of and equal to one standard holding plus an additional extent of one-fifth of one standard holding for every such member in excess of five, so however that the ceiling area shall not exceed two standard holdings.
(3) The ceiling area in the case of every individual who is not a member of a family unit, and in the case of any other person shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding.
Explanation:— In the case of a family unit, the ceiling area shall be applied to the aggregate of the lands held by all the members of the family unit.”
“Sec. 4. A. Notwithstanding anything in S. 4, where an individual or an individual who is a member of a family unit, has one or more major sons and any such major son either by himself or together with other members of the family unit of which he is a member, holds no land or holds an extent of land less than the ceiling area, then, the ceiling area, in the case of the said individual is a member computed in accordance with section 4, shall be increased in respect of each such major son by an extent of land equal to the ceiling area applicable to such major son or the family unit of which he is a member, or as the case may be, by the extent of land by which the land held by such major son or the family unit of which he is a member falls short of the ceiling area”.
“Standard Holding” is defined in Sec. 3(s) as follows:—
“Standard holding” means the extent of land specified in section 5 to be the standard holding”.
7. The extent of the ‘standard holding’ varies having regard to whether it is ‘wet’ or ‘dry’ land and again whether it is double crop wet or other wet land. “Wet land” itself is classified into six different classes, A, B, C, D, E, and F and the ‘Dry land’ is classified into five classes, G, H, I, J, K. The various provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder, prescribe the method of computing the holding of a person which may consist of different classes of land as envisaged by Sec. 5 In terms of ‘Standard Holding.’
Person is defined in Sec. 3(o) as follows:—
“‘Person’ includes an individual, a family unit; a trustee, a company, a firm, a society or an association of individuals, whether incorporated or not;”
8. The ceiling area which a person may hold is one standard holding. In the case of a family unit consisting of not more than five members the ceiling area shall be an extent equivalent to one standard-holding. But in case the family unit consists of more than five members, the extent would be equal to one standard holding plus an additional extent of ⅕th of one standard holding for every such member in ex cess of five. So, however, that the ceiling area shall not in any case exceed two standard holdings.
9. In order to determine the land held in excess of the ceiling area to which a person is entitled it is necessary to first determine the ‘holding’ of such person. “Holding” is defined in Sec. 3(i) as follows:—
(i) “holding” means the entire land held by a person:—
(i) as an owner;
(ii) as a limited owner;
(iii) as an usufructuary mortgagee;
(iv) as a tenant;
(v) who is in possession by virtue of a mortgagee by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or otherwise; or in one or more of such capacities; and the expression “to hold land” shall be construed accordingly;
Explanation: Where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity, such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons”.
10. Without reference to any other provisions of the Act, if we examine the definition of ‘Holding’ it would be apparent that before any extent of land is included in the holding of a person either as an owner or as a limited owner or as an usufructuary mortgagee or as a tenant or as a person in possession by virtue of mortgagee by a conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for sale of land or otherwise such land should have been ‘held’ by that person. It is not enough that in relation to that land, he is an owner or a limited owner or as usufructuary mortgagee or a tenant. The expression land ‘held’ by a person governs all the clauses, (i) to (v) of S. 3(i). It is also significant to note that the term ‘Holding’ is not defined as taking within its ambit any interest in or over the land which a person may have. For example—a simple mortgage of land does create an interest in the land mortgaged but the person having, such mortgage in his favour is not deemed to be ‘holding’ the land under the Act. In fact, lands mortgaged otherwise than by way of usufructuary mortgage or mortgage by conditional sale are not included, within the definition of the ‘holding’. Likewise, it would appear that every person having some interest in the land is not necessarily a person holding the land. It is, therefore, necessary to determine what is meant by the term ‘Holding’ and the expressions ‘land held by a person’ and ‘to hold land’.
11. In shorter Oxford English Dictionary the meaning of the term ‘hold’ is given as under:—
“the action or an act of holding; keeping in hand or grasping; property held; something which is laid hold of; to have or keep as one's own: to own, as property; to be in possession or enjoyment; to occupy; to retain possession or occupation.”
12. In the Law Lexicon of British India by P. Ramanatha Iyer, the meaning of the expression ‘to hold’ is given as under:—
“To hold means to retain, to keep. When used in relation to land, it embraces the idea of actual possession. When used in the habendum clause of a deed, it includes the two fold idea of actual possession of the thing, and being invested with the legal title”.
13. Thus the term ‘Hold’ has different meanings. Sec. 3 defining the various terms occurring in the Act itself declares that unless the context otherwise requires the term ‘holding’ means “the entire land held by a person in the various capacities mentioned in clauses (i) to (v) of Sec. 3(i).”
14. In Handique v. Agricultural Income Tax Board, Assam (AIR 1966 S.C 1191) the Supreme Court had to consider the purport of the expression ‘holds’ occurring in Secs. 12 and 13 of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act (Act X of 1939) for deciding the question whether the assessment should have been made under Sec. 12 of the Act or sec. 13 thereof, the tax payable under Sec. 12 being higher than that payable under Sec. 13 of the Act. Both the sections dealt with a person who holds land from which agricultural income is derived. If Sec. 13 applied to the assessee, Sec. 12(1) was necessarily excluded. The court in that context observed:—
“If the assessment was made under Sec. 12 of the Act the assessee would be assessed on the total agricultural income derived from such land at the rate which would be applicable if such person had held the land exclusively for his own benefit; and if it is made under Sec. 13 of the Act, the assessee would be liable to pay the total of the taxes payable by each of the persons on whose behalf he was holding the land. The tax payable under Sec. 12 would be higher than that payable under Sec. 13………………….”
15. The Supreme Court further observed:—
“The expression ‘holds’, includes a two-fold idea of the actual possession of a thing and also of being invested with a legal title. Sometimes it is used only to mean actual possession. But under Sec. 12 the expression is used, in the wider sense, for under that Section the person mentioned therein holds land partly for his benefit or partly, for the benefit of the beneficiary or wholly for the benefits of the beneficiary. In its wide phraseology the section takes in the trustees in whom property vests and also managers and the take who manage the properties on behalf of others. But, if the case falls under Sec. 13, to that extent it is taken out of Sec. 12. As the same expression ‘holds’ is used in Sec. 13 it must be given the same meaning as it bares in Sec. 12: that is to say, it takes in both title and possession. Sec. 13 deals with persons jointly interested in the land or in the agricultural income derived therefrom. It does not therefore, apply to a person who holds land on his own behalf as well as on behalf of others.”
16. Two things are clear from the judgment of the Supreme Court. One is that the expression ‘holds’ includes two fold idea of the actual possession of a thing and also of being invested with a legal title and sometimes it is used only to mean actual possession. Whether ??? applies to one or both the ideas must depend on the context in which it is used. It would, however, appear from the judgment that the expression ‘holds’ does not take in mere title only. In order that a land maybe deemed to be held by a person, actual possession appears to be an essential ingredient. It is obviously, for that reason that the different capacities of a person holding the land mentioned in Sec. 3(i) refer to the person holding it ‘as an owner’ or ‘as a limited owner’ or ‘as a mortgagee; or as a tenant’ or “as a person in possession under a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for sale” or “otherwise; all such persons must necessarily be invested with the actual possession. It is significant that the definition of ‘Holding’ does not take within its ambit a simple mortgage which merely creates a charge or interest in the property, but does not vest the mortagee with possession; nor does it take in the vested remainder holder so long as the possession is of the limited owner. If a term is capable of connoting diffirent ideas, it must be understood in the context in which it is used and the object of the enactment in which it occurs.
17. The A.P Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, is, as evident from its preamble, is an act to consolidate and amend the law relating to fixation of the ceiling on agricultural holdings and taking over of surplus lands and to provide for the matters connected therewith. All persons whose ‘holding’ on the notified date together with any land transferred by him on or after 24.1.71 are required by Sec. 8 of the Act to file a declaration of his ‘holding’ before the Tribunal. The Government is empowered under Sec. 6 to constitute Tribunals by way of notification specifying their jurisdiction. The Act itself directs that the ceiling area of every individual who is not a member of a family unit shall be an extent of land equal to one standards holding and in the case of a family, unit consisting of more than five members shall be an extent of land to one standard holding plus an additional extent of one fifth of one standard holding for every such member in excess of five, so that however, that the ceiling area shall not exceed two standard holding. The Act further envisages that every person holding land in excess of the ceiling area shall be liable to surrender the same as laid down in Sec. 10 of the Act. These Tribunals on receipt of the declaration furnished or information obtained are empowered by Sec. 9 to make an enquiry and pass orders determining whether the person holds or is deemed to hold, on the notified date, an extent of land in excess of the ceiling area, and if so, the extent of the land so held in excess on that date. Sec. 11 of the Act envisages that the land surrendered by the owner shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances from the date of the order to take possession. Sec. 12 contemplates the reversion and vesting of land surrendered by any usufructuary mortagagee or tenant or by any limited owner (since deleted by amendment) or by any person in possession by virtue of mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of contract for sale or otherwise to revert to the owner.
18. The Act prohibits under Sec. 17 the alienation of any part of the holding on or after the notified date by a person holding land in excess of the ceiling area as on 24-1-1971 or at any time thereafter until the extent of the land to be surrendered in respect of his holding has been determined by the Tribunal, such alienations are declared to be null and void.
