Mohamed Shafi, J.:— The claimant in O.P (M.V) No. 58/89 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur is the appellant in M.F.A No. 892/92. Claimants 1 to 4 in O.P (M.V) No. 59/89 of the same Tribunal are the appellants in M.F.A No. 893/92. The 3rd respondent insurer in O.P (M.V) No. 58/89 is the appellant in M.F.A No. 991/92 and the 3rd respondent insurer in M.V.O.P No. 59/89; is the appellant in M.F.A No. 992/92. The claimant in O.P M.V No. 58/89 was a pillion-rider riding in a motor cycle KLV 7222 driven by deceased Sivasankaran on 15-11-1980. At about 11.00 a.m when they reached Thelore, a lorry bearing registration No. KLH 5540 driven by the 2nd respondent in both the O.Ps in a rash and negligent manner swerved to the wrong side and hit at the motor cycle driven by the deceased, whereby Sivasankaran sustained very serious injuries and died instantaneously. The claimant in O.P (M.V) No. 58/89 sustained serious injuries and he had undergone prolonged treatment. Accordingly, the pillion rider filed M.V.O.P No. 58/89 claiming a compensation of Rs. 1,24,000/- and the wife, two minor children and parents of deceased Sivasankaran filed M.V.O.P No. 59/89 claiming a total compensation of Rs. 3,04,000/-.
2. Since the first respondent in both the O.Ps contended, that he sold the lorry to the 4th respondent much prior to the accident, the 4th respondent in both the O.Ps was subsequently impleaded. The 4th respondent contended that at the time of the accident there was valid insurance policy with the 3rd respondent, and at that time the first respondent was the owner of the lorry and therefore he is not liable to pay any compensation. The 2nd respondent contended that the accident was not due to any negligence or rash and negligent driving on his part. The 3rd respondent insurer contended that even though there was a valid policy for the lorry in the name of the first respondent as he transferred the vehicle illegally to defeat the provisions of law, the insurance policy became void and the insurer is not liable to pay the compensation for the accident occurred while the lorry was owned and possessed by the 4th respondent as the transferee. They further contended that if at all their liability is limited to Rs. 50,000/-.
3. The learned Tribunal after enquiry and evaluating the evidence on record found that the first respondent has transferred the vehicle and on the date of accident the 4th respondent was the real owner of the lorry and awarded a total compensation of Rs. 25,750/- to the claimant in O.P (M.V) No. 58/89 and Rs. 2,22,000/- in O.P (M.V) No. 59/89 with interest at 12% p.a from 15-4-1982 till realisation directing respondents 2 and 4 to pay the amount and the 3rd respondent to deposit the entire amount awarded in M.V.O.P No. 58/89 and Rs. 50,000/- awarded in O.P (M.V) No. 59/89.
4. Dissatisfied with the quantum of award passed by the Tribunal, the claimant in O.P (M.V) No. 58/89 has filed M.F.A No. 892/92 and the claimants 1 to 4 in O.P (M.V) No. 59/89 have filed M.F.A No. 893/92. The 4th respondent in both the O.Ps has filed the memorandum of cross-objections in both the appeals challenging the quantum as well as his liability to pay the amount awarded in both the cases. The 3rd respondent insurer has filed M.F.A No. 991/92 challenging the order passed in O.P (M.V) No. 58/89 and M.F.A No. 992/92 challenging the order passed in O.P (M.V) No. 59/92 regarding their liability to pay the amount.
5. Since all these appeals are filed against the common judgment passed by the Tribunal in O.P (M.V) Nos. 58/89 and 59/89, these appeals and cross-objections are heard and disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, while discussing in this judgment the parties will be referred to as arrayed before the Claims Tribunal.
6. The 5th respondent in M.F.A No. 893/92 died pending appeal and 4th respondent is recorded as his legal representative. The 4th respondent in M.F.A No. 992/92 died pending appeal and the 5th respondent is recorded as his legal representative.
7. The learned Tribunal found that the accident in this case occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the lorry by the 2nd respondent in both these O.Ps That finding has become final, since it is not challenged by Him.
