Indian Bank v. M/S. Blaze & Central (P) Ltd.

CASES REFERRED: 1. (1970) 2 SCC 458 : AIR 1971 SC 40 - Union of India v. J.N Sinha (Ref) 2. (1974) 2 SCC 402 : AIR 1974 SC 2009 - Chagganlal v. Greater Bombay Municipality (Foll) 3. W.P No. 7430/1983 DD. 13-4-1983 - Mahesh Virupakshappa Manvi v. State of Karnataka (do)

Mr. M.G Sathyanarayanamurthy for Appellant.

Mr. G.N Dayananda

for Respondent 1: Mr. K. Shivashankar Bhat, Central Government Standing Counsel for Respondent-2.

NOTE: ORDER REPORTED IN ILR 1980 KAR 1084 : AIR 1980 Karnataka 186 : REVERSED.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Rama Jois, J.:— This Writ Appeal is by The Indian Bank against the order of the Learned Single Judge in Writ Petition Number 6889 of 1979 allowing the Writ Petition and setting aside the order of the Estate Officer made under Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, (‘the Act’ for short) and the order of the III Additional District Judge and the Appellate Authority under the Act confirming the said order.

2. The facts of the case, in brief, are as follows: The appellant-Indian Bank, is established, owned and controlled by the Central Government. The promises bearing No. 9, K.G Road, Bangalore-560009, belongs to the Indian Bank. Therefore, the said premises is a public premises as defined under Section 2(e) of the Act. In respect of an area measuring 1140 Sq. ft. of the said building, the first respondent was a tenant. The original period of lease expired in the year 1972. Thereafter, the first respondent was continuing as a tenant from month to month. A notice dated 1st March, 1978, terminating the tenancy of the first respondent immediately on the expiry of 31st March, 1978, and calling upon the first respondent to vacate and deliver vacant possession was issued by the Manager of the Bank on 1st March, 1978. As even after the termination of tenancy by the aforesaid notice, the first respondent did not vacate the premises, the Estate Officer appointed by the Central Government for the purposes of the Act, issued a notice dated 20th September 1978 under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act to the first respondent and called upon him to show cause as to why an order of eviction should not be made against them. The first respondent gave its reply dated 7th October 1978 stating that the Bank did not really require the premises for its own use and occupation. The purport of the reply was that the respondent was not willing to vacate the premises. Thereafter, the Estate Officer proceeded with the inquiry in terms of Section 5 of the Act and passed an order of eviction on 16-11-1978. Aggrieved by the said order, the first respondent preferred an appeal before the Additional District Judge and the Appellate Authority. Before the Appellate Authority the plea of the first respondent was that no sufficient opportunity was given by the Estate Officer in the course of the inquiry conducted by him and therefore the order was violative of principles of natural justice and that the requirement of the premises for the use of the Bank was not bona fide, and that they had some other premises and therefore the order of eviction was bad. The Learned Additional District Judge found that sufficient opportunity had been given in the inquiry and there was no violation of principles of natural justice. As regards the plea of the first respondent that the requirement of the Bank was not bona fide and it had soma other premises and that greater hardship would be caused by ordering eviction of the first respondent, the Learned Additional District Judge held that those grounds were not at all relevant for passing the order of eviction under the Act. Accordingly the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the said order, the first respondent respondent the Writ Petition.

3. In the Writ Petition, the first respondent pleaded as follows: The appointment of an officer of the Bank who is interested in evicting the first respondent as an Estate Officer for the purposes of the Act was opposed to principles of natural justice as there was every likelihood of bias on the part of the Estate Officer as he would be interested in passing an order of eviction. The Estate Officer denied reasonable opportunity to the first respondent in not giving sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the Bank and refused to give copy of the statement of the witness examined on behalf of the Bank without which the first respondent could not exercise his right of cross-examination effectively. The provisions of the Act were unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in that a different drastic procedure was prescribed for eviction of tenants of public premises as against the general law applicable to all tenants for their eviction from the premises under their occupation.

