B.N. (Georgia) v IPAT: The Duty to Engage with Core Legal Claims in International Protection Appeals

B.N. (Georgia) v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 665:
The Duty to Engage with Core Legal Claims in International Protection Appeals

1. Introduction

This judgment of O’Donnell J in B.N. (Georgia) v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 665 is an important procedural decision in Irish international protection law. It does not decide the substantive refugee law issue raised – the effect, if any, of a person’s status as an internally displaced person (IDP) from Abkhazia – but instead addresses whether the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT) must explicitly engage with and determine a core legal argument advanced on appeal.

The case establishes and clarifies a significant principle:

  • In international protection appeals, the Tribunal has a duty, grounded in Irish statute and EU law, to engage with and determine an applicant’s “core claim”. That obligation applies not only to core factual assertions but also to central legal propositions raised in submissions (such as arguments based on IDP status).

Two issues arose for determination:

  1. Procedural: Whether the applicant should be granted an extension of time under s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 to bring judicial review, having issued proceedings one day late.
  2. Substantive (procedural fairness/jurisdictional error): Whether the Tribunal erred in law and breached constitutional justice by failing to exercise its jurisdiction to examine and decide the applicant’s appeal “as made”, by effectively ignoring or misunderstanding a central claim: that his status as an IDP from Abkhazia had specific legal consequences for his entitlement to international protection.

The High Court granted an extension of time, quashed the Tribunal’s decision, and remitted the matter to a freshly constituted Tribunal. Crucially, the Court refused to rule on the merits of the novel IDP-based legal argument, holding that this is for the Tribunal to decide in the first instance.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Applicant’s Personal Background

  • The applicant is a Georgian national, born in 1988.
  • He left Georgia on 23 February 2023; entered Ireland on 25 February 2023; and applied for international protection on 27 February 2023.
  • In his initial questionnaire and interview, he based his protection claim on:
    • His relationship with his partner, who is a distant relative on their mothers’ side.
    • Strong family opposition to the relationship and marriage.
    • Alleged verbal threats and physical assaults linked to his partner’s brother (said to have criminal connections), his own family, and his partner’s ex-husband’s family.
    • His stated unwillingness to seek state protection, allegedly due to a relative with political influence in Georgia.

2.2 Emergence of the IDP Argument

A key turning point occurred with the applicant’s solicitors’ written submissions to the International Protection Office (IPO) dated 12 September 2023. For the first time, they advanced a substantial legal issue:

  • The applicant is an internally displaced person (IDP) from Abkhazia.
  • His family originated in Svaneti, moved to Abkhazia after an earthquake destroyed the family home, and subsequently fled Abkhazia after the post-Soviet conflict.
  • The Georgian Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons had issued a letter (28 March 2023) confirming his IDP status.
  • The submission argued that, as an IDP, the applicant:
    “need only establish a real risk of persecution/serious harm as an ethnic Georgian in Abkhazia together with unreasonableness of relocation within the rest of Georgia in order to make out his need for international protection.”
  • Country of Origin Information (COI) was furnished concerning the treatment and position of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, areas with Russian and Armenian majority communities.

This IDP-based legal theory was later reiterated and refined in the appeal to the Tribunal and in post-hearing submissions.

2.3 IPO Decision

  • On 14 September 2023, the IPO recommended refusal of refugee status and subsidiary protection.
  • The s. 39 report:
    • Accepted most of the applicant’s factual narrative.
    • Found insufficient risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Georgia.
    • Noted Georgia’s designation as a “safe country of origin” and the absence of ongoing international or internal armed conflict in Georgia.
    • Did not address the applicant’s asserted IDP status in any meaningful way.

2.4 Appeal to the Tribunal and Further Submissions

  • A notice of appeal was lodged on 28 September 2023.
  • The grounds of appeal expressly highlighted the IDP issue:
    • Ground 2: The s. 39 report “fails to have any proper regard” to his IDP status or risks in Abkhazia.
    • Ground 6: Argued that internal relocation within Georgia was not relevant or, if considered, would be unreasonable given the applicant’s history as a person displaced by conflict.
  • An oral hearing occurred on 14 March 2024. Post-hearing submissions (7 April 2024) again emphasised the IDP argument and cited a 2021 Tribunal decision concerning a different Georgian applicant from Abkhazia, in which the Tribunal had treated IDP status and internal relocation as central, “most unusual” issues.

