Strict Adherence to Statutory Judicial Review under the Planning and Development Act 2000 for Challenges to Derelict-Site Vesting Orders
Commentary on Telstar Investments Ltd v Dublin City Council (Approved) [2025] IEHC 386

Introduction

Telstar Investments Ltd v Dublin City Council is a landmark High Court decision delivered by Simons J. on 10 July 2025. The case concerns a compulsory purchase of two derelict buildings on Parnell Street, Dublin, under the Derelict Sites Act 1990 (the “1990 Act”). Telstar, the former owner, sought to quash what it styled as a decision of Dublin City Council (“DCC”) refusing to repeal a vesting order that had already transferred title to the Council. Crucially, Telstar commenced its proceedings as a conventional judicial review under Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (“RSC”), not as a statutory judicial review under s.50 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (“PDA 2000”). Leave was granted ex parte; DCC then moved to have that leave set aside on the basis that the wrong procedural vehicle—and, therefore, the wrong limitation period and threshold—had been applied.

Simons J. agreed with DCC, set aside the leave, and refused Telstar’s late attempt to convert the matter into statutory judicial review, holding that the strict eight-week limitation in s.50A PDA 2000 had expired and that no basis existed for an extension. The judgment clarifies three key points:

• Challenges relating to the making, or alleged failure to repeal, a vesting order under the 1990 Act are squarely within s.50(2)(c) PDA 2000 and must be brought under the specialised statutory JR procedure.
• Where leave has been obtained on the incorrect procedural footing, the Court’s inherent jurisdiction permits (and may require) that leave be set aside.
• The dual-limb test for extending the eight-week time-limit in s.50(8) PDA 2000 will be strictly enforced, especially for commercial actors.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The High Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to set aside leave that had been granted ex parte under Order 84 because the application should have proceeded under s.50/s.50A PDA 2000.
2. Simons J. held that any putative power to repeal a vesting order is “read into” the 1990 Act by operation of s.22(3) of the Interpretation Act 2005; thus, any decision (or refusal) in that regard is one “relating to the compulsory acquisition of land” under an enactment listed in s.214 PDA 2000.
3. Accordingly, the correct limitation period was eight weeks from 9 May 2024 (the date Telstar received DCC’s letter confirming the vesting). Telstar’s first papers were lodged 24 September 2024—83 days late even by the most generous calculation.
4. Telstar failed both limbs of the s.50(8) test: there was no “good and sufficient reason” for delay and the delay was not outside its control. The Court emphasised that Telstar was a commercial entity, legally advised from the outset, and had clear notice of DCC’s position.
5. Leave was therefore refused, and the proceedings were dismissed, subject to final orders on costs.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. Inherent Power to Set Aside Ex Parte Orders

• M.D. v Board of a Secondary School [2024] IESC 11 – Collins J. affirmed that parties affected by an ex parte order are entitled to apply to set it aside. Simons J. used this as the jumping-off point for the set-aside jurisdiction.
• Adam v Minister for Justice [2001] 3 IR 53 and Gordon v DPP [2002] 2 IR 369 – Supreme Court authority that the onus rests on the moving party to show leave should not have been granted.
• Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála [2017] IEHC 46 – Haughton J. cautioned that leave should be set aside only where “plainly” wrongly granted, but recognised delay as a special case.
• Goonery v EPA (1999) – Kelly J. set aside leave where the wrong statutory procedure had been used, closely mirroring the current facts.

2. Statutory JR, Time-Limits and Extensions

• Heaney v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 123 – Donnelly J. described the strict two-limb extension test under s.50(8) PDA 2000.
• Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v HPRA [2022] IECA 109 – Hogan J. stressed stringent enforcement of time-limits in the “commercial sphere”.
• Habte v Minister for Justice [2020] IECA 22 – confirmed the narrow interpretation of “statutory instrument” in s.22 Interpretation Act 2005, informing Simons J.’s view that the repeal power is subsumed within the parent Act.

3. Thresholds for Leave

• Order 84 RSC – “arguable case” threshold for conventional JR.
• ss.50, 50A PDA 2000 – “substantial grounds” threshold for statutory JR.

