Accrual and Tolling of §1983 Procedural Due Process Claims in Public Employment: Commentary on Bozzo v. Nanasy (6th Cir. 2025)

Accrual and Tolling of §1983 Procedural Due Process Claims in Public Employment: Commentary on Bozzo v. Nanasy (6th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

Charles Bozzo v. Jennifer Nanasy, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on November 26, 2025, is a precedential decision clarifying when a § 1983 procedural due process claim arising from public employment termination accrues and how state limitations and tolling rules apply—particularly under Michigan law. It also reaffirms what pre- and post-termination procedures satisfy the Due Process Clause when a public employee is discharged and then proceeds through union arbitration.

The plaintiff, Charles Bozzo, a former Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) correctional officer, alleged that MDOC officials violated his constitutional rights when they terminated his employment after coworker complaints of lewd and harassing comments. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of multiple constitutional amendments, but ultimately pursued only a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process theory on appeal.

The Sixth Circuit, in a published opinion by Judge Readler (joined by Judges Thapar and Hermandorfer), affirmed dismissal of Bozzo’s complaint on two independent grounds:

  • The claim was untimely under Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury, as borrowed for § 1983 actions.
  • Even if timely, the complaint failed to state a viable procedural due process claim.

The decision is significant in three main respects:

  1. It applies the Supreme Court’s framework in Reed v. Goertz to determine accrual of procedural due process claims outside the criminal/DNA-testing context.
  2. It emphasizes that for Michigan-based § 1983 actions, courts must apply Michigan’s strict statutory tolling scheme, which leaves no room for common-law equitable tolling of the three-year period under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2).
  3. It reinforces that ordinary union arbitration procedures, absent specific procedural defects or credible allegations of bias, satisfy due process for terminated public employees.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Employment and Termination

  • Bozzo worked intermittently as a correctional officer for MDOC starting in 2013.
  • He developed “bad blood” with a coworker (Jane Doe) with whom he had previously carpooled.
  • In 2017, Doe reported Bozzo for lewd and obscene comments during their car rides.
  • She later reported other misconduct, and Bozzo allegedly responded by directing “obscenities” toward her in conversations with fellow officers. When those remarks reached Doe, she reported that conduct as well.

On June 19, 2019, MDOC served Bozzo with a formal misconduct charge summarizing Doe’s allegations and citing the MDOC rules implicated by his alleged conduct.

Five days later, MDOC held a disciplinary conference attended by Bozzo and his union representative. Bozzo characterizes the conference as “brief,” essentially consisting of a short statement by the representative regarding Bozzo’s employment and the charges.

MDOC notified Bozzo by letter, dated July 31, 2019, that his employment was terminated. This date is critical for identifying the timing of the alleged “deprivation” of his property interest in employment.

B. Arbitration

Pursuant to his collective bargaining agreement, Bozzo invoked his right to arbitration:

  • A three-day arbitration hearing concluded on December 17, 2020.
  • At the hearing, MDOC Discipline Coordinator Jennifer Nanasy testified that MDOC applied recently updated, stricter harassment policies to Bozzo’s case.
  • Bozzo later alleged that he was “set up” through “surprise” testimony at the hearing, that MDOC used subjective and new policies, and that the arbitrator relied on “falsehoods” and derived “significant income” from MDOC arbitrations, suggesting bias.
  • On March 1, 2021, the arbitrator issued a decision in MDOC’s favor.

C. Federal Litigation

The procedural history is essential to the limitations analysis:

  • December 18, 2023: Bozzo filed his first federal complaint in the Western District of Michigan, asserting § 1983 claims against Nanasy and MDOC Director Heidi Washington and invoking multiple constitutional amendments (First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth).
  • He focused on alleged unfairness in the arbitration process and arbitral bias.
  • Bozzo failed to respond to defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion; the district court dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution.
  • June 14, 2024: Bozzo refiled substantially the same complaint.
  • Defendants again moved to dismiss. This time the court dismissed with prejudice, finding:
    • The claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
    • Bozzo had forfeited all constitutional theories except procedural due process, and that surviving theory failed to state a claim.
  • On appeal, Bozzo pursued only his procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in a two-step analysis:

  1. Statute of Limitations. Applying Michigan’s three-year limitations period for personal injury actions (Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2)) to Bozzo’s § 1983 claim, the court held:
    • Under federal accrual rules, Bozzo’s procedural due process claim accrued, at the latest, on December 17, 2020, the last day of the arbitration hearing, when both elements of his claim—deprivation of a protected interest and inadequate process—had allegedly occurred.
    • Bozzo’s June 14, 2024 refiling therefore fell outside the three-year period, even factoring in statutory tolling during the pendency of his first lawsuit (December 18, 2023–May 8, 2024).
    • Equitable tolling is unavailable under Michigan’s statute and, even under federal equitable tolling principles, Bozzo could not show diligence or compelling equitable circumstances.
    • His attempt to toll the limitations period based on exhaustion of “administrative remedies” failed; non-prisoner § 1983 plaintiffs are not required to exhaust and do not get tolling for doing so.
  2. Failure to State a Procedural Due Process Claim. Even assuming timeliness, the court held that Bozzo failed to plausibly allege “inadequate state process”:
    • Pre-termination: MDOC provided written notice of charges, an explanation of the rules violated, and a disciplinary conference at which Bozzo and his union representative could respond. Under Loudermill and its progeny, this minimal pre-termination “check against mistaken decisions” satisfied due process.
    • Post-termination: A three-day arbitration before a neutral arbitrator, with representation, opportunity to call witnesses, present evidence, and challenge adverse evidence, complied with due process standards. Bozzo’s allegations of a “surprise” witness and arbitrator bias (based on repeat MDOC work and alleged reliance on “falsehoods” and “evolving standards”) were deemed insufficient and amounted merely to dissatisfaction with the outcome rather than a challenge to the fairness of the process itself.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

1. Accrual of § 1983 Claims

Two key strands of Supreme Court authority frame accrual of § 1983 claims:

  • Occurrence-based rule – Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007), and Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997), hold that a federal claim accrues when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action.”
  • Procedural due process accrual – Reed v. Goertz, 143 S. Ct. 955 (2023), interpreting accrual for a § 1983 procedural due process challenge to state post-conviction DNA procedures, held that such a claim is “complete” only once:
    1. there is a deprivation of a protected life, liberty, or property interest; and
    2. state process is allegedly inadequate.
    The claim accrues when both elements have occurred.

The Sixth Circuit also notes its own “discovery rule” line of cases, under which a § 1983 claim accrues when a plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” See Johnson v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005)). The panel candidly acknowledges tension between this discovery rule and the Supreme Court’s occurrence-based rule, a conflict previously highlighted by:

  • Judge Murphy’s concurrence in Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 885 (6th Cir. 2024) (per curiam), and
  • Judge Readler’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State University, 54 F.4th 963, 974 (6th Cir. 2022).

Still, the panel declines to resolve that conflict because both parties assume the discovery rule applies, and under the “party presentation principle” articulated in United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020), the court decides the case as framed by the parties.

2. Statute of Limitations and Tolling in § 1983 Actions

For § 1983 claims, courts borrow the state’s statute of limitations and associated tolling rules unless inconsistent with federal law. See:

  • Eidson v. Tennessee Department of Children's Services, 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007) (borrowing state personal injury limitations periods).
  • Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), and Rapp v. Putnam, 644 F. App’x 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2016), applying Michigan’s three-year personal injury limitations period to § 1983 claims.
  • Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980), endorsing application of state tolling rules to § 1983 unless they conflict with federal policies.

In Michigan:

  • Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the Sixth Circuit applies to Bozzo’s § 1983 claim.
  • Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5856 provides for statutory tolling when an action is commenced and during its pendency, among other circumstances.
  • Michigan’s Supreme Court has rejected judge-made equitable tolling where the legislature has specified limitations periods:
    • Trentadue v. Buckler Lawn Sprinkler, 738 N.W.2d 664, 679–80 (Mich. 2007) (“courts are [not] free to cast aside a plain statute in the name of equity”).
    • Devillers v. Auto Club Insurance Association, 702 N.W.2d 539, 556–57 (Mich. 2005).
    • Secura Insurance Co. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 605 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Mich. 2000) (per curiam).

The Sixth Circuit recently reaffirmed this regime in Heard v. Strange, 127 F.4th 630, 633–34 (6th Cir. 2025), emphasizing that Michigan law does not provide for common-law equitable tolling of express limitations periods like § 600.5805(2).

Even under federal equitable tolling standards—available only “sparingly”—a plaintiff must show diligence and extraordinary circumstances beyond their control. See:

  • Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2000) (no extension “by even a single day” absent compelling equitable considerations).
  • Zappone v. United States, 870 F.3d 551, 556–57 (6th Cir. 2017).
  • Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 599 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (rejecting “stop-clock” approach).
  • Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 1990) (no automatic extension equal to tolling period).