2.5 The Tribunal’s Decision

The Tribunal decision of 29 April 2024:

  • Accepted the existence of the applicant’s relationship and family disapproval.
  • Rejected as not credible:
    • Claims of death threats.
    • Claims of assaults directed or orchestrated by family members.
    • The broader narrative of serious family-based risk.
  • Concluded that no past persecution was established and that there was no well-founded fear of future persecution.
  • Found no basis for subsidiary protection:
    • No risk of death penalty, execution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.
    • In relation to the Article 1(c) Qualification Directive criterion (serious and individual threat due to indiscriminate violence in an armed conflict), the Tribunal stated:
      “while there are difficult situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, although the [applicant] lived in Abkhazia he left in the 1990's … the Tribunal is not satisfied that they are at real risk of serious harm by reason of internal armed conflict.”
  • Did not meaningfully address, in its narrative reasoning, the legal consequences of the applicant’s IDP status or the argument that this changed the legal structure of the protection analysis.

2.6 Judicial Review Proceedings

The applicant:

  • Applied for a s. 49(7) review of the Tribunal’s decision on 9 May 2024, complaining that the IDP issue had not been considered.
  • Applied for leave to seek judicial review on 29 July 2024 and obtained leave. The core grounds were:
    1. The Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by ignoring the claim that he was entitled to protection by reason of being an IDP from Abkhazia, subject only to an internal relocation analysis.
    2. The Tribunal erred by failing to treat him as entitled to international protection on that basis.

Ground (1) is procedural (failure to engage with a core claim). Ground (2) goes to the alleged substantive correctness of the IDP-based legal proposition. The High Court decided only ground (1), expressly leaving the substantive point to be determined by a fresh Tribunal.

A procedural complication arose because the judicial review was lodged one day outside the three-month statutory time limit in s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000. The applicant therefore sought an extension of time.

3. Summary of the High Court’s Judgment

3.1 Extension of Time

Applying the approach in P. (Zimbabwe) v IPAT and Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 403 (Simons J), the Court held:

  • The delay was minimal (one day) and fully explained: papers were ready and an attempt was made to file on time, but the Central Office stamping office closed at 15:30 before filing could be completed.
  • The delay had no impact on the expeditious listing or determination of proceedings.
  • No prejudice to the respondents was identified.
  • The application for extension was heard together with the substantive judicial review.
  • The claim was not manifestly weak or bound to fail.

On this basis, there was “a very strong basis” for extending time, and the extension was granted.

3.2 Substantive Holding: Failure to Address a Core Legal Claim

On the central issue, the Court held:

  • The applicant’s IDP-based argument was clearly articulated in written submissions, supported by COI, and formed a central part of his case.
  • There is no valid distinction, for the purposes of defining an applicant’s “core claim”, between:
    • Points raised in the applicant’s own evidence, and
    • Points raised in legal submissions by his representatives.
    Legal submissions by solicitors/counsel are the arguments of the applicant himself.
  • The Tribunal’s general statement that all documents and submissions were “fully assessed” could not, in the circumstances, cure the absence of any explicit engagement with the legal consequences of IDP status.
  • Authorities such as G.K. v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418 and I.R. v Minister for Justice [2015] 4 IR 144 (which:
    • Allow courts to presume that decision-makers considered all materials they say they considered, and
    • Confirm there is no need to discuss every piece of evidence or every argument)
    do not relieve the Tribunal of the obligation to engage with and decide the applicant’s core claim.
  • In international protection law, EU law requires:
    • A thorough review of the reasons of the determining authority (per R.A. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297 and Article 39 Procedures Directive).
    • An active duty of cooperation and careful, vigilant assessment of risk (per CJEU Case C‑756/21 X v IPAT and Article 4 of the Qualification Directive).
    • Implementation via s. 28 and s. 61(3)(a) of the International Protection Act 2015 (duty to assess all relevant elements cooperatively, obligation to conduct an inquisitorial process).
  • The “core claim” jurisprudence (e.g. P.D. v Minister for Justice [2015] IEHC 111; M.A.B. v RAC [2014] IEHC 64; M.M. v Chief International Protection Officer [2022] IECA 226) applies not only to central factual issues but also to central legal propositions advanced as determinative or significantly influential in the outcome.
  • Failure to engage with such a core claim is a jurisdictional error: the applicant is effectively denied the statutory decision-making process envisaged by the Oireachtas.