4. The Learned Single Judge formulated the following two questions for consideration:

(1) Whether there was likelihood of bias on the part of the Estate Officer vitiating the order of eviction? and

(2) Whether the petitioner was denied of a reasonable opportunity by the Estate Officer?

The answer given by the Learned Single Judge on both these questions was in the affirmative. Accordingly the Writ Petition was allowed and the orders of the Estate Officer and of the Appellate Authority were quashed. In view of the answer to the two questions in favour of the first respondent, the Learned Judge declined to go into the question of constitutionality of the provisions of the Act. This Writ Appeal is against the order of the Learned Single Judge.

5. The plea of the appellant-Bank is as follows: When Section 3 of the Act provides for nominating an officer of the public authority concerned as an Estate Officer for the purposes of the Act, it is impermissible to hold that be suffers from bias and therefore cannot exercise the powers under the Act applying rules of natural justice as rules of natural justice cannot prevail against the specific provisions of the Law. Full opportunity was given by the Estate Officer to the first respondent. There was no violation of rules of natural justice. In any event as the giving of a valid notice of termination of tenancy and quit notice by the Bank to the first respondent was not at all disputed by the first respondent, after 31st March, 1978, the first respondent became undisputedly an unauthorised occupant and therefore there was nothing to be inquired into by the Estate Officer. In other words, if only the first respondent had taken the stand that their tenancy had not been validly terminated and therefore they were not unauthorised occupants, it would have become obligatory for the Estate Officer to inquire as to the truthfulness of the said plea, but in the present case valid termination of tenancy was not disputed. What was disputed in the reply to the notice issued by the Estate Officer was about the bona fide requirements of the Bank which was a matter outside the purview of the inquiry required to be held by the Estate Officer under Section 5 of the Act. As far as the challenge to the constitutional validity of the Act is concerned, it is clear from the Preamble to the Act that the Act was intended for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises, which clearly indicates, that if only the occupation of a person of a public premises is unauthorised, the provisions of the Act comes into operation and the Act is intended to prescribe special procedure for evicting unauthorised occupants occupying public premises namely, the premises belonging to the Government and other public bodies, and, therefore, not only the classification is reasonable but it has also nexus to the object sought to be achieved and therefore not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

6. In order to appreciate the points arising for consideration, it is necessary to make a brief survey of the provisions of the Act. The Act is intended for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. The expression ‘Public Premises’ is defined in Section 2(e) of the Act. It reads:

“2(e) ‘Public premises means—

(1) any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of the Central Government and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980, under the control of the Secretariat of either Houses of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of the Secretariat;

(2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by or on behalf of —

(i) any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first-mentioned company.

(ii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government.

(iii) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act.

(iv) any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961.

(v) any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963.

(vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted under Section 79 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, and that Board as and when re-named as the Bhakra-Beas Management Board under sub-section (6) of Section 80 of that Act.

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According to the said definition, ‘Public Premises’ means premises belonging to the Central Government and the Companies and Corporations established by law and owned or controlled by the Central Government. The expression ‘unauthorised occupation’ is defined in Section 2(g) of the Act. It reads:

“2(g) ‘Unauthorised occupation’, in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever.”

Section 3 of the Act empowers the Central Government to appoint Estate Officer for the purposes of the Act. Relevant portion of the Section reads:

“3. Appointment of estate officers:—

The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette-

(a) appoint such persons, being gazetted officers of Government or officers of equivalent rank of the statutory authority, as it thinks fit, to be estate officers for the purpose of this Act”.

Section 4 of the Act empowers the Estate Officer to issue a notice to an occupier of a public premises calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be evicted if the Estate Officer is of the opinion that any such person was in unauthorised occupation of a public premises. If the person to whom notice is issued under Section 4 of the Act showed any cause against such notice, Section 5 of the Act requires the Estate Officer to give a personal hearing to the person to whom the notice had been issued. Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act reads:

“5. Eviction of unauthorised occupants:

(1) If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under Section 4 and any evidence produced by him in support of the same and after personal hearing, if any, given under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 4, the estate officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the estate officer may make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be vacated, on such date as may be specified in the order, by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises.”

