Late IPAT Appeals Do Not Halt Deportation: High Court refuses injunctions despite arguable challenge to Regulation 4(5) and clarifies Regulation 4(2) notice duty

Introduction

This commentary analyses the High Court (Ireland) decision in J.V.V.M. & C. de P. v The Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration [2025] IEHC 506 (ex tempore, Stack J., 19 September 2025). The applicants, a young Brazilian couple, sought to:

restrain their deportation following the refusal of their international protection claims,
compel the Minister to decide their late applications to revoke deportation orders made on 11 December 2024, and
challenge the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT)’s refusal (21 August 2025) to extend time for an appeal lodged roughly fourteen months late.

The case engages recurring issues at the intersection of international protection, deportation, and judicial review: the legal effect (if any) of a pending s.3(11) revocation application, the pre-deportation refoulement assessment, the standard governing late appeals to IPAT under the International Protection Act, 2015 (Procedures and Periods for Appeals) Regulations 2017 (S.I. No. 116/2017), and the discretionary factors governing interlocutory injunctions in removal cases. It also touches on how courts treat “one minute to midnight” applications and allegations that processes are being used to engineer grounds to delay removal.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court:

Granted leave on a single arguable ground to seek certiorari of IPAT’s refusal to extend time. The arguable point is the correct interpretation of Regulation 4(5) of the 2017 Regulations—whether its two limbs (special circumstances and injustice) are disjunctive or cumulative. The Court noted this pure point of law is pending in a series of cases and is arguable.
Refused all other grounds, including challenges premised on Regulation 4(2), alleged failure to give reasons, irrationality, and any suggestion that a pending revocation application could ground relief.
Refused interlocutory injunctive relief to restrain deportation, emphasising egregious delay by the applicants, the impermissibility of “drip-feeding” information/applications at the eleventh hour, and the absence of any legal impediment (including the asserted medical anxiety) to removal.
Clarified the scope of Regulation 4(2): its notice obligation arises only where a late notice of appeal is filed without any request for an extension or without reasons. Where an extension is actually sought and reasons given, Regulation 4(2) does not oblige IPAT to invite further representations.
Confirmed that deportation may lawfully proceed notwithstanding the grant of leave on the discrete legal question relating to Regulation 4(5). The deportation orders remain valid and unaffected by the leave decision.

Factual and Procedural Background

28 Feb 2023: Applicants arrive in Ireland; 3 Mar 2023: apply for international protection.
28 May 2024: IPO refuses international protection. Applicants are notified, with comprehensive information on their right to appeal to IPAT within 15 working days (Regulation 3(c) of S.I. No. 116/2017), and on urgent access to legal advice.
By ~18 June 2024: appeal period expires unused.
10 July 2024: Applicants refused permission to remain (s.49, 2015 Act); warned deportation orders may ensue and offered voluntary return.
11 Dec 2024: Deportation orders made. Minister reviews refoulement (s.50) and finds no non-refoulement risk, given prior IPO refusal and no new protection risk asserted.
30 Dec 2024: Applicants notified; required to leave by 2 Feb 2025 or to present on 12 Mar 2025 for arrangements.
Early March 2025: Applicants instruct current solicitors; on or about 7–10 Mar 2025, they lodge s.3(11) revocation applications. They do not seek an IPAT extension at this time. They fail to present on 12 Mar and are classified as evaders.
15 Jul 2025: First applicant arrested. Still no IPAT extension application.
20 Aug 2025: Applicants seek IPAT extension of time, roughly 14 months late, relying on a brief “report/declaration” from church pastors (undated beyond “2019”).
21 Aug 2025: IPAT refuses the extension. High Court proceedings commence the same day; second applicant arrested the same day.
19 Sep 2025: High Court delivers ex tempore judgment.

Key Issues

Whether the pending s.3(11) revocation applications—repeating previously rejected claims—could support injunctions or mandamus compelling a decision.
Whether IPAT misapplied Regulation 4(5) of the 2017 Regulations concerning extension of time (disjunctive vs cumulative limbs).
Whether Regulation 4(2) obliged IPAT to invite further representations before rejecting a late appeal where an extension request was actually made.
Whether interlocutory injunctive relief should issue given the procedural history and delays.
Whether the second applicant’s anxiety/panic disorder constituted a legal impediment to removal.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Kouaype v Minister for Justice [2005] IEHC 380; [2011] 2 I.R. 1

Clarke J. explained that, absent new evidence of risk arising in the interim, the rejection of an international protection claim implies that no refoulement risk arises on removal. Stack J. applied this principle to uphold the Minister’s s.50 assessment prior to making deportation orders: the applicants advanced no new material and thus no refoulement issue arose. The refoulement check is not a second full asylum assessment; it guards against new or supervening risk.