Accordingly:

  • The Tribunal’s decision was vitiated by error of law.
  • An order of certiorari was granted, quashing the decision.
  • The matter was remitted to a newly constituted Tribunal to reconsider the appeal, specifically engaging with the IDP-based legal argument.
  • The High Court did not rule on whether an IDP from Abkhazia is, in law, entitled to international protection subject only to internal relocation – that is for the Tribunal to determine.

The Court’s provisional view was that the applicant should receive his costs, but it listed the matter for submissions on costs.

4. Doctrinal Analysis

4.1 Extension of Time Under s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000

Section 5 of the 2000 Act (as amended) imposes a strict three-month time limit for judicial review of certain immigration and protection decisions, but allows the High Court to extend the period where there is “good and sufficient reason” for doing so.

O’Donnell J adopts and applies the analysis of Simons J in P. (Zimbabwe) v IPAT [2025] IEHC 403:

  • There is an important distinction between:
    • Regimes requiring an applicant to show “good and sufficient reason” for not making the application in time; and
    • The s. 5 regime, which asks whether there is “good and sufficient reason” to extend the period.
  • The Court should have regard to the analogous principles under Order 84, rule 21 RSC, while noting that the O.84 threshold is arguably slightly higher.
  • Relevant factors include:
    • Nature of the decision under challenge.
    • Conduct of the parties.
    • Impact of the decision on the applicant.
    • Steps taken promptly after the decision.
    • Public policy in favour of prompt prosecution of public law challengesbut also prompt determination of protection proceedings.

In this case, all factors favoured extension: the delay was tiny, fully explained, non‑prejudicial, and did not impede the policy objective of expeditious determination. The case demonstrates a pragmatic and proportionate application of s. 5, and confirms that minuscule, innocently explained slippage will not bar otherwise arguable protection challenges.

4.2 No Distinction Between Evidence and Legal Submissions for the Applicant’s “Case”

A crucial starting point in the substantive analysis is the Court’s rejection of a sharp distinction between:

  • Matters raised directly by an applicant in interview/oral evidence, and
  • Matters raised only by legal representatives in written or oral submissions.

O’Donnell J stresses:

  • Access to legal representation would be “hollowed out” if important legal issues raised by lawyers were not afforded proper consideration merely because the applicant did not personally articulate them as factual assertions.
  • Lawyers act as the applicant’s agents; “their arguments are his arguments”.
  • The IDP point was plainly and repeatedly raised as part of the appeal, and must be treated as a substantial part of the applicant’s case.

This has a real practical implication: a Tribunal cannot sidestep a legal argument by saying it is not “evidence”. Where the argument is central and supported by COI and documentation, it must be considered and resolved.

4.3 The IDP Argument as a Core Legal Claim

The applicant’s legal submission was not simply “I am an IDP”, but a structured proposition:

As an IDP from Abkhazia, I am entitled to international protection if:
  1. There is a real risk of persecution or serious harm for ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia; and
  2. It is unreasonable, or unduly harsh, to require me to internally relocate elsewhere in Georgia.

Whether or not this proposition is legally correct, it was advanced as potentially determinative of the outcome (or at least heavily influential). The High Court recognises it as part of the applicant’s “core claim”.

The Tribunal’s decision:

  • Notes that the applicants had once lived in Abkhazia and left in the 1990s.
  • States that Georgia was not in a state of international or internal armed conflict.
  • Does not explain:
    • Whether IDP status has any relevance in refugee/subsidiary protection analysis.
    • Whether the applicant’s suggested legal test is accepted or rejected and why.
    • How the COI about Abkhazia and South Ossetia impacted the risk assessment.

On this basis, the Court finds it “not at all clear” that the Tribunal engaged with and resolved the actual legal argument made, as opposed to a more generic reference to the geographical origin of the applicant. The core complaint is misunderstanding and non‑engagement, not a mere failure of drafting.

4.4 Limits of the G.K. Presumption and the I.R. Reasoning Doctrine

Two well-known authorities are addressed and confined:

(a) G.K. v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418

This case established that, where a decision-maker expressly states they have considered all materials and submissions, the Court will ordinarily accept that statement unless there is reason to doubt it. It is essentially about satisfying the requirement that relevant considerations be taken into account.

