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  • provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act
  • section 47 of the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act
  • secs. 12 & 13 of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act;
  • section 12 of the Assam Agricultural Income-Tax Act,
  • SECTION 53 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 105 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 7 of the Ceiling Act.
  • Section 8 of the Ceiling Act.
  • Section 4 of the Ceiling Act),
  • sub-section (6) of section 12
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act
  • section 47 of the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act
  • secs. 12 & 13 of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act;
  • section 12 of the Assam Agricultural Income-Tax Act,
  • SECTION 53 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 105 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 7 of the Ceiling Act.
  • Section 8 of the Ceiling Act.
  • Section 4 of the Ceiling Act),
  • sub-section (6) of section 12
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — Civil Revision under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision arises under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (the Ceiling Act). The petitioner filed a declaration under Section 8 of the Ceiling Act in respect of his land holding. The verification officer reported that the petitioner's holding comprised Survey Numbers 36, 41, 37, 42 and 92 in Ghotkuri village (dry lands) with a total extent given as Ac. 88-46 cents.

The petitioner claimed that he had sold Ac. 17-00 cents in S. No. 36 and Ac. 11-48 cents in S. No. 41 by unregistered sale deeds and had gifted S. Nos. 37, 42 and 92 to his son by a document on plain paper; the son was found in possession and cultivating the gifted lands. The Land Reforms Tribunal, Adilabad rejected the petitioner's claimed alienations, computed his holding at 1.7692 standard holdings, and declared the petitioner liable to surrender land equivalent to 0.7692 standard holding (one standard holding being the ceiling for an individual under Section 4).

The petitioner appealed to the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Adilabad. The Appellate Tribunal considered the appeal only as to S. Nos. 41 and 36 (Ac. 11-19 guntas and Ac. 17-00 guntas respectively), refused to accept the petitioner's claim to exclude these two items, and dismissed the appeal. The declarant then filed the present Civil Revision petition to the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purpose of computing a person's holding under the Ceiling Act, land in respect of which the transferor has given possession to a transferee pursuant to an agreement of sale or an unregistered/incomplete sale deed (i.e., possession under part performance as per Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act) must be included in the transferor's holding.
  2. Whether the temporal scope of Section 7 of the Ceiling Act (which places a burden on persons who have transferred land on or after 24th January 1971 to prove the transfer was not made to avoid ceiling laws) affects transfers completed by part performance prior to 24th January 1971.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner relied on the doctrine of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and argued that land sold under unregistered sale deeds with possession given to purchasers cannot be treated as part of the petitioner's holding for the purposes of the Ceiling Act. The petitioner conceded that legal title might remain in him but contended that possession under Section 53-A should exclude that land from his holding.

Respondent / State's Arguments (as presented by the Advocate General)