19. The ultimate object of the enactment is that the land so surrendered and so vesting in the Government is disposed of as laid down in Sec. 14 of the Act by the Government by allotment “for use as house-sites for agricultural labourers, village artisans or other poor persons owning no houses or house-sites or transferred to the weaker sections of the people dependant on agriculture for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto”. The persons surrendering the land entitled to a sum calculated, at the rates, specified in the 11 Schedule and payable at the option of the Government either in cash or in bonds or partly in cash or partly in bonds as provided in Sec. 15 and the rules made thereunder.
20. Thus the main object and the purpose of the Land Reforms. Act is to determine the actual, holding of a person and the excess land, if any held by a person over the ceiling area to which he is entitled and to take over possession of such land upon surrender by the surplus holder and deliver possession of such land to certain class of landless poor persons for the purpose of use as house sites or for use for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto. The main purpose is to divest the surplus holder of his possession and invest persons with actual possession of the land to whom it is allotted, if that be the real object of the Act and the intendment of the legislature, the determination of the holding of a person must be with reference to the actual possession and not merely with reference to the title or interest therein dehors actual possession a person may, have with reference to such land. The expression ‘holding’ and the expression ‘land held by a person’ occurring in Sec. 3(i) must therefore be construed as taking in the idea of actual possession and not merely any right, title or interest in the land devoid of actual possession. So read the different capacities in which the land may be held and the land so held may be treated as a ‘holding’ within the meaning of the Act becomes intelligible. “Land held by a person as an owner” must therefore necessarily mean the land in respect of which a person has not merely title but also has actual possession of that land. With reference to the land held by a person as a limited owner it takes in the present title to the land as a limited owner and actual possession. So also with reference to the land held by a person as an usufructuary mortgagee he would have present interest therein as a mortgagee and also actual possession of the land. With reference to the land held by a person as a tenant he would have the right to present enjoyment of that land also actual possession and in the case of persons mentioned in Cl. (v) of Sec. 3(i) they would necessarily be persons in possession of the land. A person who has merely a contract for sale but has no possession would not be a person ‘holding’ the land. Likewise a person having a mortgage any conditional sale but not holding the land would not come with in that definition. The Act does not envisage a person who may have merely an interest in the land but not having possession as a person ‘holding’ the land. The various capacities referred to in Sec. 3(i) necessarily imply actual possession vesting with such person. If the meaning of the expression ‘hold’ and the ‘land held by a person’ were not to be that but were to include a mere owner not having possession, the implemention of the Act would become impossible and would give rise to various anomalous situations.
21. The Act under sections 4 and 4-A of the Act which are already extracted above, ensures the retention of at least one standard holding by every person and every family unit and allows a maximum of two standard holdings for a family unit consisting of more than five members. The Act envisages the surrender of only the land held in excess of ceiling area to which a person or a family unit is entitled. Sec. 17 prohibits the alienation only by persons holding land in excess of the ceiling area. Even in case of future acquisitions, the Act does not put an embargo upon any person acquiring land upto the ceiling area to which they are entitled and in no case is the ceiling, area less than one standard holding. The Act envisages furnishing of declarations of such future acquisitions. In other words, the Act does not intend to reduce the ‘holding of a person below the ceiling area to which he is entitled upon any notional computation of the ‘holding’. It in fact ensures the retention of one ceiling area to every person and every family unit and only if such person or the family unit is holding any land in excess of the ceiling area to which he or it is entitled, that excess area has to be surrendered. If the expression ‘holding and the expression land held by a person’ were to be understood as referring to mere ownership of land devoid of actual possession, it would not be possible to ensure a person or a family unit a holding equivalent to the ceiling area to which he is entitled where part of such holding is put in possession of a person in part performance of the agreement even prior to 24-1-1971 to which period the Act does not intend to reach in any manner.
22. We may give a few examples in this regard:—
“A. “a person holding Ac. 50.00 of dry land of ‘H’ class, the standard holding for which class of land is Ac. 40.00 of dry land, transfers under a contract for sale Ac. 10.00 of land to ‘B’ who is also holding Ac. 40.00 of ‘H’ class land and puts ‘B’ in possession in part performance of the contract for sale subsequent, to 24-1-1971 and they continue, to hold the land accordingly on the notified date. ‘A’ would in fact be in possession of Ac. 50.00 of land. If ‘A’ is considered, as holding Ac. 10.00 of land transferred to “B” as well, then ‘A's holding would be Ac. 50.00 and ‘B's’ holding would also be Ac. 50.00 for in fact he is in possession of Ac. 10.00, of land transferred by ‘A’ and also Ac. 40.00 of land already owned and possessed by him. Thus both ‘A’ and ‘B’ would be deemed to be holding Ac. 10.00 of land in excess of the ceiling area to which they are entitled and each would have to surrender Ac. 10.00 While ‘A’ is entitled to hold Ac. 40.00 and, ‘B’ is entitled to hold Ac. 40.00, ‘A’ would be holding only Ac. 30.00 after, surrender for he cannot surrender Ac. 10.00 of land already transferred by him to ‘B’. (He will have to surrender another Ac. 10.00 from out of Ac. 40.00 in his possession and ‘B’ would have to surrender Ac. 10.00 out of Ac. 50.00 in his possession). In the result ‘A’ and ‘B’ who together are entitled to hold Ac. 80.00 (each Ac. 40.00) would be holding only Ac. 70.00 and while only Ac. 10.00 would be the excess over the ceiling areas of ‘A’ and ‘B’ they would be required to surrender Ac. 20.00 of land. Thus if Ac. 10.00 of land has to be computed in the holding of ‘A’, the transferor, also the holding of ‘A’ would be reduced below the ceiling area to which he is entitled, and ‘A’ and ‘B’ put together would be surrendering Ac. 20.00 although the excess over the ceiling area to which they are entitled to is only Ac. 10.00 in fact.
23. To give yet another example:—
“If in the above case, ‘A’ were to transfer in pursuance of a contract for sale an extent of Ac. 40.00 in favour of ‘B’ and if that Ac. 40.00 were to be computed in the holding of both ‘A’ and ‘B’ as contended on behalf of the State, then ‘A’ being entitled to only one standard holding i.e Ac. 40.00 he would have to surrender Ac. 10.00 but as the Ac. 40.00 of land is in the possession of ‘B’ in part performance of the contract for sale and is computed in the holding of ‘B’ ‘A’ cannot surrender that land and put the Government in possession. Although he holds Ac. 10.00 of land which is far below the ceiling area to which he is entitled, he would have to surender even the Ac. 10.00 of land in his own possession. ‘B’ would be holding Ac. 90.00 and he would have to surrender Ac. 50.00 In the result, the excess that would have to be surrendered by ‘A’ and ‘B’ put together would be Ac. 60.00 So far as ‘B’ is concerned, since he is actually holding Ac. 50.00 of land in excess of the ceiling area to which he is entitled, he would have to surrender that extent and he can have no grievance. But ‘A’ who holds only Ac. 10.00 of land and cannot recover the Ac. 4000 from ‘B’ under any law would have to surrender even the extent of Ac. 10.00 in his possession. The Government, which in the instant case is entitled to the surrender of only Ac. 50.00 of land in the possession of ‘B’, which is above his ceiling area, would on account of the notional computation of ‘A's’ holding’ would be vested with Ac. 60.00 of land. That could not have been the indention of the legislature.
24. If in the above example if ‘A’ were to transfer Ac. 10.00 of land to ‘C’ Ac. 10.00 of land to ‘D’ another Ac. 10.00 of land to ‘E, and another Ac. 10.00 of land to ‘F’ who do not themselves hold any land and retains only Ac. 10.00 with himself, he would be still deemed to be holding Ac. 50.00 of land and would be liable to surrender the Ac. 10.00 extent in his possession while the transferees who are each holding Ac. 10.00 would not be liable to surrender any land. In the result, ‘A’ will be left without any holding.
25. Again in the above example, if ‘A’ were to transfer Ac. 10.00 of land to five different persons under contracts for sale and were to put them in possession of such land, his holding would still be computed as Ac. 50.00 and he would be required to surrender Ac. 10.00 of land. There is no provision in the Act which enables ‘A’ to surrender any land in the possession of his transferees nor is there any provision in the Act to take over the land in the possession of the transferees who themselves do not hold land in excess of the ceiling area.
26. Again if in a village there are only 400 acres of ‘H’ class land & ‘A’ were to own 240 acres of that land and ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘E’ were to each own 40 acres out of it, and ‘A’ were to transfer 50 acres of land to ‘B’ ‘C’ ‘D’ and ‘E’ respectively, ‘A's holding would be computed at 240 acres and the holding of ‘B’ ‘C’ ‘D’ and ‘E’ would be computed at 90 acres each. On such computation ‘A’ would have to surrender 200 acres and ‘B’ ‘C’ ‘D’ and ‘E’ would each have to surrender 50 acres making a total of 200 acres. Notionally, even while leaving 40 acres as the holding of A, B, C, D, and E, 400 acres would be liable to be surrendered by them and the total extent of land in the village would notionally be 600 acres as against an actual extent of 400 acres. Although the land liable to be surrendered by ‘A’ would be 200 acres, even if the entire extent remaining with him is taken over by the Government it would be only 40 acres and that taken over from B, C, D, and E would be 200 acres making a total of 240 acres. Thus the Government though notionally as per the computation of the holdings of A, B, C, D and E is entitled to the surrender of 400 acres would actually get only 240 acres and ‘A’ although entitled to retain 40 acres and surrender 200 acres neither retains 40 acres nor in a position to surrender 200 acres. If the land that was actually transferred and was put in a possession of the transferees in part performance of the contracts for sale were to be computed in the holding of the transferor merely because he continues to be the owner so long as a registered sale deed is not executed in accordance with Sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and Sec. 17(1) of the Registration Act, such anamolous situation would arise. That could not have been the intention of the Legislature.
