Action of the respondents in initiating departmental proceedings, at the fag end of retirement and the order permitting the petitioner to retire subject to the conditions of recovery from retiral benefits and disciplinary action, proposed to be action after retirement, are under challenge. The petitioner has also sought for a direction to the respondents to settle all the retirement benefits, monetary as well as service, with appropriate interest till the payment and damages.

2. Facts leading to the Writ Petition are as follows:

The petitioner was appointed as Lower Division Clerk/Junior Assistant, by direct recruitment on 05.11.1960. He was promoted and posted at Salem Municipality as Assistant cum Accountant. He was working as Store Keeper in Salem Municipality from 13.07.1992 to 30.06.1992. Thereafter, he was posted as Cashier. Two other individuals posted as Store Keeper did not join duty in the said Municipality and therefore, the Commissioner of Salem Municipality orally instructed the petitioner to look after the stores in addition to the post of Cashier. His predecessor Thiru.A.V.Venugopal, Store Keeper in the above said Municipality worked for about seven years till 12.07.1992. According to the petitioner, while Thiru.A.V.Venugopal was transferred to Mettur Municipality, he had failed to handover the charge of the stores and all the connected records. Though there were several audit objections from the year 1990-91 to 12.07.1992, till he was relieved from Mettur Municipality, he had not taken any steps to settle the objections, while he was working as Store Keeper and he had also taken away all the records connected to the audit objections. It is the contention of the petitioner that though the above facts were brought to the notice of the Municipal Engineer and Commissioner, Salem Municipality, unfortunately, it was not taken care of properly and no action was taken against him, till date of his retirement.

3. It is the further contention of the petitioner that though the Vigilance Department had enquired into the irregularities committed by the said Thiru.A.V.Venugopal, during his tenure in Salem Municipality for about seven years, no action was taken on the report submitted by the Vigilance Department to the Government. Even the recommendations and suggestions made by the government to rectify the defects pointed out by the audit were not considered.

4. The petitioner has further submitted that at the fag end of his service, he was transferred to the post of Store Keeper in Salem Municipality and posted as Cashier from 01.07.1993. By order dated 31.01.1994, the petitioner was permitted to retire from the post of Cashier on the Afternoon of 31.01.1994, without prejudice to the disciplinary action being taken against him. The impugned order, dated 31.01.1994 permitting the petitioner to retire from service is subject to the following conditions, viz., (i) that Rs.1,28,40,144/- has to be deducted from the retirement benefits of the petitioner and (ii) without prejudice to the disciplinary action being taken against the petitioner.

5. The petitioner has further submitted that during his tenure, he had served as Market Superintendent (Assistant Cadre) from 22.05.1985 to 07.04.1988. Then he was transferred to Suramangalam Municipality by the first respondent and posted as Revenue Inspector (Assistant Cadre). He had served as Revenue Inspector from 08.04.1988 to 19.04.1989 in Suramangalam Municipality. Again the petitioner was transferred and posted as Assistant in the Salem Municipality. The petitioner has served as Assistant from 20.04.1989 to 07.11.1989 in Health Section and from 08.11.1989 to 12.07.1992 as Assistant (E1) in Engineering Section. He was transferred from E1 Section and posted as Store Keeper from 13.07.1992 to 30.06.1993. The petitioner is alleged to have caused loss to the Salem Municipality, as detailed hereunder:

6. In so far as the alleged loss relating to the advance of Rs.25,000/- drawn by the petitioner to meet out the delivery of Cement bags to clear and stock them by engaging local people, the petitioner has stated that he had already submitted all connected sub vouchers for Rs.26,268/- to adjust the advance on 28.01.1994. For payment of excess amount spent from his pocket, no action was taken by the department, though the adjustment vouchers were also submitted on 28.04.1991 itself. In the impugned notice, a sum of Rs.35,16,268/- is shown as loss caused under the head "leases, rent and licences". Earlier, when Salem Municipality had enhanced the rent amount, aggrieved by the enhancement, the lessees had gone upto Supreme Court and got stay of the orders, for collection of the enhanced rent fixed by the Municipality. The orders of the Supreme Court were in force at the time of retirement of the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner cannot be found fault with for non-collection of the arrears of lease/rent fixed by the Municipal Commissioner.

7. It is further submitted that after the petitioner's retirement, Salem Municipal Commissioner had taken a decision in the matter of fixing the rent and the council had accordingly resolved to cancel the amount, fixed in excess of the agreed amount. In this context, the petitioner has submitted that to cancel or write off any amount due to the Municipality, the council has got every power and authority and there is no need for outside sanction. Inspite of that, the fourth respondent, the then Commissioner, Salem Municipality, has addressed a letter to the Government for approval of the decision of the council. In view of the subsequent developments, the petitioner is not responsible for the loss caused to the Municipality under the head "Leases, Rent and Licences".

8. The petitioner has further submitted that Festival and T.A. Advance of Rs.975/- drawn by him, had already been refunded. In so far as the recovery of time barred arrears to the tune of Rs.6,055/-, the Commissioner of Suramangalam Municipality in his memo in Roc.No.K10/4987/2001, dated 10.12.2001, has stated that time barred arrears is not in existence at present. Therefore, the petitioner is not liable for the alleged loss caused due to the non-collection of time barred arrears, to Suramangalam Municipality.

9. As regards a sum of Rs.3,670/- being the alleged loss caused to the Department on account of wrong fixation of pay, the petitioner has submitted that the Audit Department was convinced with the connected records and the relevant rules and that they have dropped the objection after the retirement of the petitioner. In fine, the petitioner has further submitted that the audit objections were mainly due to the irregularities committed by the then Store Keeper, viz., Thiru.A.V. Venugopal, who had worked in Salem Municipality for seven years till 02.07.1992.