  • Certain core facts were not disputed: the petitioner sold S. No. 41 (Ac. 11-19 guntas) by an unregistered sale deed dated 12-6-1968 and S. No. 36 (Ac. 17-00 p.c.) by an unregistered sale deed dated 3-12-1969, and the purchasers were put in possession and had been in possession since those dates.
  • The Advocate General argued for a meaning of the expression “held” or “holding” that could include land owned but not presently possessed (relying on authority that the word “holds” can include a twofold idea of actual possession and legal title).
  • It was also argued in relation to Section 7 of the Ceiling Act that Section 7 is directed to transfers on or after 24th January 1971 and therefore has no application to the transfers in this case (1968 and 1969), so that the transferor need not carry the burden under Section 7 for these earlier transfers.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anantha Pillai v. Rathnasaba Pathy Mudiliar (1968 II M.L.J. 574) The possession taken by a transferee under an agreement of sale is not adverse to the transferor; such possession cannot give title by prescription. Used to support the proposition that a transferee in possession under an agreement cannot prescribe title by adverse possession but can retain possession indefinitely under Section 53-A.
Smt. S. Janaki Devi v. A.B. Ramaswamy (1976 II A.W.R. 117) A transferee in possession under an agreement of sale can file a suit for injunction to restrain the transferor from disturbing his possession and enjoyment. Relied upon to show that transferees put in possession under agreements have enforceable rights to protect their possession.
Handique v. Agricultural I.T. Board, Assam (AIR 1966 SC 1191) The expression “holds” may denote both actual possession and legal title; context decides whether the wider or narrower meaning applies. Cited by the Advocate General for a broader meaning of “held”; considered by the Court but the Court determined that context (the Ceiling Act) required a narrower construction.
Tiraih Singh v. Bachittar Singh (AIR 1955 SC 830) When a literal reading of statutory language leads to absurdity or results inconsistent with apparent legislative purpose, judicial construction may modify ordinary meaning to avoid absurdity. Invoked to justify adopting a purposive/narrow construction of “held” in the Ceiling Act to avoid absurd and unjust results.
State of M.P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Co. (AIR 1967 SC 276) Reiterates the principle that statutory language may be modified in construction to avoid absurdity where ordinary grammatical meaning contradicts purpose. Applied alongside Tiraih Singh to support a non-literal construction of the Ceiling Act definitions where necessary.
P. Laxminarsimham v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1969 I A.W.R. 119) Under a different Ceiling statute (Andhra Pradesh 1961 Act) and factual matrix, an owner not in possession could still have lands included in his holding. Distinguished on its facts and statutory definitions; the Court held it was not applicable to the present Act and circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by analysing the legal consequences of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act: where there is a written agreement of sale and the transferee takes possession (or continues in possession and does acts in furtherance of the contract), the transferee acquires a right to retain possession though the legal title may remain with the transferor. Section 53-A bars the transferor from enforcing rights in respect of the property against the transferee's possession; that right to possession can be indefinite and is not defeated by limitation nor dependent on the transferee's continuing ability to sue for specific performance. The Court reiterated that these are well-established propositions and cited relevant authorities (including Anantha Pillai and Smt. Janaki Devi) to demonstrate that a transferee in possession under part performance may retain possession and seek judicial protection of that possession.

The Court next examined the Ceiling Act, its object and key provisions (Sections 4, 5, 8, 10, 11 and 12). The Court emphasised that the Act is a socio-economic measure aimed at fixing a ceiling on agricultural holdings and taking over surplus land to distribute land more widely. The Court extracted the Act's definition of “holding”, which expressly includes lands held in various capacities: as owner, limited owner, usufructuary mortgagee, tenant and a person in possession by virtue of a conditional sale or through part performance, etc. The definition also contains an Explanation stating that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another in another capacity, such land shall be included in the holding of both persons.

The Court addressed the potential problem if the terms were read literally so that the same land would, for all practical purposes, be simultaneously counted against multiple persons for the purpose of determining excess over ceiling. It explained that such a literal result would be anomalous and contrary to the Act's purpose (i.e., ensuring a ceiling area to a person rather than depriving a person entirely of land in his possession). The Court therefore considered the Explanation in the definition together with Section 12 of the Act, which prescribes reversion rules when land is surrendered by persons in the non-owner categories. Section 12(6) was particularly important: if land surrendered by a non-owner is also surrendered by the owner, section 11 (vesting in Government) applies; otherwise the surrendered land reverts to the owner and then the owner may be required to account for it in his holding (and may be liable to surrender if the aggregated area exceeds the ceiling).

The Court analysed what “held” or “held by” meant in context. While precedent (Handique) shows that “holds” can mean either actual possession or legal title depending on context, the Court concluded that within the Ceiling Act the Legislature intended “held” to mean land actually possessed or land in which a person is presently entitled to possession. To reach that construction the Court applied cardinal rules of statutory construction and relied upon authorities (Tiraih Singh and State of M.P.) permitting departure from the literal grammatical meaning where literal reading would produce absurdity or defeat the legislative object.

The Court distinguished P. Laxminarsimham (1969) because the earlier statute and its provisions were not the same; in that case the purchaser was not entitled to be in possession, but in the present case transferees were in possession under agreements of sale. The Court therefore held that an owner is not obliged to include in his holding land which is in the actual possession of a limited owner, usufructuary mortgagee, tenant or a person in possession by virtue of part performance, except to the extent that such land reverts to the owner under Section 12.

