1. The petitioner is an officer in Middle Management Grade Scale-II in the establishment of Bank of Baroda. The validity of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner ultimately culminating in imposition of the penalty of reduction by three stages in time scale in Middle Management Grade Scale-II with effect from February 25, 1989 at the hands of the Chairman and the Managing Director of the Bank, who is the reviewing authority under Regulation 18 of the Bank of Baroda Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations. 1976, for short 'D & A Regulations' is assailed in the writ petition. The petitioner has also sought for declaration that the action of the respondents in recovering the Professional Qualification Allowance (PQA) for the period from July 1, 1989 as illegal and arbitrary and for a consequential direction to the respondents to continue the payment of PQA duly refunding the amounts already recovered.
2. The petitioner joined the service of the Bank as clerk on April 16, 1964 and he was confirmed in that cadre with effect from October 16, 1964. The petitioner was subsequently promoted to Junior Management Grade Scale-I with effect from May 1, 1971. Further, the petitioner was promoted to Middle Management Grade Scale-II with effect from July 1, 1979. The petitioner was serving as Branch Manager at Vellore between July 11, 1983 and October 31, 1984, and subsequently he was transferred to Visakhapatnam as Accountant and later to Nellore Branch. When the petitioner was serving in Nellore Branch of the Bank, he was served with the Memorandum of charge on October 27, 1987. Articles of Charge issued to the petitioner on October 27, 1987 read:
"Articles of charge Mr. C.Pattabirama Sastry was functioning as the Branch Manager of our Vellore Branch from July 1983 to October 1984. During the said period, he is reported to have committed acts and omissions which, if proved, would amount to misconduct under Regulation 3 read with Regulation 24 of Bank of Baroda Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976. He is, therefore, charged as under:
(1) He did not take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the Bank but in fact took such steps and did such omissions as were derogatory, detrimental, prejudicial and injurious to the interests of the Bank.
(2) He did not discharge duties with utmost integrity and honesty but in fact did such actions which displayed a lack of probity on his part.
(3) He did not perform his duties with devotion and diligence.
(4) He did not maintain discipline in all transactions.
(5) In the discharge of his duties and in exercise of powers conferred upon him, he acted otherwise than in his best judgment.
(6) He misused and abused his position as Manager of the Bank's Branch.
(7) He did acts unbecoming of a Bank Officer.
(8) He violated and flouted the rules, procedures and Regulations of the Bank.
(9) He has suppressed certain information to higher authorities and has given a misleading data.
Sd. S.V.Ramachandran Assistant General Manager (SZ) & Disciplinary Authority"
The petitioner replied to the Memorandum of Charge on November 12, 1987. The Assistant General Manager who is the Disciplinary Authority under D & A Regulations not being satisfied with the reply of the petitioner decided to conduct a regular departmental enquiry. Accordingly the Disciplinary Authority appointed one Sri S. Padmanabhan, Senior Manager (Legal), Bank of Baroda, Zonal Office, Madras as the Inquiring Authority in terms of sub-Regulation (2) of Regulation 6 of the D & A Regulations. The enquiry was conducted on April 8, 1988 and from May 30, 1988 to June 4, 1988. Only one witness, namely, Mr. V.Manohar was examined on behalf of the Management as P.W.1. The Inquiring Authority gave his findings on October 23, 1988 holding the petitioner guilty of all Articles of Charge except Article No. 2.