(Underlined by us)

From the aforesaid provisions of the Act, the following aspects emerge:

(1) The proceedings for eviction under the provisions of the Act can be taken:

(a) if only the premises concerned is a public premises as defined in the Act, and

(b) if only the person concerned was in unauthorised occupation of the premises concerned.

(2) Notice calling upon the unauthorised occupant to show cause as to way he should not be evicted can be issued only by the Estate Officer appointed by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Act.

(3) The only point for inquiry under Section 5 of the Act is: Whether the person concerned is an unauthorised occupant or not? and nothing more.

Having regard to the definition of the expression ‘Unauthorised Occupation’, it is only when a person is found to occupy a public premises without authority for such occupation or if he had occupied with authority it is only after that authority comes to an end he becomes an unauthorised occupant. It is only thereafter the Estate Officer gets jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 4 of the Act calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be evicted. If the person to whom notice is issued were to plead that he was not in unauthorised occupation, then it becomes necessary for the Estate Officer to inquire as to whether such a plea is well founded. If the person concerned does not dispute that he had become an unauthorised occupant on disputes but fails to prove that he was not an unauthorised occupant, the Estate Officer is empowered to pass an order of eviction under Section 5 of the Act. In the appeal before the District Judge, the only question the Appellate Authority has to consider is: Whether the finding recorded by the Estate Officer that the occupation of the person concerned of the public premises concerned had become unauthorised is correct or not. The Appellate Authority can interfere with the order of eviction if only it comes to the conclusion that the person concerned had not become an unauthorised occupant and the findings recorded by the Estate Officer that he was an unauthorised occupant is untenable in law.

7. With this background, we shall now proceed to refer to the facts of the case. The undisputed facts are: the first respondent was a tenant in the premises belonging to the Bank and the premises is a ‘public premises’. The original period of tenancy of the 1st respondent expired in the year 1972. Thereafter, the first respondent was continuing as a tenant from month to month. The Manager of the Bank issued notice of termination of tenancy on 1st March, 1978. It reads:

INDIAN BANK

Ref: Premises.1st March 1978.

Blaze & Central (Pvt.) Ltd.

Indian Bank Buildings,

No. 9, Kempegowda Road,

Bangalore-560009.

Dear Sirs,

You have been a tenant in respect of 1,140 sq. ft. in the II floor of the building belonging to the bank as per details mentioned in the schedule hereunder on a monthly rent of Rs. 670)/- The original period for which the portion let out having expired in the year 1972, you have been continuing as a tenant from month to month, the commencement of the tenancy being 1st day of the calendar month and ending with the last day of the same month.

We require the portion let out to you bona fide for locating our staff Training Centre to be opened shortly and also for the Regional Manager's Office and other requirement of our own.

The tenancy in your favour is therefore terminated hereby and you are called upon to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the leased schedule premises to us immediately on the expiry of 31st March 1978 failing which please note that legal action will be taken against you for recovery of possession of the portion occupied by you at your risk and costs.

Schedule

Portion of the premises in II Floor measuring 1,140 Sq. Ft. in building No. 9 Kempegowda Road, Bangalore-9, belonging to Indian Bank in your occupation as tenant of the bank. Please also note to update arrears of rent and electricity charges.

Arrears of rentRs. 1340/- Jan. Feb. 78

Arrears of Electricity chargesRs. 33346/- upto Feb. 78.

Yours faithfully,

Sd/- Manager.”

Thereafter, as the first Respondent did not comply with the quit notice and as the occupation of the first Respondent after 31-31978 became unauthorised occupation, the Estate Officer issued a notice under Section 4(1) of the Act on 20th September, 1978. It reads:

“FORM A

(Notice under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971)

OFFICE OF THE ESTATE OFFICER: INDIAN BANK

United Mansions Building, No. 39, M.G Road, Bangalore-1 No. 2/1978.

Indian Bank, Bangalore City Branch, No. 9, K.G Road, Bangalore-560009 — … Petitioner;

Versus

Blaze & Central Pvt., Ltd., Indian Bank Buildings, No. 9, K.G Road, Bangalore-560009. — … Respondent.