3. Procedural Due Process in Public Employment

The central substantive framework comes from:

  • Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985): Public employees with a protected property interest in continued employment (e.g., terminable only for cause) are entitled to:
    • Pre-termination: notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to respond—essentially a modest “initial check against mistaken decisions.”
    • Post-termination: a more robust procedure, such as a full evidentiary hearing or equivalent, before a neutral decision-maker.
  • Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929 (1997): summarizes the Loudermill minimum:
    1. oral or written notice of the charges,
    2. an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and
    3. an opportunity for the employee to tell his side of the story.
  • Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 596–97 (6th Cir. 2004): reaffirms that union grievance and arbitration procedures can satisfy post-termination due process, and distinguishes dissatisfaction with the outcome from a defect in process.
  • Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491, 495–97 (6th Cir. 1990): a relatively informal pre-termination conversation sufficed as a “Loudermill hearing” when the employee received allegations and had a chance to respond with a union representative present.
  • Rodgers v. 36th District Court, 529 F. App’x 642, 649 (6th Cir. 2013): elaborates the minimum procedural guarantees for post-termination hearings (attendance, counsel, right to call witnesses, present evidence, and challenge adverse evidence), quoting Carter v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center, 767 F.2d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).

The opinion also draws on American Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 839 F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2016), and Nasierowski Bros. Investment Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1991), to emphasize that in procedural due process cases, the “injury” is the defective process itself, not necessarily the ultimate substantive decision.

4. Exhaustion and § 1983

With respect to exhaustion, the court relies on:

  • Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019): reiterates that state exhaustion is not a prerequisite to § 1983 actions, except where Congress has specifically imposed such a requirement.
  • Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982): longstanding rule that § 1983 plaintiffs generally need not exhaust state administrative remedies.
  • 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a): the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) exception, requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing § 1983 claims related to prison conditions; some circuits (including the Sixth) recognize tolling of limitations while prisoners exhaust these mandatory remedies.

Because Bozzo is not a prisoner and § 1983 does not require him to exhaust, his voluntary pursuit of arbitration does not toll the statute of limitations.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Accrual of Bozzo’s Procedural Due Process Claim

A procedural due process claim under § 1983 has two elements:

  1. State action depriving the plaintiff of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property; and
  2. Inadequate state process surrounding that deprivation.

Following Reed v. Goertz and Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990), the Sixth Circuit holds that Bozzo’s claim became “complete and present” once both the deprivation (termination) and the alleged procedural defects had occurred. The opinion carefully identifies when each element occurred:

  • Deprivation: Bozzo’s public employment was terminated on July 31, 2019. That date marks the loss of his protected property interest.
  • Allegedly inadequate process: Bozzo claims:
    • Improper handling of Doe’s complaints and inadequate pre-termination procedures (as early as June 24, 2019, the date of the disciplinary conference).
    • Continuing procedural deficiencies during the arbitration process, which concluded on December 17, 2020.

Because Bozzo alleges deficiencies both pre- and post-termination, the panel adopts the last date of the alleged denial of process—December 17, 2020—as the accrual date most favorable to the plaintiff. By that date:

  • His employment had already been terminated (the deprivation), and
  • All claimed defects in process, including those at the arbitration hearing, had occurred.

Thus, under federal accrual principles, Bozzo’s procedural due process claim accrued no later than December 17, 2020.

2. Rejection of Bozzo’s “Discovery Rule” Argument

Bozzo argued that his claim accrued only when he “fully realized” that he was not afforded a fair process—specifically, on March 1, 2021, when the arbitrator issued an adverse decision. He invoked the Sixth Circuit’s discovery rule, which ties accrual to when a plaintiff knows or should know of his “injury.”

The panel rejects this contention on two grounds:

  1. It clarifies that in procedural due process claims, the “injury” is the allegedly defective process itself.
    “[T]he ‘injury’ in a procedural due process claim is the ‘infirm process’ that accompanies a deprivation.” (citing American Premier Underwriters and Nasierowski).
    Bozzo was aware of the alleged procedural defects as they occurred—during the disciplinary conference, during his termination, and during the arbitration hearing (e.g., the “surprise” witness, the arbitrator’s MDOC caseload, the application of new disciplinary policies). Thus, under the discovery rule, he had reason to know of the injury no later than the last day of the arbitration hearing.
  2. To the extent Bozzo complains about the arbitrator’s adverse decision itself, that complaint goes to the outcome, not the process:
    “[T]o the extent Bozzo’s allegations could be construed as criticizing the decision that followed, that amounts to ‘dissatisf[action] with the result,’ not the process.” (quoting Farhat).
    Dissatisfaction with the result does not reset the accrual date for a procedural due process claim.

