Rushab Ship International Llc v. M.V. African Eagle And The Freight Due For Transportation

JUDGMENT:

As the defendant no. 2 vessel was in the Port of Mumbai, the plaintiff filed this suit for arrest, sequestration, condemnation and sale of the bunkers on board defendant no. 2 vessel and arrest and deposit of freight due for transportation of cargo that was laden on defendant no. 2 at the port of Mumbai for securing the plaintiff's claim in arbitration proceedings for a sum of US$ 8,16,531.22, accrued interest of US$ 9,684.96 and costs in the sum of US$ 1,00,000/- for the present proceedings. The plaintiff after filing the suit invoked the arbitration proceedings under the charter party dated 16/03/2012. It is pertinent and very necessary to note that the plaintiff has not filed the present suit claiming that they are entitled to a decree in their favour against the defendants for any sum whatsoever. The suit is confined to seeking security pending arbitration. The prayers in the suit are as under:

a. That Bunkers onboard Defendant No. 2 vessel be arrested and detained by a Warrant of Arrest of this Hon'ble Court, as security for the Plaintiff's claim in the arbitration to be commenced and for interest, expenses, cost and poundage;

b. That Bunkers onboard Defendant No. 2 vessel be condemned in the sum of USUS$926,216.18 (equivalent to INR 5,09,41,889.90 at US US$1=Rs. 55/-) as per the statement of claim annexed at Exhibit LL hereto, costs with interest at the rate of 7% per annum from date of the suit till payment/realization and poundage, as security for the Plaintiff's claim in arbitration to be commenced;

c. That Bunkers onboard Defendant No. 2 vessel be sold and the sale proceeds thereof be held as security towards the Plaintiff's claim in arbitration to be commenced;

d. That Defendant No. 3 be called upon to forthwith disclose

i. Full particulars of all shippers who have booked cargo onboard Defendant No. 2 vessel; and

ii. The amount of Freight due to Defendant No. 3 from the shippers whose cargo has been booked onboard the Defendant No. 2 vessel.

e. That the Freight due for cargo loaded at Mumbai be arrested and detained by a Warrant of Arrest of this Hon'ble Court and Defendant No. 3 be directed and ordered by this Hon'ble Court to deposit the said Freight, as security for the Plaintiff's claim in the arbitration to be commenced and for interest, expenses, cost and poundage;

f. That pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, Bunkers onboard Defendant no. 2 vessel and the Freight due for cargo loaded at Mumbai be arrested by and under the order of this Hon'ble Court for satisfaction of the Plaintiff's claim in arbitration to be commenced;

g. That pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit Bunkers onboard Defendant No. 3 vessel be condemned for sale and the same be sold under the orders and directions of this Hon'ble Court and the sale proceeds thereof be appropriated towards satisfaction of the Plaintiff's claim in arbitration to be commenced;

h. That pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit Freight due for cargo loaded onboard Defendant No. 3 at Mumbai be directed and ordered by this Hon'ble Court to be deposited in this Hon'ble Court, as security of the Plaintiff's claim in the arbitration to be commenced and for interest, expenses, cost and poundage;

i. For ad-interim reliefs in terms of the (f), (g) and (h) above;

j. For costs; and

k. For such further and other reliefs as the nature and circumstances of the case may require. (emphasis supplied)

2. By a judge's order no. 7/2013, this Court on 7/01/2013 passed an order for arrest of bunkers on board the defendant no. 2 vessel along with the freight due for transportation of the cargo laden. The defendant no. 3 moved an application to vacate the said order of arrest.

3. By the judgment pronounced on 4/02/2013 in Notice of Motion (L) No. 59/2013, this Court was pleased to hold that an order arresting freight qua the cargo on board defendant no. 2 vessel cannot be passed as the Court did not have any jurisdiction for the same. As regards the allegations qua the bunkers, since the Court came to a conclusion that the bunkers that were on board the defendant no. 2 vessel which the defendant no. 3 was entitled to use was worth only US$ 34,692.80 and the defendant no. 3 offered to, without prejudice to its rights and contentions that bunkers on board defendant no. 2 vessel cannot be arrested and/or proceeded against in admiralty jurisdiction, whilst keeping the issue open as to whether bunkers can be arrested or not, directed the defendant no. 3 to furnish security only to the extent of US$ 34,692.80 being the value of bunkers owned by them on the date of the arrest, i.e, 7/01/2013. While disposing of the notice of motion, the Court did not grant the prayer of the defendant no. 3 for damages since such prayer was not supported by adequate particulars. However, liberty to the defendant no. 3 was granted to take out fresh notice of motion setting out all necessary particulars and seeking appropriate reliefs in this behalf. In view thereof, the defendant no. 3 has taken out Notice of Motion no. 735/2013 in which prayer clauses (a) and (b) read as under:

(a) that without prejudice and in addition to Defendant No. 3's claim in arbitration the Plaintiffs be ordered and directed to pay to Defendant No. 3 the sum of USD 398,888.64 towards the loss and/or damage suffered by reason of the wrongful arrest of the Defendant No. 1;

(b) the Plaintiffs be directed to deposit the sum of USD 398,999.64 towards the loss and/or damage suffered by reason of the wrongful arrest of the Defendant No. 1.