8. The claimant in O.P (M.V) No. 58/89 who is the appellant in M.F.A No. 892/92 has claimed Rs. 1,24,000/- as compensation while the learned Tribunal allowed Rupees 25,750/- as compensation. It is clear from Ext. A6 medical certificate that he sustained several injuries including fracture of the right Radius and right fibula and he was under treatment in the Medical College Hospital, Trivandrum from 16-11-1980 till 11-12-1980. He has contended that he was a contractor and disabled from doing any work from 16-11-1980 till the date of filing the petition and therefore he claimed Rs. 50,000,/- for loss of earning during that period. The learned Tribunal disavowed the entire claim on the ground that no reliable evidence is adduced to show that the claimant had any permanent injury. He has produced Exts. A10 and A10(a) to show that payments were made to him by the authorities for the contract work done by him. But Exts. A10 and A11(a) apart from only showing that he has done some contract work in March and June, 1981, do not establish his income or he has been doing contract work and earning income. Even though there is no satisfactory evidence to establish that the claimant had been earning income as alleged by him so as to claim compensation of Rs. 50,000/- for loss of earning from 16-11-1980 till the date of filing of the O.P as it is clear from Ext. A7 that he was undergoing treatment in the Medical College Hospital for long time after 16-11-1980, he is entitled to compensation for loss of earning during that period. Therefore, the rejection of the entire claim for loss of income by the Tribunal is not justifiable. We feel that an award of Rs. 2,000/- being loss of earning for the period from 16-11-1980 to 11-12-1980 will be reasonable in this case. The Tribunal has awarded Rs. 750/- claimed towards transport charges. Even though he had claimed Rs. 12,500/- as expenses for medical treatment, the learned Tribunal awarded Rs. 5,000/- as there was no reliable evidence to establish that he had spent Rs. 12,500/- towards medical expenses. We find no force in the challenge against the award of Rs. 5,000/- on that count in the absence of any material to substantiate the claim made by the claimant. Though an amount of Rs. 15,000/- is claimed being compensation for pain and suffering, the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 5,000/-. Though the claimant has contended that the award of Rs. 5,000/- for pain and suffering is very low, considering the facts and circumstances of the case we find that the award of Rs. 5,000/- for pain and suffering in this case is reasonable. As against the claim of Rs. 25,000/- being compensation for disability and Rs, 20,000/- for loss of amenities in life, the learned Tribunal has awarded a total amount of Rs. 15,000/- for disability and loss of amenities in life. The claimant vehemently contended that the total amount of Rs. 15,000/- awarded clubbing two claims for loss of amenities in life and disability is absolutely merge and illegal. We feel that the learned Tribunal is not justified in awarding Rs. 15,000/- being compensation for disability and loss of amenities in life and Separate amount should have been awarded on those distinct heads. We find that an amount of Rs. 10,000/- for loss of amenities in life and Rs. 10,000/- for loss of earning capacity due to the disability suffered by the claimant will meet the ends of justice in this case. Therefore we find that the claimant/appellant in M.F.A No. 892/92 is entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 34,750/-.
9. The claimants in O.P.M.V No. 59/89 have claimed Rs. 3,04,000/- as compensation. Deceased Sivasankaran, the victim in this case, was the husband of the first claimant, father of claimants 2 and 3 and the son of claimants 4 and 5. At the time of the accident he was working as the Manager of the Canara Bank, Nilambur branch drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 2,138/- and was aged 38 years at that time and his wife, first claimant was aged about 30 years. Though the claimants calculated the total claim at Rs. 4,31,000/-, they reduced the claim by 1/3rd for lumpsum payment and claimed a total compensation of Rs. 3,04,000/-. Even though the first claimant deposed before the Tribunal that the deceased used to pay Rs. 1500/- towards family expenses, the Tribunal calculated the amount of annual dependency at Rs. 12,000/- without any basis. The prospect of the deceased in service for increment, promotion etc. is not considered by the Tribunal. We feel that a monthly amount of Rs. 1500/- towards dependency of the claimants will be reasonable in this case. Though counsel for the claimants vehemently contended that the multiplier of 16 adopted by the learned Tribunal is not at all justified and a multiplier of 20 ought to have been adopted in this case in view of the longevity of life and nature of employment of the deceased in the bank, considering the facts and circumstances of the case the multiplier of 16 adopted by the Tribunal in this case appears to be reasonable. Therefore, the claimants are entitled to a total amount of Rs. 2,88,000/- for loss of dependency in this case. Even though the claimants have claimed various amounts on various counts, the learned Tribunal has granted a consolidated amount of Rs. 15,000/- for loss of consortium to the wife and loss of love and affection to the children and Rs. 3,000/- towards funeral expenses. Even if the amount of Rs. 15,000/- awarded by the Tribunal towards loss of consortium to the wife and love and affection to the children and for funeral expenses is added to the loss of dependency found by us in this case, it will exceed the total amount of Rs. 3,04,000/- claimed by the claimants in this case.
