Exclusive Judicial Review Route for Challenges to CCPC Mutual Assistance Decisions under Section 15AAA of the Competition Act 2002 – Commentary on Ryanair DAC & Ryanair Holdings plc v CCPC (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 639

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the judgment of Barrett J in the High Court of Ireland in Ryanair DAC & Ryanair Holdings plc v Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (No. 2) ([2025] IEHC 639, 20 November 2025).

The decision is an important procedural precedent in Irish competition law and administrative law. It clarifies that, following the insertion of section 15AAA into the Competition Act 2002 by the Competition (Amendment) Act 2022, the validity of certain decisions or acts of the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (“CCPC”) – including decisions connected with mutual assistance between competition authorities – may only be challenged by way of judicial review under Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (“RSC”) and within the statutory time limit. Plenary proceedings are not an available alternative route.

The case arises out of an investigation by the Italian competition authority (referred to in the judgment as the AGCM) and the CCPC’s decision to provide assistance to that authority, including applying to the District Court for a search warrant in respect of Ryanair’s corporate offices in Dublin. Ryanair instituted plenary proceedings seeking, among other things, to challenge:

the CCPC’s decision to accede to the AGCM’s request for assistance and to apply for a warrant; and
the conduct and alleged failures of the AGCM itself.

In this “No. 2” judgment, the High Court deals with the CCPC’s interlocutory application to strike out paragraphs 20–27 of Ryanair’s statement of claim under Order 24, rule 28 RSC and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, on the basis that those paragraphs:

impermissibly challenge a CCPC decision which, by statute, can only be questioned by judicial review; and
attempt to impugn the conduct of a non-party foreign authority (the AGCM).

Barrett J grants the CCPC’s motion and strikes out the impugned paragraphs in their entirety. The judgment therefore consolidates a new, clear procedural rule: where section 15AAA(2) applies, judicial review under Order 84 is the exclusive route for challenging CCPC decisions or acts; a plenary action cannot be used as an alternative, even if commenced within the judicial review time limit.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 The motion before the Court

By a notice of motion dated 26 September 2024, the CCPC sought an order under Order 24, rule 28 RSC (and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction) striking out paragraphs 20–27 of Ryanair’s statement of claim, delivered on 24 September 2024. Although the original motion had also referred to paragraph 43, the CCPC no longer pursued that part of the relief at the hearing.

Paragraphs 20–27 (reproduced in Appendix A to the judgment) set out a detailed public law challenge to the lawfulness of:

the AGCM’s request for assistance; and
the CCPC’s decision to accept that request and to apply to the District Court for a search warrant,

and they seek an order that the CCPC’s decision “falls to be quashed” by way of certiorari.

2.2 Two strands of remaining pleas

Barrett J notes that the remaining pleas in the action comprised:

a challenge to a decision of the CCPC; and
allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the AGCM.

He addresses (ii) first and then (i).

2.3 Allegations against the AGCM

The Court holds that the AGCM is not a party to these proceedings, and therefore:

“its acts cannot be impugned in this forum.” (para. 5)

That conclusion is “all the more compelling” because, in substance, the criticisms of the AGCM are a collateral attack on the CCPC: Ryanair contends that alleged impropriety by the AGCM tainted the CCPC’s actions. The Court rejects this indirect mode of challenge.

2.4 The statutory regime for challenging CCPC decisions

Turning to item (i) – the challenge to the CCPC’s decision to provide assistance – the Court emphasises that section 15AAA(2) of the Competition Act 2002 is “unequivocal”.

Section 15AAA(2) provides (emphasis added):

“The validity of a decision made or an act done by a competent authority (including an authorised officer and an adjudication officer) in the performance of a function under Parts 2C to 2G… shall not be questioned other than – (a) by way of an application for judicial review under Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts…and in accordance with this section, or (b) in accordance with a process provided for in this Act…the Act of 2002 or the Act of 2014 by which the validity of such decision or act may be questioned.”

The CCPC’s decision to comply with the AGCM’s request for assistance was taken under section 15AQ (“Mutual Assistance”, located in Part 2F of the 2002 Act). It therefore falls squarely within section 15AAA(2).

Section 15AAA(5) then imposes a specific time limit for judicial review:

“…an application for leave to apply for judicial review under Order 84 in respect of a decision or other act to which subsection (2) applies shall be made… (b) in respect of decisions or other acts under Parts 2E and 2F, not later than 8 weeks from the date on which… …the undertaking or person became aware of the decision or act.”

