B.P Singh, J.:— The plaintiff/respondent had presented a Sale Deed for registration relating to Sy. Nos. 21/7 and 21/8 of village Alur before the Sub-Registrar at Channagiri on 1st April 1970. The Sub-Registrar, after recording the statement of the defendant/executant, refused to register that document and passed an order under Section 36 of the Indian Registration Act (‘the Act’ for short). The said order is rather ambiguous. While he has observed that the executant has denied execution of the document (Ex. P-1) he also observed that another document which was executed by the plaintiff should also be produced for registration. He has ultimately refused registration of the document (Ex. P-1) on the ground that the execution of the same was not proved. It is quite apparent that if the Sub-Registrar refuses to register a document on the ground that any person, by whom it purports to be executed, denies its execution, the aggrieved party may move the District Registrar by way of an application under Section 73 of the Act. On the other hand, where the refusal by the Sub-Registrar is on any ground other than the denial of the execution, an appeal is provided under Section 72 of the Act. In the instant case the plaintiff/respondent moved an application under Section 73 of the Act. The District Registrar noticed the fact that the order of refusal was rather ambiguous, and perhaps that led the plaintiff to file an application under Section 73 of the Act treating it as a refusal on the ground that its execution was denied. The District Registrar also, by his order dated 2-3-1971 refused to register the document in question. From the order of the District Registrar it appears that he agreed with the conclusion reached by the Sub-Registrar that the transaction between the parties was not merely a transaction of sale of lands bearing Sy. Nos. 27/1 and 28/1, but was really a transaction of exchange of lands between the parties, and that 2 documents had been actually executed both in the nature of sale deeds to give effect to the transaction of exchange. On such ground the District Registrar rejected the application under Section 73 of the Act.
2. The plaintiff thereafter filed a suit in which he claimed the following reliefs:
1. “…for specific performance directing the defendant to get the sale deed registered before the Sub-Registrar, Channagiri and failing which the Court to get the Sale Deed registered;
2. For possession of the suit schedule properties from the defendant;
3. For past mesne-profits for the years 1970-1971 at Rs. 150/- per year;
4. For future mesne profits from the date of suit till the date of the delivery of possession;
5. For Court costs; and
6. Such other reliefs as the Court deem fit to grant in the circumstances of the case.”
3. The plaint also discloses that the suit is under Section 77 of the Act read with Order VII Rule 1 CPC. The aforesaid suit, being O.S No. 371/1971, was disposed of by the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff, Bhadravati on 19-4-1975. The learned Munsiff treated the suit as a suit for specific performance of the agreement and, on considering the material placed before him, refused to grant the reliefs prayed for on a finding that between the parties there was an agreement whereby they had agreed to exchange the lands and that the transaction was sought to be given effect by the parties executing sale deeds in respect of their lands in favour of each other. He therefore dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff for registration of the sale deed and for possession of the suit lands.
4. The plaintiff preferred an appeal which was disposed of by the Additional Civil Judge, Shimoga, by his Judgment and decree dated 3-8-1979. The learned Additional Civil Judge held that the suit filed by the plaintiff was not a suit for specific performance of an agreement, but was a suit under Section 77 of the Act. He held that the defendant having admitted the execution of the sale deed before the Sub-Registrar, there was no ground on which the registration of the document in question could be refused. No doubt he also referred to the evidence adduced by the parties, and from his observations it appears that he was not inclined to accept the story of exchange set-up by the defendant. Those observations, however, are not material as they were not necessary for the disposal of the suit. The Appellate Court treating the suit as suit under Section 77 of the Act, held that the execution having been admitted by the defendant, there was no justification for the orders passed by the Sub-Registrar and the District Registrar refusing to register the document (Ex. P-1). He therefore partly allowed the appeal to the extent that he decreed the suit for registration of the Sale Deed, but refused to grant a decree for possession and mesne profits. These two second appeals have been preferred against his Judgment and decree, one by the plaintiff, and the other by the defendant.
5. Section 34 of the Act lays down the nature of enquiry to be held by the Sub-Registrar before registering a document. It is quite patent that the Sub-Registrar is required to make an enquiry whether the document has really been executed by a person who purports to execute the document, and further as to the identity of the executant or his representative who appears before him. It is well settled that the question as to the validity of the document is alien to such an enquiry. If the executant admits having executed a document, the Sub-Registrar must order registration of the document if presented in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In the instant case undoubtedly the Sub-Registrar and the District Registrar have exceeded their jurisdiction in pronouncing upon the validity of the Sale Deed by referring to the agreement of exchange said to have been reached between the parties. Such matters are undoubtedly beyond the scope of the enquiry contemplated under Section 34 of the Act. I have therefore no manner of doubt that the Sub-Registrar and the District Registrar exceeded their jurisdiction in refusing to register the Sale Deed on such ground. The Appellate Court has rightly decreed the suit directing registration of the Sale Deed.
6. The learned Counsel for the appellants/defendants contended that the learned Civil Judge had erred in law in treating the suit as one filed under Section 77 of the Act; and that the suit was really for a decree for specific performance of the agreement.
7. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the plaintiff (Appellant in RSA 1154/1979) contended that the Appellate Court had erred in law, in as much as it had refused to decree the suit of the plaintiff/respondent for possession and mesne profits.
8. After arguing the matter for some time when it became clear to the learned Counsel for the parties that the parties can still agitate their claims before a Civil Court, they did not advance further arguments. It is well settled that in a suit under Section 77 of the Act, the aggrieved party must confine his case only to the question of registration of the document, because in such a suit the Court is only concerned with the genuineness of the document to be registered, i.e, whether the document is executed by the person by whom it purports to be executed. The question of its validity must be decided in a duly constituted suit. In a suit under Section 77 of the Act, no other relief can be claimed, such as for possession and mesne profits.
9. I may notice the decisions relied upon by the Counsel for the plaintiff, namely, AIR 1964 Orissa 2241, and AIR 1970 Kerala 2612, which have held that notwithstanding the fact that a person may have a right to file a suit under Section 77 of the Act, that does not preclude him from instituting a more comprehensive suit in the nature of a suit for specific performance claiming other reliefs as well, such as delivery of possession, mesne profits, etc.
10. In the facts and circumstances of this case it is not necessary to upset the finding of the learned Civil Judge since, in my opinion, he has come to the correct conclusion that the suit has to be treated as a suit under Section 77 of the Act.
11. It is needless to say that it is still open to the parties to claim in a suit such other reliefs as they may be entitled in law and any observations made in the impugned Judgment of the Additional Civil Judge shall not prejudice their cases, and must be understood as observations made in connection with the disposal of the suit under Section 77 of the Act.
12. The learned Counsel for the parties also requested me to make an observation that if they are advised to file any other suit, such as a suit for specific performance or a suit for possession and mesne profits, or any other suit, the Court will consider the pendency of this appeal before this Court and the earlier proceedings before the Courts below as a relevant circumstance for giving relief to the parties under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. I have no doubt that the Court will have due regard to the provisions of the Limitation Act because the parties have been effectively pursuing their remedy giving rise to the instant second appeal. They will be entitled to claim the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, if such a suit is filed by them.
13. In the result, these appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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