O’Donnell J makes three important points:

  • The G.K. presumption is rebuttable by evidence or inference from the decision itself.
  • It cannot be used to mask a failure to engage with a central legal issue that is at the heart of the case.
  • G.K. responds to an “administrative law” complaint of non‑consideration of a relevant factor; it does not license opacity where a decision-maker appears to have answered a different question than that posed.

(b) I.R. v Minister for Justice [2015] 4 IR 144

This authority holds that a decision-maker:

  • Is not obliged to mention every piece of evidence or every argument made; and
  • Need only provide sufficient reasoning so that the basis of the decision can be ascertained.

O’Donnell J accepts this as a “central and well‑established feature” of the jurisprudence but stresses:

  • Its purpose is to protect the practicalities of administrative decision-making, not to allow the omission of an applicant’s core claim.
  • The complaint here is not mere omission or brevity; it is that the central legal proposition was apparently misunderstood or not addressed at all.
  • In that sense, the Tribunal failed to comply with its statutory obligations under s. 28(4) and s. 61(3)(a) of the 2015 Act, read in light of EU law.

The judgment therefore carefully preserves G.K. and I.R. in their proper sphere but makes clear they cannot be used as a shield where a core claim has been sidelined.

4.5 EU Law: Thorough Review, Duty of Cooperation and Inquisitorial Function

The Court’s approach is rooted in EU law, which governs asylum and subsidiary protection.

(a) Thorough Review – R.A. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297

Hogan J, interpreting Article 39 of the Procedures Directive, held that judicial review must ensure that:

“the reasons which led the competent authority to reject the application for asylum as unfounded … may be the subject of a thorough review by the national court.”

O’Donnell J emphasises that this “thorough review” requirement means:

  • The Court must be able to understand how and why a central argument was accepted or rejected.
  • Where the decision is opaque or internally suggests misdirection on a core claim, thorough review is impeded.

(b) Duty of Cooperation – CJEU Case C‑756/21 X v IPAT

In X v IPAT, the CJEU, interpreting Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive, held that:

  • Determining authorities have an active duty of cooperation with the applicant.
  • They must obtain up-to-date COI on all relevant facts regarding the country of origin.
  • They must assess potential persecution with “vigilance and care” because issues of personal integrity and individual liberty – fundamental EU values – are at stake.

O’Donnell J connects this to:

  • Section 28(3)-(4) of the International Protection Act 2015, requiring:
    • Assessment of all relevant elements of the application, including nationality, identity and reasons for seeking protection.
    • A truly individualised assessment having regard to all relevant country-of-origin facts and how laws and regulations are applied in practice.
  • Section 61(3)(a) of the 2015 Act, which requires the Tribunal to operate in an inquisitorial manner.

In effect, the Tribunal could not discharge its EU-law and statutory duties by simply noting the existence of COI about Abkhazia while failing to engage with:

  • The specific legal significance claimed for IDP status.
  • The applicant’s theory about internal relocation and the structure of the refugee test as applied to IDPs.

4.6 “Core Claims” and Jurisdictional Error – Extending the Doctrine to Legal Questions

The Court builds on the “core claims” jurisprudence, particularly:

  • P.D. v Minister for Justice [2015] IEHC 111 (Mac Eochaidh J)
  • M.A.B. v Refugee Applications Commissioner [2014] IEHC 64 (O’Malley J)
  • M.M. v Chief International Protection Officer [2022] IECA 226

Key principles from these cases:

  • A decision-maker is not obliged to decide every minor or peripheral aspect of a claim.
  • However, the core claim (the essence or heart of the case) must be clearly addressed and decided.
  • Failure to address the core claim amounts to a significant jurisdictional error.

Earlier cases commonly concerned core factual issues:

  • In M.A.B., failure to decide whether the applicant belonged to a particular tribe was fatal; if untrue, he had no claim; if true, it strongly underpinned his risk narrative.
  • In M.M., the applicant’s sexual orientation and the resultant risks were at “the very heart” of the claim and had to be clearly determined.

O’Donnell J extends this concept explicitly to legal claims and hybrid legal-factual claims:

  • Core claims can be legal as well as factual.
  • If a legal proposition (e.g. that IDP status radically alters the analysis) is said to be determinative or significantly influential, it must be squarely confronted.
  • Whether it is accepted or rejected, the Tribunal must explain which view it adopts and why.

This is the central doctrinal development in B.N. (Georgia): the core claim obligation now clearly encompasses central legal arguments, not only core facts.