Ryanair conceded that it became aware of the CCPC’s decision to apply for the warrant on 8 March 2024, the date on which the warrant was executed (para. 10).

2.5 Rejection of Ryanair’s reliance on plenary proceedings

Ryanair attempted to rely on a body of case law (including O’Donnell v Dún Laoghaire Corporation, Ryanair v Bravofly & Travelfusion, Donatex, Shell E&P v McGrath, and the CRH plc & Irish Cement v CCPC litigation) which recognised that public law challenges may sometimes be pursued by plenary proceedings, particularly where judicial review time limits would be complied with.

The Court rejects this argument on two related bases:

Change in statutory landscape: many of the cited cases predate the 2022 insertion of section 15AAA and do not concern that provision at all. They cannot justify displacing the “plain and unambiguous” text of the new section (para. 15).
Exclusive procedural route: section 15AAA(2) mandates not simply a time limit, but a specific procedure – an application for judicial review under Order 84. Ryanair never sought or obtained leave under Order 84 and thus:
“does not enjoy any form of de facto compliance with O.84 RSC” (para. 14; see also para. 19).

As to Ryanair’s reliance on CRH plc & Irish Cement Ltd v CCPC, where a competition enforcement challenge proceeded by plenary action without objection, Barrett J notes that:

“The difficulty with this submission is self-evident: there would have been no basis for any such objection at that time, given the then-existing state of the law and the fact that the relevant provisions of the Competition (Amendment) Act 2022 would not be enacted for a further five years.” (para. 16)

2.6 Rationale: finality and legislative intent

The Court identifies a clear policy rationale behind section 15AAA:

“In my view, there is a clear rationale underpinning the enactment of s.15AAA(2), namely the promotion of finality in litigation.” (para. 18)

It would be inconsistent with that rationale, and with the statutory text, to allow a party who is “in clear breach of statutory requirements” to pursue a form of action which the statute expressly excludes, and to do so outside the prescribed framework (paras. 18–19).

The Court also rejects the submission that it would be “unusual and artificial” to be permitted to consider the legality of the District Court warrant while being prohibited from considering the legality of the CCPC’s decision to seek that warrant (para. 17). Whatever Ryanair’s view of the practical consequences, the statutory scheme is clear and must be applied.

2.7 Outcome

For all of these reasons, Barrett J:

accedes to the CCPC’s application; and
directs that paragraphs 20–27 of Ryanair’s statement of claim be struck out in their entirety (para. 20).

The Court reserves the question of costs: “I will hear the parties as to costs.” (para. 21).

3. Statutory and Procedural Framework

3.1 Order 24, rule 28 RSC – striking out pleadings

Order 24, rule 28 RSC allows the Master or the Court to strike out any pleading that:

discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence;
is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;
may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or
is an abuse of the process of the Court.

The CCPC relied on this rule (and the Court’s inherent jurisdiction) to argue that Ryanair’s paragraphs 20–27 were statutorily prohibited, since they sought to challenge a decision in a manner that section 15AAA(2) forbids.

3.2 Judicial review under Order 84 RSC

Order 84 governs judicial review. Key features include:

Leave requirement: proceedings commence by an application for leave (permission) to seek judicial review.
Time limit: the application for leave must be brought promptly and, where relevant statutes so provide, within specified short time limits (here, 8 weeks under s.15AAA(5)(b) for Part 2F decisions).
Remedies: classic public law remedies such as certiorari (quashing decisions), mandamus (compelling action), prohibition (preventing unlawful action), as well as declarations and injunctions.

Section 15AAA(2) explicitly ties challenges to CCPC decisions to this Order 84 procedure.

3.3 Section 15AQ – Mutual assistance (Part 2F, Competition Act 2002)

Section 15AQ(1) provides:

“A competent authority may request a competition authority of another Member State to carry out an inspection, interview or other fact-finding measure on its behalf…”

This is part of a wider “Mutual Assistance” scheme (Part 2F) implementing EU law obligations of coordination and cooperation among national competition authorities. It also governs the CCPC’s receipt and execution of requests from other Member States’ authorities.

In the present case, the CCPC acted under section 15AQ when it acceded to the AGCM’s request for assistance and applied to the District Court for a search warrant. That decision is the direct target of paragraphs 20–27 of the statement of claim.

