J.N Wazir, C.J:— This is an appeal filed by Shrimati Kamla Devi wife of Amar Nath against the order of the District Judge, Jammu, dismissing her application for judicial separation. The appellant averred in her petition that her husband, Amar Nath, was a drunkard, had been mal-treating her and had turned her out from his house after giving her a beating and that he had falsely involved her in a criminal case under Sec. 498 I.P.C The husband denied all the allegations made by his wife against him. The District Judge raised an issue whether the respondent has been treating the petitioner cruelly and whether he has sold her ornaments. But without recording a clear finding on this issue he found that the appellant had not been able to establish that her husband had given her any beating and had turned her out, and dismissed her application.
2. In appeal the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the husband had made false allegations of adulterous conduct against the appellant which amounted to legal cruelty and the District Judge had not given a clear finding on the issue specially raised on that point.
3. The case was remanded to the trial Court with the direction that it will allow the parties to adduce further evidence in regard to issue No. 2 and after considering the entire evidence will return a fresh finding on that issue. The District Judge after pyamining the evidence has come to the conclusion that legal cruelty on the part of her husband towards his wife has been fully established.
4. Learned counsel for the husband respondent has argued that there is no evidence to show that the criminal complaint filed by his client against his wife under Sec. 498, R.P.C has in any way affected the reputation of the appellant and, therefore, the allegations made in that complaint do not amount to legal cruelty. We do not see any force in this contention. It is admitted that a criminal complaint was filed by the respondent against the appellant in which he specially attributed adulterous conduct to the appellant.
5. He adduced evidence in support of his complaint but was unable to prove his allegations and the complaint was dismissed. The appellant has gone into the witness box and has stated that the false allegations made against her chastity have greatly shocked her and have affected her reputation. Although the term ‘cruelty’ is not defined by statute the consensus of opinion of the High Courts in India now has been that any conduct of the husband which causes disgrace to the wife or subjects her to a course of annoyance and indignity amounts to legal cruelty.
6. False accusations of unchastity made by the husband may cause the wife great mental suffering which may be much severer than bodily pain caused by some beating. Such accusations certainly would amount to cruelty in the eye of law. In Shrimati Pancho…Applicant; v. Ram Prasad…Opposite Party., AIR 1956 All 41 it has been held that a husband prone to make adverse Statements against the chastity of wife to meet the exigencies of the situation, cannot be said to be a husband who has taken a kindly attitude towards the wife. Conception of legal cruelty undergoes changes according to the changes and advancement of social concept and standards of living.
7. Where evidence of physical violence is not per se sufficient to warrant a finding of cruelty, the Court is bound to take into consideration the general conduct of the husband towards the wife and if this is of a character tending to degrade the wife and subjecting her to a course of intense indignity injurious to her health, the Court is at liberty to pronounce the cruelty proved. The same view is taken in Abbas Ali…Defendant; v. Rabia Bibi…Plaintiff., AIR 1952 All 145 and Serah Abraham v. Pyli Abraham, AIR 1959 Kerala 75. In the present case the husband made false imputations of unchastity against his wife and filed a complaint against her and tried to show that she had illicit intimacy with some one else.
8. But he failed to do so and his complaint was dismissed. Under these circumstances the appellant is entitled to a decree for judicial separation against the respondent. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the District Judge and direct that a decree be made in favour of the appellant against her husband as prayed for by her in her application. The parties shall bear their own costs in this Court.
9. Nair, J.:— I agree.
LD/R.G.D
10. Appeal allowed.
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