10. Even though counsel for the claimants submitted that no amount can be deducted for lump sum payment and therefore the claimants are entitled to a very huge amount in this case by awarding compensation on all counts they are entitled to claim, we are not impressed with that argument since the claimants have claimed only Rs. 3,04,000/- after deducting 1/3rd of the total amount claimed by them for lump sum payment. Therefore, without considering the admissibility of the claim made by the appellants on all other counts, we award Rs. 2,88,000/- for loss of dependency and confirm the award of Rs. 15,000/- for loss of consortium to the first claimant and loss of love and affection to claimants 2 and 3 and Rs. 3,000/- towards funeral expenses and reduce the amount Rs. 3,04,000/- as claimed by the claimants in this case which will be fair and reasonable compensation.
11. Even though in the cases objections filed by the 4th respondent in M.F.A No. 892/92 and 893/92 it is contended that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the scooter, the finding of the learned Tribunal that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving by the driver of the lorry is after careful analysis of the evidence on record and the 2nd respondent who is the driver of the lorry has not challenged that finding. Therefore this contention raised by the 4th respondent is absolutely untenable.
12. As already noted the learned Tribunal found that the 4th respondent is the owner of the lorry involved in this case and therefore the first respondent who is the original owner in whose name the certificate of registration and the insurance policy in respect of the lorry stood at the time of the accident is not liable to pay compensation. The Tribunal also found that since there was a valid insurance policy in respect of the lorry at the time of the accident, the 3rd respondent insurer is liable to pay the entire amount of Rs. 25,750/- awarded in O.P (MV) No. 58/89 and Rs. 50,000/- out of the amount awarded in O.P (MV) No. 59/89 since the liability of the insurer is limited to Rs. 50,000/- as per the insurance policy.
13. The 4th respondent has contended that there was no transfer of the lorry involved in this case by the first respondent and there was only an agreement for sale of the lorry in his favour and the first respondent continued to be the owner of the lorry on the date of accident. Therefore, according to him, the respondent is not liable to pay any compensation due to the accident occurred in this case and the first respondent alone is liable to pay the entire compensation. The 3rd respondent by filing M.F.A Nos. 991/92 and 992/92 challenging the awards passed by the Tribunal in M.V.O.P Nos. 58/89 and 59/89 respectively contended that the 4th respondent being the owner of the lorry alone is liable to pay the compensation awarded in these cases and as there was no policy in the name of the 4th respondent, the 3rd respondent is not liable to pay the compensation awarded in these cases by indemnifying the 4th respondent and therefore, the learned Tribunal is absolutely wrong in fastening the liability to satisfy a portion of the award on the 3rd respondent in these cases.
14. It is the admitted case that the lorry was sold by the first respondent to one Paulson as per Ext. B4 on 1-3-1978. That Paulson sold the lorry to one Jose as per Ext. XI on 18-6-1979 and Jose sold the lorry to the 4th respondent as per Ext. X3 dated 7-8-1989. It is the common case that the accident in this case occurred on 15-11-1980. It is also admitted that the registration in respect of the lorry and the insurance policy stood in the name of the first respondent on the date of accident and the registration in respect of the lorry was transferred in the name of the 4th respondent long after the accident in this case. The first respondent vehemently contended that the lorry being movable property, sale was completed when he sold and delivered possession of the lorry as per Ext. B4 to Paulson on 2-3-1978 and the transfer of registration of the lorry is of no significance at all. In support of the contention that since the vehicle involved in this case was transferred by the first respondent before the date of accident, the first respondent original owner and the insured 3rd respondent are not liable, since the vehicle being a movable property can be transferred by mere delivery of the vehicle and the transfer of vehicle takes effect irrespective of the transfer of registration and the transferee of the vehicle alone is liable to pay compensation in this case, counsel for the first and 3rd respondent relied upon the decision reported in Ouseph Varghese v. Kunjoonju Alekutty, 1993 Acc CJ 981 (Ker).
