Applications for Leave to Issue Execution Are Not “Actions Upon a Judgment”: Commentary on Start Mortgages DAC v McDaid [2025] IEHC 634

I. Introduction

This commentary analyses the decision of Mulcahy J in Start Mortgages Designated Activity Company v McDaid (otherwise McCroary) [2025] IEHC 634. The judgment sits squarely at the intersection of three important strands of Irish civil and banking law:

• the standard of proof and evidential requirements for post-judgment substitution of plaintiffs following a loan sale;
• the validity and evidential weight of redacted global transfer deeds and documents executed by corporate attorneys;
• the relationship between applications for leave to issue execution (under Order 42, rule 24 RSC) and the twelve-year limitation period for “actions upon a judgment” in section 11(6)(a) of the Statute of Limitations 1957.

The judgment both consolidates and extends a line of Irish authority which distinguishes between:

• substantive “actions upon a judgment” (to which the twelve-year limitation applies), and
• purely procedural steps to execute or give effect to an existing judgment (to which, the court holds, that limitation does not apply).

The case arises out of a familiar factual matrix: a mortgage possession order obtained many years earlier by Start Mortgages, the later transfer of Start’s loan book to Mars Capital Finance Ireland DAC (“Mars”), and the need to both substitute Mars as plaintiff and obtain leave to issue execution to enforce the existing possession order.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The Original Possession Order

On 5 March 2012, the High Court (Dunne J) made an order for possession of the defendants’ property in favour of Start Mortgages Limited (now Start Mortgages DAC). That order was:

• stayed for six months, until 5 September 2012; and
• thereafter enforceable in the usual way, subject to the court’s control over execution.

2. The 2024 Leave-to-Execute Order in Favour of Start

On 13 May 2024, Mulcahy J granted Start leave to issue execution on the 2012 possession order, subject to a further six-month stay on execution. Before that order became practically effective, however, a commercial development intervened.

3. Transfer of Start’s Business to Mars

Start subsequently transferred the entirety of its loan book and related security interests to Mars Capital Finance Ireland DAC under a Global Deed of Assignment and associated transactional documents (including a deed of conveyance).

In keeping with standard market practice:

• Start sent a "goodbye letter" to the defendants on 4 June 2024, notifying them of the transfer; and
• Mars sent a "hello letter" on 18 June 2024, confirming that the sale and transfer of the loan book had completed and that Mars was now the party entitled to enforce the loan and security.

4. The Present Motion

By motion dated 17 October 2024, Mars sought two principal orders:

1. Substitution under Order 17, rule 4 RSC, substituting Mars as plaintiff in place of Start; and
2. Leave to issue execution on foot of the 2012 possession order under Order 42, rule 24 RSC.

The defendants opposed both aspects, raising:

• challenges to the proof of assignment, particularly in light of redactions in the transfer documentation; and
• an argument that the Statute of Limitations 1957 barred any application to enforce the 2012 possession order, as more than twelve years had elapsed since it became enforceable.

III. Summary of the Judgment

Mulcahy J made the following key determinations.

1. Substitution of Mars as Plaintiff

Under Order 17, rule 4, the court:

• held that, because the application was made post-judgment and in tandem with an application for leave to issue execution (which would finally determine Mars’s entitlement to enforce the judgment), Mars had to prove its title on the balance of probabilities, not merely on a prima facie basis;
• found that, notwithstanding redactions in the global transfer deed, the evidence comfortably met that standard—in particular via the Global Deed of Assignment, Deed of Conveyance, and the “hello” and “goodbye” letters;
• rejected the defendants’ attempt to invalidate the transfer deeds on the basis that they were executed by attorneys and allegedly not compliant with the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 or the Powers of Attorney Act 1996, holding that:
  • (i) such objections, even if they had substance, would be matters between Start and Mars, not defences available to the borrowers in a substitution motion; and
  • (ii) section 41 of the Companies Act 2014, as interpreted in Pepper Finance v Beades [2021] IECA 39, makes clear that a deed executed by a duly empowered attorney binds the company as if under seal.

