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P.P. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Anor, V.S. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Anor (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
These judicial review applications concern whether the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) erred in law by determining that the Applicants, referred to here as Plaintiff A and Plaintiff B, had "not submitted any serious grounds for considering" their country of origin, Country X, to be unsafe in their particular circumstances and regarding their eligibility for international protection. The Tribunal refused to recommend international protection declarations for both Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs challenged the Tribunal's decisions, contending that the Tribunal failed to properly assess their claims, particularly regarding alleged police collusion with criminal extortion gangs in Country X. The High Court granted leave to apply for judicial review and considered whether the Tribunal's decisions were adequately reasoned and lawful.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Tribunal erred in law by concluding that the Plaintiffs had not submitted serious grounds for considering Country X unsafe in their particular circumstances and for their eligibility for international protection.
- Whether the Tribunal failed to provide adequate reasoning for rejecting the Plaintiffs’ allegations of police collusion with extortion gangs in Country X.
- How the safe country of origin concept, as set out in Section 33 of the International Protection Act 2015 and related EU directives, applies to individual claims for international protection.
- Whether the Tribunal was entitled to consider the adequacy and effectiveness of state protection in Country X when assessing the Plaintiffs’ claims.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- They argued that the Tribunal was obliged to find that because they had demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution by extortion gangs, there were serious grounds to consider Country X unsafe in their particular circumstances.
- They contended that the Tribunal should have proceeded on the premise that Country X was unsafe for them and assessed whether effective protection could be provided only under the relevant statutory provisions concerning protection.
- They asserted that the Tribunal failed to properly consider or reason on their claims of police collusion with extortion gangs, which was central to their claim that state protection was ineffective.
Respondents' Position (Tribunal and Minister for Justice)
- The Tribunal maintained that under Section 33 of the 2015 Act it must consider a country safe unless an applicant submits serious grounds to the contrary.
- It argued that the Plaintiffs’ claims about police collusion were vague, unsupported, and did not amount to serious grounds for considering Country X unsafe.
- The Tribunal emphasized that the Plaintiffs’ subjective fear and failure to report to police did not establish a serious ground, especially given that criminals appeared afraid of police intervention.
- The Tribunal noted the absence of specific evidence of corrupt relationships between extortionists and police officers in the Plaintiffs’ submissions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| N.U. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Minister for Justice and Equality [2022] IEHC 87 | Guidance on assessment under Section 33 of the International Protection Act 2015 regarding safe country of origin and the threshold of serious grounds. | Used to clarify that the Tribunal must make a clear determination on whether serious grounds exist to rebut the presumption of safety, and that safe country designation cannot be determinative once serious grounds are established. |
| R.A. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297 | Requirement for thorough review of Tribunal’s reasons for rejecting protection claims. | Referenced to underline the obligation on the court to scrutinize the Tribunal’s reasoning for rejecting applications as unfounded. |
| E.S. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 613 | Clarification that refusal of subsidiary protection must include a finding on serious grounds under Section 33. | Distinguished on the basis that in E.S., the Tribunal did not find lack of serious grounds, whereas here the issue was whether the Tribunal properly assessed serious grounds. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by affirming the statutory framework established by Section 33 of the International Protection Act 2015, which implements Article 31 of the EU Asylum Procedures Directive. This framework creates a presumption that designated safe countries of origin are safe for applicants unless the applicant submits serious grounds to the contrary based on their particular circumstances and eligibility for protection.
The Court emphasized that the threshold of "not submitted any serious grounds" is a low but significant bar that must be carefully assessed after an individual examination of the application and all material submitted. The Tribunal must explicitly consider and state reasons when concluding that an applicant has not met this threshold.
In the present case, the Plaintiffs provided evidence of a well-founded fear of persecution by extortion gangs and alleged collusion between these gangs and the police in Country X. The Tribunal accepted the fear of persecution but concluded that the Plaintiffs had not submitted serious grounds to consider Country X unsafe, particularly regarding state protection.
The Court found that the Tribunal failed to adequately address and reason on the Plaintiffs’ specific allegations of police collusion with extortion gangs. With the exception of noting the absence of evidence of a corrupt relationship between particular criminals and police officers, the Tribunal’s decisions did not engage with the Plaintiffs’ claims or the material they submitted on this issue.
The Court recognized that while the Tribunal has a margin of appreciation and may find certain claims vague or unsupported, it must still provide reasoned conclusions addressing all core issues raised by the applicants. The Tribunal’s omission to expressly evaluate whether the allegations of police collusion met the serious grounds threshold constituted an error of law.
Consequently, the Court held that the Tribunal’s decisions were inadequately reasoned and must be set aside. The applications for international protection were to be remitted for reconsideration with proper regard to the Plaintiffs’ submissions and the statutory test.
Holding and Implications
The Court SET ASIDE the Tribunal’s decisions refusing international protection declarations to Plaintiff A and Plaintiff B.
The matter is remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration consistent with this judgment, requiring the Tribunal to explicitly assess whether the Plaintiffs have submitted serious grounds for considering Country X unsafe in their particular circumstances and eligibility for protection, including proper evaluation of allegations of police collusion with criminal gangs.
No new precedent was established beyond clarifying the application of existing statutory and directive provisions. The direct effect is that the Plaintiffs’ applications for international protection will be reconsidered with adequate reasoning and procedural fairness.
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