Legal Reasoning

1. Character of the Impugned Act: The “decision” Telstar sought to quash was DCC’s alleged refusal to repeal its own vesting order. By definition, that refusal concerned the compulsory acquisition of land under the 1990 Act, an enactment listed in s.214 PDA 2000. Hence s.50(2)(c) applied.
2. Source of the Repeal Power: Any capacity to repeal stems from s.22(3) of the Interpretation Act 2005 which incorporates such a power into the original enabling Act (here, the 1990 Act). Consequently, the relevant “function” is still one “conferred by” the 1990 Act, satisfying the wording of s.50(2).
3. Incorrect Procedure = Fundamental Irregularity: Because Telstar invoked the wrong form of JR, the leave judge assessed (i) the wrong limitation period (3 months, not 8 weeks) and (ii) the wrong merits threshold (“arguable” vs. “substantial”). That went “to the very heart” of the proceedings, justifying a set-aside.
4. Extension of Time Refused: Applying the Heaney test, the Court found:
   • No good and sufficient reason – DCC’s position was unequivocal from 9 May 2024; any “mixed signals” were unsupported by documentary evidence.
   • Delay within applicant’s control – Telstar was legally advised, commercially sophisticated, and could have issued protective proceedings.

Impact of the Judgment

This decision has wide ramifications for practitioners in planning, compulsory purchase and environmental law.

• Procedural Rigour: Courts will treat the choice between conventional and statutory JR not as a mere formality but as jurisdictional. An error will almost certainly prove fatal where time-limits differ.
• Vesting Orders Under Any Listed Enactment: The ruling is not confined to the Derelict Sites Act. It signals that challenges to any decision “relating to compulsory acquisition” under the suite of enactments named in s.214 PDA 2000 (e.g., Housing Act 1966, Roads Act 1993, etc.) must employ the s.50 procedure.
• Eight-Week Window Strictly Enforced: Commercial landowners must act swiftly. Belated negotiations with a local authority will rarely justify delay.
• Content of Leave Application: Lawyers must alert the leave court to the applicable statutory framework; failure to do so can be characterised as a “significant irregularity”.
• Re-litigation Risk Controlled: The judgment demonstrates a practical mechanism to prevent three-stage litigation (ex parte leave, set - aside, substantive hearing) unless a fundamental misstep exists.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Statutory vs. Conventional Judicial Review

Conventional JR is governed solely by Order 84 RSC, has a three-month limit, and requires the applicant to show an “arguable case”. Statutory JR under the PDA 2000 (and some other statutes) overlays tighter rules: an eight-week limit, “substantial grounds” threshold, special costs provisions, and accelerated procedures.

Vesting Order

A vesting order is an instrument that transfers legal title in land to a local authority under compulsory purchase schemes. Once the vesting date arrives, ownership passes “in fee simple” free of encumbrances.

Power to Repeal (s.22 Interpretation Act 2005)

Section 22(3) implies that if an Act authorises a Minister/body to make a statutory instrument, it also permits revocation or amendment of that instrument in the same manner unless the parent Act says otherwise. The power is not autonomous; it is grafted onto the parent Act, so challenges to its exercise remain challenges under that Act.

Set-Aside Jurisdiction

Because leave for JR is normally granted ex parte, the affected respondent can apply to have that leave rescinded. However, courts exercise this power “sparingly”; it is reserved for obvious errors or fundamental procedural wrongs—as existed here.

Conclusion

Telstar Investments v Dublin City Council crystallises a vital procedural principle: where legislation listed in s.214 PDA 2000 is engaged, any attempt to challenge decisions touching compulsory acquisition must proceed through the statutory judicial review gateway, within eight weeks, and must meet the higher “substantial grounds” threshold.

By setting aside leave obtained on the wrong footing, the High Court signalled zero tolerance for procedural short-cuts in planning and acquisition litigation. The judgment also underscores the commercial reality that developers and landowners are expected to act promptly and with full procedural accuracy. Future litigants—and their advisers—must now routinely check (i) whether the decision they wish to contest falls within s.50(2) PDA 2000, and (ii) whether they are safely within the eight-week window. Failure on either front, as Telstar discovered, is likely to be fatal.