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citation codes
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Acts
  • Section 151 CPC read with Rule 9 of Companies (Court Rules, 1959 and under Section 403 of the Companies Act
  • Rules 6 and 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules read with Section 151 CPC.8.
  • Section 151 C.P.C, when the provisions of Section 144 C.P.C,
  • Section 37 C.P.C, and 114 C.P.C, and Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C,
  • Rule 6, Read with Rule 9 of Companies (Court) Rules, 1959.
  • Section 151 C.P.C or analogous provisions
  • Rules 6 and 9 of Companies (Court) Rules,
  • provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C
  • follows:Rule 4 of Order 37 C.P.C
  • provisions of Order 39 C.P.C,
  • Rule 1 of Order 47 C.P.C,
  • Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C,
  • Section 151 C.P.C18.
  • Section 151 C.P.C,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 151 CPC read with Rule 9 of Companies (Court Rules, 1959 and under Section 403 of the Companies Act
  • Rules 6 and 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules read with Section 151 CPC.8.
  • Section 151 C.P.C, when the provisions of Section 144 C.P.C,
  • Section 37 C.P.C, and 114 C.P.C, and Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C,
  • Rule 6, Read with Rule 9 of Companies (Court) Rules, 1959.
  • Section 151 C.P.C or analogous provisions
  • Rules 6 and 9 of Companies (Court) Rules,
  • provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C
  • follows:Rule 4 of Order 37 C.P.C
  • provisions of Order 39 C.P.C,
  • Rule 1 of Order 47 C.P.C,
  • Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C,
  • Section 151 C.P.C18.
  • Section 151 C.P.C,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a Company Application filed under Section 151 CPC read with Rule 9 of Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 and Section 403 of the Companies Act to discharge the Interim Administrator and Assistant Administrators and restore the Board of Directors of Deccan Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (DEPL) as it existed on November 23, 1989, along with other reliefs.

The underlying dispute originated from Company Petition No. 27 of 1987 filed by the Khemka group (Mr. R. Khemka, his wife, and son) against Sri O.P. Jalan (Managing Director) and his family members. The petition challenged the increase in share capital and allotment of shares to the Jalan family members, which allegedly altered the shareholding in favor of the Jalan group without notice to other shareholders, resulting in alleged oppression and abuse of fiduciary powers.

Pending the petition, interim orders were passed appointing an Interim Administrator, Sri Justice P. Ramachandra Raju, assisted by Assistant Administrators, to manage the company’s affairs, superseding the Board of Directors. This appointment was confirmed by a Division Bench and eventually by the Supreme Court, rendering the Interim Administrator’s position final.