10. The Examiner of Local Fund Accounts, Madras, second respondent, in his counter affidavit, has submitted that the petitioner had served as Market Superintendent from 22.05.1985 to 07.04.1988 and as Store Keeper from 13.07.1992 to 30.06.1993 in Salem Municipality (now Salem Corporation). Apart from the alleged loss caused by the petitioner towards, (1) advance drawn by him from Salem Municipality, (2) loss caused under the head "leases, Rents and licences", (3) balance of Festival and Traveling Allowance Advances, (4) loss caused due to non-collection of property tax and vacant site tax relating to the year 1985-86, which became time barred by limitation, the Director of Local Funds and Audit, Madras, has given the details of audit objections in respect of Salem Municipality as follows:

11. The second respondent has further submitted that as per the audit report for the period noted above, a sum of Rs.42.15 lakhs is pending settlement. It is further submitted that the name of the petitioner was neither mentioned as person responsible for the loss nor recommended for recovery, in all the audit paragraphs and responsibility has to be fixed by the administration, viz., the Commissioner, Salem Municipality (now Salem Corporation) on the persons responsible for the loss pointed out in the audit report.

12. The details of the objections referred to by the audit for the period between 1990-93, are as follows:

Sl.No Para No. and year Gist of Audit Objections Amount involved Rs.

Present stage of Audit object-ion Remarks Para No.10 1990-91 World Bank Project Audit Report TNUDP/MUDF Bitumen purchased Weight of Bitumen as per weigh Bridge 12.3 M.T Only 9.00 MT taken into stock shortage to be recovered at double the rate of bitumen (person responsible as per Audit para was A.V.Venugopal, the then Store Keeper) 26,400/-

Pending In the audit para it was mentioned to recover the cost from Thiru.A.V. Venugopal, Store Keeper Para No.33 1990-91 World Bank Project Audit Report Para 11(i) & (ii) 92-93 TNUDP/MUDF Advance sanctioned for purchase of Bitumen Advance not completely adjusted Bitumen for the amount paid, not completely 26,75,000 (Total Advance amount) 6,188 2,785 Pending Advances paid to institutions such as IOCL, BPCL, amount not to be recovered from individuals Para 11 MDUF 1991-92 Audit Report MUDF Ward No.38 & 39 Bitumen returned by contractor Not taken into stock Double the rate to be recovered (person responsible was A.V.Venugopal, the then store keeper) 3,648/-

Pending In the audit para it was mentioned to recover the cost from Thiru. A.V.Venu-gopal, Store Keeper Para 28 MUDF 1991-92 Audit Report Cement procured for Municipal Works Not directly from TANCEM - procured from a private agent at a higher rate, against government orders Excess paid To be recovered 56,000/-

Pending Audit pointed out loss only due to purchase of cement at excess rate than the rate fixed by Government Adminis-tration has to fix responsibility on the persons concerned for recovery of amount who purchased at excess rate Para 29 MUDF 1991-92 Audit Report MUDF Advance paid for procurement of bitumen Bitumen received part of bitumen received, was not taken into stock shortage Double the rate to be recovered other defects (person responsible as per audit para was (person responsible was A.V.Venugopal, the then store keeper) 2,130/-

54,530/-

29(ii) & (iv) pending In para 29(2) loss of Rs.2,130/- has been pointed out. In audit para audit did not point out from whom the amount has to be recovered Para 37 MUDF 1992-93 Audit Report MUDF Stock register Cement stock shortage of 330 bags of cement in stock register unauthorities issue of 180 bags of cement to the contractor - double the rate of 510 bags of cement to be recovered 1,08,120 Pending persons responsible as per audit para are (1) A.V.Venu-gopal, the then store keeper (2) Comm-issioner & (3) Municipal Engineer Para 30 Water Supply Fund Audit Report 92-93 Uniforms issued to employees under Water Supply Fund Total 68 persons - Amount paid for clothes calculated for more than 68 persons Excess paid amount to be recovered 414/-

Pending Audit did not point out from whom amount has to be recovered. Administration has to fix responsibility for recovery of amount Para 36 Water Supply Fund Audit Report 92-93 Procurement of 6" PVC Pipes Not procured from approved dealer at approved rate Procured from unapproved company at a higher rate -

1,12,000 Pending "

Para 37 Water Supply Fund Audit Report 92-93 Spare Parts Eventhough spare parts were sufficiently available Rs.4,55,351/- worth spare parts purchased due to misleading office note unnecessary locking up of fund Loss of interest G.I. Pipe not procured from approved dealer Higher rate paid Excess paid amount and loss of interest to be recovered 86,491/-

Pending "

Para 40 Water Supply Fund Audit Report 92-93 Stores issued Water Supply materials Usage not shown to audit with relevant records Value of stores issued held under objection 10,82,289 Pending Audit requested particulars of usage of water supply materials only. Records for usage of materials need to be shown to audit Total 42,15,995

13. Respondents 4 and 5 in their counter affidavit have submitted that the petitioner was permitted to retire on the afternoon of 31.1.1994, subject to the conditions that the petitioner is liable to make good the loss of Rs.1,28,43,089 to Salem Municipal Corporation and Rs.6055/- to Suramangalem Municipality. They have further submitted that the petitioner was appointed as storekeeper in Salem Municipality with effect from 17.7.1992 in place of one Thiru.A.V. Venugopal, who had worked for the past seven years. The said Thiru.A.V. Venugopal had simply closed the balance of stock of bitumen and cement accounts as NIL and handed over the ledgers to the petitioner. However, he had not handed over the charge of the stores. The respondents have further submitted that the petitioner had failed to take action to compare the floor stock with that of various ledger balance, which is a rudimentary principle to be adopted in the case where charges were not handed over to the successor.

14. The respondents have further submitted that as a responsible officer, the petitioner ought to have traced out the various invoices and other relevant particulars and submitted to the audit to settle the objections. Any difficulties in settling the objections, for want of relevant records or papers, not available with the office, ought to have been reported to the Commissioner of Municipal Administration. Without taking any efforts to settle the objections, the petitioner has simply fixed the responsibility on his predecessor, which according to the respondents 4 and 5, is not fair and acceptable.