4.7 Futility and the Court’s Refusal to Decide the IDP Question

The respondents argued that:

  • The applicant’s IDP-based legal proposition was manifestly without merit – there is no automatic entitlement to protection by reason of IDP status.
  • Therefore, even if the Tribunal had addressed it, the outcome would inevitably have been the same.
  • On this view, quashing and remitting would serve no utility and should be refused.

The Court rejected that approach:

  • It refused to pre-empt the Tribunal’s substantive assessment of the argument.
  • It held that the applicant was entitled to have the issue addressed at the statutory decision-making level, not first by the High Court in judicial review.
  • Judicial review is about legality of process, not substituting the Court’s view where the Tribunal has not exercised its jurisdiction.
  • Given that the case was not “manifestly very weak or bound to fail”, there was no basis to deny the remedy on futility grounds.

This is an important affirmation of institutional roles: courts will not short‑circuit the statutory protection regime by deciding complex or novel legal issues in the abstract when the primary decision-maker has never engaged with them.

5. Precedents and Authorities Cited

5.1 P. (Zimbabwe) v IPAT and Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 403

Used as the leading modern authority on:

  • The test for extending time under s. 5 of the 2000 Act.
  • The importance of distinguishing between:
    • Reasons for delay in bringing proceedings, and
    • Reasons justifying an extension in the broader justice of the case.
  • Policy concerns: not just prompt initiation, but also prompt determination of protection proceedings.

5.2 G.K. v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418

Established the presumption that a decision-maker who says they have considered all materials has indeed done so, unless there is a good reason to doubt it. In B.N. (Georgia):

  • The presumption is acknowledged but treated as limited in scope.
  • Where a decision is silent or ambiguous on a central argument, the presumption cannot override the objective indication that the real question posed by the applicant was not addressed.

5.3 I.R. v Minister for Justice [2015] 4 IR 144

Authority for the proposition that:

  • Not every piece of evidence or every argument requires express mention.
  • Nonetheless, the decision must reveal the basis upon which it was made.

In B.N. (Georgia), this principle is deployed but also circumscribed:

  • It cannot excuse failure to engage with a core component of the case.
  • It is meant to guard against unreal, hypertechnical expectations of decisions, not to license the omission of central reasoning.

5.4 R.A. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297

Authorities:

  • EU law (Qualification Directive, Procedures Directive) fundamentally shapes asylum procedures.
  • Judicial review in this sphere must allow a thorough review of the reasons for rejecting a claim, as required by Article 39 of the Procedures Directive.

B.N. (Georgia) relies on this to justify:

  • The Court’s insistence on clarity regarding critical legal reasoning.
  • Its unwillingness to accept a bare statement of “full assessment” at face value where a core argument appears unaddressed.

5.5 CJEU Case C‑756/21 X v IPAT

Reaffirms the duty of cooperation under Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive:

  • Authorities must actively gather and consider relevant COI.
  • They must assess risk with particular vigilance given the fundamental rights at stake.

In B.N. (Georgia), this underscores:

  • The need to engage fully with the IDP-based argument and the extensive COI provided.
  • The importance of the inquisitorial and cooperative role of the Tribunal as reflected in s. 28 and s. 61 of the 2015 Act.

5.6 P.D. v Minister for Justice [2015] IEHC 111

Key points:

  • Introduces and develops the “core claim” concept.
  • Decision-makers must provide clearly expressed decisions in relation to an applicant’s core claim.
  • Failure to do so constitutes a “significant error as to jurisdiction”.

B.N. (Georgia):

  • Confirms the continuing relevance of this doctrine under the 2015 Act.
  • Extends it beyond factual disputes to cover central legal propositions.

5.7 M.A.B. v Refugee Applications Commissioner [2014] IEHC 64

O’Malley J held that the Commissioner’s failure to state whether it accepted that the applicant was a member of a particular tribe was fatal because:

  • It was a “core part” of the claim.
  • If disbelieved, the claim essentially failed; if believed, it provided a significant substratum for the risk analysis.

B.N. (Georgia) analogises this to the IDP issue: if the applicant’s legal argument about IDP status is correct, it could significantly shape the legal analysis; if incorrect, it may undermine his central theory. Either way, the Tribunal must decide it.

