CASES REFERREDN. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose
, 2009 (7) SCC 1 17
C.K.M Appaji, Advocate for Petitioner.
V. Muruganandam, Additional Government Pleader for Respondent Nos. 1 & 2; Bharathi Kannan, Advocate for Respondent No. 3.
T. Lajapathi Roy, Advocate as Amicus Curiae.
W.P ALLOWED — NO COSTS — M.P 1/2012 CLOSED — M.P 1/2013 DISMISSED
Prayer: Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records pertaining to the order of the 1st Respondent in L3/13512/2012, dated 5.10.2012, confirming the Order of the 2nd Respondent in A2/5739/2011, dated 12.1.2012 and quashing the same.
JUDGMENT
1. Indian society has a long cherished tradition to respect and protect the elders. It is the pious obligation of the siblings to maintain their Parents and grandparents. The great saint Tamil poet “Avvaiyar” said “Annaiyum Pithavum Munnari Deivam” which means mother and father are the first God known to the children. Until few decades, in the past, these traditions, heritage and moral values were taught at the Schools as part of curriculum. Since, the children learnt these invaluable tenets, in their childhood, it was not required to remind them of their obligation towards the elders, by making any law to respect and protect them. In recent years, under the guise of preparing the younger generation to compete globally in knowledge sharing and employment, we have gradually removed the moral studies from the School curriculum. On the other side of the coin, when the Joint Family system was in prevalence, the grandparents, in order to at-least while away their time, used to tell moral stories to their grandchildren. “Patti Kathaigal” (Grandmother's stories) played a major role to imbibe good qualities in the children. Now joint family system has also slowly faded away. As a result, the children hardly have the golden opportunity of learning moral values from the elders also. As a consequence, we have witnessed crimes by juvenile delinquents on the increase. Even the Government is forced to amend the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act to treat the Juveniles on par with adults in respect of certain heinous crimes. Feeling of togetherness has vanished. Love and respect for the elders have diminished. Some, among the younger generation, do also forget to maintain their parents. They are left in the lurch in the evening of their life. So, the Government had to think of converting the pious obligation to maintain the Parents as a legal obligation. Thus, for the first time in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, provision was made for payment of maintenance to the Parents, who are unable to maintain themselves. Though a claim for maintenance is in the nature of a Civil claim, the said provision was inserted in the Criminal Procedure Code thereby giving jurisdiction to Judicial Magistrates hoping that it would be less expensive and speedy. But in course of time, the hope was belied. The aged Parents continue to suffer. Many of them have to spend their life in old age homes.
2. Taking note of the above hard realities, in order to make the procedure easier, less expensive and to be on fast track, the Government has brought into force a completely new legislation viz., “The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007”. This Act aims at compelling the children to pay maintenance to the Parents and also to the other Senior Citizens by their relatives. It also contains provision for measures for protection of the Senior Citizens. Thus, the object of the Act is though laudable, it is unfortunate that the younger generation have to be compelled by means of such a legislation to take care of the elders. What was all along considered to be a pious obligation is now a legal obligation. Those younger generation, who fail to discharge their pious obligation towards the elders are now forced to discharge their legal obligation to maintain them. Though one is to be optimistic about the Act, the fact remains that the framework of the Act in its present form may hardly yield the desired result. The case on hand illustrates the same.
3. The 3rd Respondent is a senior citizen, aged 72 years. He has got three sons and two daughters. All of them are married and they are living separately and thus the joint family has disintegrated. The Petitioner is the youngest son of the 3rd Respondent. The Wife of the 3rd Respondent died few years before. The 3rd Respondent further claims that he has been living separately and he has not been taken care of by any of his children.
4. The 3rd Respondent further claims that he has got a licence to run an oil mill and has established an oil mill known as “Nagammal Oil Mills” in Eraniel and he has been carrying on the said business all these years. The 3rd Respondent further claims that after the demise of his Wife, he handed over the income from the mill to the Petitioner. The cash was accordingly kept in the Petitioner's house for safety purpose. As of now, the mill is worth Rs. 4,75,000/- and there is stock worth Rs. 7,93,361. The 3rd Respondent further claims that his yearly income is somewhere between Rs. 1,00,000/- and Rs. 1,50,000/-. Out of the said income, the Third Respondent further claims that he was maintaining himself, meeting his expenses, including treatment, medicine, etc.