15. The respondents 4 and 5 have further submitted that it is the bounden duty of the store-keeper to produce the connected records in his custody, to audit and settle the objections. Evenafter the scrutiny of the records submitted to the audit, if the objections could not be settled for some valid reasons, then the non settlement ought to have been brought to the notice of the Commissioner with proper reasons. When the petitioner had joined duty as store keeper on 17.7.1992, he had failed to discharge the duties properly and therefore, he is responsible for the audit objections relating to the years 1990-91, 1991-92 and 1992-93.

16. The respondents 4 and 5 have further submitted that mere statement of the petitioner that for all the irregularities, his predecessor, Thiru.A.V.Venugopal alone was responsible, is not acceptable and nothing prevented him from producing the relevant records in his custody to audit for settlement of objections. As regards the averments that the advance of Rs.25,000/- was drawn and paid to the petitioner on 19.5.1993, the respondents 4 and 5 have submitted that the said amount ought to have been adjusted as soon as it was spent. According to them, till date, the said advance amount was not adjusted in any account.

17. The respondents 4 and 5 have further submitted that the petitioner served as Market Superintendent from 22.5.1985 to 7.4.1988 and a lease amount of Rs.26,207/- for the year 1985-86 was pending collection due to his inaction. Since Market Superintendent is responsible for collection of lease amount, the petitioner is fully responsible for the non-collection of lease amount.

18. It is further submitted that though a charge memo was issued to B12 Assistant, it is the responsibility of the petitioner to produce store ledgers and invoices to adjust the advances. Issue of charge memo to B12 Assistant, would not absolve the petitioner of his responsibility of adjustment of advance amount. At the time of retirement of the petitioner, there was a balance of Rs.225/- to be remitted by the petitioner. For the above said reasons, the respondents 4 and 5 prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petition.

19. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that once the government servant is permitted to retire from service on attaining the age of superannuation, no fresh disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against him after retirement. Even if any disciplinary proceedings had already been initiated against the government servant, before attaining the age of superannuation, unless the government servant is retained in service, pursuant to an order issued by the Government under rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules, the said disciplinary proceedings cannot be allowed to be continued for the purpose of inflicting of any one of the penalties enumerated under Rule 8 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, such as dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or recovery etc., It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that for the purpose of completion of disciplinary proceedings, relationship of Master and servant should be maintained and that a specific order of suspension should be passed by the Government in this regard.

20. According to the learned counsel, when the petitioner was permitted to retire from service, the relationship of Master and Servant is terminated and therefore, no disciplinary action can be taken or continued, in the absence of provisions in the service rules. Apart from FR 56(1)(c), he placed strong reliance on many decisions, which would be dealt with, in latter paragraphs.

21. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that when rule 56(1)(c) permits a particular mode for taking action against a government servant, after his retirement, the authorities can resort to only that mode and not otherwise. According to him, if the department had decided to initiate departmental action against a Government servant, then he has to be retained in service, by placing him under suspension, thereby, the relationship of Master and Servant, is retained till the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. In the case on hand, as the petitioner was neither suspended nor retained in service, orders of recovery passed against him, without conducting any enquiry, as contemplated under the service rules, is liable to be set aside.

22. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the petitioner had attained the age of superannuation, 14 years ago and he is now aged about 73 years. In the absence of any explanation from the respondent as to why disciplinary action was not initiated for the past 14 years, the recovery order is illegal. Inviting the attention of this Court to the specific words used in the impugned order, i.e., "without prejudice to the disciplinary action being taken against the individual", learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the petitioner was permitted to retire, no departmental proceedings can be initiated thereafter.

23. According to him, the allegations relate to the year 1990-91 and thereafter, after a lapse of nearly 18 years, evidence and records would have been either lost or misplaced and that no witnesses would be available to support the said allegations. The inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the department in not conducting the enquiry, would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner from effectively defending the same. He further submitted that matters, Courts have consistently held that, as inordinate delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings would cause serious prejudice to an employee, fresh action should not be permitted to be taken. He further submitted that in the absence of any satisfactory explanation in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, the delay and latches on the part of the department should not be condoned and it would be unfair to allow the department to initiate fresh or continue any action, at this length of time after retirement and therefore, submitted that the impugned proceeding is liable to be set aside.

24. As regards the allegation that the petitioner had not taken adequate steps to collect the rents due to be paid to Municipality, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the matter was pending before the Supreme Court and even before the disposal of the case, he had attained the age of superannuation and retired from service. Under such circumstances, fastening the liability on the petitioner, for non-recovery of rent is arbitrary. In the light of the decisions of this Court, holding that revenue Inspectors/Managers cannot be made liable for the failure to collect tax, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that no fresh proceedings can be initiated against the petitioner for recovery and any proceedings initiated already are not valid in law.

25. Further, placing reliance on the decisions of this Court in Nagarajan v. Commissioner, Salem Municipality, Salem reported in 1988 Writ L.R. 38 and Mani, N. v. The Commissioner, Villupuram Municipality reported in 2006 (1) CTC 632, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that liability cannot be fixed on the petitioner for recovery of time barred property tax, professional tax, and rent, due and payable to the Municipality.

26. Learned counsel for the respondents reiterated the averments made in the counter affidavits filed by the respondents.

Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the materials available on record.

