Causally Unconnected Administrative Action Does Not Entitle Costs in Moot Judicial Review Proceedings

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the High Court of Ireland’s decision in Muzaffar & Ors v Minister for Justice and Pervaiz v Minister for Justice ([2024] IEHC 753), delivered by Mr. Justice Cregan on 20 December 2024. Both sets of applicants sought orders of mandamus to compel timely decisions under the “Regularisation of Long-Term Undocumented Migrant Scheme” (UDMS). By the time leave for judicial review was granted, the Minister had issued substantive decisions, rendering the applications moot. The sole remaining issue was the parties’ entitlement to costs.

Key issues:

Whether the general rule “costs follow the event” applies when judicial review proceedings become moot.
Whether administrative decisions issued by the Minister after proceedings commenced—but in the ordinary course and unprompted by those proceedings—constitute an “event” entitling a party to costs.
The applicable test for awarding costs in moot proceedings: the role of causal nexus between the litigation and the supervening event.

Parties:

Applicants in Muzaffar: Muhammad Muzaffar (father and next friend), Harmeen Khalid (mother), and four minor children.
Applicant in Pervaiz: Ali Mumtaz Pervaiz, a Pakistani national and former spouse of an EU citizen.
Respondent: The Minister for Justice.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court applied established principles governing costs in moot judicial review proceedings and held that:

Proceedings became moot when the Minister issued UDMS decisions (granting permission in Muzaffar; refusal in Pervaiz).
Those administrative decisions were taken in the ordinary course and bore no causal nexus to the applicants’ leave applications or service of documents.
The general rule is that “costs follow the event,” but when proceedings are moot there is no “event” unless caused—or admitted—in direct response to the litigation.
Because the decisions were unprompted, uncontestedly routine and chronological, there was no event entitling either side to costs.
The appropriate order was “no order as to costs.”

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Cunningham v President of the Circuit Court [2012] 3 IR 222: Established that in moot cases without a “follow the event” anchor, courts ordinarily make no order as to costs unless mootness arises from one party’s unilateral action causally linked to the litigation.
Godsil v Ireland [2015] 4 IR 535: Clarified that an explicit admission of the applicant’s case by the respondent constitutes an “event” entitling costs.
MATA v Minister for Justice [2016] IESC 45: Reiterated the need for a causal nexus between the litigation and the action causing mootness; absence of such nexus calls for no costs order.
MKIA (Palestine) & C.Z. v IPAT [2018] IEHC 134: Summarised the principles: identify an “event,” determine if caused by litigation or an external factor, then apply or depart from the default “no order” rule.
Hughes v Revenue Commissioners & Minister for Public Expenditure [2021] IECA 5: Formulated a four-question test to analyse mootness and costs: event, locus of control, unilateral causation, and whether the action was responsive to the proceedings.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Justice Cregan distilled the law into a six-point framework (following MKIA and Hughes) for mootness applications:

Is there an “event” to which costs can “follow”?
Is there an explicit admission or acknowledgment of the litigation’s validity?
If not, was any action causing mootness outside parties’ control (default no order)?
Or within one party’s control but lacking causal nexus to the litigation (again, no order)?
If there is a causal nexus—i.e. litigation prompted the supervening act—costs should follow the event.
Absent such nexus, or any admission, the default rule of no order as to costs applies.

Applying this framework, the Court found:

The UDMS decisions were ordinary queued administrative acts, not admissions or acknowledgments of unlawful delay.
Affidavit evidence from Ms. Mary Kelly was unchallenged: the timing reflected internal processing, not pressure from judicial review.
Therefore no event occurred “in the Godsil sense,” and no causal nexus existed between the proceedings and mootness.
Consequently, the Court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

3.3. Impact

This judgment crystallises the test for costs in moot judicial review applications:

It emphasizes robust affidavit evidence on administrative processes to establish absence of causal connection to litigation.
It discourages claimants from hoping that mere initiation of JR proceedings will trigger expedited administrative action and thereby ground a costs award.
It reassures public authorities that ordinary administrative decisions—properly documented as routine—will not expose them to adverse cost orders simply because litigation was pending.
Future litigants must now demonstrate either an explicit admission by the opponent or that their case truly prompted the supervening act, failing which “no order” remains the norm.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: When the primary relief sought (e.g., mandamus) is rendered academic by a later event, leaving no live issue for the court to decide.
Event for Costs: The occurrence to which the rule “costs follow the event” attaches. In moot cases, the event must be a direct acknowledgment or a litigation-driven act.
Causal Nexus: A direct link between the litigation and the act causing mootness. Without it, there is no “event.”
Mandamus: A prerogative order compelling a public authority to perform a statutory or constitutional duty.

5. Conclusion

The High Court’s decision in Muzaffar & Pervaiz establishes that in moot judicial review proceedings the mere issuance of administrative decisions—if uncontestedly routine, queued and unprompted by the litigation—does not constitute an “event” for costs purposes. There must be either an explicit admission of the case’s validity or a causal nexus between the litigation and the supervening action. Absent that, the default position of “no order as to costs” prevails. This principle will guide future practitioners and courts in resolving costs applications where judicial review has been rendered academic by subsequent administrative action.