Subsequent applications and appeals were filed, including appointment of another Interim Administrator, Sri C.B. Desai, and proceedings regarding representation of DEPL on the board of a joint venture company, ARIL. Numerous interlocutory applications and appeals have been heard over the years, reflecting a protracted and complex litigation history.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Interim Administrator and Assistant Administrators can be discharged and the original Board of Directors restored.
  2. Whether the application seeking such relief is maintainable under Section 151 CPC, Rule 9 of Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, and/or Order 47, Rule 1 CPC.
  3. The jurisdictional competence of the Court to entertain the application, given the prior appeals and the composition of the Bench.
  4. Whether the interim orders appointing the Interim Administrator are subject to review or modification based on new facts or changed circumstances.
  5. The validity and impact of alleged misstatements and fresh material on the earlier orders.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • The appointment of the Interim Administrator was an interim arrangement subject to modification or recall under the inherent powers of the Court (Section 151 CPC) and Rules 6 and 9 of Companies (Court) Rules, 1959.
  • Relying on precedents, interlocutory orders can be reviewed or altered on proof of new facts during the pendency of proceedings.
  • Several misstatements and omissions in the earlier orders have led to miscarriage of justice, including incorrect assumptions about shareholding and capital increases.
  • Fresh material, including letters and agreements, substantially changes the factual backdrop and justifies modifying the interim arrangements.
  • The current management setup is detrimental to the company’s interests, requiring a new interim committee including the third respondent to manage affairs effectively.
  • The application is not a review in the strict sense but a request for suitable modifications to suit changed circumstances.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The application is essentially a review petition and is not maintainable before this Court or Judge, as the original order was disposed of by a Bench which included a now-retired Judge.
  • Specific provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC provide exclusive remedy for review, and inherent powers under Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to bypass these provisions.
  • The appointment of the Interim Administrator has become final and cannot be interfered with except by a competent review petition.
  • The fresh documents relied upon by the applicants are disputed, lack authenticity, and cannot be the basis for review at this stage.
  • Review can only be entertained for glaring omissions, patent mistakes, or gross errors, none of which are established here.
  • The main Company Petition is still pending trial, with witnesses available for cross-examination, and interlocutory applications should not delay substantive adjudication.
  • The applicants’ contentions were previously advanced and rejected, and there is no merit in re-arguing the same points.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
G.T Swamy v. M/S Goodluck Agencies, 1989 1 C.L.J 212 No bar to recall an order of winding up under inherent powers of the Court (Section 151 CPC and Companies (Court) Rules) Applicants relied on this to argue for modification of interim orders; Court noted context but emphasized specific statutory provisions govern review.
Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 Interlocutory orders are not final and can be reviewed or altered on proof of new facts during pendency Applicants cited this to support modification of interim administration; Court recognized principle but held specific procedural rules apply.
Abhi Prasad Sen v. Puspa Doshi, AIR 1984 Cal. 250 Review or alteration of interlocutory orders on new facts Supported applicants’ contention; Court acknowledged but stressed jurisdictional limits.
Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P, 1982 1 SCC 71 Review of interlocutory orders on new facts and misrepresentations Applicants relied on this for relief; Court highlighted that procedural rules and jurisdiction must be respected.
United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, 1981 2 SCC 766 Prima facie case and balance of convenience for interim relief Applicants used this to advocate for interim committee; Court noted but found no immediate urgency to alter administration.
Sivaramakrishnayya v. Kasiviswanadham, AIR 1957 A.P 584 Acceptance of admitted signatures prima facie Applicants cited to establish validity of documents; Court deferred consideration to trial stage.
Lakshmamma v. M. Jayaram, AIR 1952 Mysore 114 Burden on party to prove circumstances of signature Applicants relied on this; Court held genuineness to be decided in trial.
S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannalh, 1994 1 SCC 1 Orders obtained by misrepresentation or fraud can be reviewed Applicants invoked this to argue for correction of alleged misstatements; Court found no conclusive proof at this stage.
Ramachandra G. Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, 1993 4 SCC 216 Review of orders obtained by suppression or misrepresentation Applicants cited similarly; Court emphasized trial process for verification.
K. Pushpa Leela v. Labour Court, Guntur, 1992 1 APLJ 399 Jurisdiction of Court which passed decree or order for review Respondents relied on this to contest maintainability; Court upheld jurisdictional principles limiting hearing to original Bench.
Mallikarjun v. Suratram, AIR 1971 Bombay 45 Effect of appeal on trial Court’s decree and review jurisdiction Respondents cited to argue review lies only before Appellate Court; Court agreed on jurisdictional limitation.
Devaraju Pillai v. Sellayya Pillai, 1987 1 SCC 61 Review jurisdiction and interference by Single Judge in Second Appeal Respondents relied on this to emphasize limits on review petitions; Court followed precedent.
Sitaramasastry v. Sundammma, AIR 1966 A.P 173 Review not maintainable after appeal preferred Respondents used this to support non-maintainability; Court concurred.
Ramkarandas v. Bliagwandas, AIR 1965 SC 1144 Inherent powers of Court cannot override express statutory provisions for review Respondents cited to reject reliance on Section 151 CPC for review; Court accepted principle.
H.J Dorairaj v. V.R & Co., AIR 1973 Madras 135 Inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC cannot be used if exclusive remedy exists Respondents relied on this to argue against inherent powers; Court agreed.
Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 Inherent jurisdiction to issue injunctions where no specific provision exists Applicants cited this for interim relief; Court noted but emphasized statutory framework.
State Government v. M. Jeevraj & Co., AIR 1973 A.P 27 Use of Section 151 CPC where other provisions not applicable Applicants cited for inherent powers; Court distinguished applicability.
Ehirajulu Naidu v. K.R.C Chettiar, AIR 1975 Madras 333 Execution of document implies conscious appreciation of contents Respondents relied to challenge authenticity of documents; Court deferred to trial.
Ramadhin v. Siaram, AIR 1957 Patna 64 Onus on plaintiff to prove execution of document Respondents cited to contest document validity; Court reserved judgment for trial.
S. Mammad v. K. Mammad, AIR 1957 Kerala 63 Burden of proof in document execution cases Respondents used to support challenge; Court held issue for trial.
Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor, Delhi, 1980 2 SCC 167 Review only for glaring omission, patent mistake, or gross error Respondents relied to deny review; Court agreed no sufficient grounds shown.
Ramaswami Padayachi v. Shanmuga Padayachi, 1959 II M.L.N 201 Review requires reliable new facts Respondents cited to oppose review based on disputed facts; Court concurred.
Collector of 24 Parganas v. Lalith Mohan Muliick, 1988 Supp SCC 578 Review not allowed on new facts involving investigation Respondents relied to reject review based on fresh disputed documents; Court followed precedent.
Chandrakant v. Shripad, AIR 1989 Bombay 91 Erroneous decision alone is not ground for review Respondents cited to deny review; Court agreed.
Shatrunjit v. Md. A. Azim Khan, 1971 2 SCC 200 “Any other sufficient reason” in Order 47 means reason analogous to specified grounds Respondents used to argue no sufficient reason for review; Court accepted.
M.M.B Catholicos v. M.P Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 Interpretation of “any other sufficient reason” for review Respondents relied to limit grounds for review; Court followed reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully examined the procedural history and the submissions of both parties. It acknowledged the applicants’ contention that interlocutory orders, such as the appointment of an Interim Administrator, are subject to modification based on changed circumstances or new material. However, the Court emphasized that there are specific statutory provisions, notably Order 47, Rule 1 CPC, which govern review of orders, and these provisions preclude resort to the inherent powers under Section 151 CPC or analogous company court rules for review purposes.

Jurisdictionally, the Court found that since the order sought to be reviewed was passed by a Bench including a now-retired Judge, the present Bench lacked competence to entertain the review petition. The applicants’ attempt to recast the application as a modification rather than a review was rejected as a distinction without substance, since any alteration of the prior order amounts to review.

The Court also considered the disputed documents and fresh material relied upon by the applicants. It held that the authenticity and probative value of these documents could not be assessed at this interlocutory stage, but only during the trial of the main Company Petition, where the parties would have full opportunity to examine witnesses and cross-examine.

Given that the main Company Petition was already partially tried and that evidence was being recorded, the Court found no urgency or sufficient reason to interfere with the existing interim administrative setup. The Court urged the parties to focus on expeditious trial of the main petition rather than prolong interlocutory disputes.

Holding and Implications

The Court dismissed the Company Application seeking discharge of the Interim Administrator and restoration of the Board of Directors, holding the application to be not maintainable and devoid of merit.

The direct effect is that the Interim Administrator and Assistant Administrators continue to manage DEPL pending disposal of the main Company Petition. No modification to the interim management structure is made at this stage. The Court did not set any new precedent but reaffirmed the primacy of statutory provisions governing review and the limited scope of inherent powers in such contexts. The parties are directed to proceed expeditiously with the trial to resolve the substantive issues.

    O.P. Jalan v. Deccan Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.

    1. This Company Application is filed under Section 151 CPC read with Rule 9 of Companies (Court Rules, 1959 and under Section 403 of the Companies Act to discharge the Interim Administrator and Assistant Administrators and to restore the Board of Di rectors of Deccan Enterprises Pvt., Ltd., hereinafter called ‘DEPL’ as it existed on November 23, 1989 and for other reliefs.

    2. This case has a chequered career and an unending story. To appreciate the rival contentions, a brief history of the case is necessary.