27. The impugned order reads that the petitioner was permitted to retire without prejudice to the disciplinary action being taken against him and subject to the recovery of Rs.1,28,49,144/-. The said sum is split up into nine different items, viz., (1) Advance drawn by the petitioner from Salem Municipality : Rs. 25,000.00 (2) As per Audit Objection, Paragraphs 9, 10 & 16/1990-91, Paragraphs 28 & 29/1991-92 and Paragraphs 37 & 47/1992-93 under World Bank Assistance Scheme : Rs. 5,92,975.00 (3) As per Audit Objection, Paragraphs 30, 36 & 37/1991-92 under Water Supply Scheme : Rs. 2,04,912.00 (4) Loss caused under the head "leases, Rents and Licences : Rs. 35,16,268.00 (5) Loss caused due to wrong fixation of pay to the petitioner as pointed out by the audit under General Fund Account : Rs. 3,670.00 (6) As per Audit Objection, Paragraphs 33/1990-91 and 11/1992-93 under World Bank Scheme amount to be adjusted : Rs. 74,17,000.00 (7) As per Audit Objection, Paragraph 40/1992-93 under Water Supply Scheme : Rs. 10,82,289.00 (8) Towards the balance of Festival and T.A. Advance : Rs. 975.00 (9) Loss caused due to non collection of property tax and vacant site tax relating to the year 1985-86 which became barred by limitation : Rs. 6,055.00

-----------------------

Rs.1,28,49,144.00

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28. In order to examine the moot point raised by the petitioner, it is relevant to extract Rule 56(1) of the Fundamental Rules applicable to a government servant/municipal employees, who in the normal course, would retire on the Afternoon of the last day of the Month, in which, he attains the age of 58 years.

29. Rule 56(1) of the Fundamental Rules deals with retirement on superannuation and it reads as follows:

"(a) Every Government servant in the superior service shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty-eight years. He shall not be retained in service after that age except with the sanction of the Government on public grounds, which must be recorded in writing but he shall not be retained the age of sixty years except in very special circumstances:

Provided that this clause shall not apply to Government servants who are tested as in superior service for the purpose of these rules but as in the Tamil Nadu Basic Service for the purpose of pension. Such Government servants as well as all basic Servants shall retire on attaining the age of sixty years:

Provided further that on and from the 1st January 1993, a District Judge, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sub-ordinate Judge or District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, who, in the opinion of the High Court, Madras, has potential for continued useful service beyond the age of fifty-eight years, shall retire from service on attaining the age of sixty years.

(b) Omitted

(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (a), a Government servant who is under suspension,

(i) on a charge of misconduct; or

(ii) against whom an enquiry into grave charges of criminal misconduct or allegations of criminal misconduct, is pending; or

(iii) against whom an enquiry into grave charges is contemplated or is pending; or

(iv) against whom a complaint of criminal offence is under investigation or trial, shall not be permitted by the appointing authority to retire on his reaching the date of retirement, but shall be retained in service until the enquiry into the charge of misconduct or criminal misconduct or the enquiry into the allegations of criminal misconduct or the enquiry into contemplated charges or disciplinary proceeding taken under rule 17(c) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules or rule 3(c) of the Tamil Nadu Police Sub-ordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, as the case may be, in respect of item (iv) above is concluded and a final order passed thereon by the competent authority or by any higher authority."

30. The Supreme Court and this Court have considered the issue relating to the authority and power of the government or Head of the department from initiating or continuing the departmental action, if already taken, against the government servant, after retirement. In Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Director, O.S.F.C. Reported in 1999(3) SCC 666, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 7, held as follows:

"7. In view of the absence of such a provision in the above said regulations, it must be held that the Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in the retiral benefits of the appellant. There is also no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any provision stating that in the case of misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retiral benefits. Once the appellant had retired from service on 30.06.1995, there was no authority vested in the Corporation for continuing the departmental enquiry even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such an authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on retirement."

31. In State of Tamil Nadu v. R.Karupiah reported in 2005 (3) CTC 4, this Court, at paragraph 29, held as follows:

"29. From the above note it is also clear that to proceed against a Government servant, who is under suspension on a charge of misconduct, after his retirement, the fulfilling of the requirements under rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules is a mandatory one, otherwise, the competent authority cannot have any jurisdiction on the retired Government servant to proceed against him and the non-compliance of the said Rule has vitiated all the proceedings initiated against the first respondent and therefore, the same are not sustainable under law and are liable to be set aside."

32. Similar view was also taken by this Court in P.Muthusamy v. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd., reported in 2006 (4) MLJ 504, to which, I am a party, where the Division Bench held that permission to retire an employee without prejudice to the disciplinary proceedings is not authorised under any rule and hence, such permission is illegal and without jurisdiction. The ratio decidendi laid down in the above case is as follows:

"In the absence of specific enabling provision in TANCEM Service Rules the order reserving the right to continue disciplinary proceedings after superannuation is illegal and without jurisdiction."

33. Following the above decisions, another Division Bench of this Court in N.Kunnai Gowder v. the Coimbatore District Co-operative Milk Producers' Union Ltd., reported in 2007 (5) CTC 491, at Paragraph 6, held as follows:

"6. A departmental proceeding can continue so long as the employee is in service. In the event, a disciplinary proceeding is kept pending by the employer, the employee cannot be made to retire. In the instant case, no rule has been brought to our notice providing for continuation of such proceeding despite permitting the employee concerned to retire. There has to be a specific provision of law or regulation or a bye-law governing the service conditions of the person in question for continuing a departmental enquiry, initiated before the date of superannuation, even after the employee had retired from service. Without such a provision being available, there cannot be an employer-employee relationship surviving after the employee retires from service. Therefore, continuing the enquiry proceedings or conducting an action against the person after his retirement from service cannot be sustained in the eye of law."

34. rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules prescribe a mandatory procedure to be followed, when the department decides to initiate or continue disciplinary action against a Government servant, after his retirement. Rule 56(1)(a) of the Fundamental Rules states that every Government servant in the superior service shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month, in which he attains the age of 58 years and he should not be retained in service after that age except with the sanction of the Government on Public grounds which must be recorded in writing but he should not be retained after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances.