4. While obtaining the ex-parte order of arrest, the plaintiff, as required under Rule 941 of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) Rules, had filed an undertaking in the form of an affidavit, whereby, the plaintiff undertook to the Court to pay such sum by way of damages as this Court may award as compensation in the event of the defendant or any affected party sustaining prejudice by an order of arrest. The Notice of Motion No. 735/2013 is taken out by defendant no. 3 as a party that has suffered prejudice due to the order of arrest passed on 7/01/2013. It is the case of defendant no. 3 that at the time of arrest of defendant no. 1 they were the charterers of defendant no. 2 and by virtue of the order dated 7/01/2013 the defendant no. 2 got detained and the defendant no. 3 suffered substantial and serious loses/damages in the sum of US$ 398,888.64 and is entitled to claim the same from the plaintiff.

5. After filing an affidavit in reply to the notice of motion, the plaintiff took out the present notice of motion praying that pending the hearing and final disposal of the arbitration proceedings, the present suit be stayed and pending the hearing and final disposal of the present notice of motion all proceedings be stayed. During the hearing, Shri Sancheti, Counsel for the plaintiff clarified that in prayer clause (b) of the plaint “all proceedings” means Notice of Motion no. 735/2013 taken out by defendant no. 3.

6. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the Notice of Motion No. 735/2013 taken out by defendant no. 3 for damages was premature inasmuch as the issue relating to bunkers is still kept open and unless the Court decides that issue, the entire arrest order cannot be held to be wrongful and, therefore, the notice of motion taken out by the defendant no. 3 should not be proceeded with.

7. Mr. Ramabhadran, Counsel for defendant no. 3 submitted that the defendant no. 3 had right in the beginning offered to secure the plaintiff's claim in the sum of US$ 34,692.80, the same amount of security now provided, but the plaintiff refused to accept and, therefore, even if the issue as to bunkers on board a vessel could be arrested or not is kept open, the defendant no. 3 is still entitled to press for damages and it cannot be said that the claim for damages is premature. He also submitted that, while disposing of Notice of Motion (L) No. 59/2013, Kathawala, J., was inclined to award damages but did not due to want of adequate particulars. He buttress the submission by reading out paragraph 76(ix) in the judgment pronounced on 4/02/2013, where the Court has said:

“76(ix) Prayer (b) of the Notice of Motion is not granted since the said prayer is not supported by adequate particulars. However liberty to the Defendants to take out fresh Notice of Motion setting out all necessary particulars and seeking appropriate reliefs in this behalf.”

8. Mr. Ramabhadran also submitted that though Kathawala, J., has not considered the issue in his judgment of 4/02/2013, probably because nobody had raised that point or brought it to the attention of the Court, the plaint itself should be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(a) because the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. He submitted that the plaintiff in fact had no cause of action and, therefore, the question of disclosing cause of action also did not arise. Hence, the plaint has to be rejected. He relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.. 2012 9 SCC 552, which is popularly known as BALCO judgment. Mr. Ramabhadran submitted that the Apex Court has reiterated the position as it was, as a matter of law an inter parte suit simply for interim reliefs pending arbitration even if it be limited for the purpose of restraining dissipation of assets or for security is not maintainable. He submitted that the Apex Court has held that fundamental to the maintainability of the civil suit is the existence of the cause of action in favour of the plaintiff and this is evident from the various proceedings contained in Civil Procedure Code especially in Order VII and Order II. He also submitted that the Apex Court has in the BALCO judgment (supra) held that pendency of the arbitration proceedings outside India would not provide a cause of action for a suit where the main prayer is for injunction. In such a suit, right to claim could possibly arise only if the future arbitration award could possibly be in favour of the plaintiff and no suit for interim security could obviously be filed based purely on such contingency. Such an interlocutory order for security can only be granted during the pendency of the civil suit claiming a relief which is likely to result in a final decree upon the subject which is in dispute. He also submitted that since the dispute is to be decided by the arbitrator no substantive relief concerning the merits of the arbitration could be claimed in the suit and the plaintiff's only claim would depend upon the outcome of the arbitration proceedings in a foreign country over which the Courts in India would have no jurisdiction. Therefore, the cause of action would clearly be contingent/speculative and as held by the Apex Court, in such situations, there would be no existing cause of action and the plaint itself would be liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of Civil Procedure Code. He submitted that the Apex Court has held that a right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is not a cause of action. It cannot stand on its own. Mr. Ramabhadran further submitted if the plaint itself is liable to be rejected, the question of this Court even deciding on the issue as to whether bunkers on board a vessel, independent of the vessel, can be arrested or not need not be even gone into. That would mean the entire order of arrest that the plaintiff obtained itself is wrongful and, hence, the Court should reject the present Notice of Motion and proceed to hear Notice of Motion no. 735/2013.