L.C. v Minister for Justice [2007] 2 I.R. 133 and Smith v Minister for Justice [2013] IESC 4

Both Supreme Court decisions establish that the mere lodging of a revocation application (s.3(11), 1999 Act) does not entitle an applicant to injunctive relief to stave off deportation when the application adds nothing new. Revocation is not a device to paralyse a valid deportation order. Stack J. relied on these authorities to find that the applicants’ revocation filings—reiterating earlier rejected claims without fresh substance—could not ground an injunction.

Mamyko v Minister for Justice [2003] IEHC 75

Peart J. denounced “drip-feeding” information or applications at the last minute to frustrate removal. Stack J. invoked this principle to refuse to countenance an extension-of-time application made “one minute to midnight” without a coherent chronology or explanation. The doctrine serves both orderly administration of the protection system and fairness to the State.

Legal Reasoning

1) Revocation applications and non-refoulement: no basis for relief without new material

The Court found the revocation applications “replete” with references to fundamental rights instruments but devoid of specific, case-linked content. They merely restated claims rejected by the IPO and examined by the Minister in the s.50 non-refoulement check. Applying Kouaype, in the absence of new information or supervening risk, the Minister’s refoulement findings were not only lawful but correct. The Supreme Court guidance in L.C. and Smith made clear that such hollow revocation applications cannot ground injunctive relief. Nor did they support mandamus: asking the Minister to re‑decide matters already addressed is not a proper basis for compulsion.

2) The Regulation 4(5) test: an arguable disjunctive vs cumulative question

Regulation 4(5) provides that IPAT “shall not extend” the 15 working-day limit except where satisfied that:

(a) the applicant demonstrated “special circumstances” for late filing; and
(b) in the circumstances, it would be unjust not to extend time.

The applicants contend the limbs are disjunctive, not cumulative; IPAT has applied them cumulatively (as expressly recorded on the face of the decision). Stack J. accepted this as an arguable point warranting leave, noting similar pending High Court cases that await determination of the construction issue.

Important: The judgment contains an apparent textual inconsistency at paragraph 45, where the quoted ground appears to fault IPAT for treating the limbs as “disjunctive.” Elsewhere (paragraph 21), the Court records that IPAT treated them as “cumulative” and that the applicants say they should be read disjunctively. The overall thrust and procedural posture strongly indicate that the arguable ground is that IPAT erred in treating the test as cumulative. The paragraph 45 wording is likely a slip in the ex tempore transcription.

3) Regulation 4(2): no duty to invite further representations when an extension is actually sought

The applicants argued that Regulation 4(2) obliged IPAT to invite further representations before refusing a late appeal. The Court rejected this as “completely unarguable.” Regulation 4(2) imposes a notice obligation only where the late notice of appeal contains neither a request for extension nor reasons. Here, the applicants completed Part 9 of the Notice of Appeal, requested an extension, and gave a (brief) reason. In those circumstances, Regulation 4(2) simply does not apply.

4) Reasons, rationality, and fettering

The Court found no arguable failure to give reasons or irrationality. IPAT explained that a notice of appeal can be lodged within time even without supporting documentation, which may follow later; hence, the delay was due to applicants’ inaction. That conclusion was reasonable. The “fettering” argument was immaterial because IPAT was exercising a quasi-judicial function, applying statutory criteria, not a broad discretion.

5) Injunctive relief: delay is fatal; “one minute to midnight” tactics impermissible

Despite granting leave on the discrete Regulation 4(5) point, the Court refused an injunction to restrain deportation, emphasising:

the applicants’ knowledge since May–July 2024 that deportation orders could follow,
the failure to appeal within time or to seek an extension for over 14 months,
their late instruction of solicitors and pursuit of revocation instead of the obvious time extension route,
their failure to present to GNIB, becoming “evaders,”
the making of the extension application only days before a scheduled removal.

The Court reiterated that drip-feeding is unlawful: applicants cannot hold back information or applications to engineer last-minute delays. Promptness is a core discretionary factor in any interlocutory application. The presence of a single arguable ground on a legal point does not trump egregious delay.

6) Medical anxiety and removability

A general practitioner’s report obtained by the Minister stated that the second applicant has no condition rendering air travel contraindicated; sedatives are commonly prescribed for acute anxiety related to flying. The applicants’ distress was understandable, but their situation was self‑created by not leaving voluntarily when ordered. No medical evidence created a legal impediment to deportation.

Impact and Significance

Immediate practical consequences

Deportation can proceed notwithstanding leave on a pure point of law. The Court expressly confirmed that the grant of leave on the Regulation 4(5) construction point does not undermine the lawfulness of the deportation orders or oblige the Minister to stay removals.
Regulation 4(2) narrowed. Practitioners cannot rely on Reg 4(2) to force IPAT to invite further submissions if an extension is already requested in the notice of appeal. The purpose of Reg 4(2) is to alert self-represented or unaware appellants that they must request an extension and state reasons; it is not a general “second chance” provision.
Revocation is not a safe harbour. Bare s.3(11) applications repeating rejected claims provide no shield against removal and will not found mandamus or injunctions.
Egregious delay will likely defeat injunctions even where a legal point is arguable. The judgment is a strong signal that courts will not reward tactical last‑minute filings.