35. rule 56(1)(c) is an exception to the Rule 56(1)(a) of the Fundamental Rules and it states that if a government servant is under suspension on a charge of misconduct or against whom an enquiry into grave charges of criminal misconduct or allegations of Criminal misconduct is pending or against whom an enquiry into grave charges is contemplated or is pending or against whom a complaint of criminal offence is under investigation or trial, shall not be permitted by the appointing authority to retire on his reaching the date of retirement but shall be retained in service until the enquiry of the above mentioned nature is concluded and a final order is passed therein. Thus it could be seen that Rule 56(1)(a) and 56(1)(c) mandate that a Government servant has to be retained in service, if the department intends to proceed against him, in respect of certain grave charges and in the absence of retention of the government servant, no fresh departmental proceedings can be initiated against him after retirement. Reading of the Fundamental Rules, makes it clear that when a Government servant reaches the age of superannuation, the service rules applicable to him should enable or authorise the competent authority to retain him in service for the completion of the enquiry. A government servant is on a contract of employment subject to the service conditions of Master and servant relationship and the said relationship ceases to have effect on the retirement of the government servant, except for payment of pension and other retiral benefits. Therefore, unless there is an express order issued by the competent authority under FR 56(1)(c), retaining him in service, the respondent or any other authority cannot take shelter, quoting in the retirement order that he is permitted to retire, without prejudice to the departmental action, being taken against him.

36. Neither Tamil Nadu Municipal Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules applicable to the case of the petitioner nor Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, authorise the respondents to continue disciplinary proceedings or permit them to initiate fresh action after retirement, without placing the employee of the municipality or the government servant, as the case may be, under suspension before attaining the age of superannuation. When rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental 'Rules, contemplates a condition of placing a Government servant under suspension, for the purpose of conducting an enquiry into the charges of misconduct or enquiry into grave charges under contemplation and for other criminal misconduct, the said procedure ought to have been followed by the respondents, by retaining the petitioner in service for the purpose of holding an enquiry into the alleged charges. Retention of a government servant in service is a sine quo non for initiating or continuing disciplinary proceedings, after retirement.

37. As regards the next contention that rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules contemplates a particular mode for taking action against the Government servant after his retirement and that the same ought to have been done only under that mode and not otherwise, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following decisions, (1) State of Jharkand v. Ambay Cements reported in 2005 (1) CTC 223 and (2) T.Ramamoorthy v. The Secretary, Sri Ramakrishna Vidhyalaya High School etc., & Others reported in 1998 Writ L.R. 641. Let me now consider the above decisions relied on by the petitioner and few other decisions of the Supreme Court.

38. In T.Ramamoorthy v. The Secretary, Sri Ramakrishna Vidyalaya High School, etc. & Others reported in 1998 Writ. LR 641, at Paragraph 6, held as follows:

"If the statutory provision enacted by the Legislature prescribed a particular mode for terminating the service or dismissing the teaching or a non-teaching staff of a school, it can and has to be done not only in that manner alone, but it cannot be done in any manner too. This principle that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, things must be done in that way and not otherwise and that the other method of performance is necessarily precluded, is not only well settled, but squarely applies to this case also in construing the scope of the power as also its exercise by the management under Section 22 of the Act."

39. In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh, [(2004) 4 SCC 268], the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 12, held as follows:

12. Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial dispute and may not be read as a limitation on the Courts powers under Article 226, nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in that statute and in no other manner.

40. In Captain Sube Singh v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(2004) 6 SCC 440], the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 29, held as follows:

29. In Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, a Constitution Bench of this Court reaffirmed the general rule that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself. (See also in this connection Dhanajaya Reddy v. State Of Karnataka..) The statute in question requires the authority to act in accordance with the rules for variation of the conditions attached to the permit. In our view, it is not permissible to the State Government to purport to alter these conditions by issuing a notification under Section 67(1)(d) read with sub-clause (i) thereof.

41. The Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements reported in 2005 (1) CTC 223, at Paragraph 27, held as follows:

"27. Whenever the statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to severe consequences, such requirement would be mandatory. It is the cardinal rule of the interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation and where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed. Since the requirement, in the instant case of obtaining prior permission is mandatory, therefore, non-compliance of the same must result in cancelling the concession made in favour of the grantee-the respondent herein."

42. In Pandit D Aher v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2007 (1) SCC 437, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 19, held as follows:

"When an employee, by reason of an alleged act of misconduct, is sought to be deprived of his livelihood, the procedure laid down under the sub rules are required to be strictly followed. It is now well settled that a judicial review would lie even if there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If statutory authority uses its power in a manner not provided for in the statute or passes an order without application of mind, judicial review would be maintainable. Even an error of fact for sufficient reasons may attract the principles of judicial review."

43. Rule 56(1)(a) of the Fundamental Rules states that every government servant in the superior service shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month, in which he attains the age of 58 years. Rue 56(1)(c) of the said Rules is an exception, by which, the relationship of master and servant, as between the government and its servant, is retained even after he attains the age of superannuation, by suspending him from service and by another order of not permitting him to retire, for the purpose of conducting an enquiry or trial before the Court of law. When exception to rule 56(1)(a) warrants suspension under FR 56(1)(c) and another specific order of not permitting him to retire from service, the authorities are precluded from acting otherwise. Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that if a statute prescribes a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in the same manner and not otherwise and more particularly, the result of an enquiry into grave charges is likely to deprive a government servant or an employee of the local body of his livelihood or retiral benefits, as the case may be. Therefore, the impugned order of the second respondent, reserving the right to take disciplinary action against the petitioner, after permitting him to retire, without suspending him from service is contrary to FR 56(1)(c) and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

44. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the subject matter of the proposed disciplinary action, as stated in the impugned order, relate to incidents, which took place more than 18 years ago. The following judgments are pressed into service for the preposition that inordinate delay, not explained satisfactorily would cause serious prejudice and therefore, there cannot be any disciplinary action, after retirement.

45. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and another reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 738, the Supreme Court had come down heavily against the latches on the part of the employer in conducting departmental enquiry and after finding out that there was no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay, held that it would be unfair to order departmental enquiry to proceed further.

46. In State of A.P., v. N.Radhakrishnan reported in 1998 (4) SCC 154, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 19, held as follows:

"Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations."

47. In Union of India v. CAT reported in 2005 (2) CTC 169 (DB), this Court held that,

"The delay remains totally unexplained. Therefore, we have no hesitation at all in concluding that the ground of inordinate delay in proceeding with the departmental enquiry as referred to above by us, would come in the way of the Govt., to continue with the enquiry any further.............."

48. In P.V.Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in 2005 (4) CTC 403, this Court after referring to various decisions, held that, "The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore be avoided not only in the interest of the government employee but in public interests and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.

15. We therefore, have no hesitation to quash the charge issued against the appellant. The appeal is allowed. The appellant will be entitled to all the retiral benefits in accordance with law. The retiral benefits shall be disbursed within three months from this date. No cost."

49. In the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chepauk v. N.Sivasamy reported in 2005 (5) CTC 451, the Division Bench of this Court held as follows:

"Though the alleged lapse occurred in the year 1995 and certain charges related to the period 1993-94, the charge memo was issued on 15.07.1997 and served on 23.07.1997, just 7 days before the date of retirement. The contention of the appellant that only with a view to cause hardship, agony and anguish, the charge memo was issued cannot be ignored.................. We have already pointed out that though the applicant failed Original Application No.6284/97, challenging the charge memo, dated 15.07.1997, admittedly, no stay was granted. Despite the above fact that the department had not proceeded with the disciplinary proceedings, there is an inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the department. According to the applicant, he is 67 years of age as on the date and had rendered 38 years of service in the department. He had undergone sufferings from mental worry, agony, anguish and hardship for all these years. We are satisfied that there is no need to pursue the charge memo, dated 15.07.1997."

50. In yet another decision in R.Tirupathy and others v. the District Collector, Madurai District and others reported in 2006 (2) CTC 574, this Court was pleased to quash the charge memo, dated 02.02.2005 on the ground that the charges relate to purchase of uniforms during the year 1994-95 and 1995-96 and the inordinate delay on the part of the department in issuing a charge memo was not properly explained.

51. The Supreme Court in M.V.Bijlani v. Union of India and other reported in 2006 (5) SCC 88, quashed the order of removal from service, confirmed by the appellate authority on various grounds particularly, on the ground that initiation of disciplinary proceedings after six years and continuance thereof, for a period of seven years prejudiced the delinquent officer.

52. In M.Elangovan v. The Trichy District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., reported in 2006 (2) CTC 635, this Court, while quashing the second show cause notice on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating and completing the disciplinary proceedings, allowed the Writ Petitions holding that the petitioners therein were entitled to all the benefits in accordance with law. The same view has been expressed by this Court in yet another decision in Parameswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2006 (1) CTC 476.

53. In order to sustain that collection of time barred arrears cannot be a subject matter of disciplinary action against the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Mani, N. v. The Commissioner, Villupuram Municipality reported in 2006 (1) CTC 632 and Nagarajan v. Commissioner, Salem Municipality, Salem reported in 1988 Writ L.R. 38.

54. In Nagarajan v. Commissioner, Salem Municipality, Salem reported in 1988 Writ L.R. 38, this Court had an occasion to consider as to whether action can be taken against a Bill Collector for recovery of time barred profession tax. Following the decision rendered by this Court in W.P.No.3911 of 1997, dated 28.04.1980 and W.P.No.3421 to 3426 of 1978, dated 04.02.1981, this Court held that recovery ordered by the department against the bill collector for having allowed the profession tax to become time barred, is illegal. The judgment rendered in A.Selvaraj and others v. The Commissioner, Tiruvarur Municipality (W.P.Nos.3364 to 3369 of 1976, dated 23.11.1976), by His Lordship Justice S.Mohan, J. (as he then was), as extracted in the above reported judgment, is reproduced hereunder:

"Having regard to these provisions, I find it rather impossible to appreciate the stand of the Municipality as to how a Bill Collector could cause pecuniary loss to the Municipality by his failure to collect the taxes. Firstly, it does not lie within his powers to allow the recovery of taxes to become time barred. The very elaborate procedure relating to collection of taxes mentioned in paragraph 65 of Municipal Volume I would clearly indicate that it is the duty of the Executive Office to have periodic verification of the arrears. If he had failed to do the duty and thereby the arrears of tax had become time barred for recovery, that liability cannot be passed on to the Bill Collector."

55. While setting aside the order of recovery, in Nagarajan's case, this Court held as follows:

"Basically there are no grounds at all to pin down the liability on the petitioner, as now being done. The proceedings taken in this behalf are the result of a misconception of the legal position. They have to stand ignored and cannot be implemented. Taking note of the ratio of this Court, I have to hold that the petitioner cannot be mulcted with liability on this account. In view of this, this Writ Petition so far as the petitioner is concerned, is allowed."

56. Following Nagarajan's case, another learned single Judge of this Court in Mani, N. v. The Commissioner, Villpuram Municipality reported in 2006 (1) CTC 632, tested the correctness of a show cause notice issued against a Revenue Inspector for recovery of the arrears of time barred property tax and lease amount. Facts of this case are, the petitioner therein was appointed as Bill Collector in the year 1963 in the respondent Municipality and lateron promoted as Revenue Inspector on 13.4.1989. He retired from service on 31.10.2000. Impugned show cause notices therein were issued calling upon him to show cause as to why the loss suffered by the Municipality on account of failure to discharge his official duty to collect the arrears towards property tax and lease amount should not be recovered from him. The said show cause notices were under challenge on the ground of jurisdictional issue relying upon the earlier orders of the State Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.3503 of 1996 dated 28.11.1996 and O.A.No.4761 of 1992 dated 19.12.1997. Earlier, the Tribunal held that the Revenue Officers in the Local bodies cannot be made liable for the time barred arrears of tax dues and no recovery can be made from them. The conclusion was arrived at on the basis of paragraph 3 of G.O.Ms.No.1881 R.D.& L.A. Department, dated 14.9.1981, wherein it was stated that the responsibility to take proceedings to recover tax before they become time barred, vests only with the Commissioner and the Revenue Officers are not responsible for the tax arrears, having become time barred and that the only duty of the Revenue Officers is to report about the tax arrears.