5. While so, according to the 3rd Respondent, the Petitioner had dispossessed him during the year 2011 and deprived him of any income from the oil mill. In this regard, the 3rd Respondent claims to have made a Complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Kanyakumari District, on 24.4.2011 That was, in turn, forwarded to the Inspector of Police, Eraniel, for necessary action. At this juncture, the relatives intervened in the matter and tried to settle the dispute, amicably. Accordingly, the matter was settled and so, no further action was taken by the Police. A Tata Load Van, belonging to the 3rd Respondent, was handed over by the Petitioner to him. According to the settlement, the oil mill should be run by the Petitioner and he should pay Rs. 3,000/- as rent per month to the 3rd Respondent. But, so far, the Petitioner has not paid such rent to the 3rd Respondent. The Account Books for about 20 years, kept in the mill, had been retained by the Petitioner and he has not returned the same to the Third Respondent, he claims. Therefore, the 3rd Respondent made a Complaint to the Revenue Divisional Officer, who also incidentally happened to be the “Maintenance Tribunal” under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). In that Complaint, the 3rd Respondent had requested the Revenue Divisional Officer to take possession of the mill from the Petitioner and to hand over the same to him and to get back the Account Books relating to the past 20 years and also to direct the Petitioner to pay Rs. 2,00,000/-, representing the Loss of Income for the 3rd Respondent.
6. The above Petition was entertained by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Padmanabhapuram, in the capacity of the Maintenance Tribunal under the Act. Notice was issued to the Petitioner and accordingly he appeared.
7. Before the Tribunal, the Petitioner has disputed most of the allegations raised by the 3rd Respondent. He has stated that from the year 1989 onwards, he was doing copra business with his father and subsequently, out of his own resources, he purchased a land, measuring 9 cents from one Mr. P.S Thambi and by securing this, he has established a business under the name of “K.M.P Agency”. There arose some domestic quarrel at that juncture among the family members. The 3rd Respondent, therefore, asked the Petitioner not to use the name of ‘Nagammal Oil Mills’ and also the name of ‘KMP Agency’. Therefore, the Petitioner has converted his business under the name of ‘MRM Oil Mills. Accordingly, he has been doing independent business. He has also stated that he is prepared to return the steel equipments which belong to Nagammal Oil Mills to the 3rd Respondent. He has requested for action against the 3rd Respondent.
8. The Tribunal, finally, by Order dated 12.1.2012, in A2/5739/2011, issued the following directions:
(i) The Petitioner shall return all the equipments belonging to Nagammal Oil Mills and the Account Books of the said Mill to the 3rd Respondent within 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the Order.
(ii) Since joint business was conducted by the Petitioner and the 3rd Respondent from 1997, the stock in the mill should be estimated and the same should be returned to the 3rd Respondent.
(iii) The Petitioner shall pay a sum of Rs. 3,000/- per month towards Maintenance of the 3rd Respondent.
9. Aggrieved by the said order, the Petitioner preferred an Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal/District Collector. The Appellate Tribunal, by its Order dated 5.10.2012 in C3.13512/2012, confirmed the Order of the Tribunal. Challenging both the Orders of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal, the Petitioner is before this Court with this Writ Petition.
10. I have heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for Respondents 1 & 2, the learned Counsel for the 3rd Respondent as well as the Mr. T. Lajapathi Roy, Amicus curiae, appointed by this Court. I have also perused the records, carefully.
11. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the Tribunal, constituted under the Act, has got no power to pass an Order in respect of the joint business conducted by the Petitioner and the 3rd Respondent so as to return the Mill Accounts and cash to the 3rd Respondent. The learned Counsel would refer to Section 4 of the Act and would contend that under the said provision, the Tribunal has got jurisdiction only to order for maintenance and of no others. The learned Counsel would incidentally refer to Section 23 of the Act, under which the Tribunal has power to declare certain transactions as void. But, in this case, according to the learned Counsel, the Tribunal has passed the order in respect of the joint business, for which it has got no jurisdiction at all.
