Summary of Judgment by Judge Barrett

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment, delivered by Judge Barrett on 20 November 2025, arises from a motion dated 26 September 2024 in which Company B (Defendant) sought an order under Order 24, r.28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (and/or the Court's inherent jurisdiction) striking out paragraphs 20–27 of the statement of claim delivered on 24 September 2024. Company A (Plaintiff) initiated plenary proceedings seeking, among other things, an order of certiorari challenging Company B's decision to provide assistance to a foreign competition authority (referred to below as Company C) at or about the time a warrant was executed at Company A's corporate offices. Company A became aware of the execution of the warrant on 8 March 2024.

The strike-out application was one of three applications dealt with during a three-day hearing; an earlier related judgment of the Court (delivered on 18 November) provides background factual material relied upon here. The remaining pleas framed by Company A comprised (i) a challenge to Company B's decision to accede to Company C's request for assistance and (ii) allegations of wrongdoing by Company C. Company C is not a party to these proceedings; Company B's decision to accede to the Assistance Request was taken pursuant to s.15AQ of the Competition Act 2002 (Part 2F: Mutual Assistance).

For reasons explained in the judgment, Judge Barrett directed that paragraphs 20–27 of the statement of claim be struck out in their entirety. Those paragraphs are reproduced in the judgment's Appendix A (and are summarised below in the Court's analysis).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether paragraphs 20–27 of the statement of claim, which challenge Company B's decision to provide assistance to Company C and to apply for a search warrant, should be struck out on the basis that section 15AAA(2) of the Competition Act 2002 precludes such challenges except by judicial review under Order 84 RSC (and within statutory time limits).
2. Whether allegations concerning Company C (a non‑party) can properly be entertained in these proceedings, or whether such allegations constitute an impermissible collateral attack on Company B's conduct.
3. Whether Company A may pursue public-law challenges by plenary proceedings in circumstances where, it is asserted, the procedural and temporal requirements for judicial review (including leave under Order 84) have not been obtained.

Arguments of the Parties

Company A's Arguments

• Company A argued that Company B's literal reading of s.15AAA(2) was "overly simplistic" and failed to engage with a body of case law recognising that public-law challenges may be pursued in plenary proceedings, particularly where matters relevant to judicial review time limits have been addressed within the plenary process.
• Company A relied on a number of authorities (identified in the judgment) to support the proposition that plenary proceedings can be used to raise public-law issues and suggested that an objection on form would have been unlikely in prior cases decided before the 2022 Amendment Act.
• Company A contended that it had, in substance, complied with the steps required for judicial review and that it would be artificial for the Court to adjudicate on the legality of the warrant at a substantive hearing while being precluded from considering the legality of Company B's decision to accede to the request and apply for the warrant.

Company B's Arguments

• Company B applied to strike out paragraphs 20–27 under Order 24, r.28 on the basis that s.15AAA(2) of the Competition Act 2002 restricts challenges to decisions or acts under Parts 2C–2G of that Act to judicial review under Order 84 RSC (and the statutory regime), which Company A had not followed.
• Company B's oral submissions indicated that relief initially sought in relation to paragraph 43 of the statement of claim was no longer being pursued.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Barrett's analysis proceeded along discrete lines:

1. Statutory framework — The Court identified s.15AAA(2) of the Competition Act 2002 (as inserted by the Competition (Amendment) Act 2022) as unequivocally prescribing the exclusive modes by which the validity of decisions or acts under Parts 2C–2G (including mutual assistance in Part 2F and s.15AQ) may be questioned: namely, (a) by application for judicial review under Order 84 RSC in accordance with that section, or (b) by processes expressly provided for in the Act or related legislation.
2. Time limits — The Court noted s.15AAA(5), which prescribes time limits for applications for leave to apply for judicial review: 28 working days for certain Parts and eight weeks for Parts 2E and 2F, calculated from the date notice of the decision/act was published or when the person became aware of it. Company A became aware of the warrant's execution on 8 March 2024.
3. Non-party allegations — The Court held that allegations directed at Company C (the foreign authority) could not be the subject of attack in this forum where Company C is not a party; criticisms of Company C amounted in substance to a collateral attack on Company B's conduct and thus were impermissible in this proceeding.
4. Procedural compliance — The Court found that Company A had not obtained the leave required under Order 84 RSC and therefore did not benefit from any form of de facto compliance with the judicial review procedure. The Court emphasised that Company A had not proceeded in the manner mandated by s.15AAA(2).
5. On authorities and statutory primacy — The Court addressed Company A's reliance on older authorities permitting plenary public-law challenges. It concluded that reliance on pre-2022 case law could not justify departing from the plain, unambiguous wording of s.15AAA(2) enacted in 2022. The Court emphasised the legislative purpose of s.15AAA(2), notably the promotion of finality in litigation, and rejected the submission that the statutory bar produced an "unusual and artificial" outcome.
6. Outcome — Given the statutory prescription of both form and time-limits for challenging the relevant decisions/acts, and Company A's failure to comply with those mandatory statutory requirements, the Court held that paragraphs 20–27 of the statement of claim must be struck out. The Court explained that even if Company A had complied with certain procedural steps, the failure to proceed in the manner expressly mandated by statute would alone justify striking out the impugned pleas.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court acceded to Company B's application and directed that paragraphs 20–27 of the statement of claim be STRUCK OUT in their entirety.

Implications:

• The immediate effect is that the pleaded challenges in paragraphs 20–27 (which alleged that Company C failed to inform Company B of specified matters, that Company B failed to make necessary inquiries before acceding to the Assistance Request, and that the decision to accept the Assistance Request and to apply for the warrant was unnecessary, disproportionate and breached constitutional and human-rights protections) have been removed from the statement of claim.
• The Court relied on the explicit statutory scheme (s.15AAA and s.15AQ of the Competition Act 2002 as amended) and the associated time limits. The decision enforces the statutory requirement that challenges to decisions/acts under the specified Parts of the Act be pursued by judicial review in accordance with Order 84, within the prescribed timeframes.
• The judgment does not announce a novel exception to the statutory regime; rather it underscores the primacy of the 2022 amendment and its aim of promoting finality. The Court did not indicate that broader new legal principles beyond enforcing the statutory scheme were being established.
• The Court noted that it would hear the parties on costs.

Appendix — Nature of Struck Pleadings (summary)

The paragraphs struck out alleged, in substance, that:

• Company C had no justification to request assistance and Company B had no justification to accede and apply for the warrant;
• Company C failed in duties said to arise from EU cooperation obligations and failed to inform Company B of material matters (including prior responses from Company A and other relevant proceedings) which would have been central to the District Judge's decision to grant a warrant;
• Company B had public-law duties to make reasonable inquiries and to consider less-intrusive alternatives before accepting the Assistance Request;
• Had such inquiries been made, Company B would have been obliged to refuse the Assistance Request; its acceptance and the subsequent warrant application were said to constitute unnecessary and disproportionate interferences with Company A's constitutional, ECHR and EU Charter rights; and
• Accordingly, Company A sought quashing (certiorari) of Company B's decision and of any steps taken in reliance on that decision, including the warrant.

This information has been anonymised in accordance with the summary requirements and is based exclusively on the content of the provided judgment.