3.4 Section 15AAA – Exclusive challenge mechanism

Section 15AAA, inserted by section 13 of the Competition (Amendment) Act 2022, creates a bespoke regime for challenging decisions and acts of a “competent authority” (a term that includes the CCPC) under Parts 2C–2G of the 2002 Act.

Provision	Key Effect
s.15AAA(2)	The validity of a decision or act under Parts 2C–2G “shall not be questioned other than” by: (a) judicial review under Order 84 and in accordance with s.15AAA, or (b) an alternative process expressly provided in the competition legislation.
s.15AAA(5)(b)	For decisions or acts under Parts 2E and 2F (which include mutual assistance under s.15AQ), an application for leave for judicial review must be made within 8 weeks from the date when the undertaking became aware of the decision or act.

This regime mirrors the kind of exclusive challenge mechanisms found in other specialist areas of Irish public law (such as the planning and development code), emphasising speed, finality and procedural uniformity.

4. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 Non-justiciability of the AGCM’s acts and collateral attack

The Court’s first step is to deal with Ryanair’s allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the AGCM (para. 5). These are set out principally in paragraphs 20–22 of the statement of claim, where Ryanair:

asserts that “no justification existed” for the AGCM to request assistance and for the CCPC to agree to provide that assistance; and
alleges that, under the duty of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TFEU, the AGCM was obliged to inform the CCPC of various matters (including prior RFIs, Ryanair’s co-operation, and the content of Italian judgments).

Barrett J’s reasoning can be distilled as follows:

The AGCM is not a party to the proceedings. It is a foreign authority and has not been joined. It is a basic principle of fairness and procedural regularity that a party’s rights should not be adjudicated upon in its absence. Hence, “its acts cannot be impugned in this forum” (para. 5).
The attempt to criticise the AGCM functions, in substance, as a collateral attack on the CCPC. Ryanair’s theory is that the AGCM’s alleged failures (in not disclosing certain information and in requesting assistance unjustifiably) “tainted” the CCPC’s decision-making. The Court is not prepared to allow a backdoor challenge to AGCM conduct to serve as the foundation for an attack on the CCPC.

While Barrett J does not spell out every doctrinal step, this approach is consonant with:

the general principle against collateral challenges to decisions of bodies not directly before the court; and
the practical limits on an Irish court’s role in reviewing the acts of a foreign competition authority.

This strand alone would significantly weaken the foundation of paragraphs 20–22, which are expressed largely in terms of alleged failures by the AGCM to comply with EU obligations of sincere cooperation.

4.2 Application of section 15AAA(2): exclusivity of judicial review

The core of the judgment concerns the procedural exclusivity

4.2.1 Plain meaning and legislative text

The Court emphasises that the text of section 15AAA(2) is “plain” and “unequivocal” (paras. 7, 12, 15). The phrase “shall not be questioned other than” is critical. It signals that:

there is a closed list of permitted procedures for challenge; and
challenges outside those channels are prohibited.

Thus, where a decision or act is taken by the CCPC in performance of a function under Parts 2C–2G, its validity may be questioned only by:

judicial review under Order 84 (and in accordance with section 15AAA itself); or
any specific alternative review process provided for in the competition legislation (for example, statutory appeals in some regimes).

The decision under challenge here – the CCPC’s decision to accept the AGCM’s request for assistance and to apply for a warrant – was a function under Part 2F (“Mutual Assistance”) and so is unquestionably within the scope of section 15AAA(2).

4.2.2 Interaction with section 15AAA(5): time limits and awareness

Section 15AAA(5) adds a temporal component. For Part 2E and 2F decisions, leave for judicial review must be sought within 8 weeks of the date on which the undertaking became aware of the decision or act.

Ryanair was aware of the decision, at the latest, on 8 March 2024, when the warrant was executed. Thus any judicial review had to be initiated – by applying for leave under Order 84 – within 8 weeks of that date.

Instead, Ryanair chose to:

issue a plenary summons and statement of claim; and
seek effectively judicial review-type relief (quashing the CCPC’s decision by certiorari) through those plenary proceedings.

This is precisely what section 15AAA(2) is designed to prevent.