    3. Company Petition No. 27 of 1987 was filed by Mr. R. Khemka, his wife and son - referred to as Khemka group. The main contestants of the said petition are Sri O.P Jalan - the third respondent, who is the Managing Director of the Company and Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 who are his wife and sons. The 9th respondent- Sri R.N Jalan, the brother of the 3rd respondent is sailing with the Applicants. The parties will be referred to as they are arrayed in Company Petition No. 27 of 1987 for convenience. Pending Company Petition No. 27 of 1987, the fir???t petitioner - Mr. R.N Jalan, filed Company Application Nos. 184 to 1988 of 1988 seeking reconstitution of the Board of directors with representatives of R. Khemka and R.N, Jalan proportionate to the shareholding as on December 31, 1984, or in the alternate, to suspend the Board of Directors constituted on July 5, 1988; and that the joint Managing Director be appointed representing R. Khemka and R.N Jalan and a direction be issued to the Managing Director to carry on the management along with the Joint Managing Director Jointly; a fresh audit of books of account of the Company be ordered for the period ending with March 31, 1988 and March 31, 1987 and to declare the resolution passed in the Annual General Meeting held on April 5, 1988 as void. When these applications came up before a learned Single Judge, the learned Single Judge holding that the reason for increasing the share capital of the company is to gain the over all control of the company by the third respondent and that continuance of the third respondent and his supporters the Board of Directors may result in preventing the profits reaching all the share holders; that the respondents have abused the fiduciary powers as Directors by increasing the share-holding in a manner oppressive to the other share holders like Respondent No. 9 etc., appointed Sri Justice P. Ramachandra Raju, Retired Judge as Interim Administrator for a period of two years in the first instance, assisted by two Assistant Administrators, representing the petitioners and the respondent No. 9 as one block and the third respondent as another block. Questioning the said order, the Company represented by its Secretary and also O.P Jalan (the third respondent) filed O.S.A No. 28 of 1989; while the 8th respondent - Subahkaran Jalan filed O.S.A No. 3 of 1990 and both the Appeals were disposed of by a common Judgment dated April 26, 1990. The Bench observed that there was no advantage to the Company by the issue of capital and the contention of 9th respondent that it was only done to alter the share-holding in favour of 3rd respondent is prima facie justified. Here, it may be stated that Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 held board meetings on November 26, 1984 and January 5, 1985, wherein they took a decision to increase the share capital of the Company by Rs. 5.00 lakhs and by their resolution dated February 28, 1985 allotted those shares to Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 i.e the 1st applicant and his wife and son.

    4. The core of the problem for filing the Company Petition is only this. As the petitioners and Respondent No. 9 are criticising this action of the third respondent to alter his shareholding in order to secur majority shares and to have control over the Company without notice to them, the Bench while considering the source of finance of Rs. 5.00 lakhs paid by the third respondent, observed that if really it was a case where the third respondent had obtained a loan from Poddar Project for payment of share capital of Rs. 5.00 lakhs, the matter would have been simple and the various entires in the Accounts prima facie show that there is something fishy about this transaction and consequently, dismissed the appeals. Eventually, the said orders were confirmed by the Supreme Court in Special Leave petition. The net result is that the appointment of an interim Administrator has become final.

    5. While so, Mr. R.N Jalan - Respondent No. 9, filed C.A No. 37 of 1992 for various reliefs, to declare that there was no Annual General Meeting on February 18, 1985, or on October 18, 1986; the allotment of shares to Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 in 1985 and 1986 is void and illegal; and to appoint another Administrator to take over the management and administer the Company with specific instructions relating to duties and functions. The learned Single Judge by an order dated August 20, 1992 observed that since the term of Sri Justice Ramachandra Raju, appointed as interim Administrator, has already expired and as he is not acceptable to one group of share holders of substantial strength, with a view to avoid further controvercy, Sri C.B Desai, Advocate is appointed as an interim Administrator, pending disposal of Company Petition No. 27 of 1987. This order is again the subject-matter of Appeal in O.S.A No. 8 of 1992. However, the Bench while practically confirming the order of the learned Single Judge, restricted the period of appointment of Sri C.B Desai as an interim Administrator for a period of two years from August 25, 1992 or for any shorter period as may be directed by the Company Court. Accordingly, the interim Administrator is continuing as he has got his term till August 25, 1994.

    6. I may have to mention certain developments which have taken place by this time. R.N Jalan, the 9th respondent, filed Company Application Nos. 9 and 10 of 1991 in C.P No. 27 of 1987 to setaside the proceedings dated August 3, 1990 of the interim Administrator and to restrain the third respondent - O.P Jalan from representing the Company with the joint venture Company and instead appoint another suitable representative from out of the panel to be submitted in this regard from the parties respectively. The respondent-Company holds 20 per cent of shares in Amiantic Rubber Industries Limited, incorporated in Saudi Arabia - hereinafter called ARIL. Therefore, the respondent No. 9 wants that the 3rd respondent should not attend the Board Meeting of ‘ARIL’ representing the respondent-Company ‘DEPL’. The learned Single Judge who heard the said Applications, felt that the third respondent is not competent to represent ‘DEPL’ on the Board of Directors of ‘ARIL’. The learned Single Judge has also noticed the orders passed by Justice Ramanujulu Naidu dated July 27, 1987 and the orders passed by Justice M.N Rao in C.A No. 197 of 1987 dated October 14, 1987 wherein the very same question - whether the third respondent should be permitted to represent ‘DEPL’ on the Board of Directors of ‘ARIL’ was considered. This order of the learned Single Judge was again the subject-matter of appeal in O.S.A No. -14 of 1992. When this appeal came up before the Honourable the Chief Justice and Sri Justice Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, the learned Counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 3 and 8 - Mr. O.P Jalan and S.K Jalan respectively, represented that the order under appeal is more or less based on the earlier order passed by Justice Upendralal Waghray in Company Application Nos. 144 to 188 of 1988. A review application was filed seeking review of the order of Justice Upendralal Waghray and therefore, as these applications are inter-dependent and when once Company application No. 81 of 1993 gets allowed reviewing the order made in Company Application Nos. 184 to 1988 of 1988, the order in Company Application Nos. 9 and 10 of 1991 will have to be consequently reviewed. Accordingly, the learned Counsel informed the Division Bench of this Court that he will seek review of the order passed by Justice N.D Patnaik in Company Application Nos. 9 and 10 of 1991. Therefore, the appeal was accordingly, dismissed leaving the appellants to seek the remedy by way of a review of the orders under appeal. Consequently, company Application No. 73 of 1994 is filed seeking review of the order of Justice N.D Patnaik which is also pending. These are only a few instances where this Court has examined this matter in some detail. There are number of other applications filed and orders passed, but I need not refer to them for purpose of the present application.