Accordingly, on the evidence, the court held that Mars had validly succeeded to Start’s interest in the defendants’ loan and mortgage and ordered that Mars be substituted as plaintiff pursuant to Order 17, rule 4.

2. Leave to Issue Execution on the Possession Order

Turning to the application under Order 42, rule 24, the court:

• reaffirmed that the jurisdiction to grant leave is discretionary (applying Smyth v Tunney [2004] 1 IR 512), requiring consideration of:
  • any explanation for delay, and
  • any prejudice to the debtor;
• noted that there had been no delay since the 2024 order granting Start leave to execute; rather, the present application was prompted solely by the commercial transfer to Mars and was brought even before the stay on the May 2024 order expired;
• rejected the defendants’ core argument that the application was statute-barred by section 11(6)(a) of the Statute of Limitations 1957, holding that:
  • (i) an application for leave to issue execution is not an “action upon a judgment” within the meaning of section 11(6)(a); and
  • (ii) steps taken to enforce a prior judgment are procedural and not subject to the twelve-year limitation applicable to fresh actions on judgments.

In the absence of any demonstrated prejudice or culpable delay, the court granted Mars leave to issue execution on the 2012 possession order.

3. Orders Made

Mulcahy J therefore:

• ordered substitution of Mars Capital Finance Ireland DAC as plaintiff in place of Start Mortgages DAC; and
• granted Mars leave to issue execution on the 2012 High Court order for possession;
• listed the matter for 2 December 2025 for final orders.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Substitution Application

1. Governing Rule: Order 17, Rule 4 RSC

Order 17, rule 4 governs substitution or joinder where an event occurring after commencement of proceedings causes a change or transmission of interest or liability. It permits the proceedings to be “carried on between the continuing parties, and such new party or parties”.

Historically, in loan sale contexts, this rule has allowed the court to:

• substitute the purchaser of a loan for the original lender as plaintiff, or
• in some older cases, add the purchaser as a co-plaintiff alongside the original lender.

The latter “co-plaintiff” approach (seen in IBRC v Halpin [2014] IECA 3) has been overtaken by later Court of Appeal authority, notably Pepper Finance (Ireland) DAC v O’Reilly [2025] IECA 140, which disapproved the practice of simply adding the assignee as co-plaintiff in lieu of proper substitution. Mulcahy J recognises this but emphasises that O’Reilly does not dilute the standard of proof required on post-judgment substitution.

2. Standard of Proof: Prima Facie vs Balance of Probabilities

A central issue was whether Mars needed only to show a prima facie entitlement to be substituted, or whether, in a post-judgment enforcement context, it must prove its title on the balance of probabilities.

(a) Pre-judgment substitution: IBRC v Comer

In Irish Bank Resolution Corporation v Comer [2014] IEHC 671, Kelly J held that on an application to substitute a plaintiff during live proceedings:

“What I do have to satisfy myself about is whether there is prima facie evidence of that having occurred. In order to come within the relevant rule of court, there has to be evidence adduced which would justify the substitution…”

The key rationale was procedural: the substitution did not finally determine the validity of the assignment. The assignee still had to prove:

• a valid sale,
• a valid assignment, and
• valid notice

at trial. Thus, the substitution stage was deliberately light-touch.

(b) Post-judgment substitution: Bank of Scotland v McDermott

By contrast, in Bank of Scotland plc v McDermott [2019] IECA 142, the Court of Appeal (Peart J) drew a crucial distinction where substitution is sought after final judgment:

“Where, as in the present case a substitution application is made after judgment has been granted… it seems to me that the prima facie test… is not the correct test. In such cases the correct test is… the balance of probabilities.”

The reason is obvious: once judgment has been given, there is no ordinary trial stage at which the defendant can later challenge the assignment. A substitution order made post-judgment may, in substance, finally determine who may enforce the judgment.