12. The learned Counsel appearing for the 3rd Respondent would submit that the Tribunal has got power to pass such an order, which is incidental in nature.
13. In respect of these rival contentions, I have carefully gone through entire Act, more particularly Sections 4 & 7 of the Act. Section 4, empowers the Tribunal only to issue a direction for payment of maintenance. It is not inbuilt in Section 4 of the Act empowering the Tribunal to order return of properties. Apart from the said power under Section 4, the Tribunal has been empowered under Section 23 of the Act only to declare certain transactions as void. But, going by the laudable object of the Act, Section 23 of the Act should receive expansive interpretation so as to hold that while declaring a transfer of property to be void under Section 23 of the Act, the power to order for return of the property relating to the said transfer should be understood. At the same time, a plain reading of Section 23(1) of the Act will make it ipso facto clear that it is not every transfer of property which shall be so declared as void. If such a transfer has been effected on condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal. In the instant case, it is not alleged by the Third Respondent that any such transfer was effected by him on condition that the Petitioner should provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to him. It needs to be mentioned that such transfer need not be by way of gift alone as indicated in Section 23(1) of the Act. The expression “otherwise” employed in sub-section (1) of Section 23, should be liberally interpreted to include even transfer of possession but, such transfer of possession should be on condition of providing basic amenities and physical needs. In the instant case, it is not at all alleged that either there was gift or was there any other kind of transfer including transfer of possession in favour of the Petitioner on condition to provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs. Thus, in this case, the order of the Tribunal directing the Petitioner to return the properties such as joint business accounts, cash, etc. is wholly without jurisdiction. The dispute is purely Civil in nature. In such view of the matter, the impugned Order of the Tribunal, to that extent, is liable to be set aside.
14. Turning to the maintenance amount ordered by the Tribunal, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the 3rd Respondent did not even pray for ordering maintenance, as he has got sufficient personal earnings in the business as well as income from the properties owned by him, which is more than sufficient to maintain himself. Thus, according to the Petitioner, the 3rd Respondent is not entitled for maintenance. However, the Tribunal has passed the order for maintenance for which the 3rd Respondent is not entitled for, the learned Counsel contended.
15. But, the learned Counsel appearing for the 3rd Respondent would submit that of course, it is true that no such specific prayer was made for an order for maintenance to the 3rd Respondent but, that will not deter the Tribunal from passing an Order for Maintenance. In this regard, I should say, strict pleadings as are insisted upon in Civil proceedings cannot be insisted in a proceeding under this Act. The Act serves a social purpose. When Senior Citizens approach the Tribunal seeking some solace, the same cannot be turned down on a technical ground of absence of pleading. To that extent, I am able to agree with the contention of the 3rd Respondent. But, at the same time, it should be stated that an Order for Maintenance can be granted, provided the senior citizen is entitled for the same. A senior citizen, including Parents, will be entitled for maintenance if only he/she satisfies the requirements indicated in sub-section (1) of Section 4. The said provision states that a senior citizen, including parent, shall be entitled for maintenance, only if he is unable to maintain from his own earnings or out of the income from the property owned by him. These two are factual aspects which are to be proved before the Tribunal. Unless maintenance is asked for in the Petition by stating either both or any one of these contingencies, it will not afford an opportunity to the Respondent to either admit these facts or to deny the same and thereafter to prove his stand. But, in the instant case, not only there was no request for payment of Maintenance, but also there was no evidence at all let in to prove any one of the above essential requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 4. In fact, the 3rd Respondent has positively averred that his yearly income is between Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 1,50,000/-. Thus, in the absence of any evidence that the 3rd Respondent is unable to maintain himself, the Tribunal has erroneously passed the order. Therefore, that part of the Order of the Tribunal, directing the Petitioner to pay Maintenance is also liable to be set aside.
16. Turning to the Order of the Appellate Tribunal, under Section 16 of the Act, the Appellate Tribunal has committed the same error, in as much as it has not appreciated the facts of the case in their proper perspective at all. The Appellate Tribunal did not notice that no evidence whatsoever was recorded by the Tribunal. Therefore, the Appellate Tribunal's Order, confirming the Tribunal's Order, is liable to be set aside.