    7. Sri P. Chidambaram, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the applicants submits that the order passed by Justice vaghray in Company application Nos. 184 to 188 of 1988 as confirmed in O.S.A No. 28 of 1989 and 3 of 1990 by a Division Bench of this Court as stated earlier, or as a matter of fact confirmed eventually by the Supreme Court by dismissing the Special Leave Petition, will not in any way come in the way of the applicants with regard to the maintainability of this application. For this purpose, the learned Senior Counsel has invited my attention to the order of Justice waghray, wherein it is stated that when an interim administrator is being appointed “to manage the affairs of the Company during the pendency of the Company Petition, or till further orders”; as well as to another observation that accordingly, Sri P. Ramachandra Raju, Retired Judge, is appointed as “an Interim Administrator to conduct the affairs of the Company in supersession of the Board of Directors for a period of two years in the first instance”. He has also further relied upon the observation of the learned Judge that “it is open to any of the parties, or the administrator to move this Court for directions”. So, according to the learned Counsel, a reading of the order makes it abundantly clear that it is only an interim arrangement contrived in order to meet the circumstances as obtaining on that day having regard to the material placed before the Court. He even relies upon the judgment in Appeal - O.S.A No. 28 of 1989 and 3 of 1990 in support of this contention and submits that the learned Judges have taken sufficient precautionary measures in stating that the view expressed by them regarding the entries in the Accounts show that there is something fishy about it prima facie, or as a matter of fact the same view is seen in the observation that “the directions given by the Court are sufficient to safeguard the rights of all parties during the pendency of the main Company Petition”. It is his stand that this application is not for review of the order passed by Justice Waghray earlier under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC but this application is moved under Section 151 CPC as well as under Rule 6, Read with Rule 9 of Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. With a view to substantiate this contention, he relied upon a decision reported in G.T Swamy v. M/S Goodluck Agencies* 1989 1 C.L.J 212. and contends that there is no bar to recall an order of winding up under the inherent powers of the Court under Rules 6 and 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules read with Section 151 CPC.

    8. In the said case, an order of winding up was passed under Section 433(c) of the Act. So, according to the learned Counsel that when a final order of winding up can be revoked in view of the changed circumstances, an interim order like the one appointing an Interim Administrator could also be changed or altered to suit the changed circumstances. The learned Counsel further submits that it is always open to the Court to modify or alter the interim orders on the authority of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993., wherein the Supreme Court has ruled that all interlocutory orders are not final and the orders which do not affect the rights of parties cannot operate as res judicata and they can be reviewed or altered on proof of new facts at any time during the pendency of the proceeding. For the same proposition, the learned Counsel has relied upon another two decisions reported in Abhi Prasad Sen v. Puspa Doshi AIR 1984 Cal. 250. and in Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P 1982 1 SCC 71

    9. The core of the contention of the learned Counsel is that several misstatements have crept into the order of Justice Waghray while passing the order and consequently, miscarriage of justice has resulted. He invites my attention to the counter-affidavit filed by R.N Jalan (9th respondent) dated January 18, 1993, wherein he states that in regard to issue of shares of Nucon Industries Pvt., Ltd., “no statement was made before the Division Bench that the said Company had not increased the share capital” and that infact the share capital has been increased. In juxta-position to this statement, it is seen from the order of Justice Waghray that the Counsel for the 9th respondent has pointed out that the share-holding of Nucon Industries Pvt., Ltd., has not been altered and the learned Judge has proceeded on the basis of the said statement by observing that “as pointed out by the 9th respondent the share-holding of Nucon Industries Pvt., Ltd., has not been altered and the petitioners and the 3rd respondent continued to be its share-holders”, and therefore, this misstatement has materially affected the course of the judgment.