Accordingly, whether the court applies an occurrence-based or discovery-based framework, the accrual date remains December 17, 2020.

3. Application of the Michigan Three-Year Limitations Period and Statutory Tolling

With accrual on December 17, 2020 and a three-year limitations period under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2), the limitations period expired on December 17, 2023, subject to any tolling.

Bozzo filed:

  • First suit: December 18, 2023—one day after the nominal expiration date.

However, the court effectively assumes (favorable to Bozzo) that the claim was still within the limitations period when he filed the first complaint and focuses instead on what happened afterward. Under Michigan statutory tolling:

  • The first federal lawsuit tolled the limitations period while it was pending. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5856; Heard v. Strange, 127 F.4th at 633.
  • That tolling ceased when the district court dismissed the first lawsuit without prejudice on May 8, 2024.

Because dismissal without prejudice does not restart the limitations period, whatever time remained on the limitations clock resumed running on May 8, 2024. Bozzo waited until June 14, 2024 to refile, and by then the three-year period had expired. The court therefore finds his refiled complaint “untimely on its face.” See Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (statute of limitations is an appropriate ground for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal when the complaint shows it is time-barred).

4. Rejection of Equitable Tolling

Bozzo sought to avoid the limitations bar by invoking equitable tolling. He faced two hurdles:

  1. State law bar on equitable tolling. Because § 1983 borrows state tolling rules unless incompatible with federal law:
    • Michigan does not permit common-law equitable tolling of express statutory limitations periods like § 600.5805(2). (Trentadue, Devillers, Secura).
    • The Sixth Circuit finds no conflict between this Michigan rule and federal § 1983 policy, relying on Tomanio.
    • Accordingly, equitable tolling is not available under Michigan law for this claim.
  2. Failure under federal equitable tolling standards. Even if federal equitable tolling could apply in some circumstances, Bozzo:
    • Identified no “compelling equitable considerations” explaining why he could not file on time.
    • Waited nearly three years after the arbitrator’s decision to file his first suit, negating any claim of diligence.
    • Would therefore be foreclosed from equitable tolling even under federal standards, which require “reasonable diligence.”

5. Exhaustion-Based Tolling Rejected

Bozzo argued that by exhausting his “administrative remedies” he tolled the limitations period. The court finds:

  • He did not clearly identify any specific administrative exhaustion beyond contractual arbitration.
  • More fundamentally, non-prisoner § 1983 plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit. (Knick; Patsy).
  • Only prisoners, who are statutorily required to exhaust under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), receive tolling on that basis.

Voluntary pursuit of grievance or arbitration procedures, without a statutory exhaustion mandate, does not toll the § 1983 limitations period.

C. The Merits: Adequacy of Process

Although the limitations holding is sufficient to affirm, the panel proceeds to address the merits and agrees with the district court that Bozzo fails to state a procedural due process claim.

1. Protected Property Interest

The parties agree—and the court assumes—that Bozzo had a protected property interest in his continued public employment with MDOC. Under Loudermill, public employees terminable for cause generally have such an interest.

2. Pre-termination Process

The question is whether MDOC provided the minimal pre-termination procedures required by Loudermill and Gilbert. The court finds that it did:

  • Notice of charges: MDOC served Bozzo with a written misconduct charge on June 19, 2019, summarizing the allegations and identifying the rules violated.
  • Explanation of evidence: The charge itself informed Bozzo of the basis for MDOC’s action (Doe’s harassment allegations and his alleged obscene comments).
  • Opportunity to respond: MDOC held a disciplinary conference five days later, which Bozzo attended with his union representative. The representative made a statement regarding Bozzo’s employment and the charges.

Even if the conference was brief and informal, the court emphasizes that a pre-termination hearing “need not be a full evidentiary hearing” and serves only as an “initial check against mistaken decisions.” (Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545). Under Buckner, a short meeting where the employee is shown the allegations and can respond, especially with a union representative present, suffices.

The key is that Bozzo had a chance to be heard before termination. The opinion notes that Bozzo does not allege MDOC prevented him from speaking or presenting his side; he merely characterizes the opportunity as minimal. That is inadequate to show a constitutional defect in pre-termination process.