5.8 M.M. v Chief International Protection Officer [2022] IECA 226

The Court of Appeal found that the applicant’s sexual orientation and the consequent personal safety issues in her country of origin were “at the very heart” of her case and required a clear finding. B.N. (Georgia) draws on this to emphasise:

  • The necessity for clarity on core elements that shape the overall structure of the protection analysis.

6. Complex Concepts Explained

6.1 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

An internally displaced person (IDP) is someone who has been forced to flee their home due to conflict, violence, human rights abuses, or disasters but has not crossed an international border. They remain within their own country and remain under the protection of that state.

In this case:

  • The applicant’s family, originally from Svaneti, relocated to Abkhazia after an earthquake.
  • After the post‑Soviet conflict in Abkhazia, they fled again and were classified by Georgian authorities as IDPs.
  • The applicant produced official documentation confirming his IDP status.

Under international refugee law, IDP status per se does not automatically confer refugee status, which requires a well‑founded fear of persecution for one of the Convention grounds. The applicant here argued for a specific legal consequence of IDP status in the context of Georgia and Abkhazia. The High Court did not decide whether that argument is correct; it held only that the Tribunal must engage with it.

6.2 International Protection vs Subsidiary Protection

  • Refugee status (international protection): Requires a well‑founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group, and an absence of state protection.
  • Subsidiary protection: Protects individuals facing a real risk of serious harm (death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, or serious individual threat due to indiscriminate violence in situations of armed conflict) where refugee status criteria are not met.

The applicant’s claim had both aspects, but the IDP argument was potentially relevant to both refugee and subsidiary protection analyses, particularly in relation to internal relocation and risk in Abkhazia.

6.3 Safe Country of Origin

A “safe country of origin” is a country that, according to objective criteria (including compliance with human rights norms and absence of generalized violence), is presumed to be generally safe for its nationals. Georgia is designated as such by Ireland.

However:

  • This is only a rebuttable presumption.
  • The applicant may still demonstrate that, for him personally, there is a risk of persecution or serious harm.
  • Specific regions (like Abkhazia or South Ossetia) may present different risk profiles compared to the rest of the country.

6.4 Internal Relocation (Internal Protection Alternative)

The idea of internal relocation is that a person may not qualify for international protection if, although they face risk in one part of their country, they could reasonably and safely relocate to another part.

The applicant’s IDP argument effectively reframes this:

  • He suggested that, as an IDP from Abkhazia, the relevant risk assessment is tied primarily to conditions there.
  • If persecution/serious harm risk exists in Abkhazia and relocation elsewhere in Georgia is unreasonable, he says he qualifies for protection.

Again, the High Court did not decide whether this is a correct statement of law; it held that the Tribunal must assess it.

6.5 “Core Claim” in Protection Law

A core claim is the central plank or essence of an applicant’s case. It may be:

  • A fundamental factual assertion (e.g. being a member of a persecuted tribe; having a certain sexual orientation).
  • Or a central legal proposition (e.g. that a certain status, such as IDP, changes the applicable legal analysis).

Decision-makers must clearly:

  • Identify the core claim(s), and
  • Provide a reasoned determination on them.

Failure to do so means the decision-maker has not properly exercised their statutory jurisdiction.

6.6 Jurisdictional Error and Certiorari

A jurisdictional error arises when a decision-maker:

  • Acts outside the scope of powers given by law, or
  • Fails to exercise powers that they are obliged to exercise (e.g. not deciding a core claim), or
  • Misapplies fundamental legal requirements in a way that undermines the legality of the decision.

The High Court held that failure to engage with the applicant’s core claim amounted to such a jurisdictional error. The usual remedy is certiorari – an order quashing the unlawful decision – followed by remittal to the proper decision-maker.

7. Impact and Practical Implications

7.1 For the International Protection Appeals Tribunal and IPO

The judgment has several significant practical consequences:

  • Reasoned Engagement with Legal Arguments:
    • Tribunal decisions must do more than recite that submissions were “fully assessed”.
    • Where a legal argument is put forward as a central or potentially determinative claim (e.g. based on IDP status, discrimination against a particular group, or interpretation of COI), the Tribunal must:
      • Show that it has understood the argument.
      • Indicate whether it accepts or rejects it.
      • Explain, at least in outline, why.
  • No Downgrading of Representatives’ Submissions:
    • Points raised by solicitors or counsel are legally attributable to the applicant.
    • They must be evaluated as part of the applicant’s “reasons for seeking protection” under s. 28(3)(b) of the 2015 Act.
  • Core Claim Analysis:
    • IPAT and IPO must consciously identify what is at the “core” of a claim, whether factual, legal, or both.
    • They should structure decisions to address those issues explicitly to avoid jurisdictional challenge.
  • Increased Clarity and Transparency:
    • Though I.R. confirms that not every detail must be discussed, this judgment pushes towards more explicit reasoning on key issues.
    • This will likely lead to somewhat longer and more structured decisions, particularly where novel or complex legal issues arise.