    10. Mahesh Khemka wrote a letter to R.N Jalan on January 16, 1985, wherein he admitted that ‘DEPL’ has gone to the third respondent's share in the family separation and he is not willing to contibute to ‘DEPL’ under the capital issue by their group. This letter clearly establishes that applicants group is not willing to contribute to ‘DEPL’ towards the increase of the share capital. Respondent No. 8 who is the father, in his affidavit sworn to on December 20, 1989 has stated that in the distribution of the family business in about September, 1984 DEPL, Golconda Investments Ltd., Khohinoor Trading Pvt., Ltd., Jalan Commercial and Industrial Corporation, Sanjay Commercial Corporation, Anand Trading Corporation have fallen to one group exclusively of which himself, his fourth son - S.N Jalan and fifth son - O.P, Jalan (third respondent) are members. This according to the learned Counsel is the reason why the other partners have not contributed while the share capital was increased by ‘DEPL’. The learned Counsel has drawn my attention to a copy of the draft settlement which is in the hand writing of the 9th respondent and contends that it is not open to the 9th respondent to deny the said arrangement. The other reason for not responding to contribute towards the increased share capital by the Khemkas and the 9th respondent is that as they have promoted a new company viz., Andhra Polymers Limited - hereinafter called ‘APPL’ and also joined in a joint venture company UMM-AL-QUWAIN Rubber Industries Limited In U.A.E, hereinafter called ‘URIL’ and as the 9th respondent has also joined hands with the petitioners, they are not interested in making any further contribution in ‘DEPL’ to increase their share-holding. The learned Counsel has also placed a copy of the agreement dated April 9, 1987 entered into between Mahesh Khemka on behalf of his family group with R.N Jalan (9th respondent) stating that in case the 9th respondent obtains more than Rs. 60/- per share of ‘DEPL’ from the third respondent, the respondent Khemka group shall be entitled to 25% of excess over Rs. 60/- per share and Khemka group shall extend support by pleading ignorance about issue of additional capital of ‘DEPL’ in 1985. This, according to the learned Counsel is the secret understanding by which the petitioners and the 9th respondent have colluded together to defraud the third respondent. Even earlier Mahesh Khemka who was representing ‘DEPL’ on the Board of ‘AIRL’ has entertained an idea to set up a rival joint venture foreign company, and accordingly, he wrote a letter to his father on January 4, 1982 stating that he has collected all formulations, technical process and information from ‘AIRL’ and that they need not agree for holding of shares in ‘DEPL’ as Mr. Robert I Aki has assured him of his full support to start a separate Rubber Company in India. This letter also clearly explains the design and intention of the petitioners to sever their links with ‘DEPL’. Summing up the above, the learned Counsel submits that even as early as in 1982, Mahesh Khemka writes to his father to come out of Jalan's shadow; the agreement of September, 1984 alloting ‘DEPL’ to the third respondent and his father as one group is in the hand writing of the ninth respondent himself and his father, the fourth respondent has also confimed the said understanding; the petitioners and the 9th respondent have come to a secret understanding to secure 60 rupees per share to 9th respondent in TJEPL' and the two letters dated January 16, 1985 and May 21, 1985 written by Mahesh Khemka to the 9th respondent and 9th respondent to his father respectively and the signatures there also are undisputed and even the hand writing of the 9th respondent on the settlement of September, 1984 is also not denied. Therefore, the learned Counsel submits that the earlier order based on certain incorrect, non-existing facts and when all the facts are not placed before the Court, the same would afford a good ground to review the said order. The learned Counsel has also pointed out that in C.A Nos. 9 and 10 of 1991 filed by respondent No. 9 seeking to restrain the 3rd respondent from representing ‘DEPL’ with the joint venture Company etc., the observation of a learned Single Judge of this Court that in view of the prima facie findings recorded by Justice Waghray and for the same reasoning, it will not be proper for the 3rd respondent to represent ‘DEPL’ on the Board of Directors of ‘AIRL’ is materially relevant in the context that notwithstanding the earlier interlocutory order passed by Justice M.N Rao in C.A No. 197 of 1987 dated October 14, 1987 permitting the 3rd respondent to represent DEPL in the foreign joint venture company, the learned Judge has refused to accord such permission in view of the changed circumstances viz., prima facie the findings recorded by Justice Waghray and therefore, this is an instance that the interim orders cannot be treated as final orders and they can be modified to suit the changed circumstances.

    11. Under Article 8 (1) of the Articles of Association of ‘AIRL’, the Company shall be managed by the Board of Directors not necessarily partners of the Company of not less than 3 and not more than 12 as may be determined by the joint meeting and as per the resoultion of the General Assembly one Indian partner must be represented on the Board. Mahesh Khemka has withdrawn from ‘AIRL’ on May 7, 1985 as per the Resolution No. 6/85 and the third respondent was elected for a period of three years. The third respondent by his efforts succeeded in convincing the committee of ‘ARIL’ to increase the dividend by extra half million to Indian Company - ‘DEPL’ and nothing is said against the 3rd respondent in view of his sincerity in not only floating a joint venture company, but he has also taken it across the Seas and the same is evident from the letter of ‘ARIL’ dated November 20, 1993 requesting the 3rd respondent to use his good offices to secure good orders from Gulf Atternity and AMRON Gulf. The letter written by the Board of Directors of ‘ARIL’ dated March 9, 1993 that the Interim Administrator-Mr. C.B Desai cannot be allowed to represent the Board of ‘ARIL’ and if the third respondent is not allowed to represent the Indian Company, ‘DEPL’ will go unrepresented in the next meeting and the minutes of the meeting of ‘ARIL’ Executive Committee of ‘ARIL’ dated November 29, 1993 shows that exports have decreased by 55 per cent during 1993 compared to the previous year and the same is likely to decrease by 74 per cent in 1994 on account of competition from ‘URIL’ - U.A.E which reduced the company's profitability considerably. Therefore, relying on these letters and proceedings, the learned Counsel submits that ‘DEPL’ is facing competition internally by ‘APPL’ and externally by ‘URIL’. Article 26 of the Articles of Association of ‘DEPL’ exactly prohibits such a practice by its share holders. As the petitioners have promoted ‘APPL’ and ‘URIL’, they have clearly acted in violation of the said Article. The learned Counsel has also pointed out the report filed by the Interim Administrator that there are no exports in 1991-92; there are also no imports from April 1, 1992; there are also no research and developmental work going on and the ‘DEPL’ has not far identified any new iterns; the prices of product manufactured by the Company have declined from 14.50 rupees in 1992 to Rs. 11.40 on account of steep competition and the company has suffered operational loss of Rs. 6.00 lakhs, but sustained due to the dividend received from the joint venture company, and therefore, it has shown out a net profit of Rs. 35.00 lakhs. The learned Interim Administrator states that being a practising Advocate, he is attending to the day to day management of the company to the extent possible by him. The learned Counsel therefore, submits that the Company requires independent management and the person like the third respondent who could take decisions and also implement the same with business zeal and interest could alone give a boost to the Company, and therefore, he suggests that aninterim committee to manage the affairs of the Company should be constituted consisting of the third respondent and his wife in addition to a representative on behalf of the petitioners and the 9th respondent together and two or three representatives including an auditor and a representative of the financing Bank etc., In view of these circumstances, he relies upon a decision reported in United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India 1981 2 SCC 766, and contends that prima facie case has been established and balance of convenience also lies in favour of the third respondent for appointment of a suitable committee for interim administration. He also relies upon another two decisions reported in Sivaramakrishnayya v. Kasiviswanadham AIR 1957 A.P 584. and in Lakshmamma v. M. jayaram AIR 1952 Mysore 114. in support of his contention that when once signature or thumb impression is admitted or proved on a document, the external tenor of the document must be prima facie accepted and the burden lies upon the person to establish under what circumstances he put his signature. The learned Counsel has also relied upon a decision reported in S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannalh 1994 1 SCC 1. and in Ramachandra G. Shinde v. State of Maharashtra 1993 4 SCC 216. and contends that any order obtained without disclosing the truth, by suppressing the true facts and on misrepresentation or order obtained by playing fraud can be reviewed at any subsequent stage.

