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  • section 12B(2) except that section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act
  • section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1.940
  • 31, 1956. While sub-section (1) of the section
  • section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act
  • section 12B(2) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922,
  • section 12B(2) of the Income-Tax Act, 1962,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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  • section 12B(2) except that section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act
  • section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1.940
  • 31, 1956. While sub-section (1) of the section
  • section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act
  • section 12B(2) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922,
  • section 12B(2) of the Income-Tax Act, 1962,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns the application of the first proviso to section 12B(2) of the Income-Tax Act to facts arising in the assessment year 1959–60. The assessee was a private limited company with its head office at Pudukottai and a branch at Madras. For the year in question the assessee returned total income of Rs. 8,97,976, of which Rs. 8,06,916 related to business income.

Relevant transactions and administrative actions as described in the opinion:

  • On August 19, 1954 the assessee purchased 669 shares of Southern Roadways Private Limited for Rs. 93,660.
  • On December 19, 1958 the assessee sold those shares for Rs. 66,900 to three ladies, resulting in a loss (on cost vs. sale price) of Rs. 26,760.
  • On November 11, 1959 the assessee's directors resolved that the difference between the cost and sale prices might be treated as a gift to the purchasers.
  • The Income‑Tax Officer determined the market value of the stock as at March 31, 1958 to be Rs. 1,56,064 and treated the difference between cost and market value (Rs. 62,404) as a capital gain subject to assessment.
  • The Income‑Tax Officer also added Rs. 4,497, being wealth‑tax paid by the assessee, as disallowed business expenditure.

Two references arose from these assessments: (1) whether the assessee could deduct the wealth tax as an admissible business expense; and (2) whether the first proviso to section 12B(2) could be invoked by the department to treat the consideration as the fair market value (i.e., to assess capital gains of Rs. 62,404).

The Tribunal and the revenue made factual findings relevant to the proviso: the three purchasers were closely related to the directors, and the revenue disputed the assessee's contention that the sale was made to benefit the purchasers rather than to avoid capital gains tax. The Tribunal, however, found the sale was a real transaction done to benefit the ladies and not made with the object of tax avoidance; the court accepted the Tribunal's view.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in disallowing the claim for deduction of wealth‑tax payable by the assessee for the assessment year 1959–60 as an admissible business expenditure.
  2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the first proviso to section 12B(2) of the Income‑Tax Act cannot be invoked by the department for the purpose of assessing capital gains of Rs. 62,404 (i.e., treating consideration as fair market value where purchaser is closely connected to vendor).

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The purchasers were closely related to the directors, satisfying a precondition for the proviso to section 12B(2).
  • The department declined to accept the assessee's contention that the object of the sale was to benefit the purchasers; it contended the transaction should be scrutinized and that the proviso could be applied to treat the consideration as the fair market value in order to prevent avoidance or reduction of tax liability.
  • Through counsel (Mr. Balasubrahmanyan) the revenue argued that even if the lower consideration was honestly agreed, if it had the effect of avoiding or reducing the tax liability, that effect alone would be sufficient to invoke the proviso.

Assessee's Arguments

  • The sale was a real transaction, acted upon by the parties, carried out to benefit the three ladies (who were closely related to the directors) rather than to avoid or reduce capital‑gains tax.
  • The directors' resolution indicating the difference might be treated as a gift supported the view that the transaction was motivated by love and affection and bona fide desire to benefit the purchasers rather than by tax avoidance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Travancore Titanium Products Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Kerala [1966] 60 I.T.R. 277 (S.C.) Cited as governing authority on the issue of deduction of wealth tax as business expenditure. The court stated that the first question was covered by this decision and that it is adverse to the assessee; no further consideration of that question was necessary.
Karumuthu Thiagaraja Chetty and Co. v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax Mentioned in analogy to section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act; raised in argument about construing provisos relating to valuation and tax avoidance. The court found this case did not assist the interpretation of the proviso to section 12B(2) and rejected carrying the analogy further; it refused to read that the Excess Profits Tax precedent would hit an honest transaction actually involving no gain.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court accepted the Tribunal's factual finding that the sale to the three ladies was a real transaction and was not made with the object of avoidance or reduction of tax liability but to benefit them. The analysis proceeded in distinct steps:

  1. The court set out the statutory framework of section 12B (introduced in 1947 and substituted with effect from April 1, 1957). Sub‑section (2) prescribes computation of capital gain after certain deductions, and the first proviso deals with situations where the purchaser is directly or indirectly connected with the assessee and the Income‑Tax Officer believes the transaction was effected to avoid or reduce liability; in that case, the consideration shall be taken to be the fair market value (subject to prior approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner).
  2. The court identified the principal requisites for the application of the proviso: (a) acquisition from the assessee by one of the modes in section 12B(1); (b) direct or indirect connection between purchaser and assessee; (c) consideration less than fair market value; and (d) a motive of avoidance or reduction of tax liability implicated by the discrepancy between the consideration and fair market value.
  3. Noting the clumsy drafting of the proviso, the court interpreted it purposively rather than giving a purely literal effect that would render the proviso otiose. The reasonable reading, the court held, is that where there is a difference between the stated consideration and fair market value and the Income‑Tax Officer, on tangible material and in a bona fide inquiry into motive, believes the lower consideration is a device to avoid or reduce tax liability, the proviso is invokable.
  4. Conversely, if the lower consideration is honestly agreed upon and the transaction is bona fide — for example, motivated by love and affection or particular commercial circumstances — there is no justification for imputing to the vendor a motive to avoid or reduce tax. In such a case the proviso should not be applied to create a deemed or fictional capital gain.
  5. The court therefore rejected the revenue's broader submission (advanced by Mr. Balasubrahmanyan) that mere effect of reducing tax liability by a lower but honest consideration would suffice to invoke the proviso. The court concluded that neither the language, context nor structure of section 12B supports that expansive view.
  6. The court considered but declined to rely on analogy with section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act and the Karumuthu Thiagaraja Chetty decision; it found those authorities not to provide support for applying the proviso to an honest transaction actually involving no gain.

Holding and Implications

The court gave final answers to the two questions referred:

  • First question (T.C. No. 106 of 1965): Answered against the assessee. The court treated this question as governed by Travancore Titanium Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala, which is adverse to the assessee. (This relates to disallowance of the claimed deduction of wealth tax as a business expenditure.)
  • Second question (T.C. No. 107 of 1965): Answered against the revenue. The court upheld the Tribunal's finding that the proviso to section 12B(2) could not be invoked on these facts because the sale was a bona fide transaction made to benefit the purchasers and not motivated by avoidance of tax; therefore the department could not assess capital gains by treating the consideration as the fair market value in this case.

Costs and fees: the court ordered costs in each reference and awarded counsel's fee of Rs. 250 in each reference (as stated in the opinion).

Implications: The court's interpretation limits the scope of the first proviso to section 12B(2) to cases where the Income‑Tax Officer, on tangible material and proper inquiry into motive, genuinely believes the lower consideration is a device to avoid or reduce tax liability. The proviso is not to be applied to create a fictional or deemed gain where the transaction is honest and genuinely motivated by non‑tax reasons such as love and affection or other bona fide circumstances. The court thus clarified that the proviso targets escaped capital gains in fact, not imagined gains from bona fide transactions.