(c) Application in McDaid

Mulcahy J applies this reasoning squarely. He emphasises that in this case:

• judgment (the possession order) had long since been obtained; and
• the combination of substitution and leave-to-execute would finally determine Mars’s entitlement to enforce.

Accordingly, the court holds that Mars must establish its entitlement on the balance of probabilities, not merely on a prima facie basis. This is an important clarification and re‑affirmation of the post‑judgment standard, particularly in light of the evolving case law on loan assignments.

3. Proof of Assignment: Redacted Deeds and “Hello/Goodbye” Letters

The defendants advanced a familiar line of attack: the key transactional documents (the Global Deed of Assignment and Deed of Conveyance) were heavily redacted, allegedly preventing the court from safely concluding that their own loan and mortgage had in fact been transferred to Mars.

(a) The shadow of Start Mortgages v Ramseyer

The court was acutely aware of Start Mortgages v Ramseyer [2024] IEHC 329 (Simons J), where extensive and unexplained redactions led to a refusal of a possession order and an adjournment to plenary hearing:

“Nor is it a case where it has been asserted, on a reasoned basis, that certain information has been redacted… Rather, whole swathes of the operative part of the deeds have been blanked out, without any meaningful explanation or justification… The redactions are so extensive that this court cannot safely interpret the legal effect of the deeds…”

In Ramseyer, the court found that the applicant had not even made out a prima facie case of transfer, largely due to the unexplained and sweeping redactions.

(b) Distinguishing McDaid from Ramseyer

Mulcahy J distinguishes the present case on two key grounds:

1. Context of the transaction: Start had transferred the entirety of its business to Mars. Much of the redacted material related to other customers and broader commercial terms, irrelevant to the specific question whether the defendants’ particular loan and mortgage had been included in the transfer.
2. Supplemental explanation of redactions: In response to similar issues arising in another set of proceedings, a supplemental affidavit was sworn in this case. That affidavit:
   • explained the commercial structure of the transfer of business; and
   • gave reasons for the redactions (privacy of third parties, commercially sensitive material, etc.).

Crucially, the defendants:

• did not engage substantively with these explanations; and
• did not identify any specific redaction that, if revealed, might plausibly undermine the conclusion that their loan and mortgage had been assigned to Mars.

Against that evidential background, the court held that the redactions did not give rise to “any real doubt” that Start’s interest had been transferred. On the balance of probabilities, Mars had validly succeeded to the loan and mortgage.

This is significant. The judgment does not licence arbitrary or unexplained redactions. Rather, it signals that where:

• redactions are explained on affidavit;
• the core operative provisions showing transfer of the particular loan are visible; and
• the debtor cannot point to any plausible prejudice arising from what is concealed,

a court may still comfortably find that an assignment has been proved on the balance of probabilities.

4. Execution by Attorneys and the Role of Corporate Powers

The defendants also argued that the transfer deeds were “not effective” as deeds because:

• they were executed by attorneys rather than by officers under common seal; and
• Mars had not exhibited the relevant powers of attorney, allegedly falling foul of section 64 LCLRA 2009 and/or section 21 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1996.

Mulcahy J disposes of this objection on two fronts.

(a) Standing and relevance

First, such objections, even if they raised a real issue, would at most go to the question whether:

• Start can enforce the transfer deeds against Mars, or vice versa.

Neither party to the transaction has raised any concern about the authority of the attorneys or the enforceability of the deeds between them. The defendants have not demonstrated that they have any legal entitlement to challenge the inter‑creditor arrangements for the specific procedural purpose of resisting substitution.

(b) Section 41 of the Companies Act 2014 and Pepper Finance v Beades

Secondly, the court relies on section 41 of the Companies Act 2014:

“(1) … a company may empower any person, either generally or in respect of any specified matters, as its attorney, to execute deeds or do any other matter on its behalf…
(2) A deed signed by such attorney on behalf of the company shall bind the company and have the same effect as if it were under its common seal.”