4.2.3 Rejection of “de facto” compliance

Ryanair argued that its plenary proceedings were, in substance, compliant with the judicial review regime – particularly given that they were issued within the 8-week limit. The Court firmly rejects any notion of “de facto compliance”:

“Ryanair does not enjoy any form of de facto compliance with O.84 RSC, as the leave required under that Order has never been sought or obtained.” (para. 14)

And even more strongly:

“Ryanair has not complied with the requirements applicable to a judicial review application; but even if it had, the failure to proceed in the manner expressly mandated by statute would, of itself, constitute a sufficient basis for striking out the impugned pleas.” (para. 19, emphasis added)

The point is doctrinally important: where a statute prescribes not just a time limit but a particular procedure, compliance with the time limit alone does not cure the procedural defect. Proceedings must be brought in the form the statute requires.

4.2.4 Legislative purpose: finality in litigation

The Court discerns a clear rationale for the enactment of section 15AAA(2):

“In my view, there is a clear rationale underpinning the enactment of s.15AAA(2), namely the promotion of finality in litigation.” (para. 18)

This aligns with broader public law policy concerns:

regulators such as the CCPC should not be subject to indefinite or piecemeal challenges;
regulated undertakings should know promptly whether they will challenge enforcement decisions and on what basis; and
courts should not permit procedural end-runs around carefully constructed statutory schemes.

Ryanair’s proposed construction – allowing plenary actions to function as a parallel route, so long as they meet JR time limits – would undermine that purpose by:

fragmenting the procedural landscape; and
potentially lengthening and complicating litigation (given the broader scope of discovery and oral evidence in plenary actions).

4.3 Treatment of Ryanair’s authorities

4.3.1 Pre‑2022 jurisprudence on plenary challenges

Ryanair relied on a line of authority recognising that public law issues may sometimes be litigated by way of plenary proceedings, including:

O’Donnell v Dún Laoghaire Corporation [1991] ILRM 301;
Ryanair v Bravofly & Travelfusion Ltd [2009] IEHC 41;
Donatex Ltd v Dublin Docklands Development Authority [2012] IEHC 318; and
Shell E&P Ireland Ltd v McGrath [2013] 1 IR 247; [2013] IESC 1.

These cases indeed recognise that, in the absence of a statutory mechanism to the contrary, questions about the lawfulness of administrative action can be raised in plenary actions, especially where rights-based issues or complex factual disputes arise.

However, Barrett J’s central point is that these authorities:

did not concern section 15AAA (which did not exist at the time); and
in some cases, significantly predate the 2022 legislative reforms.

He concludes:

“I am not persuaded that it would be appropriate to depart from the plain and unambiguous wording of a statutory provision enacted in 2022 by reliance on case law which does not concern that provision and much of which predates its enactment by many years.” (para. 15)

Put simply, general case law permitting plenary public law challenges cannot override a later, specific statutory direction mandating judicial review as the exclusive route.

4.3.2 The CRH/Iris Cement litigation

Ryanair also argued that it was “relevant” that in CRH plc, Irish Cement Ltd v CCPC [2018] 1 IR 521; [2017] IESC 34, the challenge was brought by plenary action “with no objection of form apparently being raised” (para. 16).

The Court disposes of this point succinctly:

“…there would have been no basis for any such objection at that time, given the then-existing state of the law and the fact that the relevant provisions of the Competition (Amendment) Act 2022 would not be enacted for a further five years.” (para. 16)

Thus, CRH is factually similar (a competition enforcement challenge) but legally distinguishable due to the timing of the statutory amendments. It cannot confer enduring permission to use plenary proceedings where the legislature has since imposed a new procedural code.

4.3.3 Malone v Laois County Council – analogous planning provision

The Court notes that the “plain meaning” of section 15AAA(2) is “reinforced” by the High Court’s analysis in Malone v Laois County Council [2025] IEHC 345, concerning an analogous provision in the planning and development code (para. 12).

Barrett J does not analyse Malone in detail, stating that it is unnecessary for present purposes. However, the reference signals that:

Irish courts have already interpreted similar “shall not be questioned other than” formulations as creating an exclusive judicial review route; and
section 15AAA(2) should be read consistently with that established approach in other specialised regulatory regimes (notably planning law, where tight time limits and exclusive JR routes are well known).

4.4 Rejection of Ryanair’s “practical consequences” argument

Ryanair argued that it would be “unusual and artificial” for the Court, at the substantive hearing, to:

adjudicate on the legality of the District Court warrant; yet
be precluded from considering the legality of the CCPC’s prior decision to accept the AGCM’s assistance request and apply for that warrant.