9. Mr. Sancheti appearing for the plaintiff submitted that this stand of the defendant no. 3 has not been taken earlier. Mr. Sancheti also submitted that the judgment of the full bench of this Court in the matter of J.S Ocean Liner LLC v. M.V Golden Progress 2007 2 Bom.C.R 1 (Golden Progress) has held that an action in rem if brought in the admiralty jurisdiction for obtaining security pending arbitration can be allowed. Mr. Ramabhadran submitted that Golden Progress (supra) judgment is not applicable in the present facts of the case, because in Golden Progress, the Court was not faced with the situation like the present case. In Golden Progress, the plaintiffs had filed the suit claiming that they are entitled to a decree in their favour against the defendants and the alternative prayer was in view of the arbitration clause contained in the charter party they are entitled to seek arrest and sale of the first defendant vessel in the suit so as to secure their claim pending the outcome of the arbitration proceedings in London. Therefore, the primary relief was for decree. In the present case, there is no such prayer claiming decree. Therefore, in the light of BALCO's judgment and the other judgments referred therein, the present suit cannot stand and has to be rejected.

10. On the grievance raised by Mr. Sancheti that this point has not been taken by the defendant no. 3 earlier or even in the affidavits filed in the notice of motion already heard, Mr. Ramabhadran submitted that it is a point of law and it can be raised at any stage. He submitted that Order 7 Rule 11(a) provides as under:

“Order 7 Rule 11 Rejection of plaint - The plaint shall be rejected in the following case:-

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;”

Therefore, it is quite clear that the plaint shall be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action. There is no option. He submitted that it is like a suit being barred by limitation - the Court can take action at any stage. He said that under the Bombay High Court Rules, the power is with the Prothonotary and Senior Master, who could have while receiving the plaint not admitted the plaint. He submitted that Order 7 Rule 1 provides for what the plaint shall contain and as required in sub-rule (e), the plaint shall contain the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose and if it is not contained in the plaint, Order 7 Rule 11(a) provides for the plaint to be rejected. Mr. Ramabhadran very correctly submitted that there is no application required to be taken because Order 7 Rule 11 provides for the plaint to be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action and that rejection can be made at the stage of inception itself by the Prothonotary and Senior Master. There is no need for any application by anybody because the plaint itself could not have been taken on record and numbered. There is no application which defendant no. 3 can take because the defendants cannot prove the negative. The defendants would simply say in the application that the plaintiff has not disclosed any cause of action and nothing beyond that. It is for the plaintiff to show that the plaint discloses cause of action. Relying on a judgment in the matter of Umesh Chandra Saxena v. Administrator General, U.P, Allahabad AIR 1999 Allahabad 109, Mr. Ramabhadran submitted that an action under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, does not await an application by any party but duty is cast upon the Court itself to reject a plaint when the contents indicated in Order 7 Rule 11 are found existing and it cannot be the law that this power of the Court could be curtailed in any manner simply because the Court had proceeded to some length without applying its mind on or considering this point. He submitted that the rule itself does not indicate anywhere that the power is to be exercised upon an application or if such an application is filed, it should be at any particular stage. The Court need not wait for any application, but it is the duty of the Court to reject the plaint if the reasons are found existing from a reading of the plaint itself. Paragraphs 44 and 45 of the said judgment read as under:

“44. …. It casts a duty upon the Court itself to reject a plaint when the conditions indicated in Rule 11(a) to (d) are found existing.

45. The Hon'ble single Judge was confronted not only with the prayer for rejection of the plaint as per application No. A-415 but also with a preliminary objection on behalf of the petitioner-appellants that when written statement was filed and issues were framed therein, a prayer for rejection of plaint could not be entertained as the said provisions would only be invoked prior to the filing of the written statement. Without going to the merits of the application for rejection of plaint, it may be stated at this stage itself that the preliminary objection was rightly rejected by the Hon'ble single Judge. Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C, as already observed, casts a duty upon the Court to reject a plaint if the circumstances indicated therein were existing. It cannot be the law that this power of the Court would be curtailed in any manner simply because the Court had proceeded to some length, without application of mind on this point. The rule itself does not indicate anywhere that the power is to be exercised upon an application, or if such an application is filed it should be at any particular stage. We must and do agree that the opinion of the Hon'ble Single Judge that the preliminary objection regarding the state of moving an application under Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C was not acceptable. We would only add that an action under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C does not await an application by any party. It is the duty of the Court to reject a plaint if the reasons therefore are found existing from a reading of the plaint itself and not from a reading of the defence or other documents.”