57. Following the decision in Nagarajan's case (cited supra) and the communication of the Director of Municipal Adminstration, Chennai, addressed to all the Regional Director of Municipal Administration in ROC.No.75380/96/R1, dated 13.12.1996, the learned single Judge of this Court, in N.Mani's case, has set aside the show cause notices issued to the petitioner therein. The communication, dated 03.12.1996, referred to in the order is extracted hereunder, "The Municipal Employees Associations are demanding cancellation of recovery orders for time barred arrears among other things. In the meeting convened on 8.7.1994 in the chambers of Secretary, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department to discuss with the office bearers of the Rural Development and Municipal Employees Association Federation the following decision was taken on the above demand.

"The Director of Municipal Administration has already granted time upto 3.9.1994. Time barred arrears need not be recovered from the DCRG etc., from the retired employees."

2. To pursue further action in this regard, Government considered that proposal to write off time barred arrears due to Municipalities may be taken up after the elections to the Municipalities and after all the Municipal Councils pass necessary resolutions in this regard, Government have now called for a consolidated report in this regard, in the letter cited.

3. Hence, I request you to instruct all the Municipal Commissioners within your jurisdiction to place the matter before the Municipal Council and to send a detailed report along with the copy of the resolution, in duplicate. After getting the same, I request you to send a consolidated report to this office, along with copies of resolution passed by the Municipal Councils, so as to send a report to Government. As the matter involves the long-standing demand of the Municipal Employees, I request you to expedite your report.

Sd/- V.Pitchai, For Director."

58. The communication of the Director of Municipal Administration, Madras addressed to all the Regional Director of Municipal Administration, in his letter, dated 03.12.1996, makes it clear that time barred arrears need not be recovered from the DCRG etc., of the retired employees. In view of the decisions of this Court as well as the above said communication, the amount proposed to be recovered, is wholly without jurisdiction and arbitrary.

59. To examine whether Audit Department has specifically fixed the responsibility on the petitioner for the irregularities noticed by the department, it is necessary to examine their objections and remarks as contained in the annexure to the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent.

60. In so far as Paragraph 10 of the Audit objections for the year 1990-92, World Bank Project Audit Report, for the value of shortage of Bituman, Thiru.A.V.Venugopal, the then store keeper, is held responsible and the Director of Local Fund and Audit has stated that amount has to be recovered from him. As regards objection made in Para 33 of the Audit Report for the year 1990-91, World Bank Project Report and Para 11(i)(ii) for 1992-93, viz., advance sanctioned for the purchase of Bituman to the tune of Rs.26,83,973/- not completely adjusted, it is pertinent to note that the Director of Local Funds and Audit, Madras has stated that the advances paid to the institutions, such as IOCL, BPCL need not be recovered from the individuals.

61. As regards Audit Objections at Para 11 MUDF for the year 1991-92, i.e., Bituman returned by the contractor and not taken into stock, the Audit Report clearly indicates that the double the rate of the cost of Bituman not taken into stock has to be recovered from Thiru.A.V.Venugopal, the then store keeper. A sum of Rs.56,000/-, being the excess rate paid to a private agent for the purchase of cement for municipal works not directly from TANCEM, was one of the objections noted by the Audit at para 28, MUDF for the year 1991-92. In respect of the above sum, the Audit report has pointed out that the loss caused due to purchase of cement at excess rate than the rate fixed by the Government, the Administration has to fix the responsibility on the persons concerned for recovery.

62. At Paragraph 29, MUDF for the year 1991-92, the Department of Local Funds & Audit has observed that the advance amount of procurement of Bituman was paid. For the shortage of Bituman, the Audit has directed that double the rate not taken into stock has to be recovered. In respect of said objections, though the Audit has specifically noted that the person responsible for the loss was Thiru.A.V.Venugopal, the then store keeper, in the remarks column, the Audit did not point out from whom, the amount has to be recovered.

63. Similarly, for the shortage of 330 bags of cement in Stock Register and for unauthorised issuance of 180 bags of cement to the Contractor, the Audit has pointed out that the loss amount of Rs.1,08,120/- has to be recovered from (1) Thiru.A.V.Venugopal, the then store keeper (2) Commissioner & (3) Municipal Engineer of Salem Municipality. It is pertinent to point out that the then Commissioner was also a party to the above said irregularities. But, he has erroneously chosen to blame the petitioner for this irregularity.

64. In respect of a sum of Rs.414/-, alleged to be the excess payment made towards uniforms issued to the employees under Water supply Fund, the Audit has remarked that the Administration has to fix the responsibility on the persons for recovery of the amount. The above objection was noted in Para 30, Water Supply Fund Report 1992-93. Similarly, for procurement of 6" PVC pipes, not procured from the approved dealer at the approved rate, involving a sum of Rs.1,12,000/-, objection noted at Paragraph 36, Water Supply Fund Audit Report 1992-93, the audit did not point out from whom the amount has to be recovered and further stated that the Administration has to fix the responsibility for recovery of amount.

