In Personam Nationwide Isaac Wunder Orders in the Circuit/District Courts, but No In Rem (General) Nationwide Restraints

1. Introduction

M v M (Approved) (Supreme Court of Ireland, 23 January 2026; Hogan J.) addresses the scope of the “Isaac Wunder” (vexatious/abusive litigation restraint) jurisdiction in the lower courts. The appeal raised two linked questions:

1. Whether the Circuit Court and District Court have jurisdiction to grant an Isaac Wunder order to prevent abusive litigation.
2. If so, whether such orders can operate with nationwide effect, despite the “local and limited” constitutional character of those courts.

The parties were GM (applicant/appellant) and IM (respondent), with the Attorney General as notice party. Hogan J.’s judgment is expressly complementary to Dunne J.’s (whose factual recital is adopted), but it develops the constitutional analysis of how far nationwide effects can flow from a lower-court order.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Hogan J. agreed that both the Circuit Court and the District Court do have an Isaac Wunder jurisdiction in principle, derived from the courts’ constitutional role under Article 34.1 to protect the administration of justice and prevent abuse of process.

On geographic scope, Hogan J. drew a critical distinction:

• The Circuit Court (and District Court) may make an Isaac Wunder order in personam against a litigant already within its personal jurisdiction, and that restraint may have effect outside the territorial bounds of the relevant Circuit/District as ancillary relief connected to proceedings properly before it.
• The Circuit Court (and District Court) may not make an in rem-type Isaac Wunder order that operates generally to restrain that litigant from suing other parties in other Circuits where the court has no personal jurisdiction—because that would effectively transform a “local and limited” court into a general, High Court-like forum.

The appeal was dismissed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Kirwan v. Connors [2025] IESC 21

This was the cornerstone of the constitutional framing. Hogan J. invoked it for the proposition that Article 34.1 makes the judiciary “custodians” of the administration of justice, implying a duty to ensure court processes are not used for “oblique or abusive purposes.” In M v M, that principle supplies the constitutional source for the Isaac Wunder jurisdiction in all courts administering justice, not only the High Court.

Murphy v. Greene [1990] 2 IR 566

Cited for McCarthy J.’s recognition of the Isaac Wunder jurisdiction as a legitimate mechanism regulating access to the courts. Its role here is to support the proposition that restricting a litigant’s ability to initiate proceedings (subject to leave) can be a constitutionally permissible regulation of access, rather than an unconstitutional denial.

O'Malley v. Irish Nationwide Building Society, High Court, 21st January 1984

Costello J.’s statement that such orders would be made only “in very rare circumstances” is used as a historical contrast. Hogan J. suggests modern conditions (more frequent abusive litigation) justify a more practically engaged, though still controlled, use of the jurisdiction.

Norris v. Attorney General [1984] IR 36

McCarthy J.’s observation that there were few instances of “officious interference” (abusive litigation) is likewise treated as historically contingent and no longer reflective of contemporary litigation realities. The citation supports Hogan J.’s broader policy premise: abusive litigation is now a significant enough phenomenon that the jurisdiction must be workable at all court levels.

Grimes v. Owners of SS Bangor Bay [1948] IR 350

Used to acknowledge the proposition that the Circuit Court is “one Court,” notwithstanding its operation through local circuits. Hogan J. accepts that unity, but insists it does not erase the constitutional requirement that its jurisdiction is “local and limited.”

The State (Boyle) v. Neylon [1986] IR 551

Cited alongside Grimes for similar observations about the Circuit Court’s unity. Again, the case is not deployed to expand power, but to set up the corrective: unity does not imply an unlimited nationwide competence akin to the High Court.

Permanent TSB plc v. Langan [2017] IESC 71, [2018] 1 IR 375

Clarke C.J.’s statement that a “real meaning must be given” to the limitation on Circuit Court jurisdiction is central to Hogan J.’s reasoning on nationwide effect. It anchors the conclusion that courts cannot treat “local and limited” as a formality and thereby confer effectively general jurisdiction on the Circuit Court.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Constitutional source of the Isaac Wunder jurisdiction

Hogan J. treats the Isaac Wunder jurisdiction as an incident of the constitutional duty under Article 34.1 to protect the integrity of the administration of justice. The right of access to the courts, while constitutionally protected, is not absolute: it can be regulated to prevent oppression and harassment through repetitious, meritless proceedings. On this account, the jurisdiction is not merely a creature of statute or High Court inherent power; it is a constitutionally-inflected necessity that follows the administration of justice into the Circuit and District Courts.