17. During the course of the proceedings, I noticed that a plain reading of Section 16 of the Act gives an impression that an Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal would be only at the instance of a parent or a senior citizen. It gives further impression that the aggrieved children or the relatives have no right of Appeal. This does not appear to be a conscious omission by the Parliament. The Parliament would not have thought of differentiating between the rights of the aggrieved Parents and the Senior Citizens on one hand and the rights of the aggrieved children and relatives on the other hand. It is too well settled that the right of Appeal is a creature of statute and unless there is a specific provision made for Appeal, such right of Appeal cannot be readily inferred. If Section 16 of the Act receives literal interpretation, certainly it would lead only to an absurdity. For example, in a given case, if the parent is aggrieved by the quantum of Compensation, going by the plain reading of Section 16, he can file Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, but, at the same time, the aggrieved children cannot go on Appeal challenging the quantum ordered. They may have to approach the High Court either under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Thus, as against the same Order of the Tribunal, there may be two proceedings before two different forums. This would not have been certainly intended by the Parliament. In order to avoid this absurd result, the Court should use its interpretative tools to supply the missing words into the provision. In N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose, 2009 (7) SCC 1, Hon'ble Justice S.B Sinha, speaking for the Supreme Court Bench, has held as follows:
“Interpretative tools of Constitutional provisions and the Statutory provisions may be different. Whatever interpretative tool is applied, the Court must not forget that its job is to find out the intention of the legislature. It can be gathered from the words used. However, if plain meaning assigned to the Section results in absurdity or anomaly, literal meaning indisputably would not be applied. It is also well settled that the Court may have to change the interpretative tool in the event it is necessary to give effective contextual meaning to the Act.”
Since I am of the firm view that the missing of the words “aggrieved child or relative” in Section 16 of the Act is only an unconscious omission by the Parliament, by applying the Principle of “casus omissus”, it should be held that such a right of Appeal is available for the aggrieved son/daughter/relative as well. I only hope that the law makers would take note of this anomaly and rectify the defect in the drafting of Section 16 of the Act.
18. Before parting with this case, I wish to highlight certain sorry state of affairs which I have noticed in the proceedings conducted by the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Tribunal. Section 7 of the Act states that the State Government shall, by Notification in the Official Gazette, constitute for each sub-division one or more Tribunals for the purpose of adjudicating and deciding upon the Order for Maintenance under Section 5. A plain reading of this Section would clearly indicate that the function of the Tribunal is to adjudicate and to decide the dispute between the parties in respect of payment of Maintenance.
19. Section 6 of the Act, which deals with jurisdiction and procedure, states that all evidence to such proceeding shall be recorded in the presence of the children or relative against whom an order for payment of Maintenance is proposed to be made in the manner prescribed for summons case. This provision again makes it explicit that evidence should be recorded, if let in by the parties, and the manner of recording is as it is done in Summons cases, as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is common knowledge that if any oral evidence is let in, by one party, the adverse party has got an indefeasible right to challenge the same by way of cross-examination. Providing such an opportunity for cross-examination will be in tune with the Principles of Natural Justice, as well. Any evidence so recorded, without affording opportunity to the adverse party to cross-examine, cannot be considered as a full-fledged evidence so as to receive weightage.
20. sub-section (3) of Section 5, states that on receipt of an Application for Maintenance under sub-section (1), after giving notice of the Application to the children or relative and after giving the parties opportunity of being heard, hold an enquiry for determining the amount of maintenance. This provision again goes to highlight that the adverse party has got an opportunity of being heard. Here, the phrase “being heard” shall mean, in its true sense, that the hearing should be real and meaningful and not farcical. Again this provision clearly indicates that the enquiry is to determine the amount of maintenance by the Tribunal. Such determination can be based only on adjudication as indicated in Section 6 of the Act. Section 8 of the Act makes it tacitly clear that the procedure of enquiry to be held, as indicated in sub-section (3) of Section 5, shall be summary in nature. Section 9, indicates the standard of proof which is required of in a case of this nature falling under Section 4 of the Act. Section 9, reads as follows:
“9. Order for Maintenance: (1) If children or relatives, as the case may be, neglect or refuse to maintain a senior citizen being unable to maintain himself, the Tribunal may, on being satisfied of such neglect or refusal, order such children or relative to make a monthly allowance at such monthly rate for the maintenance of such senior citizen, as the Tribunal may deem fit and to pay the same to such senior citizen as the Tribunal may, from time to time, direct.
