Swatanter Kumar, J.:— This revision is directed against the order dated 16th November, 1999, passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division). Sangrur, vide which the judge dismissed the objections filed by the petitioner-objector.
2. The objector had filed objection on the plea that he had purchased half share of Khasra No. 1660 measuring 0-8 marlas situated at Prem Basti. Street No. 3. Sangrur through registered sale deed No. 142 dated 27.4.1998 The possession of the said property was sought to be taken by the decree-holder in furtherance to the decree passed by the court on 17.1.1998 It is contended that the objector was not party to the suit and was a bona fide purchaser, as such, the property was not liable to be attached. Learned trial court by detailed order dismissed the objections for valid and proper reason.
3. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner-objector that the decree in question was passed on 17.1.1998 and he had purchased the property on 27.1.1998 In other words, the sale deed is subsequent to the passing the decree by the Court. The person, thus, who transferred the property to the objector, had prima facie no title of the property on the date of execution of the sale deed. In other words, the objections were frivolous and at the face of it liable to be rejected.
4. At this stage, reference can be made to the case of Rocky Tyres… v. Ajit Jain…, C.R No. 3293 of 1996, decided on 17.12.1997 reported in 1998 (3) PLR 53 : 1998 (2) RCR (Civil) 17 (P&H), where the Court held as under:
“It is a settled principle of law that it is not incumbent upon the executing Court that it must put to trial every objections which are filed in any execution proceedings, even if prima facie they appear to be frivolous, vexatious and are only intended to delay the execution and frustrate the procedure of law or where it amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. In this regard reference can be made to a judgment of this Court in Execution Second Appeal No. 2333 of 1996, Bhagwan Singh v. Parkash Chand, decided in 7.11.1996 The Court after detailed discussion and following the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the cases of Babu Lal v. Raj Kumar, J.T 1996 (2) S.C 716, Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 702, B. Gangadhar v. B.C Rajalingam, (1995) 5 SCC 238 : AIR 1996 Supreme Court 790 : 1995 (3) RRR (Civil) 188 (SC)” and noticing judgments of various High Courts, held as under:—
“Now for a considerable period it is not only the judicial trend which has declined to interfere to protect unlawful possession or possession of ranked trespasser etc. but, on the other hand, judicial anxiety has been to give effective relief to the successful parties by expeditious execution of decree of favour of the parties. Unnecessary prolongation of litigation sometimes results even in frustrating the decree itself. Such attempt on the part of the objector to frustrate a decree is a mischief which has to be prevented by due process of law and expeditious decision of such ill-founded and frivolous objections would also be in the interest of justice and within the permissible field of jurisdiction of the execution.
“If frivolous objections of the present kind are permitted to unreasonably and unnecessarily prolonged the delivery of possession to a decree-holder in accordance with law it would certainly amount to putting a premium on abuse of process of law.”
Thus the carnal (cardinal) principle of law that follows is that the purpose of granting an opportunity to prove his case to an objector while entertaining objections under Section 47 read with Order 21 Rules 97 to 108 of the Civil Procedure Code does not amount to permission for abusing the process of law or court. The discretion must be exercised by the Court in such cases. Of course discretion is governed by settled judicial principles and must be exercised within four concerns of law, but such a discretion cannot be termed as a mere routine exercise of judicial discretion. Either way it should be for well founded and settled principles governing the subject.”
5. For the reasons aforestated, I find no error of jurisdiction in the impugned order. Consequently, revision petition is dismissed.
Revision dismissed.
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