Finally, concerning Section 7 of the Ceiling Act, the Court noted that Section 7 applies to transfers on or after 24th January 1971. The transfers in the present case occurred in 1968 and 1969 (prior to 24th January 1971), so Section 7 had no application to those transfers; accordingly the petitioner's burden under Section 7 did not arise here.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Civil Revision Petition was allowed. The Court declared that the two extents of land — Ac. 17-00 cents in S. No. 36 and Ac. 11-48 cents in S. No. 41 — which were transferred by unregistered sale deeds with possession handed over to the purchasers, cannot be included in the holding of the petitioner for the purpose of ascertaining whether he holds land in excess of the ceiling area under the Ceiling Act.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the specified two extents are excluded from the petitioner's holding for ceiling computation; the petition succeeds on that point and the petitioner is not required to surrender that land as part of his holding.
  • Costs: the Court ordered no costs.
  • Broader precedent impact: the Court's holding rests on statutory interpretation of the Ceiling Act in light of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and explanatory/procedural provisions (notably Section 12). The opinion does not purport to create a new general rule beyond the statutory construction it applies; it limits the inclusion of lands in a transferor's holding where the lands are in the actual possession of transferees under part performance, except where reversion occurs per Section 12. The Court distinguished earlier authority where statutory language or facts differed.

This summary was prepared solely from the provided opinion text and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Mohd. Ashrafuddin Petitioner (Declarant) v. The State Of Andhra Pradesh, Through Land Reforms Tribunal Adilabad ().

    1. The Revision arises under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act or the Ceiling Act.

    2. The petitioner as an individual filed the declaration with regard to his land holding as provided under Section 8 of the Ceiling Act. According to the report of the verification Officer, the Holding of the petitioner consists of Survey Numbers 36, 41, 37, 42 and 92 in Ghotkuri village, all dry, the total extent of which is Ac. 88-46 cents. According to the Petitioner, he sold away Ac. 17-00 cents and Ac. 11-48 cents in S. Nos. 36 and 41 respectively through unregistered sale deeds, and gifted S. Nos. 37, 42 and 92 to his son Naimuddin by means of a document written on a plain paper. With regard to the land said to have been gifted to the son of the petitioner, the latter alone is found to have been in possession and cultivating the same. The Land Reforms Tribunal, Adilabad, without accepting any of the alienations as claimed by the petitioner, computed his holding at 1-7692 standard holdings, and on the ground that the petitioner holds land of an extent equivalent to 0.7692 standard holding in excess of the ceiling, area (the ceiling area with regard to an individual being one standard holding as provided under Section 4 of the Ceiling Act), declared that the petitioner is liable to surrender land equivalent to 0.7692 standard holding. Aggrieved by that, the petitioner has taken the matter in appeal to the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Adilabad. It appears from the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal that the appeal was filed only with regard to S. Nos. 41 and 36 of the extents of Ac. 11-19 guntas and Ac, 17-00 guntas respectively said to have been sold by the petitioner through unregistered sale deeds and given possession of the lands sold, to the vendees. The Appellate Tribunal also did not accept the claim of the petitioner for disregarding the said two items in computing his holding. Hence this Revision by the declarant.

    3. The learned Advocate General appeared for the State and argued the matter. The facts which are not in dispute are that the petitioner sold S.No 41 of an extent of Ac. 11-19 guutas to one Naganna under an unregistered sale deed dated 12-6-1968 and put the transferee in possession of the land. The petitioner also sold S. No. 36 of an extent of A/c 17-00 p.c to one, Koreddy Nana under an unregistered sale deed dated 3-12-1969 and put him in possession of the same. From the dates of sales the purchasers have been in possession and enjoyment of the lands sold as mentioned above. Both the parties have argued the Revision Petition on the basis of these facts which are not in dispute.

    4. The contention of the petitioner both before the Appellate Tribunal in the appeal and in the present Revision is that having regard to the doctrtne of part performance as envisaged in section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and having regard to the provisions of the Ceiling Act, the land sold under the unregistered sale deeds through which possession of the land was given to the purchasers, cannot be taken as part of the holding of the petitioner, even though under Law it can be said that title to the lands still vests in the petitioner, there being no regular sale deeds executed to convey title to the purchasers. This contention of the petitioner was not accepted by the Appellate Tribunal and accordingly the appeal was dismissed, Aggrieved by that, the declarant has come to this Court by way of this Civil Revision petition.

