K.A Mohamed Shafi, J.:— The landlord-petitioner in R.C.P No. 49/1994 on the file of the Rent Control Court, Alappuzha is the revision petitioner. The R.C.R is filed seeking eviction of the respondent under Ss. 11(2) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Kerala Act, 2/1965).

2. The respondent is conducting a Jewellery business in the petition schedule premises after obtaining the same on rent from the original landlord. The revision petitioner purchased the petition schedule room as per the registered assignment deed dated 31.5.1993 from the original owner. Thereafter respondent attorned to the revision petitioner and has been paying rent. The rent due from 1.6.1993 was in arrears. The revision petitioner needs the petition schedule building to conduct a business of his own. Therefore, the above R.C.R is filed by him.

3. The respondent resisted the petition contending that he has been in possession of the building prior to the year 1940 and as such he is entitled to the benefit of S. 11(17) of the Kerala Act 2/1965. He has also contended that the claim for eviction of the building on the ground of bona fide need is not at all bona fide and it is only a ruse to evict him. The Rent Control Court dismissed the petition. The landlord preferred R.C.A No. 57/95 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Alappuzha. During the pendency of the appeal the claim for eviction under S. 11(2) of the Kerala Act 2/65 was not pressed since the respondent paid the entire rent. The appellate court also concurred with the finding of the Rent Control Court under S. 11(3) and dismissed the appeal confirming the order passed by the Rent Control Court on that ground. Hence this revision is preferred before this Court by the landlord.

4. The claim for the benefit under S. 11(17) of the Kerala Act 2/65 made by the respondent is negatived by the Rent Control Court finding that the lease was after the year 1940. That finding has become final.

5. The original respondent who was conducting Jewellery business in the petition schedule room died and the respondents herein are his legal representatives. The revision petitioner has sought eviction of the room alleging that he requires the room to conduct a Jewellery business of his own. It is not in dispute that the petition schedule room is situated at Mullackal street in Alappuzha where there are large number of Jewellery shops and is at the entrance to the main road.

6. It is in evidence that the petitioner's father is conducting lucrative business and his mother is conducting a lodge and vacant rooms belonging to the mother of the petitioner are available at Thondankulangara near their residential house. It is also in evidence that vacant rooms are available in the first floor of the building wherein the petition schedule shop room is situated in the ground floor and the mother of the revision petitioner is conducting a lodge. The Rent Control Court found that since there are vacant rooms available for the revision petitioner to conduct the trade, his claim for eviction of the petition schedule room under S. 11(3) of the Kerala Act 2/65 is not bona fide. It is also found that as the revision petitioner is assisting his father in the business, he being the only son of the parents who are engaged in vast business, there is no need for him to start a new business of his own in the petition schedule premises. The above findings of the Rent Control Court are endorsed by the Appellate Authority.

7. The counsel for the revision petitioner argued that as it is common case that the petition schedule building is situated at the Mullackal Street in Alappuzha which is a very important locality wherein large number of Jewelleries are being conducted, the contention of the respondent and the findings of the authorities below that the revision petitioner can start his independent Jewellery business in the rooms available at Thondankulangara near his residential house, are absolutely unsustainable and perverse. Likewise it is argued that the findings of the authorities below that the revision petitioner can start his Jewellery business in the room available in the first floor of the same building wherein the respondent is conducting the Jewellery in the ground floor, are also not sustainable since there are several risk factors against starting the Jewellery business in the first floor while the tenant is conducting the same business in the ground floor of the same building. It is further argued that this shop room belongs to the revision petitioner exclusively having purchased in his name though financed by his father in the year 1993 and his financial capacity to start the business is not disputed and in fact the contention of the respondent that as his parents have got sufficient business and vacant buildings the petitioner cannot have a business of his own in his own building is not sustainable.

8. The revision petitioner has completed his B. Com. Degree Course in the year 1995 and he wants to start an independent business of his own. Even though in the order passed by the Rent Control Court it is stated that the petitioner is conducting financial business along with his father, it is clear from the testimony of PW 1 that he never admitted that he is conducting the business with his father. The Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority found that the revision petitioner has suppressed facts in so far as vacant buildings are available to him to start the business.

9. The first proviso to S. 11(3) of the Kerala Act 2/65 provides that the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so.