3. The third respondent after consideration of the findings recorded in the enquiry report accepted the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority and issued the office order dated February 25, 1989 imposing the penalty of reduction to a lower grade from M.M.G./S-II to JMG/S-I thereby reducing the basic pay of the petitioner from Rs. 2,925/- per month in M. M. G./S-II to Rs. 2,6151- pet month in J.M.G./S-I with effect from the date of the order, as a disciplinary measure. The petitioner preferred an appeal under Regulation 17 of D & A Regulations to the second respondent, namely, the General Manager and Appellate Authority on April 16, 1989. The Appellate Authority by its order dated September 8, 1989 reduced the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority by imposing the penalty of reduction by three stages in time scale with effect from the date of the appellate order, i.e., September 8, 1989. The petitioner not being satisfied with the appellate order submitted Review Petition on February 1, 1990 to the Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of the Bank who is the Reviewing Authority under Regulation 18 of the D & A Regulations. The Reviewing Authority passed the order on July 2, 1991 further reducing the penalty and in substitution of the penalty imposed by the Appellate Authority, imposed the penalty of reduction by three stages in time scale in Middle Management Grade/Scale II with effect from February 25, 1989. From the records, it seems that the petitioner on September 22, 1993 submitted another Review Petition to the Chairman and Managing Director of the Bank requesting the latter to re-review the order made by the Reviewing Authority on July 2, . 1991. That request of the petitioner was not acceded to by the Reviewing Authority on the ground that under the D & A Regulations there is no provision to re-review the order of the Reviewing Authority. Hence this writ petition assailing the validity of the orders of the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority and the Reviewing Authority.
4. It appears that before the Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty by his order dated February 25, 1989, the petitioner was granted PQA with effect from February 1, 1989 because he had reached the maximum in time scale in M.M.G. Grade Scale-II on February 1, 1988. After the penalty was imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appeal and Review preferred by the petitioner were disposed of, according to the petitioner, an oral communication was received by him on February 1, 1993 from the Management of the Bank stating that the petitioner is not entitled to PQA and directing recovery of the sums of money already paid to the petitioner as PQA. The validity of this action of the Bank's Management is also assailed in this writ petition as pointed out supra.
5. Sri C.R. Chandrasekhar Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that-
(i) that Charge Memo was issued nearly after three years from the date of alleged misconduct and that there was inordinate delay initiating disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and on that count itself the disciplinary proceedings should be held to be invalid;
(ii) that the charges are vague and unintelligible, and that the Articles of charge are not related and cannot be correlated to the allegations made in the statement of allegations and therefore, the charge-sheet should be held to be invalid;
(iii) that since Article No. 2 of charge is held not proved both by the Inquiring Authority and the Disciplinary Authority, it should be held that other Articles of the charge are also not proved;
(iv) that the Disciplinary Authority has not applied his mind to the evidence on record and points raised by the petitioner and he has disposed of the appeal by a perfunctory order;
(v) that the Appellate Authority and the Reviewing Authority have recorded the findings in their orders virtually exonerating the petitioner from the charges; neverthless, they did not set aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority but just reduced the penalty only. The penalty imposed on the petitioner as a disciplinary measure by each of the respondents 1 to 3 is totally arbitrary and unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India;
(vi) that the action of the respondents in withholding payment of PQA to the petitioner is ex-fade illegal, unjustified and irrational.
On the other hand Sri T. Viswanatha Sastry, the learned standing counsel for the Bank-Management would support the impugned orders and also the action of the Bank's Management in withholding PQA to the petitioner.