Blaze & Central Pvt. Ltd.

Whereas, I, Shri S. Sambanatham, District Manager, now called as Regional Manager, Indian Bank at Bangalore, being person appointed by the Central Government by Notification in the Official Gazette under Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (Act No. 40 of 1971) I am of opinion on the grounds specified below that you are in unauthorised occupation of the public premises mentioned in the schedule below and that you should be evicted from the said premises.

GROUNDS

You were required by the Indian Bank Bangalore City Branch, No. 9, K.G Road, Bangalore, through their notice dated 1-3-1978 addressed to you and requiring you to vacate the schedule premises which has been let out to you by Indian Bank, since the said bank requires the premises in your possession for their bona fide use and occupation for reasons mentioned in the said notice and followed up the said notice of termination by a reminder dated 11-7-1978 for which there has been no compliance by you and as such you are in unauthorised occupation of the schedule premises, leased out to you, as defined in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, you are liable to be evicted from the premises.

Now therefore in pursuance of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act, I hereby call upon you to show cause on or before 9th October 1978 why such an order of eviction should not be made.

Schedule

1140 Sq. Ft. in the second floor of Indian Bank Buildings, No. 9, K.G Road, Bangalore-560009.

Sd/- — Estate Officer,

Indian Bank, Under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.

Signature and seal of the Estate Officer.”

To the said notice, the first respondent replied on 7th October, 1978. It reads:

“BLAZE AND CENTRAL PVT. LTD.

Indian Bank Building,

2nd Floor, K.G Road

Bangalore-560009

7th October 1978

The Estate Officer,

Indian Bank,

United Mansions,

39, M.G Road,

Bangalore-560001

Your notice dated 20-9-1978 in No. 2 of 1978 issued under Section 4(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, with reference to the same, we wish to send the following reply.

We are in occupation of premises belonging to Indian Bank measuring an area of 740 Sq. feet 400 sq. feet in all to 1140 sq. feet on a total rent of Rs. 670/- at the rate of 50 paise per sq. foot for an area of 740 sq. feet and 75 paise for per sq. foot for an area of 400 sq. feet. We have paid the rents regularly and are not in arrears of rent at any time.

The grounds set out in your notice as well as in the notice dated 1-3-1978 issued by the bank do not really exist and the claim that the bank requires bona fidely and reasonably for locating staff training centre for the Regional Managers Office and other requirements are incorrect. Indeed the Regional Office which was originally situated in this premises was shifted to M.G Road, Bangalore. As such the requirements mentioned in your notice do not really exist. That apart the notice as issued is bad in law.

If inspite of this reply, you choose to proceed with the matter the risk shall be all your own.”

It may be seen from the reply famished by the first respondent, no plea was raised to the effect that its occupation of the premises belonging to the Bank was not unauthorised after 31-3-1978. The only plea raised on behalf of the first respondent was that the need specified in the notice did not really exist and its requirement was not bona fide, which pleas could be taken only in an objection statement to an eviction petition under the provisions of the Rent Control Act and not in reply to a notice issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. Therefore, there was no plea by the first respondent that the notice of termination was not valid in law and therefore the occupation of the first respondent had not become unauthorised. In fact in this situation there was nothing for the Estate Officer to decide after giving an opportunity of hearing to the first respondent. However, the Estate Officer even after receiving the reply dated 7-10-1978 posted the case for recording statements on 23-10-1978. The notice was issued to both the parties. A memo dated 21-10-1978 was filed before the Estate Officer stating that it was inconvenient for the first respondent to attend the hearing on 23-10-1978 due to reasons beyond its control and requested for another date of hearing. On 23-10-1978 the evidence of the Manager was recorded. Relevant portion of the same reads:

“We have as early as on 1-3-1978 requested Blaze & Central (Pvt.) Limited to vacate and deliver us the vacant possession of the leased premises on the expiry of 31-3-1978. In reply they wrote to us on 11-3-1978 that they had forwarded our letter to their Head Office and we will be hearing from them shortly. As they had not vacated the leased premises nor had we have any reply from them we had reminded them on 11-7-1973 to vacate the leased premises at the earliest. But there was no response from them.”