This provision, read together with section 16(1) of the Powers of Attorney Act 1996, has been authoritatively interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v Beades [2021] IECA 39. There, Whelan J held:

“That a deed or instrument is executed on its face should suffice to meet the standard of proof on the balance of probabilities for an order to be made pursuant to O. 17, r. 4… This court has no need to go behind the instruments which are apparently valid on their face…”

Mulcahy J applies that approach. He holds that there is:

• “nothing on the face of the deeds” preventing them from having full force and effect; and
• no need for the court to “go behind” apparently valid instruments in the absence of any concrete, credible challenge to their authenticity or authority.

Accordingly, the defendants’ objections to the deeds’ execution fail. The court is satisfied that the transfer documentation is both formally valid and evidentially sufficient to justify substitution.

B. Application for Leave to Issue Execution and the Statute of Limitations

1. The Framework of Order 42, Rule 24 RSC

Order 42, rule 24 governs applications for leave to issue execution in situations including:

• where six years have elapsed since the judgment or order; or
• where there has been a change in the parties entitled or liable to execution.

In Smyth v Tunney [2004] 1 IR 512, the Supreme Court held that:

• the jurisdiction is discretionary;
• no “exceptional” circumstances are required, but the applicant must offer some reason for delay; and
• the court must consider any relevant prejudice to the debtor arising from the delay.

In McDaid, there was no genuine period of unexplained inactivity: Mars’ motion for leave to execute was brought only months after the earlier leave order in favour of Start, and indeed before that order’s stay expired. The only real issue was whether the application was statute-barred.

2. Section 11(6)(a) of the Statute of Limitations 1957

Section 11(6)(a) provides:

“An action shall not be brought upon a judgment after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable.”

Two facts were common case:

• The 2012 order for possession became enforceable on 5 September 2012 (after a six-month stay).
• Mars’ motion for leave to execute issued on 17 October 2024, more than twelve years later.

The question, therefore, was whether a motion for leave to issue execution is an “action upon a judgment” within the meaning of section 11(6)(a).

3. The Competing Approaches: English Authority vs Irish Case Law

(a) English authorities and Lowsley v Forbes

The defendants invited the court to follow the reasoning (though not the eventual outcome) of the House of Lords in Lowsley v Forbes (t/a L.E. Design Services) [1999] 1 AC 329, which treated leave to issue execution as an “action” for limitation purposes under the English Limitation Acts. That approach emerged against a background of earlier conflicting English Court of Appeal authorities:

• Lougher v Donovan [1948] 2 All ER 11; and
• WT Lamb & Sons v Rider [1948] 2 KB 331, later endorsed in National Westminster Bank v Powney [1991] Ch 339.

In Powney, the English Court of Appeal stressed:

“the right to sue on a judgment has always been regarded as a matter quite distinct from the right to issue execution under it… Execution is essentially a matter of procedure – machinery which the court can… operate for the purpose of enforcing its judgments or orders.”

The House of Lords in Lowsley later expressed disagreement with parts of this reasoning but nonetheless accepted that, due to statutory developments in England (not mirrored in Ireland), Powney represented the law there.

(b) Irish jurisprudence post‑Smyth v Tunney

In Smyth v Tunney, the Supreme Court acknowledged the English debate but did not finally determine whether section 11(6)(a) applies to applications for leave to execute. It held only that it was reasonable for a party to fear that failure to act within twelve years might jeopardise their judgment, without deciding whether that apprehension was legally correct.

Subsequent Irish decisions have tackled the issue more directly, especially in mortgage enforcement contexts:

1. Ulster Investment Bank Ltd v Rockrohan Estates Ltd [2015] 4 IR 37 (Supreme Court)
   The question there was whether an application in 2008 for an order for possession in furtherance of an order for sale made in 1990 was an “action to recover land” under the Statute. Both Irvine J in the High Court and Charleton J in the Supreme Court held that it was not. Irvine J’s policy analysis (endorsed by Charleton J) is central:

   “Limitation statutes are intended to prevent stale claims… They are designed to further remove the potential injustice that may be generated by the increased difficulty of proving a claim or defence after an extended period of time…
   These considerations do not apply where one party seeks to enforce a judgment or order previously made… There is no surprise or evidential unfairness inherent in such a process.”