11. Mr. Ramabhadran also submitted that this has been followed by our Court in its Panaji Bench in the matter of P.R Sukeshwala v. Dr. Devadatta V.S Kerkar AIR 1995 BOMBAY 227, in which the Court held that if the Court can reject the plaint suo moto and that too before admitting the plaint it can certainly do it at a later stage.

12. At this stage, it is necessary to mention that Mr. Sancheti, Counsel for the plaintiff fairly agreed with the submissions of Mr. Ramabhadran.

13. On the BALCO judgement relied upon by Mr. Ramabhadran, Mr. Sancheti submitted that the said judgment is applicable only in a civil action and not in an action in rem filed in the admiralty jurisdiction and for that one has to look to Golden Progress (supra). According to Mr. Sancheti Golden Progress says a suit such as the present suit is maintainable.

14. Before I consider BALCO judgment, we have to consider whether Golden Progress (supra) is applicable to the present case or not.

15. In Golden Progress (supra), what the Court had to consider was whether an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for security pending the award could be obtained by arrest of a ship in rem. The Court held, for arrest of a vessel for obtaining security for an award that may be made in the arbitration proceeding, an application under Section 9 of the said Act is not maintainable. What the Court held was an action in rem (in admiralty jurisdiction) for recovery of the claim and arrest of the vessel where the parties have agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration can be maintained and in such case if by way of an interim measure, the vessel is arrested or security is provided to obtain the release of the vessel, matter shall proceed in accord with Article VII of the International Convention on Arrest of Ships, 1999.

16. In Golden Progress, the plaintiffs had filed a suit (a) for the purposes of recovering an amount aggregating US$ 46,913.52 (together with interest thereon and costs) due and payable to them by the second defendant and (b) in the alternative, for securing the said amount pending the commencement and outcome of the arbitration proceedings to be initiated in London against the second defendant. The plaintiffs had claims against the defendants under the Charter Party and the defendants not having made the payments, the plaintiffs filed the suit. It is necessary to emphasise that the primary prayer was for a decree in their favour, i.e, for recovering US$ 46,913.52 and only in the alternative the plaintiffs pleaded that in view of the arbitration clause they are entitled to an order of arrest of the ship to secure their claim in arbitration which was to be commenced. In the said judgment, the full bench considered the Apex Court's judgment in the matter of Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A 2002 4 SCC 105 and held that the conclusions drawn in Bhatia International by the Apex Court and the law declared therein do not lead to the conclusion that an application under Section 9 of the said Act is maintainable for the arrest of the vessel for obtaining security for an award that may inure for their benefit in the foreign arbitration. The Court felt that Section 9(ii)(b) of the said Act cannot be construed so as to read into it in rem jurisdiction. The Court held that the said provision does not cover the arrest of the ship or the keeping of the ship under arrest in the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction in rem at all. The Court held that what is provided by Section 9(ii)(b) is securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration by way of an interim measure which does not include the arrest of the vessel. Though the Court has not said in so many words, I would say that such an action in the admiralty jurisdiction cannot be only for security pending arbitration as the sole relief. The reason for that, in my view, is the ship may be arrested in the admiralty jurisdiction only to acquire/assume jurisdiction or to obtain security for satisfaction of the claim when decreed or in execution of a decree and once the vessel is arrested, the suit must proceed to trial against the owner as in any other suit. In fact, this is confirmed by the full bench in Golden Progress (supra), while considering the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of M.V Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1993 SC 1014 and in the matter of M.V Sea Success v. Liverpool and London Steamship Protection and Indemnity Association Ltd. 2002 2 Bom.C.R O.S 537. The Full Bench has in paragraphs 30 and 38 observed thus:

30. The peculiarity of the admiralty action in rem is that the coastal authorities in respect of any maritime claim can assume jurisdiction by arrest of the ship, irrespective of the nationality of the ship or that of its owners, or place of business or dismissal or residence of its owners or the place where the cause of action arose wholly or in part. In admiralty, the vessel has a juridical personality. Admiralty law confers upon the claimant right in rem to proceed against the ship or cargo as distinguished from a right in personam to proceed against the owner. A ship may be arrested: (i) to acquire jurisdiction; (ii) to obtain security for satisfaction of the claim when decreed or (iii) in execution of the decree.

31 to 37 ……………….