    5. Under the provisions of the Ceiling Act a person who is in possession of land through part performance of a contract of sale, should also include that land in his holding. If that is so, the question for consideration is whether the transferor is also bound to include in his holding the land which he has given possession of to the transferee under art agreement of sale or through an incompleted sale deed as the case may be.

    6. Before considering the provisions of the Ceiling Act, it is convenient to know the various implications which would flow from the doctrine of part performance as envisaged in section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. It is convenient to extract section 53-A itself here:

    “Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract,

    and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract,

    then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:

    Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.”

    7. From a reading of the above provision it is clear that where there is a written agreement of sale, or where there is an instrument of transfer and the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law and possession of the property is given to the transferee as part performance of the contract, the right conferred under Section 53-A, of the Transfer of Property Act on the transferee is a right to retain possession of the property though title does not pass to the transferee. The transferor or any person claiming under him is debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him, any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken possession or having been in possession already, continued in possession. The right to be in possession is continued without any time limit. To retain possession by exercise of the right given to a transferee under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, no question of Limitation would arise it is immaterial whether the suit for specific performance is barred. That right does not depend upon the transferee retaining the right to file a suit aganist the transferor for specific performance and for a decree directing the transferor to execute a registered sale deed in his favour. Though the right under section 53-A does not create title on the transferee, the right is available to him to protect his possession The section imposes a bar on the transferor from disturbing the possession of the transferee. These propositions of law which flow from the provisions of Section 53-A, are well-established. The learned Advocate General has brought to my notice a Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in Anantha Pillai v. Rathnasaba Pathy Mudiliar (1) (1968 II M.L.J 574). There the question arose whether a person put in possession of property pursuant to an agreement to sell and no conveyance having been executed can establish his title on the basis of that agreement to sell itself by being in possession for a period of over twelve years. The Madras High Court held that the, possession taken by a transferee under the terms of an agreement of sale cannot be said to be adverse the transferor. Therefore, the transferee cannot prescribe title by being in possession for more than twelve years under the terms of the agreement of sale. There may not be any dispute with regard to that proposition of law as laid down in the above decision of the Madras High Court. The transferee, may not get title to the land; by being in possession and enjoyment of the land transferred for over the statutory period. But he is entitled to retain possession for any length of time and neither the transferor nor persons claiming, under him cannot seek to disturb his possession and enjoyment. In a recent, decision reported in Smt. S. Janaki Devi v. A.B Ramaswamy (2) (1976 II Andhra Weekly Reporter, 117, a Bench of this court has held that a transferee in possession under an agreement of sale can also file a suit against the transferor for an injunction restraining him from disturbing his possession and enjoyment.

    8. Therefore, once a transferee is put in possession of an immoveable property under an agreement of sale or under an unregistered sale deed, for all practical purposes he has a right to continue in posession and enjoyment of the property without any time limit though technically the title to the property still vests in the transferor. As between the transferor and the transferee, the later only is eniitled to be in possession and enjoyment of the property.

    9. Bearing in mind the legal implications that flow from the doctrine of part performance as envisaged under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and discussed above, the various provisions of the Ceiling Act have to be considered to find out whether a transferor, who has given possession of the land transferred to the transferee under an agreement of sale or under an incompleted sale deed, is also bound to include in his holding the land transferred and that land also has to be taken into consideration to find out the excess area in the holding of the transferor.

    10. As we find from the preamble to the Ceiling Act the object of enacting it is to consolidate and amend the law relating to the fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings and to take over the surplus land. The enactment is a socio-economic measure enacted with a view to limit agricultural holdings in order to make the lands available to as many people as possible, and presumably to improve the productivity of land also and to distribute and transfer the excess land over the ceiling area to the weaker sections of the Society for house sites and agriculture.