Contention No. (i)
6. The argument of the learned counsel is that almost three years delay in issuing the Charge Memo vitiates the entire proceedings. This contention is untenable for more than one reason. Delay simpliciter itself in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent cannot be a vitiating factor in the absence of prejudice or disadvantage suffered by the delinquent in defending his action. It is true that in some cases it may so happen that due to the delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings against an employee, the material witnesses may not be available on account of their death; the relevant documents may not be available or by the time the disciplinary proceeding is initiated they might have been destroyed. Where the defence of the delinquent has to be established only by way of oral evidence, with the lapse of time, the memories of the witnesses may fade away and the witnesses may not be in a position to speak to the facts alleged against the delinquent correctly. These factors cannot be exhaustive list of factors. When a plea of delay is putforth by the delinquent, the Court has to decide whether due to the delay in initiating disciplinary proceeding, the delinquent has suffered any prejudice or is placed in a disadvantageous position to defend his action effectively or not, and in deciding such question the Court has to take into account all the attendant facts and circumstances of the case. In the instant case, the petitioner, except stating in para 3 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the Charge Memo was issued after more than three years from the date of commission of the alleged misconduct, as a passing remark, has not taken this plea as a ground of attack also. The petitioner nowhere in the affidavit has stated that due to the delay, he suffered any prejudice or he was placed in a disadvantageous position to defend himself. The Court perused the reply submitted by the petitioner to the Charge Memo on November 12, 1987. In his reply also, the petitioner has not made any grievance against the delay in issuing the Charge Memo. The petitioner did not make any grievance either before the Disciplinary Authority or before the Appellate Authority or before the Reviewing Authority in that regard. Since the petitioner has failed to take this plea at the earliest point of time in the course of disciplinary proceedings, he cannot be permitted to make any grievance before this 1 Court on the ground that the Charge Memo was issued after more than three years from the date of complained acts. Added to this, the petitioner did not lay any foundation in the affidavit filed before this Court to satisfy the Court that the petitioner suffered any prejudice or disadvantage due to the delay in issuing the Charge Memo. However, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner placing reliance on the decision of Gujarat High Court in M.D. Parmar v. Y.B. Zala and Anr. 1980-I-LLJ-260 (Guj) and the decision of the Madras High Court in R.Srinivasan v. Union of India and Anr. 1982-II-LLJ-135 (Mad) would maintain that three years delay in issuing the Charge Memo vitiates the disciplinary proceedings. The two decisions cited before the Court are distinguishable on facts. In M.D. Parmar's case, a police constable was given a charge-sheet alleging that he had absented once and late on another occasion to the parade drill during a period of one month and a chargesheet itself was given 18 months after the alleged absence and delay. He was subsequently removed from the service as a disciplinary measure. When that action was assailed before the Gujarat High Court, the Court held that delay of about 1 1/2 years must be considered fatal from the point of time of affording reasonable opportunity to the employee to show cause against the charge levelled against him and that it would be asking for the impossible to expect the employee to explain satisfactorily the reason which occasioned the delay in reporting for duty. It was so held by the Gujarat High Court because in the nature of the allegation levelled against the delinquent therein, he had to explain the reason for his delay and absence on two days on the basis of his personal knowledge, and since there was inordinate delay of 1 1/2 years in initiating disciplinary proceeding, the delinquent would not remember the exact cause for his absence and delay. Srinivasan's case (supra) is also distinguishable on facts. In that case on January 27, 1978 charge was framed against the appellant that he failed to pay rent . payable for the period of his occupation in spite of repeated demands from the Management and Hotel Staff and has abused his official position and acted in a manner unbecoming of a public servant and thereby contravened Rule 3(1) (iii) of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The said charge was contested by the appellant therein on the basis of Ex.D-1. Ex.D-1 was a letter issued to the appellant at the time of final settlement of rent bill. Dealing with that case the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in para 11 of the judgment observed:
"In the instant case, the rent was paid in full and the receipt obtained on December 1, 1976. Exhibit D-l mentions that the Accountant Gopalakrishnan had been negligent in the settlement of accounts, even though the appellant was asking for settlement of accounts. The Charge Memo was issued to the appellant only on January 27, 1978. If the Charge Memo was issued and enquiry was held soon after payment of rent bill or within a reasonable time thereafter, opportunity for the appellant would have been available to examine the said Gopalakrishnan and establish his case. As the departmental proceedings commenced against the appellant nearly 1 1/2 years after the payment of rent bill, the appellant had lost the valuable opportunity of examining Gopalakrishnan, as he had expired by that time. If the charge had been levelled against the appellant soon after the lapse, the appellant would have substantiated his explanation by examining Gopalakrishnan and he cannot now be penalised for his inability to prove his plea to the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances the delay in charge sheeting the appellant constitutes a denial of reasonable opportunity to show cause, and on this ground also the impugned order is liable to be quashed."