2. The maximum Maintenance Allowance, which may be ordered by such Tribunal, shall be such as may be prescribed by the State Government which shall not exceed ten thousand rupees per month.”.
21. A plain reading of the above sub-section (1) of Section 9, would obviate doubt, if any, that an Order for Maintenance could be made only on the satisfaction of the Tribunal by means of adjudication on appreciating the evidence that the children or relative, as the case may be, neglect the parent/senior citizen or refuse to maintain them. In the absence of any adjudication and clear findings as indicated in sub-section (1) of Section 9, no Order can be passed for Maintenance.
22. From the nature of the functions of the Tribunal, which hereinabove I have elaborated, it is crystal clear that such adjudication may involve, at times, mixed questions of fact and law to be decided. In my view, this kind of function can be discharged effectively by a legally trained person. But, sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act, states that the Tribunal shall be presided over by an Officer not below the rank of Sub-Divisional Officer of a State. In tune with the same, the Government of Tamil Nadu has issued the “Tamil Nadu Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009”, by which the State Government has notified that the Revenue Divisional Officer of every Division in the State shall be the Tribunal for the purposes of this Act and the District Collector of the District concerned shall be the Appellate Tribunal. In most of the places, the Revenue Divisional Officers/Sub-Collectors as well as District Collectors are not legally trained. They are trained mainly on administration. I apprehend that these legally untrained officials may not effectively function as the Tribunals/Appellate Tribunals under the Act so as to accomplish the object of the Act.
23. The very purpose of the Act in creating a separate Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal is to simplify the procedure and to make the provision inexpensive and easy for the Senior Citizens. But, in practice, I should say, the Tribunals constituted in the State, instead of minimising the hardship of the Senior Citizens, will only add to their agonies. This conclusion of mine is based on factual matrix. Let us take for illustration the case on hand.
24. In this case, the 3rd Respondent made an Application to the Tribunal on 7.9.2011 On appearance of the Petitioner herein, the Tribunal wanted him to give a Written Statement. Accordingly, the Petitioner gave an unsigned and undated Written Statement. Similar Written Statement was called for from the 3rd Respondent. He gave a Written Statement, dated 5.12.2011 Then the 3rd Respondent gave a Letter on 8.12.2011 seeking a copy of the Written Statement of the Petitioner. The records do not disclose whether the same was given or not. Based on the unsigned and undated Written Statement of the Petitioner and the Written Statement of the Third Respondent, it appears, Order was drafted by someone in the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer. It was thereafter put-up before the Revenue Divisional Officer for further orders. He made certain corrections in the same and signed it. This is the Order, which is impugned in this Writ Petition. It needs to be mentioned that there was no evidence, either oral or documentary, let in by the parties and there was no opportunity to cross-examine at all. I do not understand as to how the Tribunal had determined the issues, based only on these two Written Statements. This order of the Tribunal does not satisfy even the basic requirements of law. I regret to say that the Revenue Divisional Officer was ignorant of the procedure to be followed by him. Forgetting that he was discharging a quasi-judicial function, which requires an element of adjudication, he had simply treated the entire proceeding as an administrative one and passed the Order, as though it is an Administrative Order.