   The court distinguished between:
   • “actions” within the meaning of the Statute; and
   • procedures by which an existing order may be executed or given effect.
2. Start Mortgages DAC v Piggott [2020] IEHC 293 (Gearty J)
   Applying Rockrohan, Gearty J held that the Statute did not apply to an application to renew an execution order. She emphasised that English case law, including Lowsley, was:

   “of very limited assistance… This Court is concerned to ascertain the meaning of the Statute of Limitations 1957 and to apply it, using available Irish authority and common sense.”

3. Irish Nationwide Building Society v Heagney [2022] IEHC 12 (Allen J)
   Allen J stated that there is “no difference in principle” between:
   • an application for an order for possession to give effect to a prior order for sale (Rockrohan), and
   • an application for leave to issue execution on foot of an order for possession.
   He therefore applied the Rockrohan reasoning to leave-to-execute applications.
4. Start Mortgages Ltd v Hendrick [2023] IEHC 11 (Simons J)
   Having reviewed Piggott and Heagney, Simons J unequivocally stated that an application for leave to issue execution does not constitute an “action upon a judgment” and therefore does not trigger the twelve-year limitation period in section 11(6)(a).
5. Bank of Ireland v Circuit Court Rules Committee, High Court, 30 July 2024 (O’Regan J)
   Though ex tempore and unreported, this case was important in practice. The High Court declared ultra vires those words in Order 36, rule 9 of the Circuit Court Rules that purported to limit the effectiveness of Circuit Court judgments to twelve years for the purposes of issuing execution orders.
   
   That decision rested on section 24 of the Courts of Justice Act 1936, which provides that a Circuit Court judgment “shall continue… in force” for as long as a High Court judgment would. The Circuit Court Rules were amended (SI 107/2024) to remove the twelve‑year limit on executing Circuit Court judgments. This, as Mulcahy J notes, presupposes a judicial view that such a limitation is inconsistent with the proper lifespan of a judgment, and thus with the notion that procedural steps to execute are subject to the twelve‑year bar.

4. Mulcahy J’s Resolution in McDaid

Against that background, Mulcahy J concludes:

• Irish courts, particularly since Rockrohan, have consistently drawn a sharp distinction between:
  • substantive “actions” (to which statutory limitation periods apply); and
  • procedural steps taken to enforce an existing court order (to which limitation statutes generally do not apply);
• even if some of the earlier High Court statements (e.g. in Hendrick) might be argued to be obiter, they are at least strongly persuasive, and in the case of Heagney the issue was squarely engaged because the motion was heard after the twelve-year period had elapsed;
• the reasoning of the House of Lords in Lowsley is of “very limited assistance” in interpreting the Irish Statute of Limitations 1957, as already observed in Piggott;
• no “compelling rationale” has been advanced by the defendants for diverging from this established Irish line of authority; and
• the policy rationales for limitation periods (certainty, evidentiary fairness, diligence) do not apply in the same way to applications merely to execute an existing judgment.

Accordingly, the court holds that an application for leave to issue execution on a possession order is not an “action upon a judgment” within the meaning of section 11(6)(a). The twelve‑year time limit in that provision therefore does not bar such applications.

5. Discretion, Delay and Prejudice

Having rejected the limitation defence, the court returns to the discretionary framework under Order 42, rule 24 and Smyth v Tunney.

Mulcahy J notes that:

• there had been no culpable delay by Mars; its application was brought promptly after the business transfer and even before the earlier leave order’s stay expired;
• the defendants did not identify any concrete prejudice suffered by reason of the timing of the application; and
• in such circumstances, as Simons J had stated in ACC Bank plc v Sweeney (No. 2) [2023] IEHC 503, the court should ordinarily grant leave where there is no prejudice and no culpable delay.

On that basis, Mars was granted leave to issue execution.