38. In M.V Elisabeth, the Supreme Court observed that once a foreign ship is arrested in Indian waters by an order of the High Court, in exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction vested in it by statute, or inherent in it as a Court of record, in respect of maritime claim against its owner, wherever the cause of action may have arisen, and whether or not the ship is subsequently released by the owner furnishing security, proceedings must continue against the owner as in any other suit. The arrest of the vessel while in Indian waters by an order of the concerned High Court, attracts the jurisdiction of the competent Court to proceed with the trial, as in the case of any other suit, as an action against the owner, and any decree obtained by the plaintiff is executable against any property of the owner available within jurisdiction, including the security furnished by him for release of the vessel.

17. Reading the Golden Progress (supra) judgment holistically it would show that an admiralty Court had no jurisdiction to arrest a ship or keep a ship under arrest when a party sought to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction not to obtain the hearing and determination of claim but for the purpose of obtaining security for an award for arbitration proceedings. Like in the Golden Progress matter, if a party files a suit in which the primary prayer was for a decree, it is quite possible that the defendant may give up the arbitration and proceed to defend the suit in which event, the suit shall be proceeded with and it cannot be said that the High Court had no jurisdiction to deal with such suits. This means that the plaintiff may not be keen to go on with arbitration, but may want to go on with the suit and the defendants may also sing along in which case the suit has to be proceeded with. At that stage, the plaintiff cannot say that the High Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the suit but to refer the matter to arbitration. However, in such a suit, if the defendant comes and insists that there is valid arbitration agreement operative and capable of being performed and if that is so, the Court shall have no discretion but to refer the parties to arbitration agreement. It is for this reason in Golden Progress the Full Bench in its concluding paragraph no. 78(ii) said:

“78….

(i) ….

(ii) An action in rem (in admiralty jurisdiction) for recovery of the claim and arrest of the vessel where the parties have agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration can be maintained and in such case if by way of an interim measure, the vessel is arrested or the security provided to obtain the release of the vessel, matter shall proceed in accord with Article VII of the International Convention on Arrest of Ships, 1999. (emphasis supplied)

(iii)….

(iv)….”

18. The expression used is “An action in rem (in admiralty jurisdiction) for recovery of the claim and arrest of the vessel ….”. Recovery of claim can only be in the suit where the plaintiff has sought a decree - ‘recovery of the claim’. In fact, the Full Bench has quoted and has not disagreed with what the English Courts have held. The English Courts have opined that where the plaintiff had sought to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction not to obtain the hearing and determination of claim but for the purpose of obtaining security for an award for arbitration proceedings such an action cannot be maintained. Para 39, 40, 41 & 42 of Golden Progress read as under:

39. The Cap Bon, (1967) 1 Lloyd's Report, 543 was concerned with the claim by charterers against the ship owners under a charter party containing an arbitration clause. The ship was carrying potatoes from Alexandria to London and while she was being discharged at Liverpool, the charterers commenced an action in rem against her for a cargo damage claim. The writ was served upon the vessel and she was arrested. The ship owners then entered an appearance and the bail bond was provided to obtain the ship released. Nearly three months later, the ship owners commenced arbitration proceedings against the charterers for damage. The charterers then appointed an arbitrator, both in respect of their cargo damage claim and in respect of the ship owners damage claim. The ship owners subsequently asked the charterers for a statement of claim in the action. The charterers answer was that the dispute fell within the arbitration clause; that purpose of the action was to obtain security; and that they would consent to the action being stayed and that they would resist application for dismissal of the action. The ship owners then applied for an order that unless the charterers served statement of claims on certain dates, action should be dismissed. Brandon, J. granted the order for which the ship owners asked and also ordered that in the event of the action being so dismissed, the bail should be released. Brandon J. opined that the charterers had sought to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction not to obtain the hearing and determination of claim but for the purpose of obtaining security for an award for arbitration proceedings, and that an admiralty court had no jurisdiction to arrest the ship or to keep ships under arrest for that purpose.

40. The decision in Cap Bon was followed by Brandon, J. in the Golden Trader, 1974 (1) Lloyd's Report, 378 and after reconsideration in the Rena K, (1978) 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 545.

41. In Rena K, Brandon, J. reiterated that it is not the purpose of arresting a ship in an action in rem to provide the plaintiff with security for payment of an award which he may obtain in an arbitration of the same claim as that raised in the action and, therefore, the court has no jurisdiction to arrest a ship, or keep her under arrest, for such other purpose.

