Kishori Lal Agarwal v. Ram Chandra Sindhi And Another

1. This appeal is directed against the verdict of acquittal dated 9-3-1981, passed by the then Vth, Addl. Sessions Judge, Jhansi whereby the accused respondent Ram Chandra Singh's Criminal Appeal No. 112/79 was allowed after setting aside the judgment of conviction dated 30-6-1979, passed by Shri R.S Maurya, Munsif Magistrate, Jhansi and thereby he was acquitted.

2. Permission to prefer the appeal was allowed by this Court vide its order of May 18, 1980.

3. In brief, the facts giving rise to this appeal may be recapitulated as below:—

4. The appellant/complainant Kishori Lal Agarwal filed a complaint in the Court of the then Munsif Magistrate 1st Class (Court No. 4), Jhansi in the year 1979 with the allegations that he was the owner of house No. 217 situated in Mohalla Gardhuria Ganj in the town of Mauranipur. The respondent No. 1.accused Shri Ram Chandra Sindhi was the tenant of the first floor of the two rooms apartment of the said house. On 14-12-1978, he had illegally occupied one room of the said house at the same floor located towards south of the staircase and in spite of the complainant's request to vacate the said room, he continued to be in unauthorized possession thereof and thereby committed an offence of house trespass punishable under Section 448, IPC. Shri Ram Chandra Sindhi denied the complainant's version and pleaded that he was falsely implicated in this case on account of animosity. As a matter of fact, there were four rooms at the first floor of the aforesaid house and he was tenant of the entire first floor comprising all the four rooms, for the last 15 years. The complainant on the occasion of the marriage of his sister requested him to provide temporary possession of one room. Since the complainant's temporary need was genuine, he allowed him to use for a few days one of four rooms. The remaining three rooms continued to be in his lawful possession. Even after the marriage of his sister, the complainant did not vacate the room he had taken possession of, with the permission of the accused and in this way, he himself committed an illegal act of continuing in an unlawful and unauthorized possession of the said room.

5. The prosecution examined four witnesses in support of his case while the accused examined Ram Narain as the lone witness in his defence. The prosecution witnesses supported the complainant's theory of the accused having entered in unlawful possession of the room in question.

6. On having scrutinized the prosecution as well as the defence evidence led in support of their respective versions by the parties, the Munsif Magistrate, Jhansi arrived at a conclusion that the complainant had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused under Section 448, IPC. On the basis of the said conclusion, the Munsif Magistrate recorded a verdict of conviction of the accused under the aforesaid section but instead of sentencing him to imprisonment, extended the benefit of Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Probation of First Offenders Act and released him with a command of admonition. The accused having felt aggrieved of the said conviction, filed a Criminal Appeal No. 112/79 which was allowed by the Vth Addl. Sessions Judge, Jhansi. The judgment and order of conviction as also the admonition was set aside and the accused was held not guilty and accordingly he was acquitted of the charge under Section 448, IPC. Learned Sessions Judge arrived at a finding that the evidence of the complainant and his witnesses was not worthy by credit and therefore, the charge of criminal trespass was not made out against the accused. Learned Sessions Judge has also recorded a finding of there being a lacuna in the charge. As no specific date in the notice sent to the accused for vacation of the room in question was mentioned, compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 441, IPC was held to be not fulfilled. On the basis of this technical defect and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses being inconsistent and unworthy of credence, learned Sessions Judge held that accused not guilty under Section 448, IPC and thereby recorded a verdict of acquittal.

7. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record.