V. Impact and Significance

1. Consolidation of the Non‑Application of Section 11(6)(a) to Execution Steps

The most significant doctrinal contribution of McDaid is the further consolidation of the principle that:

Applications for leave to issue execution, including on long‑standing possession orders, are not “actions upon a judgment” within section 11(6)(a) of the Statute of Limitations 1957.

Combined with Rockrohan, Piggott, Heagney, Hendrick and Bank of Ireland v Circuit Court Rules Committee, this judgment makes it increasingly difficult to argue that the twelve‑year limitation period bars procedural enforcement steps, even where many years have elapsed since the original judgment became enforceable.

For lenders and loan purchasers, this significantly strengthens the legal basis for enforcing older mortgage judgments, subject always to:

• the court’s discretionary control under Order 42, rule 24; and
• consideration of delay and prejudice under the Smyth v Tunney framework.

2. Standard of Proof on Post‑Judgment Substitution

The judgment also clarifies that:

• where substitution is sought before judgment, it suffices to show a prima facie entitlement (as in Comer); but
• where substitution is sought after judgment, and especially when coupled with an application to execute, the applicant must prove its entitlement on the balance of probabilities.

This appropriately reflects the increased significance of a substitution order in a post‑judgment context and aligns High Court practice with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in McDermott.

3. Evidential Use of Redacted Global Transfer Deeds

Following Ramseyer, some concern had arisen that extensive redactions in global transfer documentation might systematically derail enforcement applications. McDaid refines the position:

• extensive, unexplained redactions may render it impossible to safely interpret the deeds and prove assignment (as in Ramseyer);
• however, where:
  • the structure of the transaction is properly explained on affidavit;
  • the redactions concern extraneous loans or commercially sensitive details; and
  • the borrower cannot point to any specific redaction that might undermine the conclusion that their own loan was included,

a court can nevertheless find that the transfer has been established on the balance of probabilities. This gives some reassurance to loan purchasers and servicers who commonly rely on global transfer instruments spanning large portfolios and multiple borrowers.

4. Corporate Attorney Execution and Borrower Challenges

By endorsing the Beades approach, the judgment confirms that:

• a deed executed on its face by an attorney for a company will generally be accepted as binding under section 41 of the 2014 Act;
• the court will not turn substitution or enforcement motions into mini-trials on corporate authority documents, absent a concrete and credible basis for challenge;
• borrowers in mortgage enforcement proceedings will have limited scope to resist enforcement by attacking the formalities of inter‑creditor transactions, particularly where neither of the corporate parties alleges any deficiency.

5. Practical Consequences for Mortgage Enforcement

In practice, McDaid:

• reinforces the viability of enforcing older possession orders, including those arising from pre‑crisis lending, long after the twelve‑year mark, provided:
  • a proper explanation for any delay is offered; and
  • no prejudice to the borrower is shown;
• clarifies that a change in lender due to loan sales (common in the Irish market) can be accommodated procedurally by:
  • substitution under Order 17, rule 4; and
  • a fresh application for leave to execute where required;
• gives useful guidance on drafting and evidencing:
  • global transfer documentation;
  • “hello” and “goodbye” letters; and
  • affidavits explaining redactions and the scope of transfers.

VI. Complex Concepts Explained

1. What Is “Substitution” of a Plaintiff?

Substitution occurs when a party who has acquired the legal interest in a claim steps into the procedural shoes of the original plaintiff. In mortgage cases, this often happens when:

• Bank A originates the loan and obtains a judgment or possession order; then
• Bank A sells the loan and security to Entity B;
• Entity B seeks to continue or enforce the proceedings in its own name.

Order 17, rule 4 allows the court to substitute Entity B as plaintiff so that the proceedings are carried on between the defendants and the party who now legally owns the loan and mortgage.

2. What Is “Leave to Issue Execution”?

Even after a judgment or possession order is granted, a creditor does not always have an automatic, indefinite right to execute. In some circumstances (e.g. where more than six years have passed, or where the party entitled to execution has changed), the creditor must apply to the court for leave to issue execution under Order 42, rule 24.