7. As could be seen from this judgment, by the time Charge Memo was issued to the appellant delinquent a material witness, namely, Gopalakrishnan, Accountant of the Hotel had expired and since that witness was not available to prove the innocence of the delinquent, the Court held that the delay in issuing the Charge Memo vitiated the impugned Charge Memo and therefore was liable to be quashed. In both the cases decided by Gujarat High Court and the Madras High Court, the delinquents suffered prejudice and disadvantage in defending their actions due to the delay in issuing the Charge Memos. That is not the position obtaining in the present case for the reasons already stated supra.
Contention No. (ii):
8. The argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that charge-sheet itself is defective and vague; the articles of. charge are not related and cannot be co-related to the allegations made in the statement of allegations. Charge-sheet is the charter of any disciplinary action. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts that the charge-sheet should specifically set out all charges which the employee is called upon to show cause against and should also state all relevant particulars without which he cannot defend himself. The object of this requirement is that the delinquent employee must know what he is charged with and have adequate opportunity to meet the charge and to defend himself by giving a proper explanation, after knowing the nature of the offence, the nature of the misconduct with which he is charged, otherwise it will amount to his being punished unheard. Fair hearing pre-supposes a precise and definite catalogue of charges so that the person charged may understand and effectively meet them. If the charges are imprecise or indefinite, the person charged would not be able to understand them and defend himself effectively and the resulting enquiry would not be a fair and just enquiry. In the back-drop of these well-settled principles governing the issuance of Charge Memo, the Court has to consider whether the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner is defective and vague, and whether the Articles of the charge are not related and cannot be co-related to the allegations made in the statement of allegations. The petitioner is alleged to have committed misconduct specified under Regulation 3 read with Regulation 24 of Bank of Baroda Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 for short 'the Conduct Regulations'. The preamble to the Articles of charge declares that the petitioner is reported to have committed acts and omissions, which, if proved, would amount to misconduct under Regulation 3 of the Conduct Regulations, and as many as 9 Articles of charge are levelled in the Charge Memo. Regulation 3 of the Conduct Regulations reads:
"3.(1) Every officer employee shall, at all times take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer.
(2) Every officer employee shall maintain good conduct and discipline and show Courtesy and attention to all persons in all transactions and negotiations.
(3) No officer employee shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior.
(4) Every officer employee shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all persons for the time being under his control and authority."
At the left hand column of Conduct Regulation No. 3, the word 'General' is found. In other words Conduct Regulation No. 3 bears the head 'General'. Regulations 4 to 23 of Conduct Regulations mandate the observance of certain conduct from the employees governed by the Regulations. Regulation 24 of Conduct Regulations declares that breach of any of the Conduct Regulations shall be deemed to constitute a 'misconduct' punishable under the D & A Regulations. Therefore, it is clear that if there is breach of Regulation No. 3 of Conduct Regulations, that breach would constitute a misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24 of the Conduct Regulations. However, the conduct expected from an employee under Regulation 3 is general in nature. If in a given case, the employer simply alleges that the delinquent's conduct is not upto the expected conduct specified in Regulation 3 of Conduct Regulations without disclosing the basis on which such allegation is made, the allegation made by the employer can be held to be vague and imprecise because the delinquent employee will not be in a position to know on what basis or materials or evidence the employer has levelled such allegations against him. In the present case the articles of charge were accompanied by the statement of allegations. In the statement of allegations, the petitioner is accused of having committed irregularities in advancing different kinds of loans to the borrowers in violation of rules, regulations, administrative instructions, established procedure and that the petitioner did not exercise his best judgment and he utterly failed to safeguard the interest of the bank.