27. In the definition of the term ‘holding’ Sec. 53-A of Transfer of Property Act is not specifically referred. It refers to a person in possession through part performance of a contract for sale of land which is the principle statutorily recognised under Sec. 53-A. That provision, as is well known, declares that where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty and the transferee, has in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract then, notwithstanding that the contract though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed, thereof by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract.
28. As observed by the learned author, Mulla, on the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
“This equity arose by reason of the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Statute of Frauds since re-enacted in Sec. 40 of the Law of Property Act, 1925 that no action could be brought on certain contracts pertaining to land unless they were reduced to writing. “The statute was designed to guard against fraud but the courts were soon confronted with situations where one party to an oral agreement had not only performed his part of the bargain but had acted upon the basis of the agreement. In such a case, there are equities resulting from res gastee subsequent to, and arising out of the contract, and it would be manifestly unjust to deny the party any relief……………….. The correct principle on which the doctrine rests is that if a man has made a bargain with another, and allowed the other to act on it, he will have created an equity himself which he cannot resist by setting up the want of formality in the evidence of the contract out of which the equity in part arises”.
29. A person, who has in part performance of a contract for sale put the transferee in possession of the land, but does not execute any registered sale deed as contemplated by S. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, and 17(1) of the Registration Act, no doubt, continues to be the owner of such but he does not retain any right to possession nor can he recover possession from the transferee. The rights of such transferee are well recognised.
30. The Supreme Court in Nathulal v. Phoolchand ((1969) 3 SCC 120 : AIR 1970 S.C 546) in paragraph 9 of the said judgment held as follows:—
“The conditions necessary for making out the defence of part performance to an action in ejectment by the owner are:—
(1) that the transferor has contracted to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty:—
(2) that the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession in part performance of the contract;
(3) that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and
(4) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.
31. If these conditions are fulfilled then notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person, claiming under him is debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract”. As observed in Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kuman Ganguli (421. A.1) just as the equity of part performance takes a parole contract outside the Statute of Frauds, so in India, it takes a document requiring registration and Transfer of Property Acts.
32. As observed by the Supreme Court in Manekial Mansukhabhai v. Hormusji Jamsedji (1950 S.C.J 317) and in Chaliagulla Ramachandrayya v. Bopanna Satyanarayana (1964 (I) S.C.J 109) S. 53-A is a partial importation of the English equitable doctrine of part performance. By virtue of this Section part performance does not give rise to any equity, as in England, but to a statutory right. This right to retain possession rests on the express provisions of the Statute. For the exercise of the right no question of limitation can arise. It is also immaterial whether the suit for specific performance is barred.
33. A bench of this Court in Achayya v. Venkata Subba Rao (A.I.R 1957 Andhra Pradesh 854) laid down that “Section 53-A does not either expressly or by necessary implication indicate that the rights conferred on the transferee thereunder can only be invoked as a defendant and not as a plaintiff. Under the terms of the section the transferor is debarred from enforcing against the transferee only rights in respect of the property and this bar does not depend upon the array of the parties. The transferee can resist any attempt on the part of the transferor to enforce his rights in respect of the property whatever position he may occupy in the field of litigation. …….. Whether the transferee occupies the position of a plaintiff or a defendant, he can resist the transferor's claim against the property. Conversely, whether the transferor is the plaintiff or the defendant he cannot enforce his rights in respect of the property against the transferee. The utility of the Section or the rights conferred thereunder should not be made to depend on the manoeuvering for positions in a Court of law, otherwise a powerful transferor can always defeat the salutary provisions of the section by dispossessing the transferee by force and compelling him to go to a court as plaintiff. Doubtless, the right conveyed under the section can be relied upon only as a shield and not a sword but the protection is available to the transferee both as a plaintiff and as a defendant so long as he uses it as a shield”.
34. In Ramchander v. Maharaj Kunwar (AIR. 1939 Allahabad 611) it was held:
“Under S. 53-A where a person has been party to a transfer which is invalid because the formalities of the law have not been complied with, then that person is debarred form enforcing as against his transferee, any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession. In other words the intention of the Legislature plainly was that the transferor was not to be entitled merely because the transfer was invalid as the result of a non-compliance with the formalities of the law enforce, as against the transferee, a right which the deed of transfer was intended to convey.
35. The plaintiff-lessee was held entitled to enforce his rights, under S. 53-A to protect his possession and that he was only seeking to debar the defendants from enforcing any of their rights under the contract of lease. The Allahabad High Court held:
“There was therefore nothing in the terms of Sec. 53-A which disentitled the plaintiff from maintaining the suit.”
36. So also in Ewaz Ali v. Firdoos Jehan (AIR. 1944 Oudh 212) a Bench of Oudh Court held:
“Section 53-A cannot be used as a weapon of attack. It confers upon the transferee the privilege of invoking the doctrine embodied therein only as a shield against party invasion of his rights by the transferor or persons claiming under him. The words of the section do not warrant a conclusion that plaintiff as such is necessarily debarred from the benefit of the rule. Where by the nature of the case, as disclosed by the pleadings or otherwise, it is apparent that the transferee comes to Court to defend his possession against the invasion of it by the transferor he is entitled to invoke the aid of the equitable doctrine therein embodied. Since the object of the suit under O. 21 R. 103, C.P.C, is to protect possession and the capacity in which the plaintiff comes to Court is in reality one of defence, the Plaintiff can take advantage of Sec. 53-A. The mere position of a party in the heading of a suit would not determine whether he is or is not entitled to benefits of the section”.
37. In all the above decisions, the decision of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar v. Dantmara Tea Co. (AIR 1940 P.C 1) in which their Lordships of the Privy Council held that—
“The right conferred by Sec. 53-A is a right available only to the defendant to protect his possession” were understood as meaning “a person who was defending his possession”.
38. A Division Bench of our High Court in Achayya v. Venkata Subba Rao (AIR 1957 AP 854) referred with approval the decision of the Oudh High Court in Ewaz Ali v. Firdous Jehan (AIR 1944 Oudh 212) as to how the observations of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar v. Dantmara Tea Co. (AIR 1940 P.C 1) should be understood; and they are as follows:
“We are unable to consider that their Lordships of the Privy Council by the use of the word ‘defendant’ in the above observation intended to mean that the right conferred by S. 53-A was not available to a person in the position of Mst. Firdaus Jehan and that the mere position of a party in the heading of a suit would determine whether he is or is not entitled to benefits of the section. The subsequent sentence makes this clear. When they use the word defendant they use it to describe the position of a person who plead S. 53-A and they say his position must be that of a person who invokes it for defending himself against his transferor.”
39. A Bench of this Court in Smt. R.S Janaki Devi v. A.B Ramaswamy (1976 (II) An. W.R 117) held that a transferee in possession of land under a contract for sale may also file a suit against the transferor for an injuction restraining him from disturbing his possession and enjoyment.
40. In Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao (A.I.R 1948 P.C 95) even the transferee of the property from the mother of a Hindu minor who was the defacto guardian was declared entitled to invoke S. 53-A. The minor was held debarred by the section from obtaining relief by way of possession against the transferee who has been let into possession in pursuance of the contract for sale and who has performed his part of the contract.
41. In Padmanabharaju v. Lakshmi Kumar (A.I.R 1967 A.P 237) the transferee of a portion of a joint family property by the father was held entitled to invoke the benefit of S. 53-A to resist the claim of the son for possession of property on the principle that the father can be said to have executed the contract on behalf of the son also and in that sense the son was the transferor.
42. In Bobba Suramma v. P. Chandramma (A.I.R 1959 A.P 568) it was laid down that an alienee of property of a Hindu widow for legal necessity binding on the estate could invoke S. 53-A to protect his possession even against the reversioners on whom such alienation is binding. The Court observed:—
“If such a contract would be given effect to even as against the reversioners, we fail to see how Section 53-A could not be attracted to such a contract. The reversioner, in such circumstances, would be deemed to be claiming under the widow.. .. In construing S. 53-A Courts should try to give effect to equitable object underlying this provision and there should be a liberal construction on the words therein. It follows that a reversioner is debarred from claiming possession of the property from the widow's alienee, if the latter was inducted into possession pursuant to the contract and if the other necessary elements are present.”