3. Post-termination Process: Arbitration

For post-termination process, the court applies the standards from Farhat, Rodgers, and Carter:

  • The employee must be permitted:
    • to attend the hearing,
    • to have the assistance of counsel or a representative,
    • to call witnesses and present evidence, and
    • to know and challenge the evidence against him.
  • Collective bargaining arbitration procedures typically satisfy these requirements and constitute adequate post-deprivation process.

Bozzo’s arbitration met these requirements:

  • He invoked arbitration pursuant to his collective bargaining agreement.
  • He participated in a three-day hearing before a neutral arbitrator.
  • He was represented (by a union representative acting in a quasi-counsel role).
  • He had the opportunity to present evidence and challenge MDOC’s evidence; he does not allege any specific restrictions on his participation.

Bozzo’s objections focus on:

  • A “surprise” witness.
  • The arbitrator’s alleged financial incentive (deriving “significant income” from MDOC arbitrations).
  • The arbitrator’s application of new or “evolving” disciplinary policies and alleged reliance on “falsehoods.”

The court treats these arguments as insufficient on two levels:

  1. Procedural defect vs. substantive disagreement. Bozzo does not identify how the “surprise” witness violated any procedural rule or prevented him from defending himself. Nor does he show that application of new policies was a procedural violation rather than a substantive disagreement about the correct rules. These arguments, at most, reflect dissatisfaction with the arbitrator’s legal and factual conclusions, which Farhat holds is not a procedural due process problem.
  2. Lack of plausible allegations of bias. Under Iqbal and Twombly, bare allegations of bias are insufficient. The court cites Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 429 F.3d 640, 648 (6th Cir. 2005), to underscore that a reasonable person would not infer partiality merely because an arbitrator has handled prior disputes involving one party. Bozzo’s allegation that the arbitrator had “significant income” from MDOC cases is conclusory and does not plausibly show bias.

Thus, the court concludes that the arbitration process, viewed as a whole, satisfied due process. Bozzo’s complaint amounts to an objection to the outcome, not to the fairness of the procedures themselves.

4. Pleading Standard

Finally, Bozzo suggested that the district court held him to an unduly high pleading standard. The Sixth Circuit rejects this, noting the district court properly applied Twombly and Iqbal—requiring sufficient factual content to make the claim “plausible,” not merely possible. Bozzo’s procedural due process allegations did not cross that threshold.

IV. Impact and Implications

A. Accrual and Limitations for Employment-Related § 1983 Claims

Bozzo v. Nanasy reinforces and clarifies several important points for practitioners handling public employee § 1983 cases in the Sixth Circuit:

  1. Accrual is tied to the last alleged procedural violation, not the final outcome.
    • A procedural due process claim accrues when both deprivation and inadequate process have occurred.
    • Where post-termination procedures (such as arbitration) are alleged to be defective, the accrual date is no later than the last day such procedures allegedly denied due process—not when the final decision (e.g., the arbitration award) is issued.
    • This mirrors Printup, where the injury was the initial procedural mislabeling, not the later affirmance of that decision.
  2. Discovery of injury occurs with awareness of process defects, not realization of the final injustice.
    • Even under the Sixth Circuit’s own discovery rule, the “injury” in a procedural due process case is the process, not the final disposition.
    • Once the plaintiff participates in a hearing and observes the alleged defects (biased decisionmaker, surprise witnesses, new policies), the discovery clock has started. They cannot postpone accrual by claiming they only saw the unfairness once the decision came out.
  3. Timing strategies must account for limitations even while arbitration or grievances proceed.
    • Public employees who believe their due process rights are violated during grievance or arbitration proceedings cannot rely on the conclusion of those processes as the accrual date.
    • Practitioners should consider filing § 1983 actions while post-termination proceedings are ongoing or shortly after the last alleged procedural defect, rather than waiting for final arbitration decisions.

B. Tolling in Michigan for § 1983 Claims

For claims arising in Michigan:

  • Only the specific statutory tolling mechanisms in Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5856 apply. Commencing an action tolls the limitations period while the action is pending, but dismissal without prejudice simply resumes the running of the original period—it does not restart it.
  • Common-law equitable tolling is unavailable for the three-year personal injury limitations period under § 600.5805(2).
  • Voluntary exhaustion of administrative or contractual remedies (e.g., grievance processes, arbitration) does not toll the statute for non-prisoner § 1983 plaintiffs.

This strict framework, reaffirmed in Heard v. Strange and applied here, places a premium on diligent and parallel litigation strategies.

