Enhanced Reasoning Requirements for “Safe Country of Origin” Determinations

Introduction

The High Court of Ireland, in P.P. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Anor, V.S. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Anor ([2025] IEHC 134), addressed the issue of whether the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) erred in law by failing to adequately explain its application of the “safe country of origin” presumption. The Applicants, P.P. and V.S., both Georgian nationals, asserted that they faced persecution and threats in Georgia arising from an extortion scheme orchestrated by criminal gangs. They challenged the Tribunal’s determinations that they had not submitted any serious grounds for considering that Georgia is unsafe for them, despite the Tribunal’s own finding of a well-founded fear of persecution.

The case involves important questions about how Irish and European Union law govern the assessment of international protection applications, especially when an applicant comes from a designated safe country of origin. The legal framework includes domestic legislation (International Protection Act 2015) and EU directives such as Directive 2005/85/EC (the “Asylum Procedures Directive”) and Directive 2004/83/EC (the “Asylum Qualification Directive”). As a result of the High Court’s ruling, the principle has been clarified that decision-makers, when invoking the safe country of origin concept, must provide clear and thorough reasons for rejecting any arguments or evidence suggesting that the country in question may not be safe for a specific applicant.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court, per Mr. Justice Alexander Owens, determined that the Tribunal had failed to provide a sufficiently reasoned conclusion on why the Applicants’ allegations of police collusion with extortion gangs in Georgia did not meet the threshold for “any serious grounds for considering” that Georgia might not be safe. The Court stressed the following key points:

The Tribunal did not give clear explanations for concluding that Georgia was a safe country of origin for P.P. and V.S., especially since it had accepted there was a “well-founded fear of persecution” by gang members.
The absence of specific evidence of corrupt relationships between the extortionists and the police was not a sufficient reason, on its own, to disregard the Applicants’ claims.
The Tribunal must address any country of origin information or testimony relevant to police collusion to conclude properly whether there are “serious grounds for considering” the country unsafe.
Given the lack of adequate reasoning, the Tribunal’s decisions regarding P.P. and V.S. were set aside, and their applications for international protection were remitted for reconsideration.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Judgment engages with several important precedents and legislative frameworks:

N.U. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Minister for Justice and Equality [2022] IEHC 87: The High Court referenced the guidance in N.U. concerning a tribunal’s duty to make a “clear determination” on whether an applicant’s evidence passes the threshold set out in Section 33 of the International Protection Act 2015. This case provided context on how decision-makers should distinguish between the “safe country of origin” presumption and the need to evaluate whether the country can effectively protect the applicant.
R.A. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297: Cited for Hogan J’s principle that courts should conduct a “thorough review” of tribunal decisions to ensure the reasons provided are adequate.
E.S. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 613: Addressed a subsidiary protection refusal. The court reaffirmed that decision-makers must carefully consider whether the applicant’s material crosses the evidential threshold necessary to rebut the safe country of origin presumption.

In addition, the Judgment refers to key EU instruments:

Council Directive 2005/85/EC (Asylum Procedures Directive): Emphasizes that any conclusion on the safe country presumption must follow an “individual examination” of the applicant’s case.
Council Directive 2004/83/EC (Asylum Qualification Directive): Governs standards for the recognition and content of refugee or subsidiary protection status.
UNHCR’s “Background Note on Safe Country Concept and Refugee Status”: Although not itself binding law, the publication offers helpful guidance on applying the safe country of origin concept in a way that respects procedural fairness.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s legal reasoning turns on Section 33 of the International Protection Act 2015, which transposes elements of the Asylum Procedures Directive. That provision states that a country designated as a safe country of origin is presumed safe if, and “only if,” the applicant has not submitted serious grounds for considering it unsafe.

Justice Owens highlighted the necessity for decision-makers to furnish adequate and reasoned explanations when concluding the applicant has “not submitted any serious grounds.” The Tribunal must engage with all relevant material, including the applicant’s personal testimony and any submitted country information, before reaching a definitive conclusion. The Court found that while the Tribunal recognized the Applicants’ well-founded fear of persecution by criminals, it did not properly explain why the Applicants’ assertions of police collusion did not cross the “serious grounds” threshold.

This Judgment clarifies that admitting that an applicant has genuine reasons to fear non-governmental actors (such as gangs) does not necessarily foreclose an analysis of whether the authorities in the home country can or will protect that applicant. The safe country presumption only applies if the applicant fails to raise a specific and credible challenge suggesting that state protection is either nonexistent, inadequate, or compromised.

Impact

Going forward, the High Court’s insistence on thoroughness of reasoning imposes a stricter standard on the Tribunal and other decision-makers under the International Protection Act 2015. The Tribunal must:

Comprehensively evaluate such allegations of police collusion or ineffectiveness, even if the applicant’s proof appears limited or relies mostly on personal testimony.
Ensure that all relevant interview records, statements, and country information are methodically addressed in the decision.
Clearly explain why the evidence is insufficient—or conversely, sufficient—to meet the “serious grounds” threshold that would unravel the safe country presumption.

The Judgment thus serves to remind authorities that formal designations of certain countries as “safe” do not relieve decision-making bodies of the duty to scrutinize, with care, individual claims that a particular applicant is not in fact safe in that country. This precedent could lead to more detailed and nuanced Tribunal decisions, more robust findings on police corruption, and greater clarity on how to test the adequacy of state protections.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Certain pivotal issues in this Judgment involve technical legal concepts:

Safe Country of Origin: This concept means that, by law or ministerial designation, a certain country is presumed to be a place where human rights are respected and persecuted individuals can find protection. However, this designation can be rebutted if the applicant provides “serious grounds” to show a personal risk.
Serious Grounds for Considering: In practice, “serious grounds” means evidence or arguments (e.g., testimonies, documents) sufficient to raise a real possibility that a country is unsafe for the specific individual. The threshold is not extremely high, but it must be more than mere speculation.
Individual Examination of the Application: Under EU law (the Asylum Procedures Directive), decision-makers must assess every applicant’s claim separately, considering personal risk factors, country conditions, and available protection. A “one-size-fits-all” approach is disallowed.
Police Collusion or Ineffectiveness: Claims that the national police or other authority is in league with criminals, or cannot or will not protect a victim, must be scrutinized carefully. General statements about high corruption may not suffice, but relevant personal experiences, documented examples, or credible testimony must be given due weight.
Reasoned Decisions: Decision-making bodies (like the Tribunal) must do more than simply state conclusions. They must explain how they assessed the applicant’s evidence, which elements they found persuasive or unpersuasive, and how the relevant legal tests were applied.

Conclusion

The High Court’s Judgment in P.P. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Anor, V.S. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Anor ([2025] IEHC 134) significantly clarifies the scope of the “safe country of origin” presumption under Irish and EU law. While the Tribunal may initially assume that certain designated countries are capable of protecting their citizens, the Court underscores that this presumption can be displaced if the applicant sets out “serious grounds” showing the contrary.

The key takeaway is that decision-makers are required to provide a detailed and transparent rationale when they reject such contentions. In these particular proceedings, the Tribunal found that P.P. and V.S. had well-founded fears but did not sufficiently elaborate on why allegations of police collusion did not overcome the statutory threshold. By annulling the Tribunal’s decision and remitting the cases for reconsideration, the High Court firmly reiterates the principle that fairness demands clarity of reasoning. This outcome reinforces procedural safeguards for applicants and is likely to guide future international protection determinations in Ireland and beyond.