10. In this case there is no contention that the revision petitioner is in possession of any building of his own in the locality. But the contention is that the shop rooms belonging to the mother of the revision petitioner are available for him to start his independent Jewellery business. PW 1 has deposed that those vacant rooms available are not sufficient for his trade. As against the testimony of the revision petitioner as PW 1, the only evidence available is the testimony of RW 1 stating that those rooms are convenient for the independent trade of the revision petitioner. No commission is taken out to prove that the revision petitioner is in possession of any convenient room to start the trade which he intends to start. It is pertinent to note that when it was offered to the respondent the vacant rooms available at Thondankulangara or in the first floor of the building in which the petition schedule room is situated to shift his trade, he declined the same. It is the definite case of the revision petitioner that the rooms available at Thondankulangara are not convenient to start Jewellery business. He has also contended that the room in the first floor of the building in which the petition schedule room is situated is also not convenient to start Jewellery business. It is further contended that it is highly risky to start the Jewellery business in the first floor of the building while the respondent is conducting Jewellery business in the ground floor.

11. It is well settled that the tenant cannot dictate to the landlord regarding his need or choice of the building. In the decision in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.., (1998) 8 SCC 119, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of S. 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When the landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.

12. In the decision in Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. ((2000) 1 SCC 679) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“It is true that the plaintiff landlord in his evidence stated that there were a number of other shops and houses belonging to him but he made a categorical statement that his said houses and shops were not vacant and that the suit premises is suitable for his business purpose. It is a settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. (See Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T.V Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353). In the case in hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted”.

13. In the decision in R.C Thamrakar v. Nidi Lekha ((2001) 8 SCC 431) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“10. Law is well settled that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement In deciding the question of the bonafide requirement, it is unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself”.

14. In the decision in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders & Agencies ((1996) 5 SCC 344) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“As pointed out by this Court it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement If the landlord desires to beneficially enjoy his own properly when the ether property occupied by him as a tenant or on any other basis is either insecure or inconveniest it is not for the courts to dictate to him to continue to occupy such premises.”

15. In the decision in Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta ((1999) 6 SCC 222) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as available then the court has to ask the landlord why he is not occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need. Thelandlordmay convincethe court that me alternative residential accommodafion though available is stilll of no consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist Needless to say that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, Obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction.”

16. It is clear from the evidence on record that the alternate buildings shown to have available in this case to the revision petitioner are not conveniently situated to start the Jewellery business according to PW 1, and the respondent as RW 1 has also stated that he is not prepared to shift his business to any of those buildings available. Therefore, the buildings shown to have available to the revision petitioner in this case belonging to his mother are not reasonably sufficient for his proposed trade, and therefore that fact is absolutely insufficient to negative the claim for eviction underthe first proviso to S. 11(3) of the Kerala Act 2/1965.

17. The Rent Control Court as well as the appellate authority found that the inon-disclosure of the availabirity of alternate accommodation in the petition by the revision petitioner is fatal and that fact goes against the banqfides of the claim for eviction made by the petitioner under S. 11(3) of the Kerala Act 2/1965.

18. It is now settled that even if the landlord failed to mention in the petition for eviction ahout the outer premises belonging to him, if materials about those alternate accommodation have been placed before the court and the matter has been adequately considered by the court without causing any prejudice to the tenant, the non-disclosure of the availiability of buildings in the petition is immaterial.

19. In the decision in M.L Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal. ((2001) 2 SCC 355) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“5. It has been urged that there was suppression en the part of the landlord inasmuch as he did not disclose the premises which were available at No. 16/57 Gali No. 1. Joshi road as well as the premises Which are available at Basant Road, Pahar Ganj. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent, Dr. Singhvi has submitted that the only reguirement is to disclose such accommodation as is suitable for residence of the landlord. Dr. Singhvi submitted that if there is no other residential accommodation which is snitable then there is no duty to disclose. Dr. Singhvi relird upon the authority in the case of Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani ((1999) 1 SCC 141) wherein it has been held that the questions whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation ??? which is ??? ??? asguarensent It is ??? that whether the landlord has any other ??? ??? whether the other ??? ??? suit premises wotiid not solely depend upon pleadings and Jioii-diselosare by the ilarafflord. It was ??? that she landlord having another accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case and placed materials before the court and case of neither party was prejudiced. In this case even though the landlord has not mentioned about the other two premises, the material in respect of the other twopremises was placed before the Rent Controller as well as before the High Court, thus no prejudice has been caused. The parties have squarely dealt with this question.”

20. In this ease from the evidence on record it is clear that even though the revision petitionerhas not disclosed about the availability of the rooms belonging to his parents and their non-suitability for the purpose of the trade that he intends to start in the petition schedule premises, both sides have properly understood the applicability and impact of the frst proviso to S. 11(3) of the Kerala Act 2/1965 and both of mem have adduced evidence on this aspect of the ease. It is also clear that by the nondisclosure about the rooms available and belonging to the parents of the revision petitioner, absolutely no prejudice is caused to the revision petitioner and he has put forward necessary contentions and adduced evidence with regard to the applicability of the first proviso to S. 11(3) of the Kerala Act 2/1965 in this case. Hence in view of the fact that evidence is adduced by both sides with regard to the applicability of the first proviso to S. 11(3) of the Kerala Act 2/1965 and that contention is considered by the Courts below and no prejudice is caused to the revision petitioner by non-disclosure of the fact, the failure of the revision petitioner to mention that fact in the R.C.P, is immaterial and the contention of the respondent that non-disclosure of the fact is fatal in this case to the respondent, is absolutely unsustainable.