25. Turning to the Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the Appeal was made on 27.3.2012 by the Petitioner. Treating the said Appeal as an Appeal on the Administrative side, the District Collector called for para-war remarks from the Revenue Divisional Officer. The Revenue Divisional Officer submitted his para-war remarks on 25.6.2012 Thereafter, the District Collector issued Notice on 10.7.2012 calling upon the parties to be present before him for enquiry. Accordingly, they appeared. The Petitioner was asked by the District Collector to give a Written Statement. Accordingly, in the presence of the District Collector, he gave a Written Statement. The District Collector certified that the same was written in his presence. The 3rd Respondent was also asked to give a Written Statement. He submitted an already prepared Written Statement. Based on these two statements, the District Collector/Appellate Tribunal passed the impugned Order confirming the Order of the Tribunal. This Order does not have any reference to the records of the Tribunal. The very fact that the Appellate Tribunal/District Collector called for para-war remarks from the Tribunal/Revenue Divisional Officer would go to show that the Appellate Tribunal was also under the mistaken impression that the proceeding is administrative in nature and not a quasi-judicial proceeding. It also did not notice that no evidence was recorded by the Tribunal. I do not understand as to how the Appellate Tribunal could direct the parties to file Written Statements, ignoring the earlier statements given before the Tribunal. This would only go to show that the District Collector is also ignorant of the nature of the functions of the Appellate Tribunal. Both the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Collector have not even understood that in the place of a full-fledged Court of law, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal have been constituted with similar powers and more or less with similar functions.
26. This is not the only case where this Court has seen this kind of irregularities and illegalities committed by the Presiding Officers of the Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals, constituted under the Act in this State. If these officers, who are manning the Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals, are allowed to continue to function as Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals, I apprehend, the very object of the Act will be defeated, inasmuch as most of the Orders passed by these Tribunals will be interfered with by Courts on these procedural irregularities and illegalities which would result only in further mental agonies and hardship to the Senior Citizens.
27. Of-course the Parents have option to approach under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, instead of approaching the Tribunals under the special provision. The Parents may opt to go before the Criminal Courts where there will be proper appreciation of evidence by following appropriate procedure and there is no limit in respect of the quantum of Maintenance. But the other Senior Citizens cannot approach a Criminal Court against a relative. Therefore, in my view, the Parliament and the State Government should consider to amend the appropriate provisions of the Act and the Rules so as to constitute these Tribunals to be manned by legally trained persons, such as a practising Advocate or a retired Judge or a serving Judicial Officer. I may suggest that to man the Tribunals, the Government may make suitable law to engage retired Judicial Officers of Senior Division and to man the Appellate Tribunals, they may engage the retired District and Sessions Judges. This could be done even without incurring any substantial financial commitment. The Tribunal may function in the Revenue Divisional Officer's Office itself with the very same staff members, who are working in the Revenue Department. But, the proceedings of the Tribunal may be conducted by a legally trained person in the very same Revenue Divisional Officer's Office where a separate room alone may be allotted for the Tribunal for conducting the proceedings. Similarly, the Appellate Tribunal may function in the Office of the District Collector, with the very same staff members, who are working in the District Collectorate but, the proceedings of the Appellate Tribunal may be conducted by a legally trained in a separate room in the Collectorate itself. If this is adopted by the Government, the object of the Act will surely be achieved and the same also will not involve much of financial commitment to the Government.
28. Further, Section 17 of the Act bars appearance of Advocates before the Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals. As we have noticed, under Section 23 of the Act, the Tribunal is empowered to declare a transaction as void in certain contingencies. This certainly involves complicated questions of law and facts which certainly require the assistance of an advocate. Even for deciding the question of maintenance, the assistance of an Advocate would be beneficial. Section 30 of the Advocates Act also permits the appearance of Advocates before Tribunals. Thus, Section 17 of the Act also requires re-look by the Parliament.
29. Now turning to the facts of the present case, as I have concluded, for issuing direction for return of the oil mill equipments, cash, stock and account books, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction and therefore that part of the Order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside. As far as the order for Maintenance, the same is liable to be set aside for the reasons discussed hereinabove.
30. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned Orders are set aside. No costs. Connected M.P(MD) No. 1 of 2012 is closed and M.P(MD) No. 1 of 2013 is dismissed.
Note: Registry is directed to forward copies of this Order to the Chief Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Secretary to Government, Social Welfare Department, Secretary to State Government, Department of Law and Secretary to Union Government, the Ministry of Law and Justice, New Delhi, Law Commission of India and the Tamil Nadu State Law Commission.
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