    11. It is provided under section 10 of the Act that if the extent of the holding of a person is in excess of the ceiling area, the person shall be liable to surrender the land held in excess, and as provided under Section 11 the excess land will vest in the Government free from all encumbrances and it would be taken over by the Revenue Divisional Officer. Provision is made under section 14 of the Act as to in what manner the land vested in the Government has to be disposed of. The terms ‘person’, ‘holding’ and ‘ceiling area’ are defined in the Act. The expression ceiling area as defined under section 4 in the case of a family unit consisting of not more than five members shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding. The ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of more than five members shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding plus an additional extent of one fifth of one standard holding for every such member in excess of five, so, however, that the ceiling area shall not exceed two standard holdings. The ceiling area in the case of every individual who is not a member of a family unit, and in the case of any other person shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding. In the explanation to Section 4 it is mentioned that in the case of a family unit, the ceiling area shall be applied to the aggregate of the lands held by all the members of the family unit. Again, the terms ‘family unit’ and ‘standard holding’ are defined in the Act.

    12. Having regard to different, classes of lands, the wet lands having been classified into six classes A.B.C.D.E.F and dry lands into five classes as G.H.I.J.K provision is made under section 5 as to how a standard holding is to be computed for different classes of lands. For instance, for double crop wet land coming under class ‘A’ the extent of standard holding is the mentioned as 10 acres and for class ‘K’ dry land the extent of standard holding is mentioned as 54 acres. In between these two extents come the extents for the other classes of lands. Having regard to different classes of lands, the extent of a standard holding will be between 10 acres and 54 acres as shown in the Table given in section 5.

    13. Now come the definitions of the terms ‘family unit’, ‘holding’ and ‘person’. These terms are defined in section 3 of the Act under clauses (f), (i) and (o) respectively. It is convenient to extract those definitions here.

    “(f) family unit’ means—

    (i) in the case of an individual who has spouse, or spouses, such individual, the spouse or spouses and their minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters, if any;

    (ii) in the case of an individual who has no spouse such individual and his or her minor sons and unmarried minor daughters;

    (iii) in the case of an individual who is a divorced husband and who has not remarried, such individual and his minor sons and unmarried minor daughters, whether in his custody or not; and

    (iv) where an individual and his or her spouse are both dead, their minor sons and unmarried minor daughters.

    Explanation:— Where a minor son is married his wife and their off spring, if any, shall also be deemed to be members of the family unit of which the minor son is a member.

    (i) ‘holding’ means the entire land held by a person,—

    (i) as an owner;

    (ii) as a limited owner;

    (iii) as an usufructuary mortgagee:

    (iv) as a tenant;

    (v) who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or otherwise; or in one or more of such capacities;

    and the expression ‘to hold land’ shall be construed accordingly.

    Explanation:— Where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity, such land shall be include in the holding of both such persons.

    (o) person includes an individual a family unit, a trustee, a company, a firm, a society or an association of individuals, where her incorporated or not.”

    14. It is provided under section 8 of the Act that every person whose holding on the notified date together with any land transferred by him on or after the 24th January, 1971 exceeds the specified limit, shall, within thirty days from the notified dater or within such extended period as the Govt. may notify in this behalf, furnish a declarant respect of his holding. What is meant by ‘specified limit’ is mentioned in explanation III to section 8 as in the case of wet land 10 acres, and in the case of dry land 25 acres. Therefore a person, who is holding land exceeding the specified limit, has to file declaration in respect of his holding whether such holding is within the ceiling area or not to which he would be entitled.

    15. In the present case, the petitioner filed his declaration under section 8 of the Act as an ‘individual’ in which case his ceiling area shall be an extent of one standard holding. If his holding consists of more than one standard holding, he is liable to surrender the excess land over and above the standard holding, and it will vest in the Government.

    16. Therefore, the question is as to what is the extent of land of his holding and which land consists of his holding. What land his holding consists of will depended upon the meaning of the term ‘holding’ as defined in the Act and which is extracted above. Before we go into the discussion what land should be included in the holding of a person as per the definition, it will also be convenient, to note the definition of the term ‘owner’ as defined under Section 3(n) of the Act. It is an inclusive definition, which to the extent necessary for our purpose, is as under:

    “3. (n) owner, includes a person by whom or in whose favour a trust is created and a person entitled to a vested remainder; but does not include a limited owner………”