21. It is well settled that the bona fide irequirement of the landlord should be objectively tested and the landlord need not establish that it is a dire need. In the decision in Sim Simp Gupta v. Dr. Makesh Chand Gupta ((1999) 6 SCC 222) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“The judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts subsnnitiated by the landlod the need to occupy me premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest If the answer be in the positive the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord 10 substantiate the pleaded need, or In a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that reality was to the contry and the landlord was merely attempting at finding at a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord.”

22. The lower authorities found that the parents of the petitioner are having very good business and therefore, there is no necessity for the revision petitioner to start a business of Ms own, he being the only son of the parents. We have already noted that the observation by the courts below that the petitioner has been assisting his father in the business is not supported fey evidence. Even otherwise the need of the landlord to start a business of his own cannot be negatived due to the mere fact that his father or parents have got business.

23. In the decision in Ramkubai v. Hajarimal Dlwkalchand Chandak ((1999) 6 SCC 540) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“It is correct that Bhikchand was unemployed on the date of filing of the suit but he could not be expected to idle away the time by remaining unemployed till the case is finally decided. It has already taken about 25 years. Therefore, we do not think that taking up contractor work, in the meanwhile, will militate against his carrying on the business of kirana which is his family business, which was carried on by his father and is being carried on by his brother independently. The facts that the landlady during her lifetime was apartner in the firm carrying on kirana business and her elder son is earrying on kirana business do not disentitle Bhikchand to establish his own business.”

24. Therefore, the fact that the revision petitioner's parents are conducting lucrative business is no ground to negative his claim to conduct a business of his own.

25. It has been contended that the revision petitioner has no experience in Jewellery business and therefore, the need alleged by the petitioner to start a Jewellery business is not bona fide and that contention is found favour with the authorities below. It is well settled that no such prior experience to conduct business is necessary for claiming eviction under S. 11(3) of the Kerala Act 2/1965.

26. In the decision in Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde, (1999) 4 SCC 1, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“12. If a person wants to start a new business of his own it may be to his own advantage if he acquires experience in that line. But to say that any venture of a person in the business field without acquiring past experience reflects lack of his bona fides is a fallacious and unpragmatic approach. Many a business has flourished in this country by leaps and bounds which was started by a novice in the field; and many other business ventures have gone haywire despite vast experience to the credit of the propounders. The opinion of the learned Single Judge that acquisition of sufficient know-how is a precondition for even proposing to start any business, if gains approval as a proposition of law, is likely to shatter the initiative of young talents and deter new entrepreneurs from entering any field of business or commercial activity. Experience can be earned even while the business is in progress. It is too pedantic a norm to be formulated that “no experience no venture”.”

27. The counsel for the respondents submitted that in the above revision preferred under S. 20 of the Kerala Act 2/1965 this Court cannot re-appraise the evidence and reverse the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the lower authorities, even if on facts a different conclusion can be arrived at by this Court. He submitted that the plausible view taken by the authorities below in this case cannot be overthrown by this Court in the above revision since those findings are neither perverse nor illegal. Therefore, he submitted that by exercising the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under S. 20 of the Kerala Act 2/1965 which is intended to cure any illegality, irregularity or impropriety that has crept in the orders passed by the authorities below, the impugned concurrent findings of the authorities below cannot be set aside.

28. The fact that the jurisdiction of this Court under S. 20 of the Kerala Act 2/1965 is very limited though much wider than the revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 of the CPC is well settled. But the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record in this case clearly establish that the entire approach made by the authorities below in this case regarding the bona fides of the claim made by the revision petitioner for eviction under S. 11(3) of the Kerala Act 2/1965 is contrary to law and perverse without proper appreciation of the evidence on record. Therefore, we find that this is an appropriate case wherein we should exercise our revisional jurisdiction under S. 20 of the Kerala Act 2/1965 to rectify the illegality, irregularity and impropriety committed by the authorities below in this case.

29. Hence this revision petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Rent Control Court confirmed by the Appellate Authority declining eviction under S. 11(3) of the Kerala Act 2/1965 is set aside and the petition is allowed for eviction under S. 11(3) of the Kerala Act 2/1965. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent is given three months' time from this date to surrender vacant possession of the building to the revision petitioner with the liability to pay the contract rent till the date of surrender of possession.