    Sundaram Industries Private Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras

    Veeraswami, J.:— The substantial question relates to the application of the first proviso to section 12B(2) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922, to the facts and we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in holding that the proviso has no application. The assessee is a private limited company with its head office at Pudukottai and a branch at Madras. The reference is concerned with the assessment year 1959-60. Out of a total income of Rs. 8,97,976 returned, Rs. 8,06,916 related to the business income. On August 19, 1954, the assessee had purchased 669 shares of the Southern Roadways Private Limited for a sum of Rs. 93,660. On December 19, 1958, the assessee sold them for a total consideration of Rs. 66,900 to three ladies. On that transaction there was a loss of Rs. 26,760. On November 11, 1959, the directors of the assessee resolved that the difference between, the cost and sale prices of the shares might be treated as a gift to the purchasers. What the purpose of this resolution was is not obvious. The market value of the stock as on March 31, 1958, was determined by the Income-Tax Officer to be Rs. 1,56,064. He treated the difference between the cost and the market prices, viz., Rs. 62,404, as a capital gain on the sale of the shares made during the year of account. He also made another addition of Rs. 4,497, being the wealth-tax which had been paid by the assessee. These two matters have given rise to the two references relating to the same year, the questions being (1) whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in disallowing the claim for deduction of wealth-tax payable by the assessee for the assessment year 1959–60 as an admissible business expenditure, and (2) whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the first proviso to section 12B(2) of the Income-Tax Act, 1962, cannot be invoked by the department for the purpose of assessment to capital gains of the sum of Rs. 62,404.

    2. As to the first question, it is not in controversy that it is covered by Travancore Titanium Products Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax Kerala [1966] 60 I.T.R 277 S.C. which is against the assessee. No further consideration of this question is therefore necessary.

    3. On the second question, it has been found both by the revenue and the Tribunal that the three ladies who purchased the shares were closely related to the directors of the assessee and were thus directly connected to them by the relationship.

    4. That is one of the requisites for the application of the proviso to section 12B(2) and that is therefore satisfied. The revenue at all stages declined to accept the assessee's contention that the object of the sale of the shares to the three ladies was to benefit them and it was not made with the object of avoidance or reduction of the assessee's tax liability to capital gains. The Tribunal differing from that view has found as a fact that the sale was a real transaction which was given effect to and acted upon by the parties thereto and that further it was not made with the object of avoidance or reduction of tax liability but made for the purpose of benefiting the ladies. As a matter of fact, even the Appellate Assistant Commissioner mentioned that the motive for the sale might have been the natural love and affection for and desire to provide the ladies. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the second condition for application of the proviso to section 12B(2) has not been satisfied and that, therefore, the proviso could not be invoked.

    5. As we observed at the outset, we accept that view of the Tribunal as correct. Section 12B which was introduced in 1947 and substituted with effect from April 1, 1957, brings to charge certain species of income, so it is deemed to be, in the form of capital gains, that is to say, gains made from sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer of a capital asset effected in any accounting year after March 31, 1956. While sub-section (1) of the section charges such gain—and we are not concerned with its two provisos for our present purpose—sub-section (2) prescribes the procedure for computation of a capital gain. It permits its computation after making deductions under two heads, (1) expenditure incurred solely in connection with such sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer and (2) the actual cost to the assessee of the capital asset, including any expenditure of a capital nature incurred and borne by him in making any additions or alterations. Then comes the proviso which reads:

    “Provided that where a person who acquires a capital asset from the assessee, whether by sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer, is a person with whom the assessee is directly or indirectly connected, and the Income-Tax Officer has reason to believe that the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer was effected with the object of avoidance or reduction of the liability of the assessee under this section, the full value of the consideration for which the sale, exchange, relinquishment or’ transfer is made shall, with the prior approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, be taken to be the fair market value of the capital asset on the date on which the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer took place.”

