| Company C v Defendant (2014) IEHC 671 |
On substitution applications during proceedings, a court should be satisfied there is prima facie evidence of a valid sale/assignment and valid notice before ordering substitution prior to trial. |
The court relied on this to state that Comer illustrates what is required at a substantive hearing and that, on an application in advance of a full hearing, a prima facie case may suffice in many circumstances. |
| Company C v Defendant2 (2014) IECA 3 |
Illustrates an approach (at appeal stage) of adding a purchaser as co-plaintiff rather than substituting; emphasises different treatment depending on stage of proceedings. |
The court considered that Halpin permitted adding a transferee as co-plaintiff at appeal stage; it treated Halpin as distinguishable where substitution occurs post-judgment but considered subsequent authority addressing that distinction. |
| Company D v Defendant (2025) IECA 140 |
Overruled the approach of adding transferees as co-plaintiffs; clarified procedural approaches to substitution. |
The court noted that while O'Reilly overruled adding transferees as co-plaintiffs, it did not establish that post-judgment substitution applications require only a prima facie standard. |
| Company E plc v Individual (2019) IECA 142 |
Where substitution is sought after final judgment (so there is no subsequent trial to ventilate the validity of the assignment), the correct standard of proof is the balance of probabilities rather than a prima facie test. |
The court applied this distinction and held that because Company B's combined relief would finally determine its entitlement to issue execution in this court, Company B had to prove succession on the balance of probabilities. |
| Plaintiff v Defendant (2004) 1 IR 512 |
On applications for leave to issue execution more than six years after judgment: jurisdiction is discretionary; some reason for delay must be shown and the court must consider prejudice to the debtor. |
The court treated Smyth as the leading case on the exercise of discretion under Order 42, rule 24 and noted the requirement to consider prejudice and reasons for delay when exercising the jurisdiction. |
| Case in English law (1999) 1 AC 329 |
House of Lords analysis as to whether leave to issue execution should be treated as an "action" under English limitation law (Lowsley v Forbes). |
The court treated the English decision as of limited assistance in interpreting the Irish Statute of Limitations and did not adopt Lowsley as persuasive for Irish law. |
| National Westminster Bank v Powney (1991) Ch 339 |
English authority treating execution as procedure distinct from an action to recover the underlying cause of action. |
The court cited the decision as part of the English authorities surveyed and noted the differing English authorities on whether execution is an "action". |
| Lougher v Donovan (1948) 2 All ER 11 |
English authority holding leave to issue execution could be an "action" under then-applicable English limitation law. |
Referred to in the historical survey of English authorities; the court emphasised that English developments are of limited assistance to Irish statutory interpretation. |
| WT Lamb & Sons v Rider (1948) 2 KB 331 |
English authority taking a different view to Lougher on whether leave to execute is an "action". |
Referred to in recounting the English line of authorities and the subsequent House of Lords analysis; used only as comparative material. |
| Company F Ltd v Company G Ltd (2015) IESC 17 |
The Supreme Court held that applications to enforce an earlier order (e.g. an order for possession made earlier) are not "actions" to recover land within the meaning of the Statute of Limitations; limitation rationales do not apply in the same way to enforcement of judgments/orders. |
The court relied heavily on Rockrohan as persuasive and/or binding authority for the proposition that procedural steps to enforce a judgment are not subject to the twelve-year bar in section 11(6)(a). |
| Company A v Individual (2020) IEHC 293 |
Applied Rockrohan and concluded the Statute did not apply to an application to renew an execution order; emphasised limited utility of English authorities for Irish statutory interpretation. |
The court treated Piggott as supportive of Rockrohan's approach and as persuasive Irish authority that procedural enforcement steps are not actions within the Statute. |
| Company H v Individual (2022) IEHC 12 |
Concluded there was no principled distinction between Rockrohan-type enforcement applications and leave-to-execute applications such that the Statute would apply. |
The court cited Heagney as endorsing the same principles and as supportive authority that section 11(6)(a) does not apply to leave-to-execute applications. |
| Company A v Individual2 (2023) IEHC 11 |
Held that an application for leave to issue execution does not constitute an action upon a judgment for the purposes of section 11(6)(a). |
The court regarded Hendrick as unequivocal support for the proposition that leave-to-issue-execution applications fall outside the twelve-year bar; the present court treated it as persuasive authority. |
| Company D v Individual2 (2021) IECA 39 |
In the substitution context, a deed or instrument that is apparently valid on its face and executed by an attorney will ordinarily suffice on the balance of probabilities; courts need not go behind instruments valid on their face for procedural substitution applications. |
The court relied on Pepper Finance v Beades to reject the defendants' contention that execution by attorneys rendered the deeds ineffective and accepted that statutory provisions (including the Companies Act) mean such instruments may be effective on their face. |
| Company A v Individual3 (2024) IEHC 329 |
Refusal to make an order where extensive and unexplained redactions in transfer documentation prevented the court from being satisfied, even on a prima facie basis, that the relevant debt had been transferred. |
The court distinguished Ramseyer on the facts: here, supplemental affidavit explained the redactions and the defendants did not identify any redaction that raised a real doubt; accordingly Ramseyer did not prevent substitution in this case. |
| Case on commercial sensitivity (2024) IECA 16 |
Recognised that limited redactions may be justified for commercial sensitivity, subject to explanation. |
The court referred to Farrell as context for evaluating redactions and found Company B had provided explanations for redactions sufficiently in a supplemental affidavit. |
| Unreported: Bank v Circuit Court Rules Committee (30 July 2024) |
High Court concluded a twelve-year time limit in Circuit Court Rules on applications for leave to execute was ultra vires; resulting amendment removed a twelve-year limit from the Circuit Court rules. |
The court treated that decision as further evidence that limitation periods should not be imposed on procedural enforcement applications and noted resultant rule changes. |
| ACC Bank plc v Sweeney (No.2) (2023) IEHC 503 |
In the absence of established prejudice, and absent culpable delay, the court should ordinarily grant leave to issue execution. |
The court cited Sweeney as supporting the exercise of discretion to grant leave where no prejudice or culpable delay is shown; found no prejudice or delay here. |