43. If we examine the legal position of a transferor who has parted with the possession of the land in part performance of a contract for sale, in the light of the above decisions we find that he cannot exercise any right of possession or enjoyment of the property. He cannot recover possession from the transferee. He is possessed of only title which he is bound to transfer when the transferee calls upon him to do. He cannot, therefore, be treated as a person holding the land as an owner. As against him, the person in possession in part performance of a contract for sale would be “holding” the land and there is no way known to law by which the transferor could recover possession and hold or enjoy the land. The transferee may protect his possession not only as a defendant but may do so by instituting a suit; the transferor is debarred from enforcing any rights against him either as a defendant or as a plaintiff. The transferor is debarred from recovering possession. His only remedy would be to recover the unpaid purchase money, if any. Though the transferee is not vested with full title to the land, inasmuch as a registered document is not executed in his favour by the transferor, still he can protect his possession under S. 53-A, and bebar the transferor from recovering, disturbing or questioning the same. Thus a person who is entitled to invoke the provisions of S. 53-A, short of asserting title can claim all other incidents of title and possession. The Land Reforms Act itself recognises him as a person holding the land. The same land, cannot in principle be said to be held by the transferor who is merely clothed with the husk of a title while substance is with the transferee.
44. It is, however, contended by the learned Government Pleader that the legislature in enacting the explanation to S. 3(i) did envisage the computation of the same extent in the holding of both the transferor and the transferee. If any other interpretation were to be given, the explanation would be rendered redundant.
45. Our learned brother, Ramachandra Rao, J., referring these cases to the Bench also observed:
“Under the explanation to S. 3(i) where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and another person in another capacity, such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons. Therefore, the intention of the legislature is explicit and clear that where the same land is held by two persons in different capacities it should be included in the holding of both the said persons……… Under Section 3(i) read with the explanation, both the owner as well as the person in possession of the land under a contract for sale are bound to include the said land in each of their holdings.”
46. In saying that the explanation applies to the cases of an owner who has parted with the possession of the land under a contract for sale by putting the transferee in possession, in part performance of the said contract for sale, it is assumed that the same land is held by one person as an owner and another person under a contract for sale, although that is the very problem that has to be solved.
47. If a person being the owner and possessor of the land has parted with the possession under a contract for sale by putting the transferee in possession in part performance of the contract he may remain as the owner of the land but he cannot be said to be a person holding the land ‘as an owner’. Surely, a person being merely the owner of the land and a person holding the land as an owner cannot mean one and the same thing. Land of which a person is an owner and land held by a person as an owner must connote different ideas. If it were so interpreted the expression “land held by a person” occuring in S. 3(i) would become redundant in respect of a land held by a person as an owner. It is difficult to envisage that in defining the expression ‘holding’, the Legislature which intended the element of actual, possession to be one of the ingredients of a holding in the case of a limited owner, in the case of an usufructuary mortgagee, in the case of a tenant, in the case of a person in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for sale or otherwise would have thought it as not constituting an essential element when it came to the case of an owner. The possession of a person in part performance of a contract for sale connote be said to be possession for and on behalf of the owner. The trasferee's possession is in his own right and in denial of the right of the owner's right to recover possession. The owner cannot, therefore, claim to hold the land as an owner simultaneously with the transferee. The explanation in our view cannot apply to such a situation. It is not necessary that the explanation should apply to every land held and to each and every capacity in which the land is held by a person as described in S. 3(i). If as discussed above by us land held by a person as an owner implies the persons being in possession as an owner, then obviously the owner who has parted with the possession in part performance of a contract for sale cannot be deemed to be holding the land simultaneously with the transferee and the explanation can have no application. The Act does not envisage the computation of a land in the holding of any person notionally except. In the case of an alienation or a transfer which is directed to be disregarded under S. 7(1) of the Act or which is deemed to be void under S. 7(2) of the Act.
48. Under the Land Reforms Act, the legislature has chosen to give an inclusive definition of the term ‘Owner’ and has not defined who an ‘Owner is: That definition reads as follows:—
“Owner’ includes a person by whom or in whose favour a trust is created but does not include a limited owner and in the case of any land not held under ryotwari settlement, a person who is or would be entitled to the grant of a ryotwari patta or to the registration as an occupant in respect of such land under any law for the time being in force providing for the conversion of such land into ryotwari tenure and where there is no such law, any person holding such land immediately before the specified date otherwise than in any one of the capacities specified in items (ii) to (v) of Clause (i).”
49. The inclusive definition by declaring that any person holding land immediately before the specified date and entitled to the grant of a ryotwari patta or to the registration as an occupant in respect of such land under any law for the time being in force providing for the conversion of such land into ryotwari tenure and where there is no such law any person holding such land before the specified date otherwise than in one of the capacities specified in Items (ii) to (v) of Clause (i) of Sec. 3 emphasises the factum of possession as an essential element constituting a person as an owner for the purpose of the Act. This discloses the legislative intent to treat only an owner in possession as a person holding the lands as one owner but not a person who is out of possession and can never hope to recover possession or is entitled to recover possession.
50. It is not every owner of land and owner as ordinarily understood that is envisaged by the Act as holding the land. Having regard to the context in which it is used, only the owner who is with the possession must be deemed to be the ‘owner’. The expression ‘Owner’ may in certain contexts convey such an idea as held in R.B Jodha Mal Kuthiala v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab (15) (82 I.T.R 570) the Supreme Court construing the term ‘Owner’ for the purpose of S. 9 of the Indian Income Tax, Act, 1922 held:—
“………the owner must be the person who can exercise the rights of the owner, not on behalf of another but in his own right.
An assessee whose property remains vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property by virtue of Sec. 6(1) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949, as evacue property, is not the owner of the property for the purpose of Sec. 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The assessee cannot exercise any rights in that property except with the consent of the custodian; he merely has some residual beneficial interest in that property that he left in Pakistan. That residual beneficial right cannot be considered to be ownership for the purpose of Section 9”.
51. So too a land of which a person continues as owner but of which he is also not in possession cannot in our view be deemed to be the owner for the purpose of declaring him to be ‘Holding’ the land as owner.
52. A person who has put the transferee in part performance of a contract for sale does not have even this residual interest. In construing the term ‘Owner’ under the Land Reforms Act, it is not necessarily to conform strictly to the concept of ownership as envisaged by the Transfer of Property Act viz., that until one can divest himself of ownership in immoveable property by execution of a registered document he continues to be an owner; more so when the definition envisages “holding the land as an ‘Owner’.”
53. Further any land which is included in the holding of a person must in the event of his holding being declared to be in excess of the ceiling area to which such person is entitled must be capable of being surrendered so that on such surrender such land could vest in the Government. Section 11 of the Act envisages the vesting of the land in the Government only on surrender by the owner or when such land is deemed to have been surrendered by the owner and of which possession is taken of by the Government. Section 11 reads as follows:—
“Where any land is surrendered or is deemed to have been surrendered under this Act by an owner, the Revenue Divisional Officer may subject to such rules as may be prescribed by order take possession or authorise any officer to take possession of such land which shall thereupon vest in the Government free from all encumbrances from the date of such order;
Provided that any claim or liability enforceable against the land immediately before the date of vesting in the Government may be enforced only:—
(i) against the amount payable under this Act in respect of such land;
(ii) against any other property of the owner;
to the same extent to which such claim or liability was enforceable against that land or other property, as the case may be, immediately before the date of vesting.
Explanation:—Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of any law, custom, usage or agreement, relating to right of easements available for any land vesting in the Government under this section over any other land”.
54. In the case of surrender by a usufructuary mortgagee or a tenant such land does not Straightaway vest in the Government. The possession of land on such surrender reverts to the owner as provided under Sec. 12(1). Likewise, where a land is surrendered or is deemed to have been surrendered under the Act by any person in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of the contract for sale or otherwise, the land does not vest in the Government, instead the possession of such land reverts to the owner as laid down in section 12(4) of the Act. Only when the persons in possession in one of the capacities mentioned above surrender and the same land is also surrendered by the owner, the provision of Sec. 11(5) will apply and the land will vest in the Government. Otherwise, even though the holding of a person be in excess of the ceiling area there is no provision which entitles the acceptance of the surrender of a person be in excess of the ceiling area there is no provision which entities the acceptance of the surrender of a land in possession of an usufractuary mortgagee, a tenant, a person in possession under a mortgage by conditional sale or by a person in possession in part performance of a contract for sale or in possession otherwise. These persons can surrender the land only in favour of the owner and if the owner does not ‘hold’ land including the land surrendered to him, in excess of the ceiling area to which he is entitled the owner is not bound to surrender any land and no land will vest in the Government. The emphasis in the matter of surrender again is on the surrender of actual possession. Unless the possession of the land is also capable of being delivered on surrender to the Government, the Act does not contemplate the vesting of the land in the Government. A person who is not holding the land as owner i.e who is not himself in possession of the land but has put the transferee in possession in part performance of the contract for sale is not capable of putting the Government in possession and hence cannot surrender such land. When a person cannot recover possession of the land or derive any benefit from the land of which the transferee is in possession, the legislature could not have intended to compute such land in the holding of such an owner and yet not accept the surrender of such land and thereby deprive the owner of the other land which, he is in his own possession. The explanation to our mind seeks to enable the inclusion of the land surrendered by an usufructuary mortgagee, a tenant or a person in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for sale or otherwise to be computed on such surrender in the holding of an owner of the land to whom it reverts under Sec. 12 by virtue of such surrender by persons holding in that capacity. But for the explanation it would have perhaps been contended that the land having been once included in the holding of another person cannot by mere surrender of the land by that person be included in the holding of the owner for it would not be an acquisition of ownership as envisaged by Sec. 18 of the Act. The explanation is by way of abundant caution. If any other interpretation were to be placed on this explanation, it would result in arriving at a notional surplus divorced from facts which would be almost double the actual excess and in some cases such excess land would not be available for surrender by the person who is found by the Tribunal to be holding in excess of the ceiling area to which he is entitled. It could not be the intention of the Legislature to determine the surplus land which is not capable of being surrendered and which could not vest in the Government and which the Government would not be in a position to dispose of as contemplated by Sec. 14 of the Act.