They contended that such an outcome was unlikely to have been intended by the Oireachtas, and that the Court should therefore interpret section 15AAA(2) more flexibly (para. 17).

Barrett J firmly rejects this submission. He reiterates that:

the language of the statute is clear; and
the policy of finality supports a strict reading.

He goes further to say that he does not accept that it is in any sense “unusual and artificial” for a party to be precluded from commencing proceedings “in a form and at a time that contravenes the express terms of the legislation” (para. 18). On the contrary, such preclusion is “entirely consistent” with both the language and the purpose of the statutory scheme.

The message is that:

perceived practical inconvenience to litigants cannot justify judicial departure from clear statutory text; and
the Court will not “bend” procedural rules to accommodate parties who chose – perhaps strategically – not to invoke the mandated judicial review mechanism in time and in the proper form.

4.5 The role of constitutional and human rights pleas

The deleted paragraphs 26–27 allege that the CCPC’s acceptance of the assistance request and its decision to apply for a warrant:

were an unnecessary, disproportionate and unjustifiable interference with Ryanair’s constitutional rights (good name, privacy, property);
violated Ryanair’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 8 and A1P1); and
infringed rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 7).

One might suggest that fundamental rights-based arguments could justify bypassing or relaxing procedural restrictions. However, Barrett J’s reasoning does not entertain any such carve-out. Instead:

these rights-based substantive claims are simply locked into the procedural channel that the legislature has chosen; and
if a party wishes to argue that section 15AAA itself is unconstitutional or incompatible with higher norms, it would have to do so directly (which Ryanair did not attempt in this motion).

The judgment therefore implicitly affirms that: substantive rights arguments do not, by themselves, confer a right to choose a procedural route that is excluded by statute.

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 For competition law litigation against the CCPC

This decision has immediate consequences for how businesses and their advisers must structure challenges to CCPC actions taken under Parts 2C–2G (including Part 2F mutual assistance decisions).

The key implications are:

Exclusive JR route: challenges to the validity of CCPC decisions or acts under these Parts must be brought by judicial review under Order 84, or via an expressly provided alternative statutory process. Plenary actions are not a permissible substitute.
Strict time limits: for decisions under Parts 2E and 2F (which includes the kind of mutual assistance decision at issue here), the leave application must be made within 8 weeks of awareness. Delay or reliance on “ordinary” six-year limitation periods applicable to tort or contract actions will not rescue a party who fails to move within this tight window.
No “work-arounds” via creative pleading: describing the relief sought in terms of declarations or damages, or embedding public law criticisms in a primarily private law claim, will not avoid section 15AAA(2) if the essence of the claim is to challenge the validity of a CCPC decision or act under Parts 2C–2G.

In practical terms, any undertaking affected by a CCPC action under the relevant Parts must now:

identify promptly whether there is a basis to challenge the decision or act;
consider urgent judicial review as the primary route; and
prepare to comply strictly with Order 84 procedural requirements, including the leave stage and affidavit grounding the application.

5.2 For cross‑border competition investigations and mutual assistance

The judgment has a further, more specific impact in the context of cross-border enforcement:

An undertaking cannot, in Irish proceedings, impugn the legality of a foreign competition authority’s actions (here, those of the AGCM) where that authority is not a party.
Attempts to allege that foreign impropriety “taints” an Irish authority’s decision will be carefully scrutinised, and may be rejected as a collateral attack.

This reinforces the structural principle of the EU competition network: challenges to the decisions of each national authority are ordinarily to be taken through that authority’s own legal system, subject to the overarching framework of EU law, rather than indirectly through proceedings in another Member State.

5.3 For Irish public law generally

Beyond competition law, the judgment contributes to a broader pattern in Irish public law:

Where the Oireachtas enacts a special review mechanism with explicit exclusivity language (“shall not be questioned other than…”), the courts will enforce that exclusivity rigorously.
Earlier, more flexible case law on the choice between judicial review and plenary proceedings will be read subject to later, specific statutory provisions that confine or channel challenges to a particular route.
Courts will be slow to dilute or re-interpret clear statutory language on procedural exclusivity on the basis of perceived practical inconvenience or fairness in an individual case.

The reference to Malone v Laois County Council confirms that this approach resonates with similar regimes in other specialist areas, notably planning and environmental law.

