Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns an application by Company A to set aside the grant of leave in judicial review proceedings against The Local Authority. The dispute arises from the compulsory acquisition of two properties located on a street in The City, executed under the Derelict Sites Act 1990. Company A was properly served with notice of the Local Authority's intention to acquire the property but did not file a formal objection as prescribed by statute. Consequently, the Local Authority proceeded to confirm the acquisition by making a vesting order, which vested ownership of the properties to the Local Authority.
Company A contended that an architectural impact assessment report should have been treated as an implicit objection, a contention rejected by the court. Following the issuance of the vesting order and its effective date, Company A's solicitor wrote to the Local Authority to complain about the compulsory acquisition process. The Local Authority responded by affirming the legality of its actions and the vesting of the property, denying any formal objection had been received.
Company A then initiated judicial review proceedings seeking to quash what it characterized as a decision by the Local Authority not to repeal the vesting order. The initial leave to apply for judicial review was granted on the basis of conventional judicial review procedure under Order 84 Rules of the Superior Courts (RSC), with an extension of time granted subject to reservation of issues by The Local Authority. The Local Authority subsequently challenged the basis on which leave was granted, asserting that the proceedings should have been brought under the statutory judicial review procedure prescribed by the Planning and Development Act 2000 (PDA 2000), which imposes a stricter time-limit and threshold for leave.
The parties filed competing motions: The Local Authority sought to set aside the grant of leave, while Company A sought leave and an extension of time pursuant to the statutory judicial review procedure. The hearing of these motions took place on 26 June 2025.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to set aside the grant of leave obtained on an ex parte basis.
- Whether the judicial review proceedings should be classified as statutory judicial review under the Planning and Development Act 2000 or conventional judicial review under Order 84 RSC.
- Whether an extension of time should be granted to Company A for the initiation of judicial review proceedings under the statutory procedure.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The Applicant contended that the Local Authority had implicitly objected to the compulsory acquisition by receipt of an architectural impact assessment report, which should have triggered referral to an independent decision-maker.
- The Applicant argued that the power to repeal a vesting order arises partly under the Derelict Sites Act 1990 and partly under the Interpretation Act 2005, thus removing the challenge from the statutory judicial review procedure.
- The Applicant sought to characterize the Local Authority’s letter of 9 May 2024 as a "decision" refusing to repeal the vesting order, thereby framing the challenge within the statutory judicial review procedure.
- The Applicant sought an extension of time to bring the judicial review proceedings, relying on alleged ongoing engagement and mixed signals from the Local Authority officials indicating that the vesting order was not being actively pursued.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Local Authority maintained that no formal objection was made by the Applicant within the statutory time-frame, allowing the Local Authority to proceed without referral to an independent body.
- It was argued that the power to repeal a vesting order, if it exists, is conferred solely by the Derelict Sites Act 1990 and therefore the statutory judicial review procedure applies.
- The Local Authority denied any power or function to repeal the vesting order but contended that this issue was irrelevant to the procedural question of the proper form of judicial review.
- The Local Authority asserted that the Applicant had no good and sufficient reason for delay and that the circumstances leading to the delay were within the Applicant’s control.
- The Local Authority emphasized that the Applicant, as a commercial entity with legal advice, should have been aware of the Local Authority’s position and the urgency of the matter.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| M.D. v. Board of a Secondary School [2024] IESC 11 |
The High Court’s inherent power to set aside orders obtained ex parte when they materially affect another party. |
Supported the court’s jurisdiction to set aside the grant of leave obtained ex parte. |
| Adam v. Minister for Justice [2001] IESC 38 |
Onus on party seeking to set aside leave to show leave was improperly granted; leave threshold is modest. |
Reinforced the principle that setting aside leave is exceptional and must be justified by significant grounds. |
| Gordon v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] IESC 47 |
Similar principles on setting aside leave and the burden of proof on the applicant. |
Supported the court’s approach to the set aside jurisdiction. |
| Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IEHC 46 |
Delay in judicial review can justify setting aside leave if delay is significant or causes prejudice. |
Informed the court’s analysis of delay and prejudice in the context of setting aside leave. |
| Goonery v. Environmental Protection Agency [1999] IEHC 15 (Unreported) |
Leave set aside where statutory procedure was breached, specifically where leave was granted ex parte contrary to statutory requirements. |
Analogous to the present case, supporting setting aside leave due to procedural irregularity. |
| Habte v. Minister for Justice [2020] IECA 22, [2021] 3 IR 627 |
Interpretation of "statutory instrument" and caution against extending statutory definitions beyond their language. |
Guided interpretation of the power to repeal vesting orders under the Interpretation Act 2005. |
| Heaney v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 123 |
Criteria for extension of time under statutory judicial review: good and sufficient reason and circumstances outside applicant’s control. |
Applied the statutory test for extension of time and found Applicant failed to meet the criteria. |
| Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v. HPRA [2022] IECA 109 |
Strict enforcement of time-limits in judicial review of commercial decisions and scrutiny of explanations for delay. |
Supported the court’s strict approach to time-limits given Applicant’s commercial status. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first confirmed its inherent jurisdiction to set aside orders granted ex parte that materially affect other parties, referencing established Supreme Court authority. It noted that while setting aside leave is generally reserved for exceptional cases, the present case involved a fundamental procedural irregularity: leave had been granted based on the incorrect judicial review procedure.
The court distinguished this case from ordinary challenges to the leave threshold, emphasizing that the procedural misstep went to the core of the judicial review proceedings. The statutory judicial review procedure under the Planning and Development Act 2000 applies to decisions by local authorities relating to compulsory acquisition, including decisions about vesting orders. The court accepted the Local Authority’s submission that the power to repeal a vesting order, if it exists, is conferred by the Derelict Sites Act 1990, thereby triggering the statutory procedure with its stricter eight-week time-limit and higher threshold for leave.
The Applicant’s argument that the power to repeal arises from both the Derelict Sites Act 1990 and the Interpretation Act 2005 was rejected as the latter merely reads a power to repeal into the enactment conferring the original power. The court found that even if the power was conferred by both statutes, the statutory judicial review procedure would still apply.
Turning to the consequences of the procedural misstep, the court held that the grant of leave must be set aside to allow a fresh determination under the correct statutory framework. The court analyzed the delay in bringing the proceedings, noting that the Applicant’s delay was substantial relative to the eight-week statutory limit and that no good and sufficient reason was demonstrated. The court found that the Applicant had been on clear notice of the Local Authority’s position and that communications from the Local Authority did not justify any inference that the vesting order was being abandoned.
The court also emphasized the commercial nature of the Applicant, which had access to legal advice and resources, reinforcing the expectation of strict compliance with time limits. The court found no justification for the continuing delay after the expiry of the statutory time-limit and no grounds for extending time under the statutory criteria.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the Applicant failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for an extension of time and that the leave application under the statutory procedure must be refused.
Holding and Implications
The court SET ASIDE the grant of leave to apply for judicial review that had been obtained on the basis of conventional judicial review procedure.
The court refused the Applicant’s subsequent motion for leave to apply for judicial review under the statutory judicial review procedure due to failure to comply with the statutory eight-week time-limit and the absence of good and sufficient reason to extend time.
The decision directly affects the parties by requiring the Applicant to comply with the statutory judicial review procedure and time-limits in future challenges relating to compulsory acquisition decisions. No broader precedent was set beyond reaffirming the strict application of procedural rules in statutory judicial review and the court’s jurisdiction to set aside leave granted on incorrect procedural grounds.