55. It is well settled that where the expression is capable of several interpretations that interpretation which advances the intendment of the Legislature must be adopted. Further, where an interpretation leads to hardship and inconvenience unintended by an enactment such interpretation should be avoided.
56. The Supreme Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh (16) (AIR 1955 SC 830) declared as follows:—
“Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumbly not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence”.
57. In State of M.P v. Azar Bharat Finance Co. (17) (AIR 1967 SC 276) their Lordships of the Supreme Court considering whether this principle could be applied to construe the word ‘shall’ occurring in Sec. 11 of the Opium Act as applicable to Madhya Pradesh held that it should be construed as permissive and not mandatory and approved the principle that if a statute leads to absurdity, hardship or injustice presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence.
58. In referring the case to the Bench, our learned brother, Ramachandra Rao, J., observed that the question of construing sec. 12 or any hardship created at the time of surrender cannot be taken into account in construing the plain meaning of the expression ‘holding’ as defined in Sec. 3(i) of the Act. We are unable to agree that Sec. 12 should not be kept in view in understanding the import of the expression ‘holding’ in Sec. 3(i) of the Act. As already discussed above, the expression ‘Holding’ and the expression ‘land held by a person as an owner’ does not carry or convey an unalterable single idea. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Handique v. Agrl. Income Tax Board, Assam (No. 2) it carries two different ideas and is used sometimes to convey those two different ideas of title and actual possession simultaneously and some times to convey only one idea of actual possession. In such a situation, it is necessary to gather the intention of the Legislature and further the object of the enactment by a harmonious reading of the several provisions of the Act without creating undue hardship or injustice presumbaly not intended by the legislature. As pointed out above, if the same land is computed in the holding of the owner as well as his transferee in possession in part performance of contract for sale, the owner who is entitled to ire tain at least one standard holding would be deprived of that holding to the extent he has put the particular transferee in possession, and the transferor and the transferee put together would be surrendering hand in excess of what they are liable to surrender on account of such notional computation of their respective holdings. That could never have been the intention of the legislation. If the expression ‘holding’ and the ‘land held by a person’ is so interpreted the explanation would not be rendered nugatory. On the other hand if full effect is not given to the expression “land held by a person” occurring in Sec. 3(1) and governing all the five clauses of that section, it would render that expression redundant and would result in equating a person who is merely the owner of the land with a person who holds the land as an owner.
59. It is next contended that Sec. 53—A or the equitable principle underlying that section would debar only a person claiming under the transferor and not a third party and in this case the Government enforcing its rights. But it may be noted that before the Government takes possession of the land, the land must be deemed to be surplus land and before the land vests in the Government under the provisions of the Act, it must be surrendered by the owner and possession must he taken by the Government. Only on such possession being taken from the owner, the land vests in the Government. In regard to the land transferred under the contract for sale and in possession of the transferee such a stage would be reached only when such person surrenders possession and the reverts to the owner and as per explanation it is computed in the holding of the owner. Unless that land is held by the owner by such reversion, the Government cannot step into shoes of the transferor. The Government cannot declare it to be the land held in excess of the ceiling area by the transferor unless it first holds that land to be part of the holding of the transferor. It is only in view of this finding and by virtue of the provisions of the Act that it can require the owner to surrender and it steps into shoes of the transferor. Even otherwise, the question is not whether the Government is debarred from claiming the right against the transferor but the question is whether the transferor is debarred from exercising any rights against the transferee in possession and if he is debarred, the land does not become part of his holding and hence the question of the Tribunal declaring it as part of the holding of the transferor and determining the surplus on that basis and the Government exercising any right to take over that land arises.
60. In Gulabrao Anandrao Matur v. State of Maharahtra (18) (1976 Maharashtra Law Journal, 727) the Bombay High Court dealing with a case under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lauds (Ceiling on Holdings) Act (27 of 1961) held:—
“………if the various definitions given in the Ceiling Act are construed together with the other relevant provisions, then, in my opinion as the purchaser is in possession of the land by virtue of a contract of sale under Sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and cultivates it personally on his own account, then it will have to be held that he is lawfully in actual possession of the said land as an owner. If this is so then it is obvious that the seller who has parted with the possession of the land in pursuance of a contract of sale is not in actual possession of the said land and, therefore, it cannot be said that he holds the said land within the meaning of Sec. 3 of the Ceiling Act”.
61. This opinion was however, rendered having regard to the definition of the expression ‘to hold land’ occurring in Sec. 2(14) and the definition of the expression ‘Owner’ in sub-section 21 of Sec. 2 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act (27 of 1961), which reads as follows:—
“2(14) ‘to hold’, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means to be lawfully in actual possession of land as owner or as tenant and ‘holding’ shall be construed accordingly”.
“2(21). ‘Owner’ in relation to any land, includes the person holding the land as occupant, or superior holder as defined in the Code, or as lessee of Government, a mortgagee in possession, and a person holding land for his maintenance”.
62. However, in our view, the term ‘hold’ in the context of ‘Ceiling on Holdings’ and in the context of the present definition of ‘Holding’ in Sec. 3(i) which with reference to the land ‘held’ by others, by persons in different capacities necessarily implies the actual possession and must also necessarily imply actual possession in the case of the owner as well. Reliance is however, placed very strongly on the decision of a single judge of this High Court in P. Lakshminarasham v. State of Andhra Pradesh (19) (1969 (I) An. W.R 119) with reference to the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act (X of 1961). In that decision, Vaidya, J., sitting singly was construing the definition of the word ‘Holding’ occurring in Sec. 2(e) which is not wholly in pari maceria with the present definition in Sec. 3(i). The expression ‘holding’ as defined under the said Act did not include a person in possession in part performance of a contract for sale. In the context, Vaidya, J., held:—
“merely because the person is not in possession of the lands, such lands cannot be excluded from his holding for the purpose of the Ceiling Act as long as he continues to be the owner of such lands”.
63. That apart there the argument was that the definition of the term ‘to hold land’ or ‘holder of land’ given in Sec. 2(6) of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act must be kept in view in construing the meaning of the expression ‘holding’ occurring in Sec. 3(e) of the Andhra Pradesh (Ceiling on Agricultural Holding) Act (Act X of 1961). The learned Judge held;
“The definition in the Hyperabad Land Revenue Act cannot be read into the Ceiling Act when no such provision is made in the Ceiling Act and when a separate definition of holding is given under the Ceiling Act itself”.
64. The several aspects discussed above by us were not considered in the above judgment. We are, therefore, unable to persuade ourselves to accept the said conclusion.
65. In view of the above discussion, we are clearly of the view that if the owner of the land has put the transferee in possession of the land in part performance of the contract for sale, such land can be included only in the holding of the transferee and cannot simultaneously be computed in the holding of he transferor as well, for that land is not ‘held’ by him as an ‘Owner.’ It could be included in the holding of the transferor only is and when the tranferee surrenders that land and that land reverts to the transferor as provided under Sec. 12 of the Act.
66. In this view of the matter, the Civil Revision Petition 1395 of 1976 fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Advocate's fee Rs. ???
