Public interest costs doctrine consolidated: no-order costs and vacatur across all levels where the State succeeds on a discrete issue of systemic importance — Hegarty v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2025] IESC 41 (Costs)

Public interest costs doctrine consolidated: no-order costs and vacatur across all levels where the State succeeds on a discrete issue of systemic importance — Hegarty v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2025] IESC 41 (Costs)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Ireland’s costs ruling in Hegarty v The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2025] IESC 41, delivered on 14 October 2025. The ruling follows the Court’s substantive decision in [2025] IESC 36 (Murray J.) allowing the Commissioner’s appeal in a public law challenge concerning the interaction between section 14(2) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 and the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations 2007.

Background to the dispute: - The Applicant, Raymond Hegarty, had been subjected to disciplinary proceedings under the 2007 Regulations arising from alleged misconduct. - The Commissioner then sought to invoke section 14(2) of the 2005 Act to dismiss the Applicant based on the same conduct. - The Applicant instituted judicial review proceedings to restrain the Commissioner from doing so. - The High Court quashed the Commissioner’s decision ([2022] IEHC 183), and the Court of Appeal upheld that outcome ([2023] IECA 266). - The Supreme Court allowed the Commissioner’s appeal on the merits in [2025] IESC 36.

The present ruling concerns costs at all stages. The issues included whether: - The Commissioner, as the ultimate successful party, should recover costs across all courts; - The Applicant’s proceedings qualified as “public interest proceedings” within the meaning of Little v Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53; - The discrete nature of the legal question affected the application of public interest costs principles; - Prior costs orders in the High Court and Court of Appeal should stand; and - The Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024 rendered the matter moot in a way that affected costs.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court refused both parties’ applications for costs and made no order as to costs at any level. All costs orders made in the High Court and the Court of Appeal were vacated.

Key points: - Although the Commissioner succeeded on the appeal, the proceedings were classified as “public interest proceedings” per Little. - The Court reaffirmed that, in such cases—especially where the State seeks and obtains leave to appeal on a matter of general public importance—the starting point is that each party bears its own costs. - The discrete and narrow character of the legal issue did not disqualify the case from public interest classification. - The Applicant’s bid for his costs as an unsuccessful party failed; such outcomes are a “genuine rarity” and the case did not fall within the limited exceptional categories identified in Little. - The argument that the proceedings had become moot by virtue of the 2024 Act was rejected for costs purposes because the case was not moot when heard, nor was mootness suggested before judgment.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and statutory framework cited

- Section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015: Establishes the prima facie position that the successful party is entitled to its costs, subject to judicial discretion. The Court began from this general rule, noting that the Commissioner was successful before the Supreme Court.

- Little v Chief Appeals Officer and Ors. [2024] IESC 53: The Court’s structured framework for “public interest proceedings” and costs discretion. The ruling relies heavily on Little, and three components are central: - Definition of “public interest proceedings” (para. 34 in Little): 1) A claim against the State or a State organ/agency; 2) Seeking relief in public law; and 3) Directly raising a point of law of general public importance. - The “discrete question of law” dimension (para. 35 in Little): A point may be narrow yet still be of general importance; the strength of an exemption from costs grows with systemic importance, and the State may be the net beneficiary of clarifying the law. - The default position in public interest cases (paras. 51–52 in Little): The starting point is that each party bears its own costs, particularly where the State sought and obtained leave to appeal on the ground of general public importance. - The narrow exceptions for awarding costs to an unsuccessful litigant (para. 62 in Little): Such awards are rare and confined to defined exceptional categories.

- Minister for Justice v McPhilips [2015] IESC 47; [2015] 3 IR 274: Cited in Little for the proposition that awarding costs to an unsuccessful party is a “genuine rarity.” The present ruling echoes and applies that cautionary approach.