    17. From a perusal of the definition of the term ‘holding’ it is clear that the holding of a person includes the land which he holds as an owner, as a limited owner, as an usufructuary mortgagee, as tenant and the land in his possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or otherwise. But the question is whether the owner of a land having no possession and which is in the possession of a limited owner, or an usufructuary mortgagee, or a tenant, or in possession of a person by virtue of a mortgagee by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land can be said to hold it obliging him to include that land also in his holding for the purpose of holding out whether he holds any excess land over the ceiling area. If he has to include such land also in his ‘holding’ and the persons mentioned in clauses (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) of the definition of the term ‘holding’ have also to include the land in their possession in their holdings because they have to include it as per the definition, it would amount to inclusion of the same land in the holding of more than one person at the same lime.

    18. The learned Advocate General has argued that the intention of the Legislature is clear from the explanation added to the definition of the term ‘holding’ wherein it is provided that where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity, such land shall be included in the, holding of both such persons. If this explanation by itself, without anything more is to be construed literally, that would be the result. Having regard to the other provisions of the Act and the intendment of the Legislature as it would appear from those provisions, it cannot be said that the same land can become pan of the ‘holding’ of more than one person simultaneously and at the same time; If the same land is to be treated as part of the holding of more than one person, anomalous results would follow. For instance suppose an owner transferred and put the transferee in possession in part performance of an agreement of sale which is equivalent to more than a ceiling area and apart from the transferred land the owner is in possession of land equivalent to less than the ceiling area. If he is obliged to show land both in his possession of the transferee, the excess area will come to more than the land in his possession and he will be obliged to surrender the entire land in his possession leaving nothing for himself as he cannot touch the land in the possession of transferee who alone is entitled to continue in possession of it irrespective of the fact that title to the land still is with the owner transferor. Similarly, those anomalies would arise with regard to the lands in possession of a limited owner, usufructuary mortgagee or a tenant. That would not have been the result intended by the Legislature is clear having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 4, 9, 10 and 11 of the Act. According to those provisions a person is entitled to continue to hold land upto a ceiling area and it is not the intention of the Legislature to require a person to surrender land which the held and is not in excess of the ceilng areas. He is obliged to surrender only land which is in excess of the ceiling area, and it is provided under section 4 of the Act that the ceiling area shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding in the case of an individual or a family unit consisting of not more than five persons.

    19. What the Legislature must have really intended in enacting the explanation in the definition of the term ‘holding’ would be clear if Section 12 of the Act is read along with it. Provision is made under Section 12 for reversion of the land to the owner if the categories of persons mentioned in clauses (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) in the definition relating to term ‘holding’ namely, a limited owner, an usufructuary mortgagee, a tenant, a person who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land, happen to surrender the land in their possession holding in those capacities under the Act. For instance, if a transferee of land who is in possession through part performance of contract of sale having excess over the ceiling area in his holding, surrenders the land of which he is in possession through part performance of contract of sale, that land would not straightaway vest in the Government as provided: under section 11 of the Act. But it would revert to the owner transferor in which case he would be obliged to include that land in this holding. It is only, when such a land is surrendered by any of those categories of persons, and the land reverts to the owner the owner has to include the same in his holding, which means that the surrendered land would be included both in the holding of both the persons held by one person in one capacity and by another person in another capacity within the meaning of the Explanation. Perhaps, to meet a plausible argument that once a land is included in the holding of any person, it cannot be included in the holding of any other person under any circumstances the Legislature must have enacted the Explanation. It is also convenient to extract here section 12 of the Act, which is as follows:—

    “12. (1) Where any land is surrendered or is deemed to have been surrendered under this Act by any usufructuary mortgagee or tenant, the possession of such land shall subject to such rules as may be prescribed revert to the owner.

    (2) The owner to whom the possession of the land reverts under sub-section (1) from an usufructuary mortgagee shall be liable to pay the mortgage money due to the usufructuary mortgagee in respect of that land with interest at the rate of six percent per annum from the date of such reversion, and the said land shall continue to be as the security for such payment.

    (3) The owner to whom the possession of the land reverts under sub-section (I) from a tenant shall be entitled to receive from the tenant rent due for the period ending, with the last crop harvested by such tenant.