8. The first question which arises for determination, as pointed out on behalf of the State, is as to whether the appeal filed before the learned Sessions Judge against the verdict of conviction and admonition was appealable or not. It was submitted on be half of the complainant that the appeal No. 112/79 filed by the accused in the Court of Sessions was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 376, Cr. P.C A perusal of the said section would reveal that no appeal by a convicted person shall lie where a Magistrate of the First Class passes only a sentence of fine not exceeding 100 rupees. In the case in hand, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, no doubt, held the accused guilty but did not pass any sentence either of imprisonment or of fine. He was simply admonished under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Therefore, in view of the legal provisions of the aforesaid section, the appeal filed by the accused in the Court of Sessions was incompetent and, as such, the judgment of the Court of Vth Addl. Sessions Judge is a nullity. The contention is devoid of merit. Section 376 does not expressly cut down the right of appeal given to convicted persons and therefore, unless it can be held that an admonition amounts to the imposition of a fine or a sentence within the maximum limit indicated in the section, the provisions of the said section would not be attracted. A careful thought on the verdict and the sentence of admonition or release on probation of good conduct would reveal that the same cannot be equated with a sentence. As a matter of fact, when a person is released on probation of good conduct, no sentence in the first instance is imposed on him but what is significant to note is that there is a liability upon him to appear and receive a sentence during the period of probation. Such an accused can on violation of the terms of probation be called upon to serve a sentence as may be imposed by the Court concerned. Admonition cannot be termed to be a synonym of fine as a person released on admonition is under no liability to pay any amount. This view is fortified from the principle of law laid down in, “Sheo Narain Tandon v. The State, 1959 Cri LJ 677 (All), whereby it was held that no doubt by giving a convicted person who has been released on probation the right to appeal he is placed in a more favoured position than a convicted person, who has been sentenced to punishment falling within the limits of Section 413 of the Old Criminal Procedure Code but it is no reason denying the right of appeal to the persons convicted but let off on admonition so that they may not be in more favourable position. The basis for this distinction is obvious and as indicated above, it is that such a convicted person and released after admonition will be subject to the sentence of imprisonment or of fine during the tenure of his probation, on being called by a Court for violation of the terms of probation. If such a convicted person is called during the tenure of probation and sentenced to an imprisonment for a specific term, he may at that stage not be legally entitled to file an appeal against the verdict of conviction. It is in view of this idea that the appeal would be maintainable. Therefore, the appellant/complainant's contention that the Criminal Appeal No. 112 of 1979 file by Ram Chandra in the Court of Sessions was incompetent is rejected as being not sustainable.

9. Now, coming to the other aspect of the matter, it may be observed that the complainant failed to establish beyond doubt his version of the accused having committed the offence of criminal trespass. The finding of the Addl. Sessions Judge that there were major inconsistencies on the issue of illegal possession are substantiated from the record. It was not the complainant's version that the accused had broken up the lock of the room in question. He has denied in his evidence the factum of any lock being there on the door of the room and since there was no lock, question of its having been broken by the accused would not have arisen. However, all the three witnesses, namely Ram Charan Gautam, Moti Lal and Rajley testified about the breaking of the lock. Otherwise also, the evidence of these witnesses did not inspire confidence as all of them were the chance witnesses. Ram Charan Gautam was a resident of village Gaduwa and the distance of that village from the place of occurrence is nine miles. There was no occasion for him to have gone upstairs and seen the accused grabbing over the room in question. It was a coincidence for Moti Lal also to have visited that place for the first time on the date of occurrence during last fifteen years from then. He had no idea about the tenancy of the disputed room. The third witness Rajley was not cited in the list of witnesses filed along with the complaint and on the basis of this omission alone, his evidence can be brushed aside to be as concocted and manufactured. The complainant himself was not present at the first floor of his house at the time when the accused was alleged to have taken illegal possession of the room. From the notices exchanged between the complainant and the accused, it appears that initially the accused was in occupation of four rooms as tenant and he vacated for a short-term one of the said rooms with a view to provide it to the complainant on the occasion of his sister's marriage. Even after the marriage was over, the complainant declined to deliver the possession of that room to the accused and this led to a civil litigation. The accused served the complainant with a notice dated 8-9-1975 reciting therein the aforesaid facts thereby requested him to hand over possession of the said room within seven days. The theory of the accused being tenant of four rooms is established from the evidence of D.W 1 Ram Narain. He was a teacher by profession and he used to come to the house of the accused with a view to teach his children. As he stood the test of cross-examination remarkably well, his evidence was found to be trustworthy. Learned Court below also relied upon his testimony. None of the parties brought to the notice of this Court at the time of arguments as to what was the result of the civil litigation or the same is still pending. However, the fact remains that the complainant failed to establish beyond doubt that the accused committed criminal trespass on 14-12-1978 by taking unauthorized possession of a room. The notice Ext. Ka-1 sent by the complainant to the accused having no specific date/time to vacate the room in question was illegal. The learned Court below has rightly held that if a specific date is not specified in the notice, compliance of the provisions of Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code as amended by U.P Criminal Laws (Amendment Act), 1961 will be lacking. It has, therefore, rightly been observed that the notice served upon the accused was invalid. So, from this legal angle also, the offence under Section 448, IPC was hot made out against the accused.

10. Keeping all the aspects of the matter in view, I am of the decisive opinion that the learned Vth Addl. Sessions Judge, Jhansi has rightly held the accused not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 448, IPC. In the result, this appeal filed by the complainant being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed.

11. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

12. Appeal dismissed.