15. Counsel for the 4th respondent vehemently contended that though the dictum laid down in the above decision relied upon by counsel for respondents 1 and 3 cannot be disputed, the principle laid down in that decision has no application to the facts of this case since there is only a contract for sale and no contract of sale of the lorry involved in this case. According to him, Ext. B4 agreement entered into between the first respondent and Paulson and subsequent agreement Ext. XI entered into between Paulson and Jose and Ext. X3 entered into between Jose and 4th respondent are only agreement for sale whereby the ownership of the vehicle passed to the transferee only on the fulfilment of the condition imposed in those agreements. In the agreement Ext. B4 dated 2-3-78 entered into between the first respondent and Paulson with regard to the sale of the lorry, it is stated that out of the sale price of Rs. 1 lakh for the lorry, Rs. 40,000/- is paid by Paulson to the first respondent and Paulson agreed to pay the remaining sale price of Rs. 60,000/- to the South Indian Bank towards the amount due as per the hire purchase agreement between the first respondent and the bank in respect of the lorry and after discharge of the entire liability due to the bank, the first respondent should sign and give all documents for transfer of registration of the vehicle in favour of Paulson. Ext. XI agreement entered into between Paulson and Jose and Ext. X3 agreement entered into between Jose and 4th respondent contain recitals with regard to the payment of consideration as found in Ext. B4. It is the common case that the registration in respect of the lorry is transferred to the name of the 4th respondent on 20-7-1982 long after the accident occurred in this case. Ext. B8 is the letter dated 17-7-1982 sent by Jose the transferor in Ext. X3 requesting the first respondent to take steps to transfer the ownership of the lorry in favour of the 4th respondent. Ext. B9 is the letter dated 17-7-1982 written by R.W 4 the brother of the 4th respondent to the first respondent stating that himself and 4th respondent will compensate any loss sustained by the first respondent on account of the user of the lorry purchased by 4th respondent. Though R.W 4 has denied Exts. B8 and B9, counsel for the first respondent argued that R.W 4 denied those documents since those documents establish that the ownership of the lorry passed to the 4th respondent much earlier, though registration in respect of the lorry was transferred only subsequently.
16. But it is clear from the recitals made in Exts. B4, X1 and X3 that there is only contract for sale and not contract of sale in respect of the lorry involved in this case since it is clearly recited in those documents that the deed will become complete only after discharging the entire liability due to the bank on account of hire purchase agreement in respect of the lorry and the ownership of the vehicle will be transferred only after discharging the entire liability due to the bank on account of the hire purchase agreement. Under Sec. 4(4) of the Sale of Goods Act an agreement to sell becomes a sale only when the time elapses or the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the property in the goods is to be transferred. In this case the sale evidenced by Ext. B4, Ext. X1 and Ext. 3 will become complete only on satisfaction of the condition imposed in those agreements to discharge the liability to the bank. It is admitted by the first respondent as R.W 5 that all payments were made in the bank in his name and he signed the documents for transfer of registration of the vehicle only after discharge of the debt due to the bank. In the decision reported in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jameela Beevi, (1991) 1 Ker 832, a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows:—
“But, where the transfer of the property in the goods is not immediate but is to take place “subject to some conditions thereafter to be fulfilled” the contract is called an agreement to sell (S. 4(3)—Sale of Goods Act) and not a sale. Thus, an agreement of sale of goods becomes a sale “when …… the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the property in the goods is to be transferred” (S. 4(4) — Sale of Goods Act). In other words, where the parties are agreed that certain movable property shall be transferred upon fulfilment of a condition, the transfer of property in the goods is not complete until the condition is fulfilled”.
Therefore, it is clear that on a careful examination of Ext. B4, Ext. X1 and Ext. X3 and also the oral evidence in this case, the sale of the lorry involved in this case was not complete on the date of execution of those documents and the ownership of the vehicle passed to the transferee only on completion of the condition stipulated in those documents viz. discharge of the liability to the bank in respect of the vehicle. As admittedly the liability due to the bank is discharged and the first respondent signed the documents for transfer of registration etc. long after the accident and the registration was transferred to the 4th respondent only 20-7-1982 long after the accident involved in this case, it has to be held that the first respondent continued to be the owner of the vehicle on the date of accident. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal that the 4th respondent was the owner of the vehicle and the consequent exoneration of the first respondent from the liability to pay the amount of compensation awarded in this case is not sustainable.