In his statement, the Manager specifically referred to the quit notice dated 1-3-1978 issued to the first respondent. He also stated that the plea of the first respondent that the requirement of the premises by the Bank was not bona fide was not correct. As stated earlier, that was not and could not be a subject matter of inquiry by the Estate Officer. The Estate Officer also replied to the first Respondent on 23-10-1978 stating that the request for a month's adjournment was not justified. The contents of the reply are as follows:

“Blaze & Central Pvt. Ltd.

Bangalore-560009.

The above case was posted for recording your statement on 23-10-1978 cited your letter dated 21-10-1978 requesting for a month's time for recording your statement. As no valid reasons are given in your letter cited above, we are unable to give a month's time as the petitioners require the building very badly for their occupation as per the petitioner's statement recorded this day. As a special case, we have posted the case for 28-10-1978. No further adjournment of time will be given. You are requested to appear before me on 28-10-78 positively at 11-00 a.m”

On 23-10-1978 the first respondent filed a statement before the Estate Officer, which reads:

“Respondent states as under:

Respondent had prayed for time by their memo dated 21-10-78 since the person incharge of the file Mr. Elias Fernandes, Manager, was a way at Mangalore in view of his father's serious ill health, who later died about three days ago. In that circumstances they further request for time for at least 20 days.

2. The Respondent also prays that a copy of the statement recorded of petitioner be furnished.

3. Respondent denies the allegations of the petitioner that they require the premises bona fidely and reasonably for their own use and occupation. The Respondent would be put to great hardship in the event of order of eviction, whereas no hardship would be caused to petitioner, if eviction is not ordered since petitioners are already having their own premises suitable for their requirements.

Kindly grant Respondent a further date of hearing for recording statement and intimate the next date of hearing.”

In the said statement, the first respondent wanted a copy of the statement of the Manager and also a further date of hearing. In reply to the said statement, the Estate Officer stated thus on 28-10-1978:

“The adjourned case posted to 28-10-78 for recording your statement - cited your letter of even date - the reason attributed by you for adjournment of your hearing is unsatisfactory. Petitioners have further stressed the need for the leased out premises for their own use and to locate the office of Regional Manager and for Staff Training Extension Centre and have requested early to hand over them the vacant possession of the premises. As a last chance, we have posted the case for recording your statement for 16-11-1978 at 11-00 a.m Exparte order will be issued on the petition filed by Indian Banks Bangalore City Branch, the petitioner.”

On 16-11-1978 the first Respondent filed its final statement. It reads:

“1. It is submitted that the premises in question no longer required by the petitioner, since the Regional Manager's office to whose benefit the premises where asked to be vacated, shifted to No. 39, M.G Road, Bangalore. Further, in view of the vacancy caused in regard to the premises which were under the occupation of Dodsal (Pvt.) Limited and the insurance office which was situated in the 2nd floor, those areas are more sufficient for locating the Staff Training Centre. That apart the area under occupation of Regional Office earlier since vacant is more than sufficient for the requirements of petitioners occupation for purpose of Staff Training Centre.

2. On the other, Respondent has no other premises of their own and they will be put to greater hardship in the event and order of eviction is made. No hardship would he caused to the petitioner by denial of an order of eviction.

In the circumstances, it is prayed that the claim of the petitioner be rejected.”

It is significant to point out once again that even in the said statement it was not the case of the first respondent that it was not in unauthorised occupation of the premises belonging to the Bank. The two grounds urged for not passing an order of eviction were: (1) The requirement of the Bank was not bona fide, and (2) By the order of eviction greater hardship would be caused to the first respondent than the hardship that might be caused to the Bank, if eviction was not ordered. Both these grounds raised before the Estate Officer were plainly misconceived and was not the subject matter for inquiry before the Estate Officer.