42. With regard to the decision given by him in the Golden Trader, in Rena K, Brandon, J. reproduced his conclusions thus

(1) That the Court had no jurisdiction to keep the ship under arrest in order to provide the charterers with security for an award in the arbitration. It only had jurisdiction to keep her under arrest in order to provide security for a judgment or settlement in the action. This conclusion accorded with my earlier decision in The Cap Bon, which was not, as I have said, challenged by Counsel for the charterers, and which appeared to me in any event to derive support from the approach adopted in three earlier cases which I examined: The Athenee (1922) 11 L.L Rep. 6; Foresta Romana S.A v. Georges Mabro (Owners)(1940) 66 LI.L Rep. 139; and The Fehmarn[1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 511: [1957] 1 W.L.R 815: [1957] 2 Lloyd's Rep 551: [1958] 1 W.L.R 159. ……. (emphasis supplied)

19. It must be remembered that the mere fact that dispute between parties falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement entered into between them does not by itself preclude one of them from bringing the action in the High Court and procure the arrest of the ship or otherwise proceed with the action. The mere existence of the arbitration agreement will not by itself prevent a party from filing a suit and in the case of action in rem, procuring the arrest of the ship or otherwise proceeding with the action. But, if such an action is taken, the other party may apply for a stay of proceedings and the Court is bound to grant the stay.

20. Let us suppose in an action in rem to obtain the hearing and determination of the claim, before the Court had granted the stay of proceedings under the Arbitration Act, the plaintiff has obtained security by the arrest of ship. If the stay is granted, the Court may require as a condition of granting a stay, the bail provided for release of the ship be made available to secure an award made in the arbitration proceedings. It is left to the discretion of the Court to pass appropriate order in that regard after taking into consideration all circumstances. This is what, in my view, the Full Bench in Golden Progress (supra) had in its mind when it articulated its conclusions as provided in para 78(iv) which reads as under:

“78(iv) With regard to clauses (ii) and (iii), it is, however, clarified that retention of security shall remain a matter of discretion and it shall be for the court to pass appropriate order in that regard after taking into consideration all relevant circumstances.”

21. Therefore, I am in agreement with Mr. Ramabhadran's submissions that Golden Progress case is not applicable in the present facts of the case as there is no prayer for decree or substantial relief in this case. In Golden Progress the suit itself was primarily for a claim and for decree against the defendants therein. The Full Bench, in my view, has not considered a situation like in the present as to whether a suit seeking a final relief at the interlocutory stage is maintainable or not.

22. Therefore, we will have to consider whether this suit itself can be proceeded with or the plaint should be rejected in the light of BALCO (supra) judgment.

23. In the BALCO (supra) judgment, the Apex Court has in no uncertain terms held that an inter parte suit simply for interim reliefs pending arbitration would not be maintainable. The Apex Court held that in order to claim an interim relief, the existence of a pending suit is necessary. The Apex Court opined that pendency of the arbitration proceedings outside India would not provide a cause of action for the suit where the main prayer is for interim relief and in a suit where it is only for interim relief as security pending arbitration, interlocutory reliefs and the final relief would be identical and such a suit would not be maintainable because an interlocutory injunction can only be granted during the pendency of the suit, claiming the relief which is likely to result in a final decision upon the subject in dispute. The Apex Court further held that the suit would be maintainable only on the existence of a cause of action, which would entitle the plaintiff for the substantive relief claimed in the suit and the interim relief must be a part of the substantive relief to which plaintiff's cause of action entitled him. The Court further said that these ingredients will be missing in a suit claiming only interim relief during pendency of the arbitration proceedings outside India. Since the dispute is to be decided by the arbitration, no substantive relief concerning the merits of the arbitration could be claimed in the suit and the plaintiff's only claim would depend on the outcome of the arbitration proceedings in a foreign country over which the Courts in India would have no jurisdiction. The cause of action would clearly be contingent/speculative. There would be no existing cause of action and the plaint itself would be liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the Civil Procedure Code. What in effect the Court said was no interim relief could be granted unless it is in aid of as an auxiliary to the main relief that may be available to a party on final determination of rights in a suit.

24. It is necessary to reproduce the following paragraphs from the BALCO judgment:

“Is an inter partes suit for interim relief maintainable?

172. It appears to us that as a matter of law, an inter partes suit simply for interim relief pending arbitrations, even if it be limited for the purpose of restraining dissipation of assets would not be maintainable. There would be number of hurdles which the plaintiff would have to cross, which may well prove to be insurmountable.

173. The civil courts in India, by virtue of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”), have the jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature, excepting suits which are either expressly or impliedly barred. Fundamental to the maintainability of a civil suit is the existence of a cause of action in favour of the plaintiff. This is evident from the various provisions contained in CPC. However, it would be appropriate to notice that Order 7 Rule 1 gives the list of the particulars which have to be mandatorily included in the plaint. Order 7 Rule 1(e) mandates the plaintiff to state the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose. Order 7 Rule 11(a) provides that the plaint shall be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action. A cause of action is the bundle of facts which are required to be proved for obtaining relief prayed for in the suit. The suit of the plaintiff has to be framed in accordance with Order 2. Order 2 Rule 1 provides that:

“1. Frame of suit - Every suit shall as far as practicable be framed so as to afford ground for final decision upon the subjects in dispute and to prevent further litigation concerning them.”