2) The Court’s legal reasoning

Step-by-step application of principles:

  • Step 1: Identify the nominal “successful party” for section 169 purposes. The Supreme Court had allowed the Commissioner’s appeal in [2025] IESC 36. Prima facie, the Commissioner was entitled to costs under section 169.
  • Step 2: Engage costs discretion. Costs remain discretionary. The Court turned to Little to test whether the case fell within “public interest proceedings,” potentially displacing a normal “costs follow the event” outcome.
  • Step 3: Classify the proceedings. The Court held that the Applicant’s challenge: - Was against a State agency (the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána), - Sought public law relief (judicial review), and - Raised a point of law of general public importance (the interaction between the 2005 Act and the 2007 Regulations, for which the Supreme Court had granted leave to appeal). Hence, the case qualified as “public interest proceedings.”
  • Step 4: Address the “discrete point of law” argument. The Commissioner’s appeal concerned a relatively narrow statutory interpretation issue. The Court, citing Little para. 35, emphasized that the discrete nature of the question does not undermine its public importance. The issue was substantial, as evidenced by differing views across the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and even within the Supreme Court (one Justice favoring the Applicant’s position). The systemic value of clarification was significant.
  • Step 5: Consider who benefits from clarification. The Court recognized that, although the 2005 Act has since been repealed, the Commissioner obtained the “advantage of a clarification” on difficult questions, yielding greater certainty in the scope and exercise of powers essential to maintaining public confidence in the police force. Per Little, the State may often be the net beneficiary of clarification, tilting the equities toward “no order as to costs.”
  • Step 6: Apply the public interest default on costs. Given that the State sought and was granted leave to appeal on a matter of general public importance, Little strongly points to each party bearing its own costs. The Court adopted that starting point and outcome.
  • Step 7: Assess the Applicant’s request for his own costs notwithstanding failure. The Court reiterated that awarding costs to an unsuccessful litigant in public interest proceedings is a “genuine rarity” and depends on discrete, tightly confined categories identified in Little (para. 62). The Applicant’s case did not fall within any of those categories. Accordingly, his request for costs failed.
  • Step 8: Reject the mootness argument. The Applicant’s contention that the 2024 Act rendered the proceedings moot was rejected as misconceived for costs purposes. The proceedings were not moot when heard, and no party suggested mootness before judgment. Having delivered judgment, the Court applied the usual principles (namely, Little) to determine costs; the later legislative change did not alter that analysis.
  • Step 9: Vacate prior costs orders across all levels. The Court refused both parties’ costs applications and made no order as to costs. Importantly, this applied to the proceedings in the High Court and Court of Appeal: all costs orders made below (including “costs in the cause” directions) were vacated.

3) Why the precedents mattered

Little is the cornerstone. It supplies the taxonomy for public interest proceedings and shifts the default away from the orthodox “costs follow the event” approach when three conditions are met. It also calibrates the weight to be given to the State’s role and benefit where it pursues an appeal on a point of general public importance.

The reliance on McPhilips underscores the Court’s resistance to normalizing awards of costs to unsuccessful public interest litigants. That norm preserves a narrow channel for exceptional departures while preventing a drift toward routine indemnification that might chill State appeals or distort incentives.

4) The ruling’s place in the evolving public law costs landscape

This decision consolidates and operationalizes Little in four notable ways:

  • Discrete issues still count: The Court expressly confirms that a narrow, discrete statutory interpretation issue can qualify as a public interest point of law of general importance. That clarification is pivotal for appeals confined to tight points of construction.
  • State-benefit emphasis: The Court reaffirmed that the State frequently gains systemic value from appellate clarification. Where the State initiates and obtains leave on a point of public importance, the equities will “strongly” favor no-order costs.
  • Cross-level harmonization and vacatur: The no-order outcome applies not only to the Supreme Court stage but also retrospectively aligns costs across the High Court and Court of Appeal, vacating prior orders. That harmonization reduces fragmentation and inconsistency in costs outcomes across levels when a case ultimately falls within the Little paradigm.
  • Mootness is time-sensitive for costs: Legislative changes after a hearing will not retroactively transform the costs analysis where mootness was not raised prior to judgment. Costs remain governed by the controlling framework in place at the time of adjudication and on the basis of how the proceedings were actually litigated.

Impact and implications

For public law litigants

  • Expectation management: Even if an applicant ultimately loses in the Supreme Court, a no-order-as-to-costs result is a realistic outcome where the case qualifies as public interest proceedings under Little. This reduces the chilling effect on meritorious challenges against the State on systemic issues.
  • Limits on costs recovery when unsuccessful: The exceptional circumstances in which an unsuccessful public interest litigant may be awarded costs remain tightly confined. Parties should not assume indemnity merely because the litigation raised important questions.
  • Discrete questions count: Applicants should not be deterred from advancing narrow but significant issues; their discrete character does not diminish their public interest status for costs purposes.