8. Having regard to these facts and circumstances of the case, we are convinced that there was neither violation of rules of natural justice by the Estate Officer in conducting the proceedings nor any prejudice was caused to the first respondent by the non-furnishing of the copy of the statement of the Manager. From the proceedings of the Estate Officer, narrated above, it may be seen the case was posted to 23-10-1978 for the inquiry and the date of hearing was duly notified to the first respondent. Therefore, the first respondent cannot complain that the statement of the Manager was recorded behind his back and an opportunity to cross examine the Manager was denied. Apart from this the observance of rules of natural justice is not a ritual. As pointed out earlier in the absence of any plea on behalf of the first Respondent that their tenancy had not been validly terminated and that their occupation had not become unauthorised, there was nothing for the Estate Officer to inquire. He could have straightaway passed an order of eviction under Section 5 of the Act as his jurisdiction under the said provision was only to be satisfied as to the unauthorised occupation of the person concerned and not about the bona fide requirements of the public authority or about comparative hardship, just because the respondent chose to raise the pleas as they were not relevant to the inquiry under Section 5 of the Act. Therefore, the order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer was unexceptionable and was very rightly upheld by the learned District Judge pointing out that the points raised by the first Respondent were outside the purview of the Act.

9. As regards the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the Estate Officer being an Officer of the Bank he was Judge in his own cause and therefore the notice issued and the order passed were violative of rules of natural justice, it appears to us that when Section 3 of the Act authorises the appointment of an officer of a statutory body concerned as Estate Officer, and the officer so appointed alone is competent to issue notice under Section 4 and pass order under Section 5 of the Act, it would be a case of statutory exception to the applicability of the rules of natural justice. In such a case there is no scope for applying the rules of natural justice and to hold that he is disabled to issue the notice and pass the order of eviction, as rules of natural justice only supplement the law and do not supplant it. (See: Union of India v. J.N Sinha)1. Debarring the Estate Officer from exercising his powers by applying rules of natural justice would result in the defeating of the provisions of the Act as there would be no officer who could issue notice under Section 4 or pass an order under Section 5 of the Act. Unless the provisions of the Act is challenged on the ground that it is unconstitutional for conferring power to inquire and order eviction from a public premises on an officer of the concerned public authority and the challenge is upheld, the order passed by the Estate Officer cannot be set aside on the ground that he was an officer of the public authority which intends to evict the person concerned. In fact the first respondent had questioned the constitutional validity of the Act which was left open by the learned Single Judge as the two other questions were answered in favour of the first respondent.

10. As the two questions are answered by us against the first respondent, we proceed to consider the question of constitutional validity of the provisions of the Act. The question is not res integra. The matter is fully covered by the Judgment of the Supreme Court in M. Chagganlal v. Greater Bombay Municipality . 1974 2 SCC 402, in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act and the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, which are pari materia with the provisions of the Act. It is surprising that the appellant failed to rely on and to bring to the notice of the Court the above binding decision on the point, though it was rendered and reported five years before the filing of the Writ Petition. Applying the ratio of the above decision a challenge to the constitutional validity of similar provisions of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974, was rejected by this Court in the case of Mahesh Virupakshappa Manvi v. The State of Karnataka . W.P No. 7430 of 1983 DD. 13-4-1983.. The Writ Appeal No. 1733 of 1983 preferred against the Judgment was dismissed as withdrawn.

11. It is true that the Act is applicable only for eviction of persons occupying public premises. But the provisions of the Act are applicable to eviction of persons whose occupation is unauthorised, i.e, who have no right to continue in the premises. According to the definition of unauthorised occupant given in Section 2(g) of the Act, a person is regarded as unauthorised occupant:

(i) If he had occupied a public premises without authority, or

(ii) If the authority pursuant to which he occupied, stood terminated.

The authority to occupy a pubic premises could be given either by way of permission or license or through lease. In a case where a person is authorised to occupy a public premises by the concerned public authority by way of license and not by lease, the moment the license is withdrawn or comes to an end, the occupation of such person becomes unauthorised and in the case of lease on the termination of the lease the occupation becomes unauthorised.