67. C.R.P Nos. 1329 and 1332 of 1976.
68. These two revision petitions are directed against the orders of the Land Reforms Tribunal. Anantapur in L.R.A No. 26 and L.R.A No. 25/1976. The declarant claimed that his wife had sold an extent of Ac. 10-71 cents of dry land under Ex. A-4, contract for sale dated 3-9-1970 for a consideration of Rs. 16,000/- and a sum of Rs. 6,000/- was received by way of earnest money. It was agreed that the transferee be put in possession of the land after the standing crop was harvested. The crop was harvested on 1-1-1971 and the transferee was put in possession of the land in part performance of the contract for sale. The balance of consideration was agreed to be paid with interest in yearly instalments. The vendee was examined as P.W 6 and the vendor as P.W 17. The scribe and the two attestors were respectively examined as P.W 16. P.W 5 and P.W 11. Their evidence proves the execution of the written contracts for sale, payment of consideration and delivery of possession. The village Karnam, P.W, 14, and the village Munsif, P.W 15 were examined in support of the declarant's plea that the transferee was put in possession of the land covered by the contract for sale and that he is in possession eversince 1-1-1971 and paying the cist. The cist receipts marked Ex. A.16 filed in support of the declarant's plea that the transferee was put in possession of the land in part performance of the contract for sale are proved by the evidence of the village officials. There is absolutely no cross-examination of these witnesses. There is also no other evidence adduced in rebuttal. The evidence of the village Officials is fully corroborated by the payment of cist by the vendee. The only two reasons given by the Tribunals for not accepting the contract for sale are that it was written on a stamp paper purchased in the name of the vendor and that patta was not transferred ??? of the agreement. None of these reasons are ??? There is no prohibition against using a stamp paper purchased by the vendor for writing a document. All that the Stamp Act requires is that the agreement should be on a stamp paper of the requisite value. If the document is not duly stamped, it is liable to penalty. In the absence of any agreement between the parties as to who should pay the stamp duty, the executant would have to pay the stamp duty and not having been paid the same would be liable to pay the penalty. That is no ground for doubting the genuiness of the contracts. The patta was not transferred evidently because a regular sale-deed was not executed and obviously none of the parties applied for transfer of the property. There is no reason why the unchallenged and unreported evidence adduced on behalf of the declarant supported by the cist receipts should not have been accepted by the Tribunals. The other alienation pleaded by the declarant is the alienation of Ac. 10-57 cents of land under the contract for sale, Ex. A.12 dated 3-8-1970. That is for a consideration of Rs. 12,684-00. On payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000/- by way of advance by the vendee. P.W 9 he was put in possession by the vender P.W 18. The subsequent payments of the balance of consideration are evidenced by the endorsements, Exs. A.13 and A.14 These documents are proved by the evidence of the scribe, P.W 16 and the attestor, P.W 10. The Village Munsif P.W 13 corroborates the statements of the vendor and the vendee that the vendee was put in possession of the land in part performance of the agreement for sale, Ex. A.12 The versio is also supported by the payment of the cist by the vendee. The depositions on oath given by these witnesses have not been challenged by way of cross-examination; nor is any evidence adduced in rebuttal there is also nothing inherently improbable in their statements made on oath so as to discredit their testimony. There is no reason why the village munsiff should come forward to perjure himself to support the declarant. Unless the transaction was true and the vendee was put in possession in part performance of the agreement and the vendee was paying land revenue, cist receipts would not have been issued to the vendee and the village Munsif would not have deposed in their favour. The Village Munsif is not shown to be interested in the declarant or the vendee. There is no reason to suspect these transactions to be sham and nominal. The vendee is not shown to be a close friend or near relation of the vendors in either of these cases. The reasons given by the appellate Tribunal for not accepting the evidence in regard to Ex. A.12 are the same as are given in regard to Ex. A.4 and for the same reasons, the findings of the appellate Tribunal in regard to Ex. A.12 also cannot be accepted. The village Munsif has deposed that in the Adangals, the name of the vendors were shown as there was no order for mutation of patta. He deposed that cist receipts would not have been issued to the vendee unless he had paid the same. The vendee would not have paid the amount unless possession was delivered to him in pursuance of the contract for sale. In this state of evidence, these two contracts for sale must be held proved, and also that the vendee was put in possession of the lands in pursuance of the two contracts for sale Exs. A.4 and A.12 The finding of the lower Tribunals in this behalf is therefore set aside.
69. That being the factual position, having regard to the conclusion we have reached on the question of law discussed above, the extents covered by contracts for sale, Exs. A-4 and A-12 have to be excluded in computing the holding of the declarant's family unit. The land Reforms Tribunal shall therefore compute the holding of the declarant in the light of the judgment and if it finds that the petitioner's family unit is holding any land in excess of the ceiling area to which it is entitled it may issue notice in form No. 6 and take proceedings accordingly.
70. The Civil Revision Petitions are accordingly allowed but in the circumstances without costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/- in each. C.R.P No. 1011/1976:—
71. In this Civil Revision Petition by the declarant directed against the order of the land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Nellore in A.C No. 33/1975, the declarant had set up that his wife had executed two unregistered agreements for sale dated 25-12-1970 one in respect of Ac. 19.07 cents of dry land in favour of Magunta Sudarsanamma, wife of Chandrasekhara Reddi and another extent of Ac. 20, 10, cents of dry land in favour of Anumareddi Pushpavenamma wife of Venkata Subbareddi. He also claimed that his wife sold under yet another unregistered agreement for sale dated 10-1-1971 an extent of Ac. 5-00 of dry land in S. No. 1171 in favour of Magunta Sudarsanamma, wife of Chandrasekhara Reddy. The Tribunals did not doubt the genuiness of these documents but following decision of this Court in P. Lakshminarasimham v. State of Andhra Pradesh (19) (1969 (I) An. W.R 119) which is a decision rendered under the A.P Ceilings on Agricultural Holdings Act (Act X of 1961) which we have discussed above and distinguished and refused to exclude these lands from the holding of the petitioner on the ground that no registered sale-deeds were executed in respect of the alienations and as such the declarant-petitioner still continued to be the owner of these lands.
72. In the view we have now taken above, as the above extents are in the possession of the purchasers in part performance of the contracts for sale, they cannot be included in the holding of the declarant. The holding of the family unit of the petitioner has to be computed excluding the above extents. The Land Reforms Tribunal may compute the holding of the declarant accordingly. If on such computation, it finds that the petitioner's family unit is holding any land in excess of the ceiling area to which it is entitled it may give notice to the petitioner in form No. 6 and take proceedings accordingly.
73. This Civil Revision Petition is accordingly allowed. But in the circumstances without costs. Adocate's fee Rs. 100/-. C.R.P No. 915/1976.
74. This Civil Revision Petition is by the declarant in C.C 1808.VKA/1975 on the file of the Land Reforms Tribunal, Narasaraopet and is directed against the orders of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal. Guntur in L.R.A No. 26/1975. The declarent claimed that he had sold an extent of Ac. 2.45 cents in S. No. 174/5A under an agreement for sale dated 15-6-1977 and on receipt of the consideration he put one Kodali Narasimha Rao in possession of the land in part performance of the said contract for sale. It was his further case that he had sole another extent of Ac. 5-12 cents covered by S. No. 41/2 and 41/3 of Gundlapalli Village to one Ponduri Veeraiab, of Kunkalagunta under a contract for sale dated 10-12-1968 and put him in possession thereof in part performance of the said contract for sale. He also claimed that he had sold two other extents of land also, but we are not concerned with the said items of property in this revision petition. The original tribunal rejected the petitioner's claim that these extents should be excluded from his holdings on the sole ground that have not been conveyed under registered sale-deeds. Even the Appellate Tribunal merely observed that the title to the property could be conveyed only under registered documents but did not doubt the genuinenss of these contracts. Both the Tribunals proceeded to consider that even if the sales are true, the declarant had to be treated as owner of these extents as he had not executed registered sale-deeds and as such computed the same in his holding.
75. In the view we have taken above viz., that lands in the possession of declarant's transferee in part performance of the contract for sale cannot be camputed in the holding of the declarant-transferor, the extents covered by the two contracts for sale have to be excluded in computing the holding of the petitioner's family unit. The Appellate Tribunal had determined the excess over the ceiling area to which the petitioner's family unit was entitled at 0.0055 standard holdings by including the extents covered by the above contracts for sale. These extents constitute more than 0.0055 standard holdings. As these extents have now to be excluded, the holding of the petitioner's family unit would be less than the ceiling area to which it is entitled. Consequently the petitioner is not liable to surrender any land.
76. This Civil Revision Petition is accordingly allowed, bout in the circumstances without costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-. C.R.P No. 921/1976.
77. This Civil Revision Petition is by the declarant in C.C No. 2475.Gov/1975 on the file of the Land Reforms Tribunal, Nuzvid. It is directed against the order of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Krishna in L.R.A No. 15/1975. The petitioner's family unit consists of himself and his wife. The total holding declared by him was computed at 1.1922 standard holdings and the excess over the ceiling area which he was liable to surrender was determined at 0.1922 standard holdings.
78. It was the case of the petitioner that he had sold an extent of Ac. 3.00 in R.S No. 118 under a contract for sale dated 9-4-1970 and put the purchaser, one Pothineni Suryanarayana in possession of the said land in part performance of the said contract. It was his further case that under a sale-deed dated 12-1-1972 he had conveyed an extent of 0.07 3/8 cents of house site in RS No. 138/3 and 138/9 in Amudalapalli Village in favour of one Phillip and another extent of 219 1/4 square-yards under a sale deed, Ex. A.5 dated 12-1-1972 in favour of Nageswararao and others for house sites. Under yet another sale deed, Ex. A.6, he sold an extent of Ac. 4.00 of land in RS Nos. 50 and 61 to one P. Nacharamma. In addition to the above, he also pleaded that he executed a gift deed, Ex. A.I dated 17-3-3970 in favour of his brother's-in-law daughter, Lakshmi Prasanna gifting an extent of Ac. 2.57 cents as her mother had died during her childhood and as he had no children of his own he had brought her up. Both the Tribunals rejected all his contentions and included these extents in his holding.
79. Mr. Babul Reddy, learned counsel for the declarant contended that the genuineness of these transactions has not been doubted. All that the Appellate Tribunal stated was that the declarant did not discharge the burden cast on him to show that they were bonafide transactions. With regard to the gift deed, Ex. A.1, also the Tribunals did not doubt the genuineness but they proceeded to include the extent in the holding of the declarant presumably on the ground that it was intended to defeat the provisions of the Act. With regard to the sales under Exs. A-4, A-5 and A-6 it was further observed that the sale deeds do not recite that the lands were sold for the purposes of the marriage expenses of Lakshmi Prasanna, his brother's-in-law's daughter. The gift deed is dt. 17-3-1970. Even the land covered by the gift deed is not excluded from the holding of the petitioner. The gift deed is anterior to 24-1-1971. The tribunals have no jurisdiction to go into the bonafides of this transfer. The extent covered by the gift deed has to be excluded from the holding of the declarant. There is no burden cast upon the declarant to establish in regard to this transaction that it was not a transfer made with a view to avoid or defeat any impending Legislation as to reduction in the ceiling area of agricultural holdings. The genuinness of the sales not having been doubted, in the view we have taken on the question whether the lands in possession of the purchasers in part performance of the contract for sale could be included in the holding of the transferor, these extents have to be excluded from the holding of the declarant's family unit. So far as the sales of lands under Exs. A-4, A-5 and A-6 are concerned, their truth and genuineness was not doubted by the appellate tribunal. Even so, the learned Government Pleader contended that as these sales have been affected subsequent to 24th January 1971, they have to be disregarded as directed by section 7(1) of the Act.