    12. The learned Counsel has finally submitted that the agreement dated April 9, 1987 between R. Khemka and the 9th respondent, the letter dated April 14, 1987 of the 9th respondent confirming the said agreement, the letter of Mahesh Khemka dated January 4, 1982 to his father and the letter dated January 21, 1985 of the 9th respondent addressed to his father, as well as the letter dated January 16, 1985 of Mahesh Khemka addressed to the 9th respondent are all fresh material which substantially change the entire scenerio or the backdrop against which the earlier order was passed by Justice Waghray and therefore, it is eminently a fit case for making certain suitable modifications to the said order, or alternately make a suitable fresh order in the interest of justice. Even the agreement dated April 25, 1991 among the members of the Jalan family though filed before the Bench is O.S.A No. 3 of 1990 by the 8th respondent-father, the Court did not advert to it.

    13. Refuting these arguments, Sri K. Srinivasa Murthy, the learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 in this application, who are petitioners in the main Company Petition No. 27 of 1987, raised a preliminary objection that this application is not maintainable. According to the learned Counsel this application virtually seeking review of the order of Justice Waghray is not maintainable. According to the learned Counsel as the order of Justice Waghray was the subject matter of O.S.A, it is only the said Bench and since one of the Judges that constituted the Bench has retired, the remaining Judge alone is competent to hear this application. It is true, the prayer in this application, as has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondents, is to discharge the interim administrator and the assistant administrators and to restore the Board of Directors of ‘DEPL’ as existed on November 23, 1989 with O.P Jalan as the Managing Director. The learned Counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in K. Pushpa Leela v. Labour Court, Guntur 1992 1 APLJ 399., and submits that as Smt. Justice Amareswari has since retired, the remaining Judge Sri Justice Radhakrishna Rao, who formed the earlier Bench alone should hear this application and no other Judge has got jurisdiction to hear this application. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court considering the meaning of the expression “the Court which passed the decree or made the order” occurring in Section 37 C.P.C, and 114 C.P.C, and Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C, held that it means the Court of first instance only for purpose of execution of the decree or order, but for purposes of review, it is only the Appellate Court and not the Court of first instance. The Bombay High Court in Mallikarjun v. Suratram AIR 1971 Bombay 45. held that when an appeal is filed even though the same is dismissed, the trial Court decree would necessarily merge in the decree of the Appellate Court, with the result, the trial Court decree has no independent existence, apart from the appellate Court's decree. Therefore, an application for review of the decree has to be filed before the Appellate Court or the Revisional Court as the case may be. In a decision reported in Devaraju Pillai v. Sellayya Pillai. 1987 1 SCC 61, the Supreme Court has severely criticised interference of a Single Judge of the High Court in a review petition with the decree passed in Second Appeal by another learned Judge, since left the Court, as having totally exceeded his jurisdiction.

    14. The learned Counsel also contends that the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C, can be resorted to if no appeal has been preferred and since an appeal has been preferred in this case, the review petition is not maintainable and for this proposition, reliance is placed on a Judgment of a Single Judge of this Court reported in Sitaramasastry v. Sundammma AIR 1966 A.P 173.. The learned Counsel also submits that no order can be reviewed under Section 151 C.P.C, the inherent powers of the Court. In the face of specific provisions contained under Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C, no resort can be had to Section 151 C.P.C or analogous provisions contained under Rules 6 and 9 of Companies (Court) Rules, in the absence of a specific provision either in the Code of Civil Procedure or in the Companies Act. To substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on a Supreme Court decision reported in Ramkarandas v. Bliagwandas AIR 1965 SC 1144., wherein it is observed as follows:—

    “Rule 4 of Order 37 C.P.C expressly gives power to a Court to set aside a decree passed under the provisions of that Order. Express provision is thus made for setting aside a decree passed under Order 37 and hence if a case does not come within the provisions of that Rule, there is no scope to resort to Sec. 151 for setting aside such a decree.”

    15. In a decision reported in H.J Dorairaj v. V.R & Co. AIR 1973 Madras 135., a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that “it is well settled that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 151 C.P.C, cannot be resorted to when the aggrieved party has got exclusive remedy available under law”. In a decision reported in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal AIR 1962 SC 527., considering the issuance of a temporary injunction in the circumstances not governed by Order 39, or by any Rule made under the Code, the Supreme Court ruled that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunction in circumstances which are not governed by the provisions of Order 39 C.P.C, if the Court is of the opinion that the interest of Justice requires issuance of such interim injunction. It is further held that “question of issuing an order against a party restraining him from proceeding with another suit in a regularly constituted Court of law deserves great care and consideration and such an order is not to be made unless absolutely essential in the ends of Justice”.

    16. The decision reported in State Government v. M. Jeevraj & Co. AIR 1973 A.P 27., provides a precedent for resorting to Section 151 C.P.C, when the provisions of Section 144 C.P.C, cannot be made applicable for restitution of an order or decree passed not by a Civil Court, but by a Tribunal. In a decision reported in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993., the Supreme Court has laid down as follows:—

    “It is common ground that the inherent power of the Court cannot override the express provisions of the law. In other words if there are specific provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter the inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code. The prohibition contained in the Code need not be express but may be implied or be implicit from the very nature of the provisions that it makes for covering the contingencies to which it relates.”