    6. It is rather curious that this proviso is made part of the procedural part of the section which deals with computation and deductions. The proviso really has the effect of an addition subject to what may follow in this judgment. The main requisites for application of the proviso are 1(1) acquisition by a person from the assessee of a capital asset by one of the modes mentioned in section 12B(1); (2) connection directly or indirectly of the purchaser with the assessee who is the vendor; (3) consideration for such a transaction as expressed or found being less than the fair market value; and (4) the motive for the transaction, namely, avoidance or reduction of liability to tax, impliedly with reference to the difference in price not reflected in the transaction. The language employed by the proviso in order to express the difference in price in relation to the market value has not been happily worded. In fact, if literal effect is given to the words actually used, it must be said that the purpose of the proviso will be otiose. The proviso refers to “the full value of the consideration for which the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer is made shall… … … …be taken to be the fair market value” and that would mean that the value mentioned in the particular transaction as the consideration shall be taken to be the fair market value. If we give effect to these words, as we should, nothing more need be said against the revenue in this case. But we shall proceed on the basis that roughly the intention has been brought out notwithstanding the clumsy phraseology that where there is a difference between the consideration for the transaction and the fair market value, the consideration for the transaction shall be taken to be the fair market value. When can this assumption be made? It is obvious that the transaction should be a real one and has been acted upon. But the connection directly or indirectly between the vendor and purchaser may serve as the starting point for a probe as to the motive for the transaction. If in the search for the motive in the light of tangible material the Income-Tax Officer is of opinion that the consideration recited for the transaction, which is lower than the fair market value, was a means to avoid or reduce the tax liability, all the requisites required for invoking and applying the proviso would have been satisfied. But where it is found or there is nothing to show that the consideration for the transaction, though lower than the fair market value is not a means or device or a cloak to avoid or reduce the tax liability, the proviso will have no application. It reduces itself to this that, if the consideration for the transaction has been honestly agreed upon, with a view to benefit, the purchaser and out of love and affection on account of the relationship, or with reference to particular circumstances, there will then be little room and there will, in our view, be no justification for imputing a motive to the vendor to avoid or reduce the tax liability. The consideration cannot be said to be the result of an honest dealing and at the same time it be dubbed as a device for avoidance or reduction of tax liability. What the proviso gets at for charge is the actual capital gain which the vendor should, in the circumstances, have made but is made to appear that the gain as shown by the consideration for the transaction to be much less or nil. We are not persuaded to think that the proviso discourages or avoids honest transactions made out of love and affection or for other conceivable reasons on pain of being on an assumption, hauled up, if we may use the expression, for having attempted to avoid or reduce the” tax liability and on that basis made liable to tax on the difference between the consideration for the transaction and the fair market value. That simply, as we read the proviso, is not its purpose. It does not treat what is not an actual capital gain as a deemed capital gain. In fact, occurring as it does as the first proviso to sub-section (2) dealing with the procedural aspect of computation, it should, we think, be interpreted as limited to escaped capital gain, which is so in truth and in fact, and not intended to bring about fictional gain on an assumption and charge the same.

    7. Mr. Balasubrahmanyan strenuously urged before us that even if the consideration for the transaction mentioned is not fraudulent but an honest one representing the truth, if the consideration lower than the fair market value has the effect of avoiding or reducing the tax liability, that in itself would be sufficient for invoking the proviso. On the view of the scope and effect of the proviso we have just now mentioned, we cannot accept this point of view of the revenue. Neither the language of the proviso nor its context nor the structure of section 12B as a whole enables us to come to such a conclusion. We are wholly unable to read the proviso in the sense 1 in which Mr. Balasubrahmanyan would desire us to do.

    8. Our attention was drawn to section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1.940 as well as to Karumuthu Thiagamja Chetty and Co. v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax but we find no assistance from them in construing the scope and effect of the proviso to section 12B(2) except that section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act has a resemblance in language to the proviso to section 12B(2). But beyond that the analogy should not, in our opinion, be carried further, as the circumstances and the ambit in which the Excess Profits Tax Act revolve are different from those attending section 12B. Apart from that we do not think that Karumuthu Thiagaraja Chetty and Co. v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax meant to lay down that section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act would hit even an honest transaction actually involving no gain, though it happens to be for a consideration lower than the fair market value.

    9. The first question in T.C No. 106 of 1965 is answered against the assessee and the question in T.C No. 107 of 1965 against the revenue with costs in each and counsel's fee of Rs. 250 also in each.

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    Sundaram Industries Private Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras
    (Dec 16, 1968)