80. section 7(1) makes special provision in respect of transfers or trusts of land made on or after 24th January, 1971 in the following words:—
“7(1) Where on or after the 24th January 1971 but before the notified date, any person has transferred whether by way of sale, gift, usufructuary mortgage, exchange, settlement, surrender or in any other manner whatsoever, any land held by him or created a trust of any land held by him, then the burden of proving that such transfer or creation of trust has not been effected in anticipation of, and with a view to avoiding or defeating the objects of any law relating to a reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings shall be on such person, and, where he has not so proved, such transfer or creation of trust, shall be disregarded for the purpose of thy computation of the ceiling area of such person.
81. A close reading of this provision would disclose that it does not declare any transfer or trust of land made on or after 24th January 1971 void or inoperative. It only directs the transfers and the trusts to be disregarded. It is also significant to note that this provision does not direct that every transfer or trust should be disregarded, its operation is restricted to only such transfers or trusts as are made in anticipation of and with a view to avoid or defeat the provision of any law as is referred to therein. Further they are not to be disregarded for all purposes. They are to be disregarded only for the purposes of computation of the ceiling are of such transfer or author of trust and not for any other purpose Further this provision lays the burden of providing that such transfer or trust was not effected in anticipation of, and with a view to avoiding or defeating the objects of any law relating to a education in the ceiling on agricultural holdings on the transferor or the author of the trust. In other words an initial presumption may be raised by the Tribunal that such transfer or trust was effected with that object. But the transferor or author of the trust may rebut that presumption. If no evidence is lead to rebut the presumption such transfer shall be disregarded for the purposes of the computation of the ceiling area of such person. If the presumption is rebutted that transaction has to be given effect to and the extents covered by such transaction shall have to be excluded from the holding of the transferor. As Sec. 7(1) merely directs that the transfer or trust to be disregarded and does not render the transaction void in law and the transferee becomes the owner of such land and holds that land, that land would be included in the holding of both the transferor and the tranferee.
82. Prior to 2nd May 1972 transfer or alienation of agricultural lands was not prohibited. Such a prohibition evidently intended as the first preliminary step towards the enactment of a law relating to a reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings, was imposed by the promulgamation of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Ordinance, 1972, which was later substituted by the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972. Under that Act alienation of any land except in accordance with that law, was prohibited and was declared null and void even under that law certain alienations of agricultural land were not prohibited. Also alienations of lands by persons holding less than 10 hectares of dry land or 4 hectares of wet land were not torched such persons were free to alienate and those alienations are not declared null and void. Only such alienations as are in contravention of the provisions of that enactment have been declared null and void under Sec. 7(2) for the purpose of the Land Reforms Act in the following words:—
“7(2). Not withstanding anything in sub-sec. (1) any alienation made by way of sale, lease for a period exceeding six years, gift, exchange, usufructuary mortgage or otherwise any partition effected or trust created of a holding or any part thereof, or any such transaction effected in execution of a decree or order of a civil court of any award or order of any authority, on or after the 2nd May, 1972 and before the notified date, in contravention of the provisions of the A.P Agricultural Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 shall be nullland void.”
83. Such alienations as are covered by the provisions of these two enactments having been declared null and void, the land which forms the subject matter of such alienations has perhaps to be included in the holding of the alienor. However, as no such prohibition was imposed on alienation of agricultural lands prior to 2nd May, 1972 and on some alienation even after 2nd May, 1972 even if such alienations or transfers were made on or after 24th January, 1971 such alienations or transfers not being null and void conveyed valid title and possession in favour of the transferee. Even in a case where ownership is not transferred but a person has put another in possession of land in part performance of a contract for sale on or after 24th January 1971 the transferor ceases to hold the land as discussed above. It is against this background and in this context the true scope and object of section 7(1) has to be ascertained.
84. Section 8 of the Act directs a person whose holding on the notified date together with any land transferred by him on or before 24th January 1971 by way of sale, gift, settlement, surrender or in any other manner whatsoever and in respect of which a trust has been created by him on or after 24th January 1971 exceeds the specified limit to file a declaration, before the Tribunal. In such a declaration, the declarant has to include the land held by him as defined under Sec. 3(1) of the Act. Since as discussed above alienations of land by persons who hold lesser extent of land then specified under Sec. 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act 1972 are not rendered null and void, the land so alienated cannot be treated as held by the alienor. Consequently the Tribunal, which is required under Sec. 9 determine the extent of land in excess of the ceiling area of the declarant must hold that the land so transferred does not form part of his holding. When the alienation itself is not declared by section 7(1) to be null and void, it cannot be logically postulated that such land continues to form part of the ‘holding’ of the transferor. For any land to be treated as part of a person ‘Holding’ he must hold that land either as an owner, as a limited owner, as an usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant or must be in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for sale or otherwise. Once there is valid transfer, he does not hold the land in any of these capacities as discussed above. If he does not hold the land, it cannot be computed in his holding. If the provisions of S. 7(1) were to be read as taking within its ambit even valid and genuine alienations it would come into conflict with the definition of ‘holding’ in Sec. 3(i). The Tribunal even while finding that the alienation made after 24th January 1971 is true and genuine would still have to disregard the transfer or trust in computing the holding of such person although in fact such land does not form part of such person's holding. That could not have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting Sec. 7(1) which does not declare that notwithstanding such transfer or trust, the land shall be deemed to be ‘held’ by such person. The only possible way of giving effect to the said provision and to render it harmonious with the other provisions of the enactment elaborated above would be to restrict its operation to sham and nominal transfers or trusts. If the transaction is sham and nominal ostensibly the transferee would be holding the land, but in fact the transferor would be in possession and enjoyment of the land and as such ‘holding’ that land. Consequently, such land could properly be included in the holding of the transferor, who has effected the sham and nominal transfer or trust. But where the transfer is true and genuine the transferor ceases to hold the land and the transferee, would be ‘holding’ the land. Sec. 7(1) does not substitute a different definition of holding and as the Tribunal is enjoined to determine the ‘holding’ of the declarant as on the notified date cannot therefore compute such land, which is validly and genuinely transferred on or after 24th January, 1971 in the holding of sub-person.
85. However, the express direction contained in Sec. 7(1) to disregard the transfer or trust for the purpose of computing the ceiling area of such person cannot be deemed redundant. It has to be given effect to. It is here that the import of the expression ‘that such transfer or creation of Trust has not been effected in anticipation of and with a view to avoiding or defeating the objects of any law relating to a reduction in ceiling on agricultural holdings” has to be grasped. The transferor creation of the trust should be one made in anticipation of such law and secondly it must have been made with a view to avoiding or defeating the objects of any such law as is referred to in Sec. 7(1) Before a transaction is disregarded under Sec. 7(1) both these conditions must be satisfied. When a person transfers or creates a trust for meeting medical or educational expenses, for performing the marriage of his children or kith and kin or building a house or improving his property or make a more beneficial investment of one's assets or for discharging debts or the like it is only in the ordinary and normal course of conduct of life in the social setting in which one is placed. Whether any legislation relating to reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings is impending or not, he would have to and would make such transfers or trusts they are not necessarily transactions made in anticipation of any such legislation and with a view to avoid or defeat the objects of any such law.
86. The expression ‘defeat’ means overcome, thwart, evade, frustrate, circumvent, bypass, disappoint, prevent the accomplishment of. According to shorter Oxford English Dictionary the expression ‘avoid’ means in law to defeat, invalidate, to make void or of no effect. In maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes Eleventh Edition, page 108, preferring to Construction of Statutes designed to prevent evasion noticed and referred to the decision in Simms v. Registrar of Probates (20) (1900 A.C 323) which held:—
“Everybody agrees that the word (evade) is capable of being used in two senses: one which suggests underhand dealing and another which means nothing more than the intentional avoidance of something disagreable.”
As regards the first of these senses, it does not really involve a question of verbal construction of a statute at all. It is simply fraud-not less than a flagitious attempt to pass off an existing state of things as being something other than that which it really is……………..The question will be, “Is an evasion being attempted?” If so the court will make short work of it. But when the second sense of ‘evasion’ is under consideration it merits careful though not necessarily favourable, scrutiny, and if the result of investigation shows that ‘avoidance’ is not, in fact, within the mischief contemplated by the statute it is in a legal sense neither an evasion nor blameworthy, the author being proved to have done nothing outside his right. In either case it may be said that there was an attempt at evasion, but the attitude of the court towards the one will be very different from that as regards the other.”
“It is however, essential not to confound what is actually or virtually prohibited or enjoined by the statutory language with what is really beyond the enacting part, though it may be within the policy of the Act; for it is only to the former case that the principal under consideration applies, and not to cases where, however manifest the object of the Act may be, the language is not fairly co-extensive with it. An Act of Parliament is always subject to evasion in this tense, for there is no obligation not to do what the legislature has not really prohibited nor to do what it has not really commended. It is not evading an Act to keep outside it.”