9. The allegations are set out under five heads. The first head relates to the petitioner sanctioning various MSA loans in favour of the partners of Shanthi Radio House, and it is alleged that while MSA Loans were in arrears, the petitioner sanctioned jewel loans under Agriculture portfolio which is covered by Priority Sector Lending Scheme. It is also alleged that though there were considerable overdues in various MSA accounts of the partners and their relatives, the petitioner sanctioned further increase in the cash credit limit upto Rs. 50,000/- on March 20, 1984. The second head relates to sanctioning loans to four firms and two individuals. Here also the allegation is that during January/February, 1983, those firms and individuals were granted huge amount of temporary overdrafts far in excess of the branch discretionary lending powers. It is also alleged that though the petitioner had reported the sanction of the clean overdrafts to the various firms for the period from November 1, 1983 to November 15, 1983 on November 16, 1983, he did not obtain any financial statements from the firms and also failed to prepare necessary credit proposals as per administrative guidelines. Head No. 3 deals with cash credit (Pledge) limit of Rs. 75,000/- granted to one New Bharath Agencies. It is alleged that the conduct of the account was not studied properly by the petitioner before . extending the credit facility to the firm. The sanction of temporary overdraft to the firm had nullified the margin stipulated for the pledge account and the petitioner failed to follow the administrative procedure and to take appropriate steps to safeguard the funds of the bank. Head No. 4 relates to sanction of loans in favour of G.R. Printers. The allegation is that the petitioner granted cash credit limit of Rs. 25,000/- on May 21, 1984; he had allowed a temporary overdraft on January 5, 1984 in their Current Account upto Rs. 3,390-46p.; the petitioner permitted transfer of funds from cash credit account to clear the temporary overdraft on May 23, 1984 and to close the earlier MSA term loan granted to the proprietor of the firm, namely, G.Ramachandran. The allegation is that the petitioner sanctioned a far higher limit than the actual need despite that this was pointed out to the petitioner by the Regional office. It is also alleged that while reporting the MSA loans and the proposal, the petitioner did not report the overdue position, and on the other hand, he had stated in the proposal that the party's dealings were satisfactory. Head No. 5 deals with the Term Loans sanctioned by the petitioner under self-employment scheme for educated unemployed youth. The allegation is that despite obtaining adverse report from the Union Bank of India in writing on July 11, 1984, the petitioner granted loan to one Sri Vijaya Kumar and this action is also in utter violation of the administrative guidelines and he flouted the- instructions of the higher authorities. Ultimately, it is alleged in the statement of allegations that the petitioner failed to ensure that administrative procedures are scrupulously followed, such as conducting pre-sanction inspection of the business; the petitioner over looked the ceiling limit of MSA Loan for working capital for Retail Trade Category and also the stipulated average disbursement of Rs. 15,000/- per beneficiary under the scheme for providing sell-employment to the educated unemployed youth as envisaged in the administrative circulars.
10. All these allegations are proved by the Disciplinary Authority on the basis of the clinching documentary evidence and by examining P. W. 1. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner did not advance any, argument to assail the correctness and validity of the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority. Therefore, there is no need to review the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority and accepted by the Disciplinary Authority. That is the reason why the Court does not find it necessary to refer to each and every allegation contained in the statement of allegations. The Court referred to the allegations very briefly for the limited purpose of showing that since the allegations are proved, the Articles of charge cannot be said to be vague or imprecise. As already stated the conduct specified under Regulation 3 of Conduct Regulations is general in nature, and. whether a particular employee has adhered to the expected conduct can be determined or inferred from the proved allegations. The question which falls for consideration is whether the misconduct specified under. Regulation 3 of Conduct Regulations can be attributed to the petitioner on the basis of proved allegations. The Inquiring Authority recorded the finding that the second charge is not proved. The first charge relates to the failure of the petitioner to take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank, and on the other hand the petitioner took steps which were detrimental, prejudicial and injurious to the interest of the bank. Third charge relates to the failure of the petitioner to discharge and perform his duties with devotion and diligence. The fourth charge relates to the failure of the petitioner to maintain discipline in all transactions. The 5th charge relates to the failure of the petitioner to discharge duties and exercise powers conferred upon him in his best judgment. The 6th charge relates to misuse and abuse of the petitioner's power as Manager of the Bank's Branch. In order to prove misuse, and abuse on the part of the petitioner, it is not necessary for the Bank to prove the dishonesty of the petitioner. When a donee of the power uses that power for any purpose other than the purpose for which it is meant, then it is said that the donee is guilty of misusing and abusing the power. Charge No. 7 alleges that the petitioner did acts unbecoming of a Bank Officer. Charge No. 8 points out that petitioner violated and flouted the Rules, Regulations and procedures of the Bank. Charge No. 9 alleges that the petitioner suppressed certain information to higher authorities and has given misleading data. The Court has already referred to the allegations made in the statement of allegations and all those allegations stand proved. From these proved allegations, one can safely say that the petitioner is guilty of all the charges except Charge No. 2. Therefore the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the charges are not related to and cannot be co-related to the allegations made in the statement of allegations is not well-founded. The petitioner was in clear terms told what were the allegations against him and he was charged that he did not take expected steps to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank; he did not perform his duties with devotion and diligence; he did not adhere to office discipline; he did not exercise best judgment; he violated the Rules, established procedures and Regulations of the Bank and that he suppressed certain information to higher authorities.