(b) “Local and limited” jurisdiction and nationwide effect: the in personam / in rem divide

The pivotal move is Hogan J.’s importation of a classic distinction:

• In personam orders operate against a person who is already properly before the court (personal jurisdiction established). Once that threshold is met (here, by reference to statutory jurisdictional gateways such as those in the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961), the court can grant effective ancillary relief that may be complied with anywhere.
• In rem orders purport to operate against “the world” or against status/property in a way that affects third parties and interests beyond those properly within the court’s reach. Hogan J. reasons that allowing a Circuit Court to issue an order with such general effect outside its Circuit would, in substance, confer an impermissibly broad jurisdiction.

(c) Application to Isaac Wunder orders

Hogan J. characterises a properly framed Isaac Wunder order, made in proceedings where the court has seisin and personal jurisdiction over the litigant, as a form of ancillary in personam control: the litigant may be restrained from suing the same opposing party anywhere in the State without leave. This does not extend the court’s subject-matter reach; it controls the conduct of a person already within jurisdiction in order to protect the administration of justice and the opposing party from continued harassment.

By contrast, a purported order restraining the litigant from suing anyone (other parties, other proceedings) across the State would be “in rem” in substance—functioning as a general, system-wide filing ban. That would exceed the constitutional limits of the lower courts by creating a “localised replica of the High Court” (citing JP Casey’s formulation).

(d) Institutional note: regulation by law

Hogan J. agrees with Collins J. that it would be desirable for the jurisdiction’s parameters to be regulated, preferably by statute but at least by Rules of Court. This signals a concern for procedural clarity (threshold, evidence, duration, leave criteria, review) to ensure proportionality and consistency, given the constitutional sensitivity of restraining access.

3.3 Impact

(a) Practical availability of anti-abuse tools in the lower courts

The judgment confirms that litigants and judges are not confined to High Court relief to curb abusive proceedings: the Circuit and District Courts have their own constitutional competence to act. This likely reduces cost and delay where abusive conduct manifests in family, civil, or summary contexts commonly litigated at those levels.

(b) A workable model for nationwide effect without unconstitutional expansion

By permitting nationwide practical effect of an in personam restraint (tied to proceedings and parties within jurisdiction), the Court supplies a middle path: protection can be meaningful (not confined to one Circuit) without converting the Circuit/District Courts into general administrators of the entire system’s docket.

(c) Incentive to frame orders narrowly

The in personam / in rem distinction will shape drafting. Orders are more likely to survive challenge where they are:

• linked to a litigant already within the court’s personal jurisdiction,
• connected to identified proceedings or an identified opposing party, and
• structured as a leave-to-issue mechanism rather than an outright prohibition.

(d) System design: impetus for Rules or legislation

The expressed desirability of regulation invites procedural harmonisation (potentially across all court tiers), including clear criteria for leave applications, notice requirements, duration, and review/appeal mechanisms—important to ensure proportionality and to protect legitimate access to justice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Isaac Wunder order: a court order aimed at stopping a person from repeatedly bringing abusive or meritless litigation. Typically it requires the person to obtain the court’s permission (“leave”) before starting further proceedings of a specified kind.
• In personam: an order directed at a specific person. Even if made by a local court, it can require that person to act (or not act) anywhere, because it binds the individual, not a place or property.
• In rem: an order directed at property or status, or one that effectively binds “everyone.” Such orders are more constitutionally sensitive for local courts because they can affect third parties and extend beyond the court’s territorial competence.
• “Local and limited” jurisdiction: a constitutional constraint (Article 34.3.4°) that the Circuit and District Courts cannot be given the same general, nationwide original jurisdiction as the High Court. Their jurisdiction must be meaningfully bounded, including by geography.
• Ancillary relief: additional orders a court may make to ensure its process is effective and fair in litigation properly before it (e.g., controlling abusive conduct connected to those proceedings).

5. Conclusion

M v M (Approved) confirms that the Circuit Court and District Court possess a constitutionally grounded power to restrain abusive litigation through Isaac Wunder orders, rooted in their Article 34.1 duty to protect the administration of justice. The judgment’s principal doctrinal contribution is the limitation principle: lower courts may issue in personam Isaac Wunder orders with practical nationwide effect against litigants within their personal jurisdiction, but they may not issue generalised (in rem-like) orders restraining proceedings against all potential parties across the State.

The decision both strengthens protection against oppressive litigation and preserves the constitutional architecture distinguishing the High Court’s full original jurisdiction from the “local and limited” character of the lower courts.