12. If a lessee of a public premises is allowed to remain in the premises after the expiry of the lease and the public authority concerned accepts the rent, as had happened in this case, his occupation becomes authorised occupation as he becomes a tenant holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. In such cases, it is only after a valid notice of termination of tenancy in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is issued by the owner, the occupation becomes unauthorised. Such a notice was issued in this case. Any law which provides for eviction of an unauthorised occupant cannot be held to be unreasonable or discriminatory.

13. As far as the procedure for eviction of an unauthorised occupant of a public premises is concerned, the Act prescribes a special procedure for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises instead of compelling public authorities to file a civil suit. Just as special provision is made under several enactments for recovery of public monies as arrears of land revenue, the Act provides a special remedy in the matter of eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. In such a case, there is nothing unusual to confer power on an officer of the same department or authority to pass an order of eviction. For instance the Power to inquire as to whether a person is in unauthorised occupation of Government land and to pass an order of eviction against an unauthorised occupant is conferred on the Deputy Commissioner, an officer, of the Goverment to whom the land belongs, in the land revenue laws. To such cases the principle of ‘No person should be a judge in his own cause’ is hardly applicable. It is a statutory power to rake action against a person who occupies a public premises without authority or having occupied the premises with authority refuses to vacate after the authority to occupy comes to an end. It cannot be said that it is unreasonable to confer such a power on an officer of the public authority concerned. We do not find any substance in the contention that the provision, in order to be reasonable should provide for the appointment of an officer outside the establishment of the public authority concerned. Of course, if the power conferred is arbitrary and without procedural safeguards, it could be a different matter. In Chagganlal's case, the Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of similar provision contained in Chapter-V of The Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The power to pass an order evicting an unauthorised occupant of a premises belonging to Bombay Municipal Corporation was conferred on its Chief Executive Officer, namely, the Municipal Commissioner under the Act. The procedural safeguards prescribed under that Act were similar to those contained in the Act. An appeal to the City Civil Court was provided for, against the order of the competent officer. Rejecting the contention that the provision was violative of Article 14, the Supreme Court said thus:

“18. ……..On the whole, considering the object with which these special procedures were enacted by the legislature we would not be prepared to hold that the difference between the two procedures is so unconscionable as to attract the vice of discrimination. After all, Article 14 does not demand a fanatical approach. We therefore hold that neither the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act nor the provisions of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, are hit by Article 14 of the Constitution.”

(See also paragraph 40 of the Judgment)

Under the Act also there are similar in built safeguards. Section 3 requires that a gazetted officer or officer equal in rank alone could be appointed as Estate Officer. Section 4 requires the giving of not less than 10 days to show cause against eviction. Section 5 requires the Estate Officer to consider the cause shown, if any, against the notice and empowers him to pass an order if only he is satisfied after inquiry that the person concerned was in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. When an order of eviction is passed against a person found to be in unauthorised occupation of the public premises, thirty days' time has to be given to him to comply with the order. Section 9 of the Act confers a right of appeal to the District Judge. Relevant part of the Section reads:

“9. Appeals - (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the estate officer made in respect of any public premises under Section 5 or Section 7 to an appellate officer who shall be the district judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years' standing as the district judge may designate in this behalf.

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(3) Where an appeal is preferred from an order of the estate officer, the appellate officer may stay the enforcement of that order for such period and on such conditiors as he deems fit”.

The appeal is to a District Judge or to a judicial officer, who has put in not less than 10 years of service. Power to grant stay of eviction is expressly conferred on the appellate authority. If an occupant is aggrieved by the appellate order, he can seek judicial review of that order under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India.

14. In view of the ratio of the decision in Chagganlal's case, in which the constitutionality of similar provisions of Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act and the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act were upheld, the contention that the provisions of the Act are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution must fail. The reasons given by the Supreme Court for upholding the constitutional validity of Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act and the provisions of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, are also sufficient to reject the contention of the first respondent that on the ground of likelihood of bias, the exercise of powers under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act by the Estate Officer is violative of rules of natural justice.

15. In the result, we make the following order:

(i) The writ appeal is allowed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 1,000/-.

(ii) In reversal of the order made by the learned Single Judge the Writ Petition is dismissed.