Longer-term effects on the law

Regulation 4(5) test remains unsettled. The disjunctive versus cumulative construction awaits authoritative resolution in pending cases. If the test is disjunctive, the threshold for obtaining an extension might be lower (satisfying either special circumstances or injustice). If cumulative, applicants must satisfy both limbs. Regardless, this judgment suggests that where applicants knew of refusals and deportation orders and still delayed for many months without cogent reason, extensions will rarely be granted.
Administrative efficiency and abuse-of-process concerns. The Court hinted that using time-extension requests primarily to generate litigation leverage (rather than to prosecute a bona fide appeal) may be an abuse of process. Future cases may develop this into a firmer doctrine limiting tactical filings designed to delay deportation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT): Independent body hearing appeals from IPO refusals of refugee/subsidiary protection. Appeals must be lodged within 15 working days (Reg. 3(c) of the 2017 Regulations).
Regulation 4(2) (2017 Regulations): If a late notice of appeal is filed without any request for an extension or without reasons, IPAT must notify the appellant of the lateness and its intention to reject the appeal, triggering a short window (Reg. 4(3)) to apply for an extension. It does not apply when an extension is requested and reasons are given.
Regulation 4(5): Governs when IPAT “shall not” extend time except in defined circumstances: (a) “special circumstances” explaining lateness; and (b) injustice in refusing an extension. The live legal controversy is whether both must be satisfied (“cumulative”) or whether either suffices (“disjunctive”).
Refoulement (s.50 of the 2015 Act): Prohibits removal to a place where the person faces persecution, serious harm, or other prohibited ill‑treatment. After an IPO refusal, unless new evidence arises, the default is that no refoulement risk exists upon deportation.
Revocation (s.3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999): A power allowing the Minister to revoke a deportation order, usually where new material circumstances emerge. It is not intended to relitigate failed protection claims.
Judicial review remedies:
- Certiorari: quashes an unlawful decision (e.g., IPAT’s refusal to extend time).
- Mandamus: compels a decision‑maker to perform a legal duty (e.g., deciding a revocation application).
- Interlocutory injunction: temporary court order restraining deportation while proceedings are pending; granted only where the claim is arguable and the balance of justice favours a stay, with promptness being critical.
“Drip-feeding”: The disapproved practice of withholding information or applications to spring them at the last moment to delay deportation.
“Evader”: A person who fails to present for deportation arrangements as required, becoming liable to arrest.

Practice Pointers

Appeal periods are tight—act immediately. In protection cases, the 15 working-day deadline is strict. Lodge the notice of appeal even if supporting documents are pending; they can be supplied later.
If seeking an extension, provide a full chronology, identify precisely when new evidence was obtained, explain why it couldn’t be furnished earlier, and demonstrate concrete injustice if time is not extended. Vague references to recently obtained materials will fail.
Do not rely on revocation to stall removal. Unless there is genuinely new and material information going to refoulement or other legal impediments, s.3(11) applications will not protect against deportation or justify judicial relief.
Injunctions must be sought promptly. Delay is a major discretionary bar. Last-minute applications are likely to be refused even if a legal point is arguable.
Keep contact details updated and monitor correspondence. Only rare cases—such as mis-service to a wrong address—are likely to justify very late appeals after deportation orders have issued.

Note on Apparent Textual Inconsistency

Paragraph 21 records that IPAT interpreted Regulation 4(5) cumulatively and that the applicants argue for a disjunctive reading. Paragraph 45 quotes a ground suggesting IPAT misdirected itself by treating the limbs as disjunctive. Given the overall analysis and context, the latter is best read as a slip in the transcription: the arguable ground is that IPAT erred in applying a cumulative test where the applicants contend the statutory wording is disjunctive. The Court did not decide the point; it merely granted leave for it to be argued.

Conclusion

J.V.V.M. & C. de P. adds clear and practical guidance to the Irish international protection and removal jurisprudence:

It reaffirms that revocation applications lacking new material cannot ground injunctions, and that refoulement is presumed addressed by the protection refusal absent supervening risk (Kouaype).
It clarifies that Regulation 4(2)’s notice duty is narrow: it applies only if a late notice contains no extension request or reasons.
It holds that egregious delay is fatal to interim relief, condemning “drip-feeding” and signalling that courts will not facilitate last-minute tactical filings.
It recognises a single arguable legal issue on the construction of Regulation 4(5) (disjunctive vs cumulative), leaving that question for determination in pending cases.
Crucially, it confirms that grant of leave on a pure point of law does not in itself restrain deportation. The Minister remains entitled to execute valid deportation orders pending the outcome of the judicial review.

The decision thus balances respect for legal process—by permitting an arguable statutory construction challenge to proceed—with firm insistence on procedural discipline and timely engagement with available remedies. For applicants and practitioners, its message is unambiguous: act promptly, substantiate extension requests rigorously, and do not expect late-stage procedural manoeuvres to arrest enforcement of lawful deportation orders.