C. Procedural Due Process and Arbitration

On the merits side, the decision has implications for public employers and unions:

  • Minimal pre-termination hearing duty remains modest. A brief disciplinary conference with notice, an explanation of the charges, and an opportunity to respond—especially with union representation—will generally satisfy Loudermill.
  • Union arbitration is presumptively adequate post-deprivation process. So long as the employee can attend, is represented, can present evidence and witnesses, and can challenge adverse evidence, due process is satisfied.
  • Challenging arbitrator neutrality requires specific, plausible allegations.
    • Repeating work for a governmental employer does not by itself prove bias.
    • Allegations that the arbitrator misapplied policies, believed “falsehoods,” or relied on “evolving standards” will usually be treated as substantive disagreements, not procedural defects.

The opinion thus offers comfort to public employers using standardized grievance and arbitration systems: adherence to basic, transparent procedures will typically insulate them from procedural due process challenges, even if employees remain deeply dissatisfied with the outcomes.

D. Unresolved Tension on Accrual Rules

The panel flags—but leaves unresolved—the tension between:

  • Supreme Court precedent emphasizing an occurrence-based accrual rule for § 1983 claims, and
  • The Sixth Circuit’s own discovery rule for accrual.

Practically, the court avoids committing to either approach because the result is the same under both: Bozzo knew of the alleged injury (defective procedures) as they occurred. However, the opinion’s reliance on Reed v. Goertz and Wallace, combined with that acknowledged tension, signals that future en banc or Supreme Court intervention may clarify accrual doctrines more broadly in the circuit.

V. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a federal statute that allows individuals to sue state officials in federal court for violations of federal constitutional rights. It does not create rights itself; it provides a mechanism to enforce rights found in the Constitution or federal law.

B. Procedural Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that the government follow fair procedures before depriving someone of life, liberty, or property. In employment cases:

  • Property interest: A public employee has a protected property interest if, under law or contract, they can be fired only for cause (not “at will”).
  • Pre-termination process: Before firing, the employer must:
    • tell the employee what they are accused of,
    • briefly explain the evidence, and
    • give the employee a chance to respond.
  • Post-termination process: After firing, the employee is entitled to a more thorough hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, often through a grievance or arbitration system.

C. Accrual

“Accrual” is the moment when the law treats a claim as having come into existence, starting the statute of limitations clock. In procedural due process cases:

  • The claim accrues once the government has both:
    • taken the protected interest (e.g., employment), and
    • failed to provide adequate procedures.
  • Later affirmances or appeals of that decision do not reset the clock.

D. Statute of Limitations and Tolling

  • Statute of limitations: The time limit for filing a lawsuit. For § 1983 in Michigan, it is three years from accrual.
  • Tolling: Circumstances that pause the running of the limitations period. In Michigan:
    • Filing a lawsuit tolls the clock while the case is pending.
    • Dismissing the case without prejudice restarts the running; the plaintiff must refile before the original deadline passes.
    • Equitable tolling (judge-made extensions for fairness) is not available for the three-year § 600.5805(2) period.

E. Exhaustion

“Exhaustion” means using all available administrative (internal) remedies before suing. In § 1983:

  • Most plaintiffs, including public employees like Bozzo, are not legally required to exhaust state administrative processes.
  • Prisoners are the exception: the PLRA requires them to exhaust prison grievance systems before suing.
  • Voluntarily using grievance or arbitration procedures does not extend the limitations period unless a statute explicitly says so.

VI. Conclusion

Bozzo v. Nanasy is an important published decision from the Sixth Circuit that:

  • Applies the Supreme Court’s Reed v. Goertz framework to procedural due process claims in the public employment context, clarifying that such claims accrue no later than the last alleged process violation, not the issuance of an adverse decision.
  • Reaffirms that Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury (§ 600.5805(2)) applies to § 1983 claims and that common-law equitable tolling is unavailable, leaving plaintiffs to rely on limited statutory tolling under § 600.5856.
  • Confirms that ordinary union arbitration—where employees receive notice, representation, and a full opportunity to present and challenge evidence—typically satisfies post-termination due process requirements.
  • Stresses that dissatisfaction with the factual or legal outcome of arbitration, without concrete allegations of procedural defects or bias, does not amount to a procedural due process violation.

For litigants and counsel, Bozzo reinforces two practical lessons: move promptly to protect § 1983 rights, even while arbitration or other processes are ongoing, and frame procedural due process claims around concrete defects in the fairness of the procedures—not simply objections to how the decisionmaker evaluated the case.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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