For State bodies and regulators

  • Success does not guarantee costs: Even where the State succeeds at the Supreme Court, costs may not be recoverable if the case is public interest litigation meeting the Little definition and the State sought and obtained leave to appeal on general public importance grounds.
  • Systemic benefit is a double-edged sword: The clarificatory value of a decision—particularly where it standardizes or stabilizes administrative practice—will often tilt the equities toward no-order costs rather than State recovery.
  • Strategic consideration of appeals: When seeking leave on discrete points of general importance, State bodies should anticipate a strong likelihood of a no-order-as-to-costs outcome, including at earlier stages if the Supreme Court so directs.

For courts and case management

  • Coherence across levels: This ruling indicates that where Little applies at the Supreme Court stage, the Court may vacate lower court costs orders to reflect a coherent public interest costs outcome throughout the litigation lifecycle.
  • Handling intermediate applications: Even orders such as “costs in the cause” for unsuccessful interlocutory applications (e.g., to cross-examine witnesses) may be overtaken by a global no-order outcome if the case falls within the Little framework at the end of the appellate process.

Subject-matter implications: policing discipline and governance

Although the costs ruling is neutral on the merits, it underscores that litigation clarifying the interaction between statutory dismissal powers and disciplinary regulations can be quintessentially public interest in nature. The Court expressly acknowledged the systemic significance of clarification for the Commissioner’s powers and public confidence in the police force. Even a subsequent legislative overhaul (here, the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024) does not negate the public interest character for costs purposes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Costs follow the event: The general rule that the winning party recovers its legal costs from the losing party.
  • No order as to costs: Each side pays its own costs; the court makes no award for or against either party.
  • Public interest proceedings (per Little): Civil litigation that (1) targets the State or a State agency, (2) seeks public law relief (e.g., judicial review), and (3) directly raises an issue of law of general public importance.
  • Discrete question of law: A narrow, focused legal issue. The Supreme Court clarifies that “discrete” does not mean “insubstantial” for public interest purposes; narrow questions can still be of broad systemic importance.
  • Costs in the cause: An interim order deferring the determination of costs on an application to the final outcome of the case.
  • Vacatur of costs orders: The Supreme Court’s setting aside of existing costs orders made by lower courts to align with the final costs disposition.
  • Mootness: When a case no longer presents a live controversy such that a court’s decision would have no practical effect. For costs, mootness is assessed at the relevant time; if not moot when heard and not raised before judgment, later changes typically do not retroactively alter the costs framework.
  • Section 169 LSRA 2015: The statutory source of the general “winner’s entitlement” to costs, subject to the court’s discretion and applicable principles like those set out in Little.

Conclusion

Hegarty (Costs) [2025] IESC 41 is a significant application and consolidation of the Little public interest costs framework. The Supreme Court held that: - A narrow, discrete statutory interpretation appeal can qualify as public interest proceedings; - Where the State seeks and gains leave to appeal on a point of general public importance, the starting point is that each party bears its own costs; - The State’s systemic benefit from legal clarification is an equity favoring a no-order outcome; - The exceptional circumstances for awarding costs to an unsuccessful litigant were not met; - Late-breaking legislative change does not retroactively convert the case into a “mootness costs” scenario; and - Coherence requires vacating earlier costs orders to reflect the public interest disposition across all levels of the litigation.

The ruling offers clear, practical guidance to litigants and public authorities. It signals that appellate clarification in public law frequently attracts a “no order as to costs” result even when the State ultimately succeeds, especially where the litigation has delivered systemic value. By vacating prior costs orders and refusing costs both ways, the Court promotes consistency and predictability in the application of Little, reinforcing a principled and measured approach to costs in public interest litigation.

Citation: Hegarty v The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána (Approved) [2025] IESC 41 (Costs), Supreme Court of Ireland, 14 October 2025.

Related merits judgment: [2025] IESC 36 (Murray J.) allowing the Commissioner’s appeal.

Key authorities: Little v Chief Appeals Officer and Ors. [2024] IESC 53; Minister for Justice v McPhilips [2015] IESC 47; s. 169 Legal Services Regulation Act 2015.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Ireland

Comments