1. This is tenant's revision petition against the judgment and decree dated 27-1-1993 passed by the Appellate Authority under A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act viz., Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry in R.C.A No. 20 of 1992.
2. The brief facts lying in a narrow compass may be stated thus: The respondent, land lady, filed R.C.C No. 39 of 1980 in the Court of the Rent Controller (Principal District Munsif), Rajahmundry against the petitioner on 18-4-1980 under section 10(2)(i) of the A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that he had committed willful default of the payment of rent amounting to Rs. 635/- upto 31-3-1980. The tenant pleaded that the land lady had agreed to sell the suit premises to him for Rs. 18,000/- and he had paid Rs. 5000/- as earnest money; the agreement is dated 1-9-79. On this basis, he pleaded that since there had already been an agreement of sale in this regard, hence he thought that he need not pay the rent. He further pleaded that he was always ready and willing to pay the rest of the amount of purchase money to get the registered sale deed executed in his favour. But, since the land lady did not execute the sale deed, he filed Original Suit No. 96 of 1980 against her for specific performance of the agreement of sale. That suit was dismissed and then he filed A.S No. 85 of 1989 in the Court of the I Additional District Judge, Rajahmundry. He also pleaded that even before receiving the notice of R.C.C No. 39 of 1980, he had deposited the arrears of rent referred to above in the Court and thereafter deposited the rents regularly. After trial, the Rent Controller found that there was no wilful default on the part of the tenant, hence he dismissed the petition for eviction on 3-8-1992. Aggrieved by the said decree, the land lady-respondent filed appeal R.C.A No. 20 of 1992 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry viz., the Appellate Authority under the Act. The appellate Authority by its impugned judgment dated 27-1-1993 held that the default on the part of the tenant was not ‘bona fide’ and, further, during the pendency of the R.C.C there had occured second default from August, 1980 onwards. On this basis, the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority, now the tenant has preferred this revision petition.
3. I have heard the learned counsel on both sides at length and have gone through the record of the case carefully.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently placed two arguments before me. Firstly, since there had been an agreement of sale executed by the respondent in favour of the petitioners, hence the default in payment of rent committed by the latter need not be termed as ‘wilful’ in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in R.R.R Gopala Rao v. N.G Sesharao (1) (1989) 4 SCC 255 : AIR 1989 SC 2185 and secondly, the subsequent defaults of payment of rent beyond August, 1980 referred to by the Appellate Authority could not form the basis for eviction because the petition filed by the respondent under section 11(4) of the Act in this regard in the Court of the Rent Controller had already been dismissed being not pressed. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the factual aspects involved in the instant case do not attract the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above and secondly the subsequent defaults referred to by the Appellate Authority do go to indicate that they were sufficient to prove the mala fides on the part of the petitioner-tenant.
5. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the reported case cited supra goes to indicate that where the tenant omits to pay the rent on bona fide plea that he had a right to purchase the property in view of prior agreement to sell with the land lord, and earnest money had also been paid by the tenant, then in such a case, the alleged default could not be termed as ‘willful default’. The facts of the case before the Supreme Court go to indicate that the earlier agreement was dated 14-10-1977 and the default of payment of rent started from December, 1977 indicating thereby, there was a prior agreement of sale. But, in the instant case, admittedly the alleged agreement of sale of the suit premises is dated 1-9-1979 while the default of the rent was Rs. 635/- upto 31-3-1980, indicating that the default must have been for about nine months, because the rent was Rs. 70/- per month. This goes to show that the default must have started from July, 1979 i.e, prior to the agreement of sale, because it was alleged to be upto 31-3-1980. Now to be more precise in the Supreme Court case cited supra and vehemently relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the alleged agreement of sale was prior and the default was later while on the contrary, in the instant case, the agreement of sale is later and the default is prior. Consequently, it is but crystal clear that the ‘ratio’ laid down by the Supreme Court in the case cited supra which speaks of ‘prior agreement to sell the property’ does not clinch the issue to the factual aspects involved in the instant case. Obviously, therefore, I am of the view that the above decision does not help the petitioner.
6. Even other-wise, looking to the statement of the petitioner, it further becomes clear that he knew it well that he was required to pay the rents till a regular registered sale deed was not executed in his favour. He has categorically deposed so, as also referred to by the appellate authority in its impugned judgment at para 13. This subjective element existing in the mind of the petitioner further goes to indicate that the defaults in the payment of rent made by him, whether prior or after the alleged agreement of sale, were not bona fide. Coupled with this, admittedly, there had occured subsequent defaults also from August, 1980 onwards and in that regard a petition under Section 11(4) of the Act was also filed by the respondent in the Court of the Rent Controller, and though it was dismissed being not pressed, yet, this aspect goes to indicate the mala fides on the part of the petitioner-tenant.
7. In view of the above discussion, on the factual and legal aspects involved in the case, I am of the view that the alleged defaults on the part of the petitioner were ‘wilful’ and not ‘bona fide’ and, thus, the view taken by the appellate authority does not call for any interference. This petition, therefore, fails, and it is hereby dismissed and the impugned order passed by the appellate authority is upheld. However, as prayed by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, the petitioner is given four months time to vacate the premises. No costs.
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