17. Counsel for the first respondent vehemently argued that since there was absolutely no employer and employee relationship between the first respondent and the 2nd respondent, driver of the lorry who was appointed by the 4th respondent, the first respondent is not liable for the tortious act committed by the 2nd respondent. According to him, as per Ext. B4 the first respondent was only entitled to receive the balance amount. In support of the contention that the first respondent is not vicariously liable for the tortious act committed by the 2nd respondent driver of the lorry appointed by the 4th respondent since the first respondent had absolutely no control over the lorry or the 2nd respondent driver, counsel for the first respondent relies on the observations made by the learned author B.M Gandhi in his book Law of Tort at page 222 and the observations made by the learned author Anand and Sastri in their book Law of Torts 4th Edition at page 278. In support of the very same contention that the first respondent is not liable in this case since he had no control over the lorry or the driver of the lorry appointed by the 4th respondent, counsel for the first respondent relied upon the decisions reported in Devki Devi Tiwari v. Raghunath Sahai Chatrath, 1978 Acc CJ 169 (All); D. Rajapathi v. University of Mudari, 1980 Acc CJ 113: (AIR 1980 Mad 219); Devinder Singh v. Mangal Singh, 1981 Acc CJ 448: (AIR 1981 Raj & Har 53) and Dharam Vir v. Krishna Devi, 1984 Acc CJ 737 (Punj & Har). Though the above decisions relied upon by counsel for the first respondent laid down that when there is no master and servant relationship between the owner of the vehicle and the person who drove it at the time of the accident, no vacarious liability can be fastened upon the owner of the vehicle, those decisions have no application to the facts of this case.
18. In the light of the above finding, it cannot be contended that there was no master and servant relationship at all between the first respondent and the driver of the lorry, even accepting that the driver was one appointed in fact by the 4th respondent. So long as the first respondent continued to be the owner of the lorry, its ultimate control vests in him even if he is found to have transferred possession to a third party and he is in actual control of the same. He could at any time control the entire functioning of the lorry in exercise of his ownership right. The conditions imposed in the successive agreements executed with reference to the lorry, would show that the first respondent wanted specifically to retain title and ultimate control of the lorry with him till the entire conditions are complied with. All the successive transferees under the agreements should be deemed to have accepted the ultimate ownership and/or authority of the first respondent and the right of the Bank as financier over the lorry. Transfer of possession under the agreements can only be treated as arrangements agreed to between the first respondent and successive transferees for their mutual benefit. In fact it is evident that various conditions imposed in the agreement are intended to protect the interest of the first respondent. It is in his interest to retain his title to the lorry till the liability due to the Bank is cleared to the full extent. In the facts and circumstances, we are inclined to take the view that the lorry in question was being operated by the successive transferees including the 4th respondent for their common benefit and the first respondent was having the ultimate control over the lorry and its operation even on the date of the accident. In this view, we would hold that the lorry in question was being operated, by the 4th respondent appointing a driver as authorised or permitted by the first respondent so as to be vacariously liable for the negligence of the driver even according to the strict principles of vacarious liability.
19. In this connection we find that the principles of vicarious liability as extended by Lord Denning in Ormrod v. Crossville Motor Service Limited, (1952) 2 All ER 753 which principle has been approved by the Supreme Court in Sitraram v. Santanuprasad, AIR 1966 SC 1697 lends considerable support for the view which we have taken in this regard. The extended principle has been thus stated by Lord Denning in the above decision:
“It has often been supposed that the owner of a vehicle is only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the course of his employment. This is not correct. The owner is also liable if the driver is, with the owner's consent, driving the car on the owner's business or for the owner's purposes.
……….. The law puts a especial responsibility on the owner of a vehicle who allows it to go on the road in charge of someone else, no matter whether it is his servant, his friend or anyone else. It is being used wholly or partly on the owner's business or for the owner's purpose, the owner is liable for any negligence on the part of the driver. The owner only escapes liability when he lends it or hires it to a third person to be used for purposes in which the owner has no interest or concern”.
It is relevant to note the observations of Subba Rao, J. who wrote a dissenting judgment in the above decision which is to the following effect (AIR 1966 SC 1697 at p. 1700):
“The doctrine of constructive liability is in a process of evolution. It is a great principle of social justice. A Court no longer need be overweighed with the old decisions on the subject given under radically different circumstances, for now the owner of a car in India is not burdened with an unpredictable liability as there is a statutory compulsion on him to insure his car against third party liability and his burden within the framework of the Motor Vehicles Act is now transferred to the insurer”.
