Hegarty v The Commissioner of A Garda Siochana (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant was subjected to a disciplinary process under the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations 2007. After that process concluded, the Respondent/Appellant sought to invoke section 14(2) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 to dismiss the Applicant for the same conduct. The Applicant commenced judicial review proceedings to restrain that step.

The High Court quashed the Respondent/Appellant’s decision to invoke section 14(2) ([2022] IEHC 183). The Court of Appeal dismissed the Respondent/Appellant’s appeal ([2023] IECA 266). The Respondent/Appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court. For the reasons set out in the judgment of Judge [Murray] in [2025] IESC 36, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The present ruling addresses the issue of costs following that outcome.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, following the Respondent/Appellant’s success in the Supreme Court, the Respondent/Appellant is entitled to its costs at each stage (High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court), including costs related to the Applicant’s unsuccessful application to cross-examine certain witnesses.
2. Whether the proceedings constitute “public interest proceedings” within the principles set out in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer and Ors. [2024] IESC 53, and, if so, what the default costs position should be.
3. Whether any exceptional basis exists to award costs to the unsuccessful Applicant in a public law case of general public importance, having regard to the categories identified in Little.
4. Whether the alleged mootness said to arise from the enactment of the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024 should affect the costs order.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• As the successful party in the Supreme Court, the Appellant is entitled to its costs for each stage of the proceedings (High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court).
• The Appellant is also entitled to the costs of the Applicant’s unsuccessful application to cross-examine certain witnesses (including Chief Superintendent [Nugent]).
• The Applicant instituted the proceedings for personal advantage, and the equities therefore favour awarding the successful State defendant its costs, at least outside the Supreme Court appeal.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Court should award costs in the Applicant’s favour and leave undisturbed the costs orders made in the courts below.
• The Supreme Court’s judgment did not dispose of other grounds pleaded in the High Court; the Court of Appeal addressed only issues relating to the invocation of section 14 of the 2005 Act.
• But for the enactment of the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024, the judgment may have led to a rehearing in the High Court regarding the Appellant’s approach to invoking section 14 and the associated evidence.
• The case raised matters of public interest concerning public confidence in the police, and the judgment has benefited the Appellant by clarifying the scope and exercise of its powers; the Applicant is now better placed to challenge any future decision under the 2024 Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1) Prima facie entitlement and discretion: The Court began by noting that the Appellant, having succeeded in the Supreme Court, is prima facie entitled to costs under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. However, the Court retains a discretion, which must be exercised in line with the principles in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer and Ors. [2024] IESC 53.

2) Public interest proceedings: Applying Little, the Court found these proceedings fall within the “public interest” category. The case involved a claim against a State agency, sought public law relief, and raised a point of law of general public importance concerning the interaction between the Garda Síochána Act 2005 and the 2007 Regulations. The Court had previously granted leave on that basis and recognized that even discrete issues of statutory interpretation may be of systemic importance.

3) Starting point of no order for costs: In public interest proceedings, Little indicates that, in the majority of cases, it is appropriate to exempt the plaintiff/applicant from an adverse costs order. Where the State has sought and been granted leave on a matter of general public importance, the equities point strongly towards no order as to costs. Here, the Appellant benefited from clarification of difficult legal questions regarding the scope and exercise of powers, including those connected to maintaining public confidence in the police.

4) No basis to award costs to the unsuccessful Applicant: The Court examined whether the case fits within the rare categories in which an unsuccessful litigant should nevertheless obtain costs, as identified in Little. It held that this case did not fall within any of those types and reiterated that such awards are a “genuine rarity” (citing Minister for Justice v. McPhilips via Little).

5) Mootness argument rejected as a costs lever: The Applicant’s contention that the proceedings were rendered moot by the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024 was rejected for costs purposes. The proceedings were not moot when heard, nor was mootness suggested before judgment. Having delivered judgment on the merits, the Court determined costs by the usual principles set out above.

6) Resulting exercise of discretion: Weighing these factors, the Court concluded that the appropriate order was to refuse both applications for costs and to make no order as to costs across all levels of the proceedings.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court refused both costs applications and made NO ORDER AS TO COSTS. In accordance with Little, this applies to the High Court and the Court of Appeal, and the prior costs orders in those courts are vacated.

IMPLICATIONS: Each party bears its own costs for the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court stages. The decision applies established principles from Little to public interest litigation involving discrete questions of statutory interpretation where the State obtains clarification of the law. The ruling sets no new precedent beyond the application of those principles and has the direct effect of vacating the existing costs orders below.