7.2 For Legal Practitioners

For solicitors and counsel:

  • Strategic Framing of Core Claims:
    • There is a premium on clearly identifying and labelling central legal or factual propositions as “core” components of the claim in written submissions.
    • Where a novel legal theory is advanced (as with the IDP argument here), it should be tightly reasoned and clearly linked to statutory/EU provisions and COI.
  • Grounds of Appeal and Judicial Review:
    • Practitioners should ensure that Tribunal decisions are scrutinised for engagement with core claims; absence of such engagement may ground a jurisdictional challenge.
    • Arguments about failure to address core claims can be distinguished from mere disagreement with conclusions or complaints about minor omissions.
  • Use of Previous Tribunal Decisions:
    • Although Tribunal decisions are not binding precedents, B.N. (Georgia) confirms that citing analogous decisions can sharpen the expectation that a Tribunal will explain any divergence, particularly where a similar legal construct (e.g. IDP from Abkhazia) has been treated differently before.

7.3 For Future IDP and Georgia/Abkhazia Cases

While the Court declined to decide the substantive IDP question, the judgment:

  • Opens the door for more systematically argued IDP-based claims, especially in relation to Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.
  • Requires IPAT to grapple directly with:
    • The legal relevance, if any, of IDP status under the Qualification Directive and Irish law.
    • How COI on ethnic Georgians in breakaway regions interacts with the safe country of origin presumption.
    • The structure of internal relocation analysis for former residents of conflict zones within “safe” states.

Regardless of whether the applicant in this case ultimately succeeds, there will now likely be a body of Tribunal reasoning elaborating on IDP-related issues, which can inform future judicial review challenges.

7.4 On Futility and the Role of Judicial Review

The judgment implicitly cautions against over‑use of futility arguments where:

  • A novel or complex legal issue has never been considered by the statutory decision-maker.
  • The High Court is being asked effectively to determine the merits in the first instance.

The Court underscores that:

  • Judicial review is designed to ensure legality, fairness, and compliance with statutory/EU obligations.
  • It is not intended to replace the Tribunal’s inquisitorial, merits-based role, particularly in a specialised, EU-law-governed field like international protection.

8. Conclusion

B.N. (Georgia) v IPAT [2025] IEHC 665 is a procedurally focused but doctrinally important decision. It establishes that:

  • The International Protection Appeals Tribunal must explicitly engage with and determine core claims in an applicant’s case, including core legal arguments advanced through submissions.
  • General statements that all materials have been considered, or reliance on minimal reasoning doctrines like I.R., cannot excuse the omission or misapprehension of such core claims.
  • The “core claim” doctrine, drawn from earlier case law, extends to hybrid factual–legal propositions that may be determinative of entitlement to protection.
  • Failure to address a core claim amounts to a jurisdictional error, justifying quashing and remittal.
  • EU law requirements of a “thorough review” and a robust duty of cooperation shape both the Tribunal’s reasoning obligations and the High Court’s supervisory role.
  • Minimally delayed judicial review applications, where delay is fully explained and non‑prejudicial, will generally attract an extension of time under s. 5 of the 2000 Act.

The decision does not answer the underlying substantive question about the legal consequences of IDP status for Georgian applicants from Abkhazia. That issue is remitted to a fresh Tribunal in accordance with the statutory scheme. In doing so, the Court reaffirms the primacy of the statutory protection process and limits the tendency to resolve complex refugee law questions in the abstract at judicial review stage.

In the broader legal landscape, B.N. (Georgia) reinforces fair procedures, transparency, and the EU‑law‑driven imperative of a careful, reasoned engagement with the true substance of international protection claims. It will likely shape how IPAT and IPO structure their decisions, how practitioners frame appeals, and how future judicial review courts scrutinise the handling of both factual and legal core claims in asylum and subsidiary protection determinations.

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