20. That apart, even assuming that there was actual transfer of the lorry and the first respondent had nothing to do with the lorry on the date of the accident except the fact that he continued to be the registered owner of the lorry, still we are inclined to take the view that there is sufficient justification for making the first respondent also liable along with other for compensation payable to the victim of the accident in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. It is evident from the successive agreements that transfers were effected clandestinely in order to defect the provisions of law on all occasions. All parties concerned wanted to make it appear to the whole world that the lorry even after transfers continued to be in the registered ownership of the first respondent subject to the liability outstanding to the Bank and subject to the policy of insurance in the name of the first respondent. By retaining the registration in his name and allowing the policy of insurance taken in his name to continue as such, the first respondent allowed the lorry to be operated by the 4th respondent, apparently complying with all the requirement of law, but really violating the various requirements of law. But, for the continuation of registration and the policy of insurance in his name, the 4th respondent would not have been able to operate the lorry as he did on the date of the accident. The registered owner, who thus, transfers the vehicle without taking steps to intimate such transfer to the proper authorities concerned under the Motor Vehicles Act and the insurer must be deemed to have knowledge that the vehicle will be used by the transferee or his agent or servant and that they might use it negligently or rashly causing injuries to third parties. If in such circumstances and with such knowledge the registered owner transfers the vehicle without complying with statutory provisions required to be complied with in public interest, there is no valid reason why he should not be held liable for the negligent act of the transferee or his servant or agent. We find sufficient legal support in taking the above view in the following passage in the decision reported in Mohamed Ramjan v. Shrifanbai, AIR 1983 Madh Pra 34 (at pp. 38 and 39):
“The question which arises in this appeal has not been dealt with in any decision relied upon by the learned counsel for Bhanwarilal. No other decision bearing on the about involved in this was brought to my notice. If a vehicle is transferred by the owner thereof to circumvent any provision of law and the owner continues to remain the registered owner thereof and the vehicle is also insured in the name of the registered owner and an accident is caused by the transferee or by a servant or agent of the transferee in such a case if the law laid down in the English decisions cited by the learned counsel for Bhanwarilal is followed, the registered owner is not liable. The insurer would also not be liable because the vehicle is insured in the name of the registered owner. In such cases great hardship would be caused to the injured or the dependants of the deceased because the transferee may be a man of straw and they may not be able to recover any compensation from him. In my view in such cases the registered or the ostensible owner must be held liable for the negligence of the transferee or his servant or agent in the course of his employment or within the scope of his authority, because in transferring possession of the vehicle in contravention of the provision of law the ostensible owner must be deemed to have knowledge that the vehicle will be used by the transferee or his agent or servant and that they might use it negligently or rashly causing injuries to 3rd parties. If with this knowledge the owner transfers the vehicle to circumvent and rule or provisions of law there is no valid reason why he should not be held liable for the negligent act of the transferee or his servant or agent”.
21. The fact that the liability of the insurer is limited to Rs. 50,000/- under the policy is not disputed. What remains is the consideration whether the insurer is liable in these cases to that extent provided under the insurance policy. We have already found that the first respondent has clandestinely transferred the vehicle by way of an unregistered agreement Ext. B4 without informing the insurer about the transfer with the deliberate and avowed intention to defeat the provisions of law and the insurance policy stood in the name of the first respondent for a very long time even on the date of accident on 15-11-1980 though the vehicle is transferred by the first respondent on 2-3-1978 as per Ext. B4. Therefore, in view of the fact that the first respondent as well as the transferees under him committed deliberate fraud upon the insurer and deliberately omitted to inform about the transfer of the vehicle to the 4th respondent and the other intervening transferees, it cannot be held that the insurer is liable to indemnify the insurer first respondent in this case.
22. On the basis of what is stated in the preceding paragraphs, M.F.A No. 892/92 is allowed and a total compensation of Rs. 34,750/- is awarded to the claimant therein. The award passed in O.P (M.V) No. 59/89 is enhanced to Rs. 3,04,000/- and M.F.A No. 893/92 is allowed to that extent. The Memorandum of Cross Objection filed by the 4th respondent in M.F.A Nos. 892/93 and 893/92 are dismissed. M.F.A Nos. 991/92 and 992/92 are allowed and the insurer is absolved from their liability to any portion of the compensation awarded in these cases. It is held that respondents 1, 2 and 4 are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation awarded in these cases. Interest as awarded by the Tribunal is confirmed. We make no order as to costs in these appeals.
Order accordingly.
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