    17. Therefore, Mr. Srinivasa Murthy, the learned Counsel for the respondents contends that in view of the specific provisions available under Rule 1 of Order 47 C.P.C, for review, in any form of modification of the order, resort cannot be had to the inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C

    18. Sri P. Chidambaram, the learned Senior Counsel for the applicants, countering these arguments submits that the applicants are not seeking review of the order of Justice Waghray, but in the light of the new material that has surfaced, it is necessary to make suitable modifications or adjustments to the earlier order without resorting to reviewing the said order since these modifications are necessary to suit the exigencies and the conditions as obtaining subsequently. Therefore, the learned Counsel submits that though in the application, a broad relief of review is sought for, the applicants are confining the relief to a limited extent viz., to supersede the Interim Administrator and appoint a Committee to carry on the day to day administration of the Company. In other words, the learned Senior Counsel does not insist on restoration of the Board of Directors as it is, but to alter the set up of Interim Administration. In my view, in whatever way a modification or alteration or interference with the order passed earlier by this Court is sought for, it would amount to reviewing the said order. In this case it is not a mere clerical or arithmetical mistake that has crept in from out of an accidental slip or omission which can be corrected at any time. The main thrust of the argument of the learned Counsel for the Applicants, is that on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record due to misstatements of fact recognized by the Court or on account of omission to advert to certain material and relevant evidence and in view of the fact that certain fresh material has now surfaced, the order passed earlier requires modification and correction. This relief is exactly what is contemplated by Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that the relief sought for in this application can be granted only by resorting to provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C Under these circumstances, I cannot accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the Applicants that the relief can be granted under Section 151 C.P.C, or under analogous provisions contained under Rules 6 and 9 of Companies (Court) Rules; inasmuch as there is a specific provision available under C.P.C As I have taken the view that it is only a review petition that is maintainable under Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C, it necessarily follows in view of the aforesaid discussion of the relevant case law, I have no jurisdiction to entertain the review petition since I am not a member of the Bench that has disposed of the appeal against the order of Justice Waghray who has since retired. On both the counts, as mentioned above, the Application as filed, is not maintainable.

    19. Sri K. Srinivasa Murthy, the learned Counsel for the respondents, opposing this application submits that even on merits there are no grounds to review the order of Justice Waghray. The learned Counsel has invited my attention to the observations of the Bench in O.S.A No. 8 of 1992 to the effect that “the decision directing appointment of an Interim Administrator in supersession of the Board of Directors to manage the affairs of M/s. Deccan Enterprises Private Limited, pending disposal of the Company Petition No. 27 of 1987 has become final”. It is also pointed out about the further observation of the bench which is as follows:—

    “We have to bear in mind that in view of the order passed by Justice Upendralal Waghray directing appointment of Interim Administrator in supersession of the Board of Directors to manage the affairs of the company which has become final, the affairs of the Company have to be managed, pending disposal of the Company Petition, only by an interim Administrator appointed by this Court.”

    20. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the order cannot be interfered with except under a properly constituted Review Petition before the Court competent to hear the same.

    21. Disputing the letter dated January 21, 1985 alleged to have been written by the 9th respondent (R.N Jalan), it is commented by the learned Counsel that the letter was not produced by the father-S.K Jalan, to whom it was addressed although he filed an appeal in O.S.A No. 3 of 1990 as well as Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court. The father of R.N Jalan also filed an affidavit in Calcutta High Court on June 8, 1985 with several details, but curiously no mention was made about this letter. The so called letter addressed by Mahesh Khemka is on letter pad at Dammam, Saudi Arabia and it is strange that he should have used the letter pad of Saudi Arabia even though he had left Dammam three years before. The learned Counsel has also criticised the agreement dated April 9, 1987 which is signed by Mahesh Khemka alone on a stamped paper purchased eight years ago i.e, on March 17, 1979 and there is also no signature of the 9th respondent - R.N Jalan, but peculiarly R.N Jalan is alleged to have confirmed the agreement by a separate letter dated April 14, 1987 when both of them were at Hyderabad only. According to the learned Counsel this is a strange way of entering into an agreement inferably an old stamped paper and he signed leaves of letter pad of R.N Jalan are pressed into service for this purpose. Even the letter dated January 4, 1992 alleged to have been written by Mahesh Khemka contains only one million Rials as the capital of the company, while in fact, it should be 2 million Rials. Therefore, inferably an old leaf in the letter pad was made use of for typing this letter. Although O.???. Jalan filed number of affidavits in this Court, this letter has not seen the light of the day. In fact, Mahesh Khemka who is examined in the Company Petition as P.W 1 has denied these documents. So, when these documents are disputed, no reliance can be placed on these documents at this stage. Placing reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court reported in Ehirajulu Naidu v. K.R.C Chettiar AIR 1975 Madras 333., it is contended that “the execution of a document implies independent and conscious appreciation of the contents thereof, all facts connected there with and where the defendant admitted only that he had put his signature on a blank piece of paper which he alleged had possibly been utilised for fabricating Ex.A-1, it cannot be regarded as his having admitted execution of Ex.A-1”. For the same proposition he relies upon a decision reported in Ramadhin v. Siaram AIR 1957 Patna 64. to show that onus of proving that a particular document was duly executed by the defendant under those circumstances, should be upon the plaintiff only. To a sumilar effect is the decision reported in S. Mammad v. K. Mammad AIR 1957 Kerala 63..

    22. The learned Counsel for the respondents has also canvassed that the review petition cannot be entertained unless “where a glaring omission or a patent mistake or law, gross error has crept in earlier by a judicial fallibility, as reiterated by the Supreme Court in a decision reported in Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor, Delhi 1980 2 SCC 167. The learned Counsel has cited a decision of the Madras High Court reported in Ramaswami Padayachi v. Shanmuga Padayachi 1959 II M.L.N 201., in support of his contention that unless the new facts are of reliable nature, review of the order cannot be entertained. In a decision reported in Collector of 24 Parganas v. Lalith Mohan Muliick 1988 Supp SCC 578, it was expressed by the Supreme Court that where new facts involving investigation are alleged, review cannot be considered. A decision reported in Chandrakant v. Shripad AIR 1989 Bombay 91. of Bombay High Court, is cited to show that a decision cannot be reviewed merely because it is an erroneous one. The learned Counsel has also placed reliance on a decision reported in Shatrunjit v. Md. A. Azim Khan 1971 2 SCC 200 wherein the expression “any other sufficient reason occurring in Order 47 of the Code would only mean a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those specified immediately preceding in that order”. Even in a decision reported in M.M.B Catholicos v. M.P Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526., the words “any other sufficient reason” as incorporated by the judicial committee, must only mean a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those specified in Rule has been approved. The learned Counsel for the respondents submits that there are no sufficient grounds to review the earlier order in accordance with law.