    (4) Where any, land is surrendered or is deemed to have been surrendered under this Act by any limited owner or by any person in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through a part performance of contract for sale or otherwise, the possession of such land shall, subject to such rules, as may be prescribed revert to the owner.

    (5) The Owner to whom the possession of the land reverts under sub-section (4) shall be liable to discharge the claim enforceable against the land by the limited owner or person in possession and the land surrendered shall, if held as a security, continue to be the security.

    (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where any land surrendered by an usufructuary mortgagee or a tenant or a limited owner or a person in possession referred to in, sub-section (4, is also a land surrendered by the owner, the provisions of section II shall apply”

    20. From a reading of sub-section (6) of section 12 it is clear that if any land is surrendered by any of those categories of persons mentioned in the definition of the term ‘holding’ other than the ‘owner’, the land will not straightaway vest in the Government as provided under section 11, and section 11, applies only if the same land is also surrendered by the owner. From this it is very clear that when a land is surrendered by any of those categories of persons, only then the surrendered land is to be included in the holding of the owner and if, by including that land along with his other land in the holding of the owner it is in excess of the ceiling area then he has to surrender the land in which case only it would vest in the Government as provided under section 11 of the Act.

    21. The expression ‘holding’, as already seen above, is defined as meaning the entire land held by a person in one or the other five capacities (clauses (i) to (v) mentioned therein). Then, the question is as to what is the meaning that has to be given to the expression ‘held’ used therein. The learned Advocate General has argued that the expression means the land possessed as well as the land owned without being in possession. He has argued that a person is bound to include in his holding not only the land which he owns and possesses but also the land in which he may not have any right to the present possession but only the persons like usufructuary mortgagee, limited owner, lessee, transferee in possession in pursuance of a contract of sale as in the categories mentioned in Clauses (ii), (iii, (iv) and (v). The meaning of the word ‘hold’ given in the Oxford Dictionary is, to keep fast to grasp; to contain; to possess; to occupy. The meaning is also given as be the owner in this connection the learned Advocate General has brought to my notice a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Handique v. Agrl. I.T Board, Assam (3) (AIR 1966 SC 1191). There, the Supreme Court was dealing with secs. 12 & 13 of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act; Both the sections deal with a person who-holds land from which agricultural income is deprived. The Supreme Court said that the expression ‘holds’ includes a two fold idea of the actual possession of a thing and also of being vested with a legal title. Sometimes it is used only, to mean actual possession. Under section 12 of the Assam Agricultural Income-Tax Act, the expression is used in the wider sense, for under that section the person mentioned therein holds land partly for his benefit or partly for the benefit of the beneficiary or wholly for the benefit of the beneficiary. In its wide phraseology the section takes in the trustees in whom property vests and also managers and the like who manage the properties on behalf of others. As the same expression ‘holds’ is used in section 13, it must be given the same meaning as it bears in section 12.

    22. Therefore, whether the expression is used in a wider sense or in a limited sense the idea of actual possession of a thing only, has to be determined having regard to the context in which it was used. In the present case, having regard to the various provisions of the Act, which were discussed above, the Legislature must have meant in using the expression ‘held’ to mean only possessed or entitled to the present possession. As already mentioned above, as indicated in section 4 the object of the Act is to ensure one ceiling area to a person. If the owner of a land, who is not entitled to possession for the reason that it is in possession of another person in any of the capacities as mentioned in clauses (ii) to (v) of the definition of the term ‘holding’ is obliged to include that land also in his holding and as a result of which if there is any excess over the ceiling area, he cannot surrender the land in possession of the other person as he has no right of possession over it and he will be obliged to surrender only the land in his possession which may result in completely depriving him of any land at all. That would not have been the intention of the Legislature. What must have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting the explanation to the definition is clear from the provisions-made in section 12, about which discussion had already been made above.