This is a procedural safeguard. The court can:

• ensure that execution is not being pursued oppressively or after unjustified delay; and
• consider any prejudice to the debtor.

3. “Action Upon a Judgment” vs Procedural Enforcement

Section 11(6)(a) of the Statute of Limitations 1957 bars “actions” upon a judgment after twelve years. An “action upon a judgment” typically means:

• a fresh legal action to recover on the judgment debt itself (e.g. suing on a foreign judgment or on an unsatisfied Irish judgment as a cause of action).

By contrast, an application for leave to issue execution, or for an order giving effect to an existing judgment, is a procedural step within the original proceedings. The Irish courts have now repeatedly held that such procedural steps are not “actions upon a judgment” for the purposes of section 11(6)(a).

4. Limitation Statutes: Certainty, Evidentiary, and Diligence Rationales

Limitation statutes are underpinned by three main rationales (as identified in Rockrohan/Rockrohan Estates, citing Brady & Kerr):

• Certainty: Defendants should know that, after a certain period, they will no longer face the risk of being sued for old claims.
• Evidentiary fairness: Over time, memories fade, documents are lost, and it becomes harder to fairly determine the facts.
• Diligence: Plaintiffs should act with reasonable promptness and not sleep on their rights.

These concerns are acute in substantive claims where the underlying facts remain contested. But in enforcement of an existing judgment:

• liability has already been determined by the court;
• there is no “surprise” to the debtor that enforcement may follow; and
• the key evidential issues have already been resolved at trial.

For that reason, the Irish courts have concluded that the policy of limitation statutes does not require applying section 11(6)(a) to procedural execution steps.

5. Deeds Executed by Corporate Attorneys

Historically, companies executed deeds under their common seal. Modern company law, particularly section 41 of the Companies Act 2014, allows a company to:

• appoint an attorney to execute deeds on its behalf; and
• treat deeds signed by that attorney as binding as if under seal.

In practice, many large transactions (including loan sales) are executed by attorneys under powers of attorney. Courts will generally:

• accept on their face deeds executed by attorneys as valid;
• decline to require production of the underlying power of attorney in routine cases; and
• only look behind the deed where there is a concrete, credible challenge to the validity of the execution.

VII. Conclusion

Start Mortgages DAC v McDaid [2025] IEHC 634 is a significant High Court decision in the continuing evolution of Irish mortgage enforcement and limitation law. It makes three key contributions:

1. It consolidates the now-strong line of authority that applications for leave to issue execution are not “actions upon a judgment” under section 11(6)(a) of the Statute of Limitations 1957. The twelve‑year bar does not, of itself, preclude procedural steps to enforce an existing judgment, though the court retains a discretionary power to refuse leave where there has been culpable delay or prejudice.
2. It clearly distinguishes between pre‑judgment and post‑judgment substitution. When substitution is sought after judgment, especially in tandem with execution, the assignee must establish its entitlement on the balance of probabilities, not merely on a prima facie basis, reflecting the finality of such orders.
3. It provides practical guidance on evidential and formal issues arising from loan sales:
   • redacted global transfer deeds can be sufficient to prove assignment where the redactions are properly explained and do not create real doubt about the transfer of the particular loan; and
   • deeds executed by corporate attorneys are, in the absence of specific challenge, taken as valid and binding under section 41 of the Companies Act 2014, consistent with Pepper Finance v Beades.

For practitioners, the judgment underscores the importance of:

• properly structured evidential packages for substitution and execution applications (including clear affidavits explaining the scope of assignments and redactions);
• careful attention to delay and potential prejudice under the Smyth v Tunney discretionary framework; and
• recognising that challenges to the internal formalities of commercial loan sale documentation will rarely avail borrowers at the procedural stage of substitution and leave-to-execute motions.

In the broader legal context, McDaid further entrenches the conceptual distinction between substantive limitation on actions and the procedural machinery of enforcement, providing greater certainty for both creditors and debtors as to the lifespan and enforceability of judgments in Ireland.