Contention No. (in):
11. The contention of the petitioner's counsel is that when Charge No. 2 is held not proved both by the Inquiring Authority and the Disciplinary Authority, it should be held that the other charges are also not proved. This contention again is not well-founded. Charge No. 2 is that the petitioner did not discharge duties with utmost integrity and honesty and in fact did such actions which display lack of probity on his part. This charge directly questions the, integrity and honesty of the petitioner. Since there is no satisfactory evidence led in the enquiry, the Inquiring Authority rightly held that second charge is not proved. But in order to prove the other charges, it was not at all necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to prove dishonesty or lack of integrity or lack of probity on the part of the delinquent-petitioner. It is because all the charges except Charge No. 2 can be proved without proving dishonesty, lack of integrity and lack of probity on the part of the petitioner. It may be that the petitioner might have violated and flouted Rules, established procedures and Regulations out of innocence or ignorance and not for any extraneous or collateral consideration nor prompted by any corrupt motive. Once violation of Rules, Regulations and the administrative instructions, established procedures is proved against a delinquent, such violation would constitute misconduct within the meaning of that term under Section 24 of the Conduct Regulations.
Contention No. (iv):
12. The contention is that the Disciplinary Authority has not applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record and passed a perfunctory order. It is well-settled that when the Disciplinary Authority concurs with the finding recorded by the Inquiring Authority, he need not give separate reasons in support of the findings. The Disciplinary Authority in his order dated February 25, 1989 has stated that he has carefully gone through the Articles of charge, statement of allegations, enquiry records and the enquiry report and all facts and circumstances of the case. The Disciplinary Authority has also referred to the charges levelled against the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Disciplinary Authority has not applied his mind to the relevant materials and passed the order mechanically.
Contention No. (v):
13. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Appellate Authority as well as the Reviewing Authority having given a clean chit to the petitioner certifying that the petitioner has put in long unblemished service of about 25 years and the indulgence shown by the petitioner to the clients was not due to lack of integrity or mala fide, ought to have set aside the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and exonerated the petitioner from all the charges. The Appellate Authority in its order has observed:
"I find much credence in the submissions of the appellant before me. I also find that the appellant had not left unreported any irregularity and had always submitted status of the accounts in reports to the higher authorities though after some lapse of time."
In order to understand the purport of the observations of the Appellate Authority, it is necessary to note what the appellant submitted before the Appellate Authority. As could be seen from the order of the Appellate Authority, the petitioner contended that most of the lapses attributed to him are only of operational and procedural in nature and he had no mala fide intention to cause any loss to the Bank. The Appellate Authority has not differed with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority or the Disciplinary Authority on the charges. Therefore, the observation of the Appellate Authority has the effect of exonerating the petitioner from Charge No. 2 because Charge No. 2 questions the integrity and honesty of the petitioner.