    23. In the appeal filed by the father, if these documents had been filed, before the Division Bench, the Division Bench would have considered them. Without doing so, there is no justification to seek review of the order by filing these disputed documents along with this application. If really, O.P Jalan has got the necessary dynamism to take the company to prosperity, nothing prevents him to do so, while assisting the Interim Administrator as he is one of the Assistant Administrators. The enthusiasm, the zeal and the interest he has got can equally be employed as an Assistant Administrator for the benefit of the Company. According to the learned Cousnel for the respondents, the very same contentions were advanced before Justice Waghray as well as before the Bench while hearing the Application and appeals and as the said argument was not found favour, interim Administrator is appointed since prima facie it is established that he has abused his fiduciary capacity and manipulated records etc.

    24. Finally, the learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the Company Petition itself was part heard; one witness - Mahesh Khemka, was examined in full; three witnesses have filed affidavits and they are ready to make available themselves for cross-examination at any time and at this stage, it is not open to the applicants to seek for modification of the earlier orders.

    25. Sri S. Ravi, the learned Counsel appearing for R.N Jalan has submitted that the issuance of additional shares of Rs. 5.00 lakhs is only a make-believe affair and even the nominal fee payable to the Registrar of Companies which would be paid within a period of one month was not paid on the transfer of shares, but it was only paid in September, 1985. Notices which are supposed to have been sent to the share holders about the increase of share capital bear the postal stamp of Sanjeevareddy Nagar Post Office while the Office is situated at Secunderabad; when Deccan Enterprises Private Limited is flourishing with bumper profits, it is unimaginable why Khemkas have missed to take advantage of increasing their share-holding.

    26. According to the learned Counsel, his client-R.N Jalan, questioned the action of O.P Jalan by his letter dated October 29, 1985 and the reply given by Mr. O.P Jalan on November 8, 1985 is silent regarding several allegations made by his client, except stating that for the rest he would depend upont he records of the Company. Even the first applicant-R. Khemka also addressed a similar letter dated December 17, 1985 to O.P Jalan as Managing Director of ‘DEPL’ and asked him to send every communication by registered post and for that purpose a sum of Rs. 100/- was also sent to cover the postage etc. For that on January 16, 1986 a reply was given by Mr. O.P Jalan only to the effect that in view of negotiations to resolve various pending matters, he is not dealing further with those matters. These circumstances, according to the learned Counsel clearly establish manipulation of books of account including meeting notices and manoeuvring the share holding so as to secure over all control of the company resulting in oppression of the other share holders and thus betraying the fiduciary relationship and therefore, no grounds are made out for interference.

    27. I shall now proceed to consider the merits of the review application on the assumption that I have power to entertain this application. As the documents on the basis of which this review application is filed are disputed, it is not possible for me at this stage to base my order on those documents. The truth or genuineness of those documents can be decided only during the trial, when both parties will have ample opportunity to explain the circumstances under which they are signed, executed or disputed. As already noticed in a decision reported in Collector of 24 Parganas v. Lalith Mohan Mullick (24 supra), disputed documents cannot form basis for review. In this case P.W.I was already examined in full; three more witnesses filed affidavits and are available for cross-examination. In view of the present situation, it would not take long time for disposal of the Company Petition as its trial can be taken up day to day. If both parties had sincerely concentrated on the trial of the Company Petition, it would have been disposed of in less than half the time spent on several interlocutory applications filed till now. I have referred to some of the applications filed in the Company Petition and orders thereon at the threshold of this order to show the nature of the applications and elaborate pleadings and arguments with meticulous details at great precision placed before the Court only to show the amount of time spent by the parties on those applications. In the main Company Petition the dispute is about the allotment of shares in the year 1985. All other issues revole round this main issue viz., the validity of the issue of shares. Most of the documents on which the parties are relying in support of their respective contentions have been either filed or disclosed and they are before the Court. Remaining witnesses have to be examined either to prove the documents or for their denial. Hence, it should not take much time now as was the case in the year 1990 when the Bench obsered “that the Company Petition is likely to take a long time”. According to me the best and simple course for the parties is to proceed with the trial with right earnestness and complete the trial expeditiously. The evidence of P.W 1 was already recorded by my learned brother - Dasaradarami Reddy, J. Under these circumstances, as I do not find that there is any imminent urgency to alter the present set up by reconstituting the machinery for interim administration, I am not interfering with the same. This conclusion of mine is reached since I am of the opinion that it may not be proper for me to go into the acceptability or otherwise of the documents filed by the applicants at this stage and express any opinion on them. As the trial had already commenced, it would be appropriate to consider the genuineness, relevancy, admissibility and the probate value of those documents during the course of trial.

    28. As already stated though the learned Counsel for the applicants herein has depicted a very gloomy picture of the company in view of the report of the Interim Administrator, or letter from ‘ARIL’, Sri K. Srinivasa Murthy, the learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand sees a rosy picture of the Company and states that during 1993-94 the rail pad despatches have nearly doubled when compared to previous year which touched 6 crores and so considering the production capacity of the company, these figures show that the company is over booked with orders and orders is no problem. Whatever be the degree of improvement, there seems to be a slight swing towards better side during 1993-94. I may make it clear that I am not embarking on a discussion whether the Interim Administrator is able to give the necessary boost to the Company, but I am only considering whether there is immediate need to interfere with the present interim administrative set up or in otherwords whether the urgency is such that it cannot brook a short delay of 3 or 4 months which may take for disposal of the main Company petition. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that there is immediate necessity to interfere with the interim arrangement at this stage.

    29. For the above reasons, the Company Application fails as it is devoid of merits and is accordingly, dismissed, but without costs.

    Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C,

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    O.P. Jalan v. Deccan Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.
    (Apr 28, 1994)