6. Complex Concepts Explained

6.1 Judicial review vs plenary proceedings

Judicial review (Order 84 RSC):

is a specialised procedure designed to review the lawfulness of decisions or actions of public bodies;
requires an initial application for leave (permission) supported by affidavit evidence;
is subject to short time limits (often weeks, not years);
typically focuses on legality, reasonableness, and procedural fairness rather than broad factual disputes; and
offers public law remedies (certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, declarations).

Plenary proceedings (ordinary civil action):

commence by plenary summons and usually proceed to trial on oral evidence;
are used for a wide range of civil disputes (contract, tort, constitutional torts, etc.);
are subject to longer limitation periods (often measured in years); and
allow extensive factual exploration, discovery and cross-examination.

Historically, Irish courts allowed some flexibility: public law issues could sometimes be litigated via plenary actions. However, where legislation such as section 15AAA(2) imposes an exclusive judicial review route, that flexibility is curtailed.

6.2 Collateral attack

A collateral attack occurs where a party indirectly challenges the validity or propriety of a decision or act by a body that is not directly before the court, instead of using the proper procedural route to challenge that body’s decision.

In this case, Ryanair’s attempt to allege breaches by the AGCM (a non-party foreign authority) and to argue that those breaches tainted the CCPC’s conduct was characterised as such an indirect attack. The Court refused to entertain it.

6.3 Duty of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TFEU)

Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) imposes a duty of sincere cooperation on Member States and EU institutions. It requires them to assist each other in carrying out tasks arising from the Treaties and to take appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of obligations under EU law.

Ryanair alleged that, under this principle, the AGCM was obliged to provide the CCPC with extensive background information about the Italian investigation before requesting assistance. They argued that AGCM’s failure to do so, and the CCPC’s failure to inquire into these matters, rendered the assistance request unjustified and its acceptance unlawful.

The Court did not engage with the merits of these contentions, because:

the AGCM’s acts are not justiciable in these proceedings; and
the challenge to the CCPC’s acceptance of the request is procedurally barred under section 15AAA(2) when pursued via plenary proceedings.

6.4 Mutual assistance in competition enforcement

“Mutual assistance” refers to mechanisms whereby competition authorities in different EU Member States cooperate in investigations, including by:

requesting each other’s authorities to carry out inspections or “dawn raids”;
collecting documents and data; and
conducting interviews or other fact-finding measures.

Section 15AQ of the 2002 Act is Ireland’s domestic legal vehicle for such cooperation. In this case:

the AGCM requested the CCPC’s assistance;
the CCPC, acting under section 15AQ, decided to accede to that request; and
the CCPC then sought and obtained a search warrant from the District Court, which was executed on 8 March 2024.

Ryanair sought to argue that the CCPC’s decision to accept the request and to seek a warrant was disproportionate and unlawful. Section 15AAA(2), as applied by the Court, makes clear that such challenges must go through judicial review.

7. Conclusion

The High Court’s decision in Ryanair DAC & Ryanair Holdings plc v CCPC (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 639 establishes a clear and important precedent in Irish competition and administrative law.

The central holding is that section 15AAA(2) of the Competition Act 2002 creates an exclusive route – judicial review under Order 84 – for challenging the validity of CCPC decisions and acts taken under Parts 2C–2G, including mutual assistance decisions under section 15AQ (Part 2F). Plenary proceedings cannot serve as a parallel or alternative route, even where they are commenced within the statutory time limit for judicial review.

The Court underscores:

the plain and unequivocal statutory language of section 15AAA(2);
the policy of finality underpinning the provision; and
the inability of pre‑2022 case law on plenary public law challenges to displace this specific, later-enacted procedural code.

Additionally, the judgment affirms that:

the acts of a foreign competition authority (here, the AGCM) cannot be impugned in Irish proceedings where that authority is not a party; and
attempts to frame such allegations as a way of undermining the CCPC’s actions will be treated as impermissible collateral attacks.

In the broader legal context, the decision consolidates a trend towards specialised, exclusive, and time-sensitive review mechanisms in regulatory fields, and serves as a warning to litigants that they must carefully observe statutory procedural requirements when seeking to challenge administrative decisions. For competition law practice in particular, it emphasises that any challenge to CCPC actions under Parts 2C–2G must be mounted swiftly and via judicial review, not by ordinary plenary action.

Exclusive Judicial Review Route for Challenges to CCPC Decisions under Section 15AAA: Commentary on Ryanair DAC v CCPC [2025] IEHC 639