14. The Reviewing Authority in its order dated July 2, 1991 has observed:
"The petitioner no doubt has shown indulgence to parties and in certain cases deviated from the laid down rules and procedures in sanction of loans to borrowers. However the fact remains that the proposals submitted by the petitioner were scrutinized at Regional level and limits were thereafter sanctioned to the parties. This goes to show that the petitioner wanted to keep higher authorities informed. It is also found that TODs granted by the petitioner to parties were borne out of business considerations. I also find that the petitioner has put in long unblemished service of about 27 years and the indulgence shown by the petitioner to clients was not due to lack of integrity or mala fide on his part."
Here again the effect of this observation is to exonerate the petitioner from the second charge. The certificate given by the Reviewing Authority that the petitioner has put in long unblemished service of 25 years and the indulgence shown by the petitioner to the clients was not due to lack of integrity and mala fide on his part would not wipe out the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority and accepted by the Disciplinary Authority on the charges except Charge No. 2. Either the Appellate Authority or the Reviewing Authority nowhere stated that they differ with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority on the charges. On the other hand, the Reviewing Authority himself has pointed out that the petitioner has shown indulgence to parties, and in certain cases deviated from the laid down Rules and procedures in sanction of loans to borrowers. This finding recorded by the Reviewing Authority supports the order made by the Disciplinary Authority. However, in their discretion, the Appellate Authority and the Reviewing Authority thought it fit to reduce the penalty having regard to the fact that the petitioner has put in 27 years of service in the Bank and his integrity and honesty are not in doubt. Therefore, the 5th contention of the learned counsel is not acceptable to the Court.
Contention No. (vi):
15. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the action of the respondents in withholding payment of PQA to the petitioner is ex facie illegal, unjustified, irrational both in terms of merits and in terms of procedure. The petitioner's statement that when he reached maximum in time scale in M.M.G. Grade Scale-II on February 1, 1988 he started drawing Rs. 100/- as PQA with effect from February 1, 1988 for by that time he had passed Part I C.A.I.I.B. is not denied in the counter filed by the respondent No. 3. If the petitioner started drawing PQA with effect from February 1, 1989 that is to say, well before the third respondent-Disciplinary Authority passed the order imposing penalty, the concerned Authority in the management of the Bank ought to have given a notice to the petitioner giving him an opportunity to putforth his say in the matter, It may be that in view of the final penalty imposed by the Reviewing Authority, the petitioner may not be entitled to PQA. The denial of PQA to the petitioner has the effect of affecting his civil rights. Therefore, the Bank Management ought to have issued a notice to the petitioner giving him an opportunity to have a say in the matter before it decided to withhold payment of PQA and directed recovery of the sum of money paid to the petitioner towards PQA. It is because, according to the petitioner, even if the final penalty imposed by the Reviewing Authority is upheld, still he is entitled to draw PQA. On the other hand, according to the Bank Management, in view of the penalty imposed by the Reviewing Authority on the petitioner, the petitioner is not entitled to draw PQA. I do not find it necessary to decide this Us between the parties because admittedly the Bank Management withheld payment of PQA to the petitioner without notice to him. In that view of the matter, ends of justice would be met by directing the Bank Management to decide the question whether petitioner is entitled to PQA in view of the penalty imposed on him by the Reviewing Authority after notice to the petitioner and giving him an opportunity to have his say in the matter.
16. In the result I dispose of the writ petition with the following order:
(i) The writ petition is dismissed in so far as it assails the validity of the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the order of the Reviewing Authority dated July 2, 1991.
(ii) The Management of the first respondent is directed not to withhold Professional Qualification Allowance to the petitioner until it serves a notice on the petitioner proposing to withhold Professional Qualification Allowance, gives him an opportunity to have his say in the matter and takes a decision in that regard. Recovery of monies already paid to the petitioner towards PQA shall also await the decision to be taken by the Management of the Bank in pursuance of this direction.
(iii) In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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