The aforesaid Rule is required to be read along with Rule 2 which provides that:

“2. Suit to include the whole claim - (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any court.” (emphasis supplied)

The aforesaid provisions read together would lead to the firm conclusion that the existence of cause of action is a sine qua non for the maintainability of a civil suit.

174. The provisions with regard to the temporary injunction and interlocutory orders are contained in Order 39 and Order 40. In order to claim an injunction the existence of a pending suit is a prerequisite. It is in this background that one has to examine as to whether an inter partes suit for interim relief during the pendency of arbitration proceedings outside India would be maintainable.

175. In our opinion, pendency of the arbitration proceedings outside India would not provide a cause of action for a suit where the main prayer is for injunction. Mr. Sundaram has rightly pointed out that the entire suit would be based on the pendency of arbitration proceedings in a foreign country. Therefore, it would not be open to a party to file a suit touching on the merits of the arbitration. If such a suit was to be filed, it would in all probabilities be stayed in view of Sections 8 and 45 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. It must also be noticed that such a suit, if at all, can only be framed as a suit to “inter alia restrain the defendant from parting with property.” Now, if the right to such property could possibly arise, only if the future arbitration award could possibly be in favour of the plaintiff, no suit for a declaration could obviously be filed, based purely only on such a contingency. All that could then be filed would, therefore, be a bare suit for injunction restraining the other party from parting with property. The interlocutory relief would also be identical. In our view, such a suit would not be maintainable, because an interlocutory injunction can only be granted during the pendency of a civil suit claiming a relief which is likely to result in a final decision upon the subject in dispute. The suit would be maintainable only on the existence of a cause of action, which would entitle the plaintiff for the substantive relief claimed in the suit. The interim injunction itself must be a part of the substantive relief to which the plaintiff's cause of action entitled him. In our opinion, most of the aforesaid ingredients are missing in a suit claiming injunction restraining a party from dealing with the assets during the pendency of arbitration proceedings outside India. Since the dispute is to be decided by the Arbitrator, no substantive relief concerning the merits of the arbitration could be claimed in the suit. The only relief that could be asked for would be to safeguard the property which the plaintiff may or may not be entitled to proceed against. In fact the plaintiff's only claim would depend on the outcome of the arbitration proceeding in a foreign country over which the courts in India would have no jurisdiction. The cause of action would clearly be contingent/speculative. There would be no existing cause of action. The plaint itself would be liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(a). In any event, as noticed above, no interim relief could be granted unless it is in aid of and ancillary to the main relief that may be available to a party on final determination of rights in a suit. This view will find support from a number of judgments of this Court.

176. In The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, at SCR p. 35 this Court held: (AIR p. 14, para 6)

“6….An interim relief can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceeding.”

177. Following the above Constitution Bench, this Court in Cotton Corpn. Of India Ltd. v. United Industrial Bank Ltd. held: (SCC p.635, para 10)

“10……But power to grant temporary injunction was conferred in aid or as auxiliary to the final relief that may be granted. If the final relief cannot be granted in terms as prayed for, temporary relief in the same terms can hardly if ever be granted. In The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta a Constitution Bench of this Court clearly spelt out the contours within which interim relief can be granted. The Court said that ‘an interim relief can be granted only in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceeding’. If this be the purpose to achieve which power to grant temporary relief is conferred, it is inconceivable that where the final relief cannot be granted in the terms sought for because the statute bars granting such a relief ipso facto the temporary relief of the same nature cannot be granted.”

178. The legal position is reiterated in Ashok Kumar Lingala v. State of Karnataka.

179. In matters pertaining to arbitration, the suit would also be barred under Section 14(2) of the Specific Relief Act. Although the provision exists in Section 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, for grant of temporary/perpetual injunction, but the existence of cause of action would be essential under this provision also. Similar would be the position under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act.

180. Claim for a Mareva Injunction* in somewhat similar circumstances came up for consideration in England before the House of Lords in Siskina (Owners of Cargo) v. Distos Compania Navieria S.A In this case, cargo owners had a claim against a Panamanian company. The dispute had no connection with England. The defendant's only ship had sunk and there were insurance proceeds in England to which the defendant was entitled. The cargo owners sought leave to serve the writ on the defendant under what was then RSC Order 11, Rule 1(1)(i). Mocatta, J. gave leave and at the same time granted an injunction in the terms asked for in Paragraph 2 of the writ petition. Subsequently, Kerr, J. set aside the notice of the writ but maintained the injunction pending in appeal. On the cargo owners' appeal, the Court of Appeal by a majority reversed the judgment of Kerr, J. and restored the Mareva injunction as originally granted by Mocatta, J. The matter reached the House of Lords by way of an appeal against the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords on appeal held that there was no jurisdiction to commence substantive proceedings in England. Therefore, the writ and all subsequent proceedings in the action had to be set aside. Consequently there could be no Mareva injunction. It was held that a Mareva injunction was merely an interlocutory injunction and such an injunction could only be granted as “.… ancillary and incidental to the preexisting cause of action”.