65. One of the allegations is with regard to the excess payment made in respect of purchase of spare parts, due to a misleading office note, when the same were sufficiently available, the amount involved was Rs.86,491/-, noted in Para 37, Water Supply Fund Audit Report 1992-93. The Audit did not say that the petitioner was responsible for the loss. The last of the objections mentioned by the Director of Local Funds and Audit, Madras, is with reference to the stores issued towards water supply materials. According to Audit, the usage was not shown to the audit with relevant records. Therefore, the audit has directed that the value of the stores issued should be collected. This said objection is noted in Para 40, Water Supply Fund Audit Report, 1992-93. As far as fixing of responsibility, the Audit has stated that till the date of filing of the counter affidavit, the records have not been furnished. It is evident from the remarks that the records for usage of the materials were not furnished by the department.

66. The audit in Serial No.6 of the tabular column for the period 1992-93 towards World Bank Project MDUF and Water Supply Fund, has made it clear that besides Thiru.A.V.Venugopal the then Storekeeper, the then Commissioner of Salem Municipality and the Municipal Commissioner are also responsible for some of the objections as detailed in the foregoing paragraphs. The total amount included in the audit objections is to the tune of Rs.42,15,995/-, out of which, the Local Fund Audit has categorically remarked that a sum of Rs.26,75,000/-, Rs.6,188/- and Rs.2,785/- paid towards advance amount for purchase of Bituman to the Institutions, such as IOCL, BPCL need not be recovered from the individuals. In respect of some of the items, the Audit has categorically held that the loss caused to the Municipality has to be recovered from Thiru.A.V.Venugopal, the then Storekeeper, Commissioner of Salem Municipality and Municipal Commissioner.

67. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner was appointed as Storekeeper in Salem Municipality with effect from 13.07.1992 in the place of Thiru.A.V.Venugopal, who had earlier worked as Storekeeper for nearly seven years. An important aspect to be noticed in the audit objections is that the audit department, which scrutinised the available records for the relevant period, during which, the irregularities were said to have taken place, has specifically pinpointed the concerned persons responsible for the revenue loss caused to the department in respect of items No.1 and 2, and partly in respect of Items 3 and 4. In respect of Item No.2 to the tune of Rs.26,83,973/-, the audit has remarked that advances paid to the institutions such as IOCL, BPCL, amount not to be recovered from individuals. The Directorate of Local Fund Audit, which verified the ledgers, Accounts and other registers, has not stated that the petitioner was person responsible for the irregularities. On the other hand, the department has stated that responsibility has to be fixed by the administration on the persons who had caused loss, as pointed out in the Audit Report. When the Department of Local Fund and Audit has not specifically identified that the petitioner as responsible for the loss caused to the department, it is patently illegal and arbitrary to blame that the petitioner was responsible for the entire loss caused to the Municipality. In the light of the specific remarks of the Audit department, mulcting responsibility on the above said persons, and having regard to their specific statement in the counter affidavit that the name of the petitioner was neither mentioned as person responsible for the loss nor recommended for recovery, the very formulation of the charges against the petitioner is arbitrary, without any basic grounds and that the petitioner has been made as a scapegoat for the irregularities committed by others, in respect of certain items. Therefore, in these circumstances, it is manifestly clear that an enquiry has to be necessarily conducted by the department to fix the responsibility on the persons for the loss. Without conducting an enquiry, pinning down the liability of the petitioner, without any basic grounds, reflects the pre-determined mind of the Regional Executive Engineer and the Regional Director of Municipal Administration, third respondent. It is pertinent to note that the reports 4 and 5 in their counter affidavit have stated that the then Storekeeper, Thiru.Venugopal had simply closed the balance of stock of bitumen and cement accounts as Nil , without handing over the charges to the petitioner. There is no whisper in the counter affidavit about the action taken against him and the fact remains, he has been allowed to retire from service. Therefore, for the purpose of conducting an enquiry into the allegations, the results ought to have invoked FR 56(1)(c) by retaining the petitioner in service.

68. The department has not placed any satisfactory reasons for the inordinate delay in proceeding with the enquiry for nearly 17 years, in respect of an allegation for the year 1990-91, the petitioner had been considered for promotion to higher post.

69. In view of the settled proposition of law on the aspect of inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating or conducting disciplinary proceedings, on the part of the employer, as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court is of the view that initiating fresh proceeding or continuing the departmental action against the petitioner after retirement, at this length of time, would cause serious prejudice, particularly when the relationship of master and servant is snapped. Therefore, on the facts of this case, the only course of action that was available to the respondents was to follow the mandatory procedure contemplated under FR 56(1)(c), i.e., suspension of the Government servant or the employee of the local body and retain him from service for the purpose of holding an enquiry into the charges said to have been pending. The impugned order is liable to be struck down on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, as held in Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Director, O.S.F.C. Reported in 1999(3) SCC 666, State of Tamil Nadu v. R.Karupiah reported in 2005 (3) CTC 4, P.Muthusamy v. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd., reported in 2006 (4) MLJ 504 and N.Kunnai Gowder v. the Coimbatore District Co-operative Milk Producers' Union Ltd., reported in 2007 (5) CTC 491, and for inordinate and unexplained delay in concluding the enquiry. Further, in the light of the decisions of this Court, the authorities have no jurisdiction to order for recovery of time barred arrears of property tax, professional tax and lease amount from the petitioner.

70. For all these reasons, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. The Writ Petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to settle the retiral benefits within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.

05.11.2008 Index: yes Note to Office:

Issue order copy on 10.11.2008 skm S. MANIKUMAR, J.

skm To

1. The Commissioner, Municipal Administration, Ezhilagam Avenue, 6th Floor, Chepauk, Madras-5.

2. The Examiner of Local Fund Accounts, Thayar Sahib Street, Madras-2.

3. The Regional Executive Engineer and the Regional Director of Municipal Administration, Krishna Rajendra Choultry Campus, Arisipalayam, Salem-9.

4. The Commissioner, Salem Municipality, Salem.

5. The Commissioner, Suramangalam Municipality, Suramangalam, Salem 636 005.

W.P.No.15231 of 2006 05.11.2008