87. In Sundaram Industries Private Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras* (21) (1974 I.T.R 243) construing the proviso to S. 12-B of the Income-Tax Act of 1922 which brought to charge capital gains, that is gains made from sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer of capital asset “affected with the object of avoidance or reduction of the liability of the assesset under the scheme, expressed that the said proviso does not discourage or avoid honest transactions made out of love and affection or for other conceivable reasons on pain of being hauled up for having attempted to avoid or reduce the tax liability and on that basis made liable to tax on the difference between the consideration for the transaction and the fair market value, nor does it treat what is not actual capital gain as deemed capital gain but it must be limited to escape capital gain which is in truth and in fact bring about a fictorial gain on an assumption and charge the same.
88. In Simms v. Registrar of Probates (supra) their Lordships construed the word ‘evade’ occurring in S. 27 of the South Australian Succession Duties Act, 1893 as follows:—
“Evade” there means some device or stratagem; some arrangement, trust or other device (whether concealed, or apparent on the face of the non-testamentary disposition) by which what is really a part of the estate (of the deceased) is made to appear to belong to somebody else in order to escape payment of duty.”
89. In that case it was held “that a covenant by a deceased to pay 200,000 to his children which conferred on them a complete ownership of the debt and which diminished be that amount his net assets liable to duty and though it was a “Disposition of property” within the meaning of the Act, yet it was not entered into “with an intent to evade” the duty, there being no evidence to show the covenant was not genuine transaction or anything to impeach its bonafides.”
90. In Sakthi v. Kuppathammal (22) (1960) (II) M.L.J 89) Anantanarayana, J., had to consider a somewhat similar question in dealing with a petition under Sec. 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act (Act XVIII of 1980). There a conscientous guardian of the property of a minor filed an application under Sec. 29 of the Guardiads and wards Act for permission to sell 55 standard acres of the lands belonging to the minor. In that petition the guardian fairly stated that legislation fixing a ceiling upon the possession of landed property by any single individual, and substantially reducing the ceiling area which a person may hold was impending and he had adequate grounds for believing that the compensation that would be awarded for the surplus lands that may be taken over would be grossly inadequate and that too would be payable over a number of years and sought the permission of the court to safeguard the interests of the minor by alienating the land for which he was getting inadequate price. That petition was dismissed by the District judge inter alia holding that the avowed object appeared to him to be to get over the legislation, which might even amount to contravention of a public policy and no court could countenance such a proposal. Anantanarayana, J., dealing with this ground for refusal of permission, held:—
“The argument of the learned District Judge that this is opposed to the spirit of the legislation, and amounts to some kind of circumvention of the law, is clearly, based on a misconception. On the contrary, the sales, by private owners of land, of surplus areas over the probable ceiling are by themselves, an effective instrumentation of the reform. This is a mode by which a more equitable distribution of landed property is effected, even before the enactment itself comes into force. Had it been otherwise, the State would have declared prohibition similar to a moratorium upon sales of land, which it has advisedly refrained from. To anticipate a law, and to take certain measures dictated by prudence, which are legally permitted, is not at all in contravention of public policy.”
91. This question directly arose for consideration in Naganath Iyer v. The Authorised Officer (23) 71 (Vol. 84) Law Weekly, 69). Ramanujam, J., had to consider the effect of Sec. 22 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961, as amended in 1970 and observed:—
“Sec. 22 does not in terms invalidate such transfers effected after the commencement of the Act, but authorises the Authorised Officer to declare the same to be void if it defeats the provisions of the Act. On a fair reading of Sec. 22 it has to be construed as one intended to invalidate transfers entered into only with a view to defeate the provisions of the Act, without a bona fide intention to transfer title under the document of transfer”.
92. He further observed:
“If the Legislative intention is also to invalidate all bonafide transactions during the relevant period it would have made certain consequential provisions as to what are the rights of the transferor and the transferee in relation to the property conveyed and how the resultant equities between the transferee and the transferor have to be worked out. This view that section 22 will cover only transactions of sham, nominal, and bogus character which are intended only to defeat the provisions of the Act, will not be inconsistent with the object provided in section 7.
A bonafide transfer in anticipation of the law cannot be said to defeat the provisions of the Act, especially, when the statute does not in terms prohibit a transfer as such”.
93. The object of the Land Reforms Act as discussed above is to fix the ceiling on agricultural holdings and to take over the surplus lands for the purpose of disposing of the same in favour of landless poor to be used as house sites or for purposes of agricultural purposes or purposes ancillary thereto. That law ensures a ceiling area, which in no case is intended to be less than one standard holding, to every individual or family unit. The Act does not intend to touch or effect persons whose holding is below the ceiling area on the notified date. If a person genuinely transfers any land after 24th January, 1971 with a view to conform to the provisions of any law that may be enacted in the near feature fixing a reduced ceiling area for agricultural holdings, that person would not be defeating the provisions of such enactment. He would be only arranging his affairs as an ordinary prudent person. At a time when there is no prohibition of alienation of agricultural land, if a person transfers or alienates his land with a view to conform to the law that may be enacted in future, he would be in fact furthering the object of the enactment and not taking any step to avoid or defeat its object. That must be the necessary intendment of Sec. 7(1) when it refrains from declaring every alienation made after 24th January 1971 to be null and void. The same transaction cannot be valid in all respects with reference to the transferee and the land covered by that transferor included in the holding of the transferee under Sections 8 & 9 of the Act, and at the same time be disregarded and included in the holding of the transferor under the very same enactment. Such an interpretation of Sec. 7(1) and computation of such land in the holding of the transferor or author of trust would lead to the same anomalous consequences as we have pointed out in detail with reference to the computation of the lands in the possession of a person through part performance of a contract for sale of land and that of his transferor. Such a reading of section 7(1) would render various provisions of the Act unworkable and should be avoided. That can be done only by restricting the operation of section 7(1) to sham and nominal transactions. Sec. 7(1) could never have been designed to defeat the valid alienations. Its true scope and operation must, therefore, be restricted to such transfers or alienations as are sham and nominal for in such a case while for all ostensible purposes the transferee holds the land, in fact the transferor would be holding and in enjoyment of that land. If there is a true and genuine transfer it would in fact be in furtherance of the public policy which the impending legislation intends to achieve; it would not avoid or defeat the objects of such law. Hence any transfer made on or after 24th January 1971 if true and genuine and not sham and nominal, cannot be disregarded and the extent covered by such transfer would have to be excluded from the holding of the transferor.
94. As observed in the State of Andhra Pradesh Represented by Special Tashildar: Authorised Officer Land Reforms v. Tikkavararapu Balarami Reddi (24) (1977 (1) APLJ. 452) “there is an initial presumption that such alienations were made with a view to avoid or defeat the provisions of the Act,” but this would arise only if the transactions are shem and nominal. As observed therein “the section itself contemplates that such a presumption is rebuttable”. Once the transferor or the creator of a trust proves the transactions to be true and genuine, and that the transaction is not sham or nominal the provisions of Sec. 7(1) would have no application. That may be done by showing that consideration has passed and possession has been delivered. The extents covered by these transactions would have to be excluded in computing the holding of the transferor or the creator of the Trust. The transfers covered by Exs. A.4, A.5 and A.6 being true and genuine, they cannot be disregarded under Sec. 7(1). The extents covered by these transactions have to be excluded in computing the holding of the petitioner.
95. While the excess holding of the petitioner's family unit is determined by the Appellate Tribunal at 0.1920 standard holdings, the extents now to be deleted amount to more than 0.1920 standard holdings. The holding of the petitioner's family unit computed in the manner indicated above would be less than the ceiling area to which it is entitled the Civil Revision Petition, therefore, succeeds and is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances without costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.
96. C.R.P No. 1110 of 1976:—
97. This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Guntur, in L.R.A No. 68 of 1976. The petitioner had claimed that he had sold Ac. 6.26 1/2 cents of land covered by S. Nos. 1107/1, 1110/1, and 111/1 under a contract for sale dated 16-9-1968, marked Ex. A-1 and delivered possession of the same to the purchaser in part performance of the said contract for sale and as such it should be excluded in computing in his holding. Both the Tribunals held that this contract for sale to be true but refused to exclude this land in computing his holding on the ground that the vendor not having executed a registered sale deed was a person holding the land as an owner under Sec. 3(1)(i) of the Act even though possession was delivered after receiving full consideration.
98. Having regard to the view expressed by us above on this question of law, this extent has to be excluded in computing the holding of the petitioner under the Act. The holding of the petitioner's family unit was computed at 12263 standard holdings. As he was declared entitled to one-ceiling area, he was directed to be surrendered 0,2263 standard holdings. The extents of the land covered by Ex. A.1 are as follows:—
1107/1
Ac. 2.26 cents.
Constituting
0.1395
standard holdings.
1110/1
Ac. 2.51
Constituting
0.0837
standard holdings.
1111/1
Ac. 1.50 1/2
Constituting
0.0238
standard holdings.
99. Thus the total standard holdings of the land covered by Ex. A.1 constitutes 0.2460 standard holdings which has to be now excluded is more than the excess holding determined by the appellate Tribunal. As such, it is declared that the petitioner's family unit is not liable to surrender any land.
100. In the result, the C.R.P is allowed, but in the circumstances without costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.