    23. The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the Legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the later has to be adopted. It must first he tried to ascertain the intention of the Legislature from the words used by attaching the ordinary meaning of the word under grammatical construction. If the language is not free from ambiguity, it becomes necessary and proper to take into consideration the back ground of the legislation and other circumstances which may help in the ascertainment of the intention. In Tiraih Singh v. Bachittar Singh (4) (AIR 1955 SC 830) the Supreme Court held that where the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of M.P v. Azad Bharat Finance Co. (5) (AIR 1967 SC 276). If the meaning of the word ‘held’ is to be given as also including ‘be the owner’ it will lead to absurd results, resulting in hardship and injustice, which cannot be presumed to have been intended by the Legislature., because the object of the Legislature as indicated in the various provisions of the Act seems to be to assure land upto one ceiling area to a person. The intention of the Legislature cannot be said to deprive a person completely of the land in his possession. Therefore, it must be taken that when the Legislature used the expression ‘held’ in the definition of the term ‘holding’, they must have used it only to mean as actually possessed or having a right to be in the present possession.

    24. The learned Advocate General has also cited a decision of this Court reported in P. Laxminarsimham v. State of Andhra Pradesh (6) (1969 I Andhra Weekly Reporter, 119) rendered under the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1961, wherein it was held that merely because the owner is not in possession of the lands such lands cannot be excluded from his holding for the purpose of the Ceiling Act as long as lie continued to be the owner of such lands. There, the definition of the term ‘holding’ is not similar to the one here There is no provision there similar to the one in section 1 of the present Act. Not only that, there when a purchaser under an invalid agreement of sale was in possession the question arose whether that land should be included in the holding of the owner. As provided under section 47 of the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act permission was necessary from the Tahsildar for any alienation. There was no such permission there. Justice Vaidya held that the lands agreed to be sold under an invaild agreement should be included in the holding of the owner. That is so because the purchaser there was not entitled to be in possession whereas the owner was entitled to be in possession. Therefore, the facts of that case have no application here.

    25. Therefore, a owner is not liable to include in his holding the land which is in possession of a limited owner; an usufructuary mortgagee; a tenant; or a person who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or otherwise or in one or more of such capacities, except, to the extent of the land reverted, if any, to the owner as provided under section 12 of Act. Here, the transfers are under unregistered sale deeds which took place in the years 1968 and 1969 which are prior to 24th January, 1971. Therefore, it is argued on behalf of the respondent that Section 7 of the Act has no application to these transfers. It is provided under section 7 of the Act that where on or after the 24th January, 1971 and before the notified date, any person has transferred whether by way of sale, gift, usufructuary mortgage, exchange settlement, surrender or in any other manner whatsoever, any land held by him, then the burden of proving that the said transfer has not been effected in anticipation of, and with a view to avoid or defeat the objects of any law relating to a reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings, shall be on such person. It is also argued that unless there is a transfer of interest in land Section 7 has no application at all. If that is so, it would lead to absurd results. If Section 7 cannot have any application whatsoever with regard to such transfers even if the transfer under an agreement of sale with possession was subsequent to 24th January, 1971, there would not be any obligation on the part of the transferor to show that it has not been effected in anticipation and with a view to avoiding and defeating the object of law relating to a reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings. It would not have been the intention of the Legislature to make the transfers under agreements of sale with possession to be on a better footing than the transfers made under registered documents. The expressions used in the section is only a transfer. As provided under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, when there is an agreement of sale and the transferee takes possession of the land agreed to be sold in part performance of the contract, it is a transfer. The expressions used in section 53-A are ‘transferor’ and ‘transferee’. So also a lease of immoveable property, though it does not involve transfer of interest, is mentioned as a transfer under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, to be a transfer there need not be any transfer of interest in the immoveable property. The expression ‘transfer, is not defined in the Act. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘transfer’ means convey, handover, make over possession of etc. Hence, there is no difficulty in holding that the transfers envisaged under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act also come under transfers mentioned in section 7 of the Ceiling Act. Therefore, if a transfer which comes under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is subsequent to 24th January, 1971, the transferor also is obliged to prove that he did not make the transfer in order to avoid and defeat any ceiling law for disregarding that land transferred in the computation of his ceiling area, if it is prior to that date, he need not prove it.

    26. Therefore, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and it is declared that the two extents of land of Ac. 17-00 cents and Ac. 11-48 cents in S. Nos. 36 and 41 respectively, cannot be included in the holding of the petitioner for the purpose of ascertaining whether he is holding any land in excess of the ceiling area. No costs.

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