181. Lord Diplock observed that: (Siskina case, AC p. 255 D)

“…. it is conceded that the cargo owners' claim for damages for breach of contract does not of itself fall within any of the sub-rules of Order 11, Rule 1(1); nor does their claim for damages for tort.”

It is further observed that: (Siskina case, AC p. 255 F-G) “What is contended by the counsel for the cargo owners is that if the action is nevertheless allowed to proceed, it will support a claim for a Mareva injunction restraining the ship owners from disposing of their assets within the jurisdiction until judgment and payment of the damages awarded thereby; and that this of itself is sufficient to bring the case within sub-rule (i) which empowers the High Court to give leave for service of its process on persons outside the jurisdictions”.

182. Interpreting Order 11 Rule 1(1)(i), it was held in Siskina case16 that the word used in sub-rule (i) are terms of legal art. The sub-rule speaks of “the action” in which a particular kind of relief, “an injunction” is sought. This presupposes the existence of a cause of action on which to found “the action”. A right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is not a cause of action. It cannot stand on its own. It is dependent upon there being a pre-existing cause of action against the defendant arising out of an invasion, actual or threatened by him, of a legal or equitable right of the plaintiff for the enforcement of which the defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court. The right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is merely ancillary and incidental to the pre-existing cause of action. It is granted to preserve the status quo pending the ascertainment by the Court of the rights of the parties and the grant to the plaintiff of the relief to which his cause of action entitles him, which may or may not include a final injunction.

183. As noticed earlier, the position is no different in India. Therefore it appears that under the law, as it stands today, an inter-parte suit simply for interim relief pending arbitration outside India would not be maintainable.

………..

192. So far as the Indian Law is concerned, it is settled that the source “of a Court's power to grant interim relief is traceable to Section 94 and in exceptional cases Section 151 CPC. The Civil Procedure Code pre-supposes the existence of a substantive suit for final relief wherein the power to grant an interim relief may be exercised only till disposal thereof.

193. In this view of the matter, it is patent that there is no existing provision under the Civil Procedure Code or under the Arbitration Act, 1996 for a Court to grant interim measures in terms of Section 9, in arbitrations which take place outside India, even though the parties by agreement may have made the Arbitration Act, 1996 as the governing law of arbitration. (emphasis supplied)”

25. Mr. Sancheti's argument that BALCO judgment is not applicable and it is applicable only in a civil suit and not admiralty suit cannot be accepted. Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to all suits whether filed in the original jurisdiction or in admiralty jurisdiction. The Code of Civil Procedure applies to proceedings on the admiralty side as well of the High Court. This has been so held by our Court in the matter of The Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company Ltd. v. Shepherd and Haji Ismail Hossein ILR 1888 XII Bombay 23, which has been approved by the Apex Court in the judgment of M.V.A.L Quamar v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd. JT 2000 9 SC 184 All suits are liable to be rejected if they do not disclose cause of action. Therefore, it is immaterial if the suit is a civil suit or an admiralty suit.

26. In the circumstances, as the Apex Court has held that an inter-parte suit simply for interim relief pending arbitration outside India will not be maintainable and unless the dispute is decided by the arbitrator cause of action will clearly be contingent and speculative and there will be no existing cause of action, the plaint is bound to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(a). In my opinion, the Court's jurisdiction to arrest a ship in an action in rem should not be exercised for the purpose of providing security of an award, which may be made in arbitration proceedings that is maintainable because the purpose of the exercise of the jurisdiction is to provide security in respect of the action in rem, and not to provide security in some other proceedings like an arbitration proceeding. If the plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the Court to obtain the arrest of the ship as security for an award in an arbitration proceeding, the Court should not issue a warrant of arrest.

27. The submissions of the plaintiff that the claim for damages by defendant no. 3 is premature is incorrect. Moreover, Kathawala, J., while disposing of Notice of Motion (L) No. 59/2013 had said he was not granting the claim for damages due to inadequate particulars and not because it was premature. Had the particulars been adequate then, he would have, even though the issue of arrest of bunkers was kept open, granted damages. Even on this ground the submissions of the plaintiff that the claim for damages was premature has to fail.

28. The plaint is hereby rejected. Since the plaint itself is being rejected, this notice of motion taken out by the plaintiff cannot be even considered. Hence it is disposed as rejected.

29. The Notice of Motion